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                 ABSTRACT 
 
There are unresolved issues concerning the 1987-88 military conflict in Angola, 
specifically the battle of Cuito Cuanavale and the role of Cuba. This particular aspect of 
southern African history is highly controversial and politicized. The original contribution 
of this dissertation is to provide a detailed scholarly treatment and analysis of the battle 
of Cuito Cuanavale, drawing from an array of different sources, some of which were not 
previously available. 
Cuito Cuanavale is a controversial subject because the outcome and 
consequences continue to be disputed among the principal protagonists. Arrayed on one 
side were the armed forces of Cuba, Angola and the South West African People’s 
Organization, on the other, the South African Defense Force, military units of the Union 
for the Total National Independence of Angola and the South West African Territorial 
Force of Pretoria-controlled Namibia. By drawing on South African, Cuban, United 
States documents and other sources, and placing the 1987-88 military engagement in the 
context of South African military regional intervention, this dissertation elaborates 
Cuba’s role in the conflict and attempts to resolve the questions and disputes surrounding 
the competing interpretations of the military nature and political ramifications for the 
apartheid regime of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.  
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CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION: WHY CUITO CUANAVALE? 
Cuba’s contribution to the southern African anti-colonial and anti-partheid struggle is a 
relatively neglected arena. The major exceptions are Piero Gleijeses’ Conflicting 
Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976 and Edward George’s The Cuban 
Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale.1 A 
significant historiographical lacuna concerns Cuba’s subsequent role in southern Africa, 
particularly the 1987-88 military engagements at Cuito Cuanvale. Several scholars have 
asserted the significance of these military events in Angola to Namibian independence 
and, in some cases, to the dissolution of apartheid.  
However, with the notable excepton of George’s The Cuban Intervention in 
Angola, no in-depth study exists.  In most studies the 1987-88 conflict in Angola is either 
ignored or allocated only a few sentences, paragraphs or pages. This dissertation seeks to 
address this gap by providing a detailed treatment and analysis of Cuito Cuanavale and 
Cuba’s role, endeavouring to resolve the questions and disputes surrounding the military 
and political nature of the engagement, in addition to its consequences for the apartheid 
regime. The central research focus is the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which occurred in 
southeastern Angola, and lasted from late 1987 to the middle of 1988.2  
                                                
1  P. Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976 
(Chapel Hill, 2001) and E. George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From 
Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale (London, 2005) 
 
2 The proposed research project builds on and augments previous work. See I. Saney, 
African Stalingrad: The Cuban revolution, internationalism and the end of Apartheid, 
Latin American Perspectives, 33:5 (2006), 81-117, and I. Saney, Cuba: A Revolution In 
Motion (London, 2004), 191-6 
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Cuito Cuanavale was the largest military engagement in Africa since the North 
African battles of the Second World War.3 Arrayed on one side were the armed forces of 
Cuba (FAR), Angola (FAPLA) and the South West African People’s Organization 
(SWAPO). On the other side was the South African Defense Force, military units of the 
Union for the Total National Independence (UNITA) of Angola (the South African 
supported insurgency) and the South African Territorial Force (SWATF) of Pretoria-
controlled Namibia.  
Map1: Southern Angola, with Cuito Cuanavale highlighted.4  
 
 
                                                
3 H. Campbell, Cuito Cuanavale, in M.E. Crahan et al., (eds.), The Oxford Companion to 
Politics of the World (New York, 2001), 187; T. Collelo, Angola: A Country Study 
(Washington, 1991), 205; D. O’Meara, Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the 
Politics of the National Party, 1948-1994 (Athens, Ohio, 1996), 377; A. G. Pazzanita, 
The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 29:1 
(1991), 83-114 
 
4 Source:  http://monthlyreview.org/2013/04/01/the-military-defeat-of-the-south-
africans-in-angola 
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The battle is a controversial and contentious subject, with its outcome and consequences 
disputed among the principal protagonists. What is not in dispute; however, is the central 
role that Cuba played in the events that unfolded in Cuito Cuanavale. All sides agree that 
Havana provided significant reinforcements, war materiel and planning. Thus, a 
corollary of the dispute is the portrayal of the battle as either a major victory or defeat for 
the foreign policy of the Cuban Revolution. 
This introductory chapter will establish why Cuito Cuanavale is a legitimate 
subject of inquiry and will outline the current controversy and the treatment of the 
military engagement in academic discourse. The context in which Cuito Cuanavale was 
embedded is elaborated by examining newspaper coverage, the impact inside South 
Africa, regional developments in 1974-76, Pretoria’s adoption of the policy of military 
intervention, and the regional impact of the wars destabilization. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
A principal research question taken up in this dissertation is: What was the significance 
of Cuito Cuanavale in the end of apartheid?  An assessment of the military outcome and 
political consequences of Cuito Cuanavale engages a series of corollary questions:  What 
role did Cuba play? What were each side’s military objectives? Were these objectives 
attained or frustrated? In political terms: What was the politically acceptable level of 
casualties on both sides? Finding the answer to these questions involves exploring the 
issues of causalities, the impact on SADF soldiers, equipment losses and the battle for air 
supremacy.  
In political and geo-strategic terms: What were the strategic and political 
objectives of each side? How was U.S. policy towards South Africa affected? What was 
the economic impact of the battle? Entwined with the study of Cuito Cuanavale is the 
determination of what was at stake for Pretoria and how the battle for Cuito Cuanavale 
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interacted with the Botha regime’s regional strategy? What were the ramifications for the 
internal dynamics of the Botha regime and the apartheid state? How Cuito Cuanavale 
was experienced inside South Africa is examined by assessing its influence on white and 
black South Africans.  
RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
This dissertation draws primarily on archival material, memoirs, and interviews 
conducted in South Africa, Cuba, England and the United States. The interviews with 
persons directly involved in the events discussed were of particular importance.  Despite 
the limitations of oral history, important insights and interpretations were obtained. 
Official documents were also obtained from Cuba, South Africa and the United States. 
Two declassified reports of particular interest were the United States Defence 
Intelligence Agency’s Briefing Regarding Developments in the Military Situation in 
Angola since July 1987 and The 1987-88 Combat in Southern Africa: Lessons Learned, 
which provide insight into Washington’s views on the 1987-88 conflict.  
During a three-week research trip to Cuba in April/May 2006, 15 people were 
interviewed, including several soldiers who served in Angola, specifically at Cuito 
Cuanavale, and an active participant in the southern African liberation struggles, now 
living in Cuba. The Embassy of Cuba in the United Kingdom, the Cuban Institute for 
Friendship with the Peoples and the Internal Press centre facilitated my research on the 
island by providing letters of introduction.   I conducted research at the Ministry of 
Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headquarters of the Communist Party of Cuba, 
Granma head office (the main Cuban national newspaper), National Library, and the 
Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Besides 
surveying various Cuban official publications, documents and newspapers, several 
memoirs of Cuban soldiers who fought in Angola were obtained. One of the most 
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interesting and important Cuban documents accessed was Preparación Martiana, 
Marxista-Leninista para el personal de las FAR: Segundo periodo de instrucción año 
2005. This is a document produced by the Cuban armed forces solely for its own internal 
purposes.  It contains the most detailed official Cuban treatment of the war in Angola, 
especially Cuito Cuanavale.  
Cuban state institutions closely guard and control access to their archives. While, 
I was able to obtain various materials from various Cuban institutions, I was not able to 
access certain documents from the highest levels of the Cuban government, particularly 
minutes of the Politburo of the Communist Party for Cuba for the 1987-88 period. This 
would have required special clearance and authorization from the top echelons of the 
Cuban leadership. However, I was allowed to make notes from and in some cases 
digitally photograph the documents I requested and did receive. The exception was the 
personal diary of an SADF soldier that the Cubans found at the Angolan town of 
Calueque. Photography, photocopying and written notes were not permitted. 
The documents provided appeared to be complete and not tampered with or 
redacted. There were no indications of alterations or selective censorship. Also, 
during my research trip I was allowed to travel freely and conduct my interviews. No 
restrictions were placed on me and no one was discouraged from speaking with me. All 
of my interviewees spoke freely and uninhibitedly. One person insisted on anonymity 
because he was an official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was not authorized to 
publicly speak on the matters I interviewed him on. 
During a July 22 to August 21, 2006 research visit to South Africa, several 
extensive interviews were conducted, and archives and libraries visited.  Interviews were 
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conducted with 23 persons, including anti-apartheid activists from the ANC and UDF. 
Among those interviewed were members of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK):  Ronnie Kasrils 
from the MK’s high command, and a current general and colonel (both of whom wished 
to remain anonymous) in the South African National Defence Force.  Former members 
of the Botha government and the SADF were also interviewed, including several who 
fought in Angola in 1987-88. Of particular importance were the interviews with Colonel 
Gerhard Louw (SADF ground commander of last assault on Cuito Cuanavale) and 
General Chris Thirion (deputy director of SADF Military Intelligence and a member of 
Secretariat of State Security Council and frequent participant in SSC meetings).  
  Various archives and libraries in South Africa were accessed: African Studies 
Library (University of Cape Town); Apartheid Museum (Pretoria); Foreign Affairs 
Archives (South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria); Mayibuye Centre 
(University of Western Cape); National Library of South Africa – Cape Town Branch; 
National Archives of South Africa (Pretoria); Trade Union Library (Cape Town). Also, 
several sites were visited: South African Defence Force Memorial; South African 
Airforce Memorial; South African Military Cemetery; South African Military Defence 
College; and Walmansdal (a South African military base). 
 One of the research challenges faced was the lack of primary South African 
documents from the government of P.W. Botha. This lack of documents either indicated 
that no such documents existed or they had been concealed or destroyed. Several sources 
stated that as the apartheid system came to an end, records and documents related to 
South Africa’s involvement in Angola, particularly Cuito Cuanavale, were systematically 
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destroyed.5  However, a restricted series of documents, specifically minutes of the State 
Security Council, were obtained on 23 October 2006 by means of a request made 
through the South African Promotion of Access to Information Act. These minutes 
provide insight into discussions at the highest echelons of the Botha regime.  Also, 
through a contact in the headquarters of the South African National Defence Force, one 
of the most informative documents was obtained: the SADF Roll of Honour, an 
extensive official list of all those who died in SADF service from 1962 to 1994, 
including the conflict in Angola. These documents combined with other archival work, 
interviews, memoirs by SADF officers and soldiers, and video materials provided a rich 
source of evidence upon which to draw. Frederick Bridgland’s The War for Africa: 
Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent is particularly significant as a primary 
source as it had been officially authorized by the SADF high command and contains 
extensive interviews with SADF participants that were conducted in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1987-88 conflict in Angola.6  
While, a few voices from Angola appear, the following narrative is 
overwhelmingly dominated by Cuba and South Africa, as they have produced the major 
accounts and memoirs.  This is not to imply that Angolan voices and documents are not 
important.  A planned trip to Angola was cancelled due to the collapse of research 
arrangements. Given time and resource limitations, a decision was made to concentrate 
on the research in South Africa. Nevertheless, despite relying heavily on Cuban and 
                                                
5 Interview with Colonel Gerhard Louw, Kimberley, 29 July 29 2006; Interview with 
Colonel Patrick Ricketts, Pretoria, 22 July 2006; Interview with SANDF general, 
Johannesburg, 6 August 2006 (the general wished to remain anonymous)  
 
6 F. Bridgland, The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent 
(Gibraltar, 1991) 
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South African sources, it is possible to generate a reliable narrative, particularly as Cuba 
and South Africa emerge as the principal protagonists in the conflict.  
 The five maps in this dissertation were chosen because they were the ones that 
best conveyed the necessary geographical perspective framing the 1987-88 conflict. The 
sources for the maps are indicated in the footnotes.  
CHAPTER STRUCTURE 
 
The dissertation is divided into six chapters. The aim of this introductory chapter is to 
establish Cuito Cuanavale as a legitimate area of research, while also establishing the 
context for the 1987-88 military confrontation in Angola. The chapters that follow 
examine the battle of Cuito Cuanavale and its ramifications, aiming to resolve several 
questions and disputes surrounding the military and political nature of the engagement, 
and the consequences for the apartheid regime.  
 Chapter Two: The Road to Cuito Cuanavale covers the events that led up to 
Cuito Cuanavale. After summarizing South African intervention in Angola from the 
1975 invasion to the incursions throughout the 1980s, the main focus is on the period 
from August to November 1988, which began with the summer 1987 FAPLA offensive 
against UNITA, setting the stage for the SADF intervention and Havana’s decision to 
send reinforcements. This chapter also analyzes what were the SADF objectives in 
Angola and how many South African soldiers were deployed. Chapter Three: The Battle 
of Cuito Cuanavale continues the narrative from Chapter Two, covering events from 
November 1987 to March 1988. The competing strategies employed by both sides and 
the size of the forces involved are discussed in both chapters, with Chapter Three 
examining the evaluating the competing interpretations of who won or lost the military 
encounter.  
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Chapter Four: Aftermath: Military Consequences examines the battle for air supremacy; 
the Cuban, FAPLA and SWAPO drive to Namibian border and two key military 
engagements, the clashes around Tchipa and the Cuban air strike against Calueque.  The 
chapter also discusses SADF morale and the number of white casualties sustained by the 
South African armed forces in Angola over the course of the 1975-1988 intervention, 
with a specific focus on the casualties of 1987-88. In the end it assesses how the regional 
balance of power in the region was affected.   
 Chapter Five: Aftermath: Namibia and South Africa discusses the impact on the 
negotiation process leading to Namibian independence and the internal ramifications for 
South Africa. The economic dimensions of the conflict are analyzed, situating them 
within the overall economic challenges that faced South Africa. The chapter also 
addresses how the morale and attitudes of white South Africans to the war in Angola 
were affected, with an examination of the anti-war opposition and the coverage of the 
war in the South African media. This is followed by a discussion of the response of anti-
apartheid organizations and activists.  
 The last chapter, Chapter Six: Aftermath: Impact on the Botha Regime, examines 
how the events in Angola affected South African ruling circles, specifically the Botha 
government. It also addresses the impact on Cuba. The chapter draws also some general 
conclusions about the role of Cuito Cuanavale in the anti-apartheid struggle and its 
influence on the trajectory of the apartheid regime. This assists in framing and 
ascertaining the contribution of this dissertation to the existing historiography.  
LEGEND & FABLE 
The 1987-88 military confrontation in Angola remains a fiercely debated and politicized 
episode of southern African history; its proximity to the present adding an extra edge to 
the sharpness of the dispute. The 20th anniversary commemorations of the battle of 
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Cuito Cuanavale illustrated this ongoing contestation. A number of events were 
organized throughout southern Africa to mark the occasion. In Brazzaville, the Angolan 
and Cuban embassies jointly organized celebrations.7  Namibian President Hifikepunye 
Pohamba awarded Namibia’s highest honour, The Order of the Most Ancient 
Welwitschia Mirabilis, to Fidel Castro, declaring: “We are indebted to the Cuban 
Government and the heroic Cuban people for this support and we shall never forget this 
unparalleled example of selfless internationalism.”8 Meanwhile, ANC President, Jacob 
Zuma, led a delegation at an event at Cuito Cuanavale where a commemorative 
monument was erected.  At the event Zuma stated: “We salute all combatants who laid 
down their lives in Cuito Cuanavale and other parts of Angola. They paid the ultimate 
price so that the oppressed people of Southern Africa could be free from racism, neo-
colonialism, proxy wars, and underdevelopment.”9  
While these activities went unchallenged in the respective countries where they 
occurred, inside South Africa, the actions of leading ANC politicians, however, 
provoked controversy and were contested. As Graeme Addison noted in an article in the 
Johannesburg Business Day, “claims and counterclaims regarding victory continue to 
make this one of the most controversial episodes in the story of the fall of apartheid.”10 A 
contentious dispute broke-out in the South African parliament. During the debate on 
                                                
7 “Local, Cuban Embassies in Brazzaville Celebrate Cuito Cuanavale Battle”, 
AllAfricaGlobalMedia, 21 March 2008, 
www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200803210378.html 
 
8 K. Kangueehi, Castro Gets Highest Honour, AllAfricaGlobalMedia, 25 March 2008, 
www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/200803250368.html 
 
9 Zuma leads ANC delegation to Cuito, Mail and Guardian, 22 March 2008; Zuma 
salutes combatants of Cuito Cuanavale, Mail and Guardian, 25 March 2008 
 
10 G. Addison, “Fighting Over the Memory of a Battle Nobody Won”,  Business Day, 25 
February 2008  
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Cuito Cuanavale, Sport and Recreation Minister, Makhenkesi Stofile, declared that the 
SADF and its UNITA allies had been “convincingly trounced.”11 Opposition MPs 
heckled and laughed at Stofile, with J.H. van der Merwe, of the Inkatha Freedom Party, 
dismissing Stofile’s statement as “a fable” and “untrue.”12  Peter Mulder, leader of the 
Freedom Front, accused the ANC of “spreading its own propaganda.”13 Ronnie Kasrils, 
Minister of Intelligence Services, responded for the ANC, defending the position that the 
SADF had suffered an unambiguous defeat. A few days after the parliamentary debate, 
he published in The Sunday Independent, “Turning point at Cuito Cuanavale,” 
elaborating the ANC position.14 As a direct response to the 2008 celebrations, Leopold 
Scholtz, a researcher at Stellenbosch University, published South African Strategic and 
Operational: Objectives in Angola, 1987–88, arguing that the SADF was not defeated 
and statements to the contrary have no foundation.15  
 Kasrils’ stance reflected a consistent and frequently articulated ANC theme. 
Several ANC leaders have described the battle of Cuito Cuanavale as a decisive event in 
the dissolution of apartheid, which forced Pretoria to negotiate.16 This stance has become 
                                                
11 N. Mafela, “Apartheid forces vs Liberation forces in Parliament”, The Times 
(Johannesburg), 20 March 2008 
 
12 Ibid. 
 
13 Ibid. 
 
14 R. Kasrils, “Turning point at Cuito Cuanavale”, The Sunday Independent, 23 March 
2008 
 
15 L. Scholtz, The South African Strategic and Operational: objectives in Angola, 1987–
88, South African Journal of Military Studies, 38: 1 (2010), 68-98 
 
16 E.g., O.Tambo, Tambo’s Opening Address to the ANC 48th National Conference, 
Durban, 2 July, 1991, www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/or91-3.html 
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part of ANC canon. Most prominent among these declarants was Nelson Mandela, who 
avowed: 
  The defeat of the apartheid army was an inspiration to the struggling 
people in South Africa! Without the defeat of Cuito Cuanavale our 
organizations would not have been unbanned! The defeat of the racist 
army at Cuito Cuanavale has made it possible for me to be here today! 
Cuito Cuanavale was a milestone in the history of the struggle for 
southern African liberation! Cuito Cuanavale has been a turning point in 
the struggle to free the continent and our country from the scourge of 
apartheid!17 
 
Mandela’s successors have continued in this vein, with Thabo Mbeki on several 
occasions echoing those sentiments.18 On 9 December 2010, during a visit to Cuba, 
President Zuma announced the cancellation of Cuba’s US$137 million (£86m) debt to 
South Africa, taking the opportunity to hail the "Cubans' depth of internationalist 
feeling..."19 This action was praised by South Africa’s National Union of Mineworkers, 
stating that this gesture toward Cuba sprung from a shared “concrete struggle for 
freedom and liberation of the oppressed people of our country and the southern African 
region."20 Physical monuments to the anti-apartheid struggle are also deployed in this 
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dispute. On the Wall of Names in Pretoria’s Freedom Park, the names of 2,106 Cubans 
who died in Angola during the 1975-1991 Cuban military missions are inscribed.21  
As noted this stance on Cuito Cuanavale is not confined to South African or ANC 
personalities. Former SWAPO and Namibian leader Sam Nujoma not only identified 
Cuito Cuanavale as crucial for Namibian independence but also claimed credit as its 
intellectual author. In his autobiography, he described an April 1987 meeting in Havana 
at which he advised President Fidel Castro to reinforce Cuban forces in Angola in order 
to seek a decisive military engagement with South Africa.22 Within Pan-Africanist 
circles, Cuito Cuanavale and the Cuban role are valorized. For example, New Africa, 
self-described as the bestselling Pan African magazine, dedicated 20 pages of its April 
2008 issue to a tribute to Fidel Castro, highlighting Cuba’s role in defeating the South 
African armed forces. Castro graced the cover, with the lead story entitled “Fidel Castro: 
Africa’s Great Friend.”23   
Angolan writer Ondjaki in his acclaimed semi-autobiographical novel, Good 
Morning Comrades, set the childhood escapades in Luanda of the main character, 12-
year-old Ndulu, against the backdrop of the war. The Cuban presence was a central 
motif. Cubans were portrayed positively, performing a critical role in defending Angolan 
independence. Good Morning Comrades described toasts given to “Cuban soldiers who 
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fell on Angolan soil…”24 Towards the end of the novel, Ndulu, recounted conversations 
in which South Africans were described as being “scared shitless of the Cubans…”25 
 In Cuba the battle has assumed legendary status.26 Numerous articles have 
appeared in the Cuban press, several documentaries have been produced and a number of 
memoirs have been published.  Cuito Cuanavale is viewed as not only as having 
defended Angola from South African aggression, but also as a decisive blow against the 
apartheid regime. It has even earned the appellation of being the African Stalingrad of 
apartheid.27 Fidel Castro asserted that Cuito Cuanavale “resulted in the immediate 
liberation of Namibia and speeded up the end of apartheid by perhaps 20 to 25 years.”28  
In 2005, the 30th anniversary of Cuba’s military mission in Angola was marked by a 
series of official activities, culminating in a major speech by Fidel Castro that 
highlighted Cuito Cuanvale.29  A series of articles in the Cuban press and high profile 
public events commemorated the 20th anniversary.30 
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CUITO CUANAVALE IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY 
The literature on apartheid South Africa is quite voluminous. Nevertheless, the treatment 
of the war in Angola, specifically Cuito Cuanavale has generally not been in-depth. As 
noted in the introduction, E. George’s The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: 
From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale and P. Gleijeses’s Conflicting Missions: 
Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1976 are the two major exceptions. However, 
while Conflicting Missions provides a detailed treatment of Cuba intervention in Angola, 
from 1959-76, it does not cover 1987-88 and the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.31 Therefore, 
George’s The Cuban Intervention provides the only extensive discussion of the 1987-88 
conflict and the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.  The Cuban Intervention will be discussed in 
greater detail later.  
In the historiography, there are four approaches to Cuito Cuanavale. First, it is 
simply ignored. The books and articles that do not mention or allude to the battle range 
from general ones on Africa to specialist works on South Africa.32 Second, Cuito 
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Cuanavale is often presented as a peripheral event having little significance for the 
subsequent trajectory of southern Africa.33 The third approach represents a departure 
from peripherilization. Most of the scholars of this approach were involved in the anti-
apartheid struggle and would be categorized as leftist (even Marxist). They extol Cuito 
Cuanavale as a crucial defeat for the apartheid system, decisive in realizing Namibian 
independence and accelerating the dissolution of apartheid.  
Venacio stated that the battle was “a watershed in southern African affairs,” 
leading to “a new balance of power” that “accelerated the independence of Namibia,”34 
forcing South Africa to accept and implement United Nations resolutions on Namibia’s 
independence.  The Mozambican journalist, Carlso Cardoso argued that the source of 
change in South African policy was their military defeat: “South Africa agreed to 
negotiate and signed the agreement on Namibian independence because it had no 
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choice.”35  Victoria Brittain agreed, stating that as Cuban forces approached Namibia, 
South African forces were is such a perilous position that Pretoria sought to extricate 
their troops “without humiliation and alive.”36 She underscored that “Cuba’s military 
actions and readiness for sacrifice changed the balance of power as years of Western 
diplomacy could not,” and were “the most important factor in the outcome of the 
negotiations.”37 She further declared that Cuito Cuanavale was transformed into “a 
symbol across the continent that apartheid and its army were no longer invincible.”38   
For Pazzanita, the South African defeat forced the apartheid regime “to make 
concessions that had been unimaginable only the year before.”39 The defeat forced South 
African ruling circles to reconsider “the wisdom of continuing a war on its border.”40  
Tvedten concurred, arguing that that Pretoria entered into negotiations because it was 
confronted with a serious military disaster. 41 Davenport stated that the result of Cuito 
Cuanavale and its aftermath was the virtual trapping of South African troops “thus, in 
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effect forcing the South African government to negotiate.”42 Peter Vale posed the 
question regarding Namibia: “Had Castro not bolstered his troops in Angola...would the 
South Africans have agreed to withdraw?”43  Herbstein and Evenson contended that 
without its defeat at Cuito Cuanavale, South Africa would have continued its occupation 
of Namibia, defying the UN resolutions and international law: 
South Africa had no serious intention of leaving Namibia.  The 
government had never really accepted Resolution 435…But once the 
SADF had invested its prestige in capturing the airfield of a remote 
Angolan town, and failed, the chemistry of the sub-continent changed. 
Like it or not, the non-victor had to abide by the rules of the game.44 
 
Some went further, positing significant internal repercussions for apartheid.  Davidson 
asserted that the cumulative weight of “these defeats began to take effect” inside South 
Africa, creating condition where “[t]he vision of a liberated south came a little closer.”45  
Similarly, Harvey affirmed “an entire South African armoured division had been 
trapped,” which generated a critical situation not only militarily but also politically by 
amplifying internal contradictions within South Africa, in the society, in general, and in 
South African ruling circles, in particular.46  O’Meara described the battle “as a disaster 
for Pretoria,” with serious consequences for the South African government, specifically 
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the political ambitions of Defence Minister Magnus Malan. 47 Dubow asserted that 
events in Angola: 
proved a turning point in military and strategic thinking. A direct 
consequence was the government’s decision to finally end South Africa’s 
illegal occupation of Namibia from 1989...While South African power in 
the region was undeniably being rolled back: in addition, an important 
precedent for negotiated political transition was thereby established.48 
 
Nevertheless, despite these assertions about the significance of military events in Angola, 
no sustained elaboration of those events is presented. Invariably the treatment of Cuito 
Cuanavale is cursory, amounting to a few sentences or, at most, a few pages. Given the 
competing interpretations about the military events in Angola, the brief analysis and 
commentary provided seems insufficient to support the interpretation that the 1987-88 
military engagements had major ramifications for South Africa.  
 The fourth approach contradicts the third, arguing that there was no Cuban 
victory, often portraying the battle as a victory for the SADF in which thousands of 
Cubans and Angolans were killed, and South Africa sustaining sparing causalities.  W. 
Martin James asserted that “South Africa never had any intention of deploying its troops 
to capture Cuito Cuanavale” and, therefore, had not put itself in a position where it could 
have been defeated.49 Allister Sparks noted that Pretoria was able to withdraw its armed 
forces from Angola without “too much loss of face.”50 Edward George describes the 
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results of the battle as “ambiguous.”51 While not academic, the principal bulwarks of the 
fourth approach have been prominent members of the apartheid regime. Former SADF 
Chief of Staff, Jannie Geldenhuys, claimed in his memoirs, that the combined 
Cuban/Angola force had been conclusively defeated.52 Magnus Malan, Minister of 
Defence under P.W. Botha, stated categorically that “[t]he military successes of the 
SADF in the late 1980s in Southern Angola paved the way for the political dispensation 
in South Africa” that unfolded in the 1990s.53  
 George’s book, The Cuban Intervention in Angola (based on his doctoral 
dissertation at the Univerity of Bristol) is an extensive and detailed analysis of the 1987-
88 conflict in Angola.54 As the sections dealing with the 1987-88 conflict in Angola are 
substantively the same as the dissertation, citation references will be to the book. The 
book’s greater accessibility is accentuated by its interrnet availability as a PDF.55  The 
extensive reference notes at the end of the book provide a detailed description of the 
sources used by George.56 Together with South African sources, George uses interviews 
with Cuban soldiers and Cuban publications. Nevertheless, this dissertation differs from 
The Cuban Intervention in Angola in that it uses a variety and array of sources that were 
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not available to George, for example, minutes of meetings of the South African State 
Security Council and declassified U.S. government documents.  
There are areas of substantial agreement between The Cuban Intervention in 
Angola and this dissertation. Both agree that South Africa repeatedly tried and failed to 
defeat the Cubans and Angolans at Cuito Cuanavale. However, where both 
fundamentally differ and diverge is on their assessment of the significance of Cuito 
Cuanavale. George stated that Havana inflated the “importance of the battle of Cuito 
Cuanavale,” arguing that  “Cuba constructed the myth of Cuito Cuanavale,” an “ersatz 
military victory…conjured up” by Fidel Castro.57  He described Cuito Cuanavale “as a 
costly stalemate…no more than a costly stand-off, its real significance lying in the 
impetus it gave to the American brokered peace process.”58  In George’s view, it was 
Washington who seized on the “costly stand-off” as the opportunity to negotiate an 
agreement that would extricate Cuba and South Africa from a war both wanted to exit 
and, therefore, end the conflict. George described the resulting New York Accords as a 
“triumph of Crocker [the chief U.S. diplomat in Africa] and, therefore, of Washington.”59 
However, this dissertation argues that real significance of Cuito Cuanavale lay 
not only in preventing the South African capture of the town, but its role in a strategic 
coup de main that encompassed a massive build-up of Cuban and Angolan forces to the 
west of Cuito Cuanavale and on the Angolan/Namibian border that decisively altered the 
military balance in favour Cuba and Angola and against South Africa. With Pretoria 
focused on Cuito Cuanavale, the Cuban plan was to achieve a stalemate at Cuito 
                                                
57 The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 234-235 & 277-278 
 
58 The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 213 & 3 
 
59 The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 248 
 
  
 29 
Cuanavale, while completing the deployment of its forces in an outflanking operation. 
This outmanoeuvring of South Africa was to have profound consequences. This 
dissertation argues that it was this change in the military balance of power that was the 
principal driving force behind the negotiations, eventually having significant 
repercussion within apartheid South Africa. George only briefly discusses Havana’s 
military deployment on the Namibian/Angolan border, mentioning that the number of 
Cuban troops had reached 65,000.60  His failure to adequately address this phase of the 
conflict and its implications is - in this author’s opinion - a serious gap. The areas of the 
1987-88 conflict in Angola where The Cuban Intervention in Angola and this dissertation 
clearly diverge and substantially differ are highlighted and discussed at various places. 
With the exception of The Cuban Intervention in Angola, the historiography on 
Cuito Cuanavale is not in-depth, often based on secondary resources and testimony 
primarily from only one side of the conflict. Many of those who declared Cuito 
Cuanavale as a defeat for South Africa and, therefore, a victory for the anti-apartheid 
forces were active supporters and activists in the international anti-apartheid movement; 
some being actual participants in the southern African liberation struggles. As a result, 
their positions are seen by others as not objective or unbiased but as being ideologically 
driven, re-waging the ‘old’ battles on the terrain of scholarship. Of course, the same 
critique can be leveled at many of those who either dismiss Cuito Cuanavale or label it a 
SADF victory. 
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS & BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS, 1974-76 
The 1987-88 military confrontation in Angola was the most intense episode of a conflict 
that began in 1975 with the South African invasion of Angola, an action heralded by the 
collapse of Portuguese colonialism in southern Africa. The apartheid regime’s 
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relationship with the rest of southern Africa was profoundly affected by the successful 
anti-colonial and independence struggles in Angola and Mozambique. As a consequence 
of these developments, Pretoria (particularly the Botha regime) viewed the arena outside 
the borders of South Africa as a critical locus of struggle.  
 The break-up of the cordon of white-ruled states surrounding South Africa in 
1974-1975 resulted in Pretoria restructuring its relationship with the region. As anti-
colonial struggles at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s intensified, engulfing the 
countries surrounding South Africa, Pretoria adopted an interventionist policy and 
undertook covert operations in Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique. In Angola and 
Mozambique, the SADF cooperated closely with the Portuguese colonial authorities.61 
This covert involvement reflected the rethinking underway in Pretoria aimed at 
countering the liberation movements and protecting the apartheid regime, which 
conceptualized “the region, and particularly the minority-ruled and colonial territories of 
Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa, primarily as a military 
buffer zone.”62  
In 1969, a report crafted by then-Minister of Defence P.W. Botha, stated that 
South Africa faced “ever increasing threats from outside.”63 The 1973 White Paper on 
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Defence – also shaped primarily by Botha – explicitly argued that South Africa was “a 
target for international communism and its cohorts - leftist activists, exaggerated 
humanism, permissiveness, materialism, and related ideologies.”64 Moreover, as South 
Africa held “a position of strategic importance,”65 it was being specifically “singled out 
as a special target for the by-product of their ideologies, such as black radicalism, 
exaggerated individual freedom, one-man-one-vote, and a host of other slogans 
employed against us based on double standards.”66 An editorial in The Star reflected this 
growing concern over the “long-term pressures from within and without.”67  It noted  
“the military situation had changed dramatically following the intensification of the 
black attack on the white-ruled buffer states which shelter South Africa.”68 The SADF’s 
submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) underscored the growing 
apprehension, stating “for the first time, the potential threat of conventional war was on 
the northern borders of the sub-continent.”69 In response Pretoria’s “strategy was to keep 
the ‘defence line’ as far as possible from South Africa itself.”70 The buffer zone was of 
singular importance. A quasi-cordon sanitaire, it insulated South Africa from the 
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pressures of African nationalism. Maintaining it was considered an imperative. 
 The overthrow of the fascist regime in Portugal in 1974 caught Pretoria by 
surprise. Lisbon declared its intention to grant independence to Angola and Mozambique 
as quickly as was practicable. In response, Pretoria significantly reoriented South African 
regional policy.71  These events transformed South Africa’s “friends into foes.”72 The 
SADF submission to the TRC emphasized the sudden transformation: “The unexpected 
coup in Portugal on 25 April 1974 brought the RSA’s defence line to its borders and this 
changed the government’s perceptions of security in a very dramatic way.”73 Prominent 
white South African political leaders and commentators viewed with trepidation the 
impending end of Portuguese colonialism, casting the imminent independence of Angola 
and Mozambique as a serious threat to South Africa.74 The cordon had been breached.  
 The 1975 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production, written under the 
direction of Defence Minister Botha, was the defining document that laid out Pretoria’s 
interpretation of regional developments. It further elaborated on the positions outlined in 
the 1969 and 1973 White Papers on Defence. What stands out is the characterization of 
the threat from Angola and Mozambique as primarily political (as opposed to military). 
It stated that neither Angola nor Mozambique posed a credible military danger, noting 
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that the military challenge found “its only actual physical expression in the existence of 
armed elements of banned political organization accommodated in neighbouring 
states.”75 These “armed elements” were not considered militarily significant.  
 The 1975 White Paper framed the threat within the ideological strictures of the 
Cold War. Newly independent Angola and Mozambique fell “within the ambit of the 
communist international battle for world domination,”76 reflecting “the increase and 
establishment of communist influence and presence in southern Africa.”77  Pretoria 
conflated communism with the anti-apartheid struggle, equating “communism as 
resistance to apartheid.”78 The direct substantive threat posed was the political and 
ideological influence these successful anti-colonial struggles would have on black South 
Africans. The 1975 White Paper argued that the emergence of newly independent 
southern African countries would have a direct political and ideological impact inside 
South Africa and, therefore, represented a concrete threat to the apartheid system. The 
most serious danger was that blacks would be encouraged and driven to “greater 
efforts”79 to overthrow the apartheid system: 
 Undesirable influences and tendencies will undoubtedly encourage 
the radical elements in revolutionary organizations inside and outside 
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and incite them to greater efforts. They regard Angola and 
Mozambique as new allies and potential new operational bases.80 
 
This would prove to be a well-founded conclusion. The impact of the national liberation 
movements on South Africa was not a Pretoria created phantasm. The developments in 
Mozambique and Angola from 1974 to 1976 did have a considerable influence among 
black South Africans, inspiring the internal anti-apartheid forces. It was a significant 
factor in their increased radicalization and militancy. The greatest influence appears to 
have been on black youth. This was most clearly reflected in the response of the Black 
Consciousness Movement (BCM).  
Primarily based in urban areas, the BCM “had created a heightened political 
awareness amongst certain strata in the urban population.”81 The two main 
organizational expressions, the South African Students’ Organization (SASO), founded 
in 1968, and the Black Peoples’ Convention (BPC), founded in 1972, planned activities 
and published pamphlets in support of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
(Liberation Front of Mozambique - FRELIMO) and also in celebration of Mozambique’s 
liberation from Portugal. Allieson Lazarus, a secondary school student at the time, 
remembered being influenced by the BCM’s Mozambique activities, emphasizing their 
role in shaping the worldview of youth: “FRELIMO events were organized by the BCM. 
They were a defining moment for a particular group of young people.”82  The success of 
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FRELIMO had “contributed to a growing sense that minority domination was not 
unassailable.”83 
 Amongst black students the greeting “Viva!” became a popular cry.84 When 
Mozambique’s independence was formally achieved, SASO and BPC called for major 
celebrations on 25 September. The Minister of Justice responded by banning, under the 
Riotous Assemblies Act, any gatherings or meetings by SASO or the BPC from 24 
September to 20 October 1974. As a result, several members were arrested and detained. 
Nine SASO and BPC members were charged with involvement in a “conspiracy to bring 
about revolutionary change in South Africa by violent means or the threat of such 
means,” and “with organizing rallies in support of Frelimo in September 1974.”85  
 Despite the prohibition and the arrests, pro-FRELIMO rallies were held in 
Durban and the University of the North at Turfloop in northern Transvaal on 25 
September 1974.86 More than 1,000 students attended the Turfloop rally.87 Police 
attempts to shut down the rally resulted in fighting between the authorities and the 
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students. Several students were arrested and the campus was closed for two-days. This 
was followed by another week of student protests. Before the Turfloop rally, students 
covered the campus buildings with posters and painted slogans expressing their 
sentiments on Mozambique and apartheid. They saw in Mozambican independence “the 
affirmation, in political terms, of Black Consciousness and the confirmation of black 
identity in the continent of their birth.”88 These slogans illustrated the connection in the 
students’ consciousness between the successful Mozambican struggle and the anti-
apartheid movement inside South Africa: 
Frelimo fought and regained our soil, our dignity. It is a story. Change 
the name and the story applies to YOU. 
Viva Frelimo. Azania is bored and from this boredom a Revolution shall 
erupt.  
Down with Vorster and his dogs (Boers)! Power!!! We shall overcome. 
Revolution!! Machel will help! Away with Vorster Ban! We are for 
Afro Black Power!!! 
We shall drive them to the sea! Long live Azania! 
Samora Machel is now coming and Vorster must GO!! 
The dignity of the Black Man has been restored in Mozambique and so 
shall it be here. 
Black must rule.89 
The pro-FRELIMO rallies were a direct challenge to the status quo. Oliver Tambo stated 
that to that point they “represented the sharpest confrontation we had had with the 
apartheid regime in the struggle for the support of our region and of Africa as a whole.”90  
J. H. Synman, a justice of South Africa’s Supreme Court, led a commission of inquiry 
into the events of September 25. The commission attributed the protests and the riot “to a 
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situation outside the university,” namely “the success of Frelimo in Mozambique.”91  It 
singled out the new militancy that was now dominant among the students, warning that 
the events of 25 September demonstrated that Black Consciousness had “introduced a 
new factor into the situation: an aggressive claim that the Black man is the White man’s 
equal. The only sphere where he feels capable of a trial of strength with the White man is 
the political one.”92  
 Tom Lodge argued that the increased assertiveness of the black working class, 
reflected in the upsurge of strikes from 1972-1976, could, in part, be attributed to the 
influence of regional events.93 The number of strikes by black South Africans soared 
from an annual average of 72 during 1970-1972 involving 5,329 workers to 318 
involving 49,144 workers, in 1973-1976.94  The challenge posed to the apartheid system 
was captured by a 22 January 1974 article in The Star with the headline “Builders Warn 
on African Unions,” arguing for the necessity to maintain political and ideological 
control in the face of growing African working class militancy.95  
 The 1975 South African invasion of and subsequent withdrawal in 1976 from 
Angola were also to have a significant effect on black South Africans.  At the December 
1975 annual conference of the BPC, delegates passed a resolution recognizing the 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of 
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Angola – MPLA) as “the legitimate government of Angola.”96 The impact of the events 
in Angola among blacks as a whole is probably best reflected in the coverage by The 
World, the major black daily newspaper, one of the most influential black publications.  
At the time, it was South Africa’s second largest newspaper. It had an estimated 
circulation of 160,000, with a weekend circulation of 200,000.97 The World had a 
broader reach into the black communities than the literature or activities of SASO or the 
BPC, which were predominantly targeted at the student movement. 
 In 1976, The World provided extensive coverage of the conflict in Angola. From 
19 January to 19 March 1976, 66 articles were published; a ratio of slightly more than 
one article per day. Several articles appeared on the front-page. Various editorials 
focused on the conflict and its broader implications. That The World would devote so 
much time and space to Angola is indicative not only of the editorial staff’s interests and 
concerns but of what was deemed to be the interests and concerns of Black South 
Africans. The editorial shift from suspicion to support for the MPLA and the Cuban 
presence may also be indicative of not only a change in attitude of the editorial staff but 
of blacks as a whole.  
 Initially The World presented various articles on the progress of the conflict and 
refrained from expressing any editorial position; however, in January 1976, it published 
a series of articles with contradictory positions on who was actually winning the conflict.  
If anything, the initial tilt was toward UNITA as interviews were published with UNITA 
spokespersons;98 but then, on 26 January 1976, a front-page article described the South 
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African military setback as a “crisis for Pretoria.”99 Subsequent editorials and articles 
argued for respect for Angolan sovereignty and independence, stating that South Africa 
should not be involved in Angola.100  
A series of articles focused on the deteriorating South African military situation, 
highlighting the possibility of a major clash in Namibia.101 On the 13 February, a front-
page article declared that Cuban troops “have swept down to only 200 km from the 
South West African border…”102 Another front-page with a big banner headline reported 
Pretoria’s warning that the SADF would retaliate if Namibia was threatened and the 
border crossed.103  
 The World did not confine itself to only reporting on the unfolding military 
situation. It also explored black South African attitudes: an exploration that provided 
insights into how blacks viewed regional developments. A 19 February editorial posed a 
provocative question seeking to measure Black support for Pretoria’s actions in Angola: 
“Can White South Africans count on the support of their Black countrymen in the event 
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of a Russian threat to this country from Angola.”104 The World requested that readers 
write in and express their positions. The results were published on the 11 March front-
page: “Blacks Speak Out On War Issue: Many against fighting ‘White man’s battle.’”  
From 19 February to 11 March, The World received an average of more than 12 letters 
per day on the Angolan conflict, with more than 10 of them rejecting the apartheid 
regime’s position.  
According to the tally, 203 out of 244 respondents (83.2 per cent) disavowed 
Pretoria’s policy, stating they would not defend South Africa.105 The 27 February edition 
also carried a short ‘man on the street’ interview. When asked to comment on the 
situation in Angola and the MPLA victory, and to say whether he was “pleased” or not 
by the outcome, he responded with an unambiguous statement of support: “Pleased? I am 
delighted…look the [South African] government is against them so there must be some 
good in the MPLA.”106   
 Several articles focused on the threat that Cuban/Angolan forces posed to 
Pretoria’s interests.107  Angolan President Neto was quoted, declaring that the MPLA 
was now in a position “to contribute to the independence of other peoples.”108 Perhaps 
the most striking commentary was the editorial of 24 February, which unequivocally 
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expressed support for the Cuban intervention in Angola and explicitly linked the defeat 
of South African forces to black liberation: 
Black Africa is riding the crest of a wave generated by the Cuban 
success in Angola. South Africa backed off, the West did not come in at 
all, and from the peak of this surge of dominance over the whole White 
South, Black Africa is tasting the heady wine of the possibility of 
realizing the dream of ‘total liberation.’109 
 
The World was not the only paper interested in the positive response of Black South 
Africans to Angolan developments. Another major South African daily newspaper, the 
Rand Daily Mail, read widely by whites, noted “[t]he boost to African nationalism which 
has seen South Africa forced to retreat.”110 A Rand Daily Mail editorial commented on 
the psychological dimension: 
In Angola Black troops – Cuban and Angolans – have defeated White 
troops in military exchanges. Whether the bulk of the offensive was by 
Cubans or Angolans is immaterial in the colour-conscious context of the 
war’s battlefield, for the reality is that they have won, are winning and are 
not white and that psychological edge, that advantage the White man has 
enjoyed and exploited over 300 years of colonialism and empire, is 
slipping away.111 
 
A New York Times op-ed echoed this sentiment describing, “the drive for black freedom 
spearheaded by Cuban troops.”112 In the same issue, a black worker declared: “It makes 
us all think. In Rhodesia they are talking and after 10 years they have nothing. In Angola 
and Mozambique they fought and they have won.”113 Nicholas Ashford, The Times 
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(London) South Africa correspondent, wrote that based on his discussions it was clear 
that Black South Africans saw the war in Angola “as part of the general liberation 
struggle.”114 One commented: “Two years ago we could never have dreamed that the 
Portuguese would have left and there would be black governments in these two 
countries. It has completely altered our own outlook.”115  White South African 
politicians took note of growing black valorization. Colin Eglin, a leader of the 
Progressive Reform Party, told the South African parliament:  
Far too many black people see what is happening in the North and in 
Angola as part of the process of liberation from discrimination within in 
South Africa. I believe that many of the black people of South Africa 
are getting silent satisfaction out of the successes of the M.P.L.A.116  
 
In some cases the satisfaction was not silent, as illustrated in Cape Town where “huge 
black audiences would watch the television news in coloured hotels and cheer every 
report of South African casualties in the ‘operational zone.’”117 The South African 
Sunday Times noted, “coloureds’ would jeer “when South Africans appear on the screen” 
but “when scenes are shown of MPLA or Cubans soldiers there are shouts of 
exultation.”118  
 The impact of South Africa’s defeat extended to the Soweto Uprising that began 
on 16 June 1976.  While the immediate impetus for the uprising was the imposition of 
Afrikaans as a means of school instruction and the underlying cause the pent-up 
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frustration against apartheid, Mozambican independence and the SADF defeat in Angola 
had an important role in amplifying militancy among Black youth. Allister Sparks, a 
reporter and editor of the Rand Daily Mail from 1977 to 1981, observed: “The slogans 
and rhetoric of the Portuguese colonial revolution swept the South African townships 
and stimulated a nascent rise in revolutionary consciousness.”119 Kane-Berman noted: 
“to the extent that black South Africans saw the withdrawal of South African military 
forces from Angola as a sign that white power was not invincible, this would have had an 
important psychological impact.”120 A principal of a Soweto high school provided 
compelling testimony, stating that the situation in Angola “was very much on the minds 
of his 700 students…They discuss it all the time and they are pleased by the 
developments there – it gives them hope.”121 The Sunday Times observed that Cape 
Town’s ‘coloured’ townships gangs were adopting new names such as “Cuban Kids” and 
“MPLA Terrors.”122 An editorial in The Times explicitly linked regional developments to 
the uprising: 
Afrikaans was only the detonator…Now that there is a free state on one 
of the Republics borders, and now that Africans are fighting it out with 
white troops in Rhodesia... The young are roused, poised, awaiting their 
moment in South Africa.123 
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White South African politicians were cognizant of the link. Helen Suzman, a prominent 
member of the opposition Progressive Party, highlighted the role of regional 
developments: “The days of patient submission are over for them [Black youth]…The 
occurrences beyond our borders in Mozambique and Angola and Rhodesia have not 
escaped their notice.”124 The Synman Commission’s report directly tied the rising tide of 
resistance to regional events: “The political and military events in southern Africa... 
helped to create the state of mind in which rebelliousness could be stirred up.”125 
Perhaps, the most poignant illustration of this influence was a placard used during the 
Soweto march. It simply stated: “It happened in Angola. Why not here??”126  
The ANC and the SACP depicted regional developments as crucial to the 
struggle within South Africa. Mandela, in a message smuggled out of Robben Island, 
stated, “the frontiers of white supremacy are shrinking. Mozambique and Angola are free 
and the war of liberation gathers force in Namibia and Zimbabwe”127 This same 
satisfaction was expressed in a SACP statement, which noted that “[w]hilst Angola 
destroyed the myth of the South African military invincibility, Soweto demolished the 
myth that the government’s security forces are able to destroy the people’s revolutionary 
spirit.”128 Oliver Tambo unequivocally linked Angola and the Soweto Uprising:  
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Terrified at the prospect of the victory of the forces of progress within 
the country in the aftermath and as a direct continuation of the popular 
victory in Angola, the Vorster regime, unleashed the bloody terror that 
is today symbolized by Soweto.129 
 
This position was not just reflective of official pronouncements of the leadership the 
anti-apartheid movement, who might be accused of hyperbole or embellishment, 
especially in order to maintain good relations with allies such as the MPLA and Cuba. It 
was also the position of rank and file activists. The significance of the South African 
defeat for the struggle inside the country was underscored by Neil MacDonald, an anti-
apartheid activist who was incarcerated after being caught journeying to Angola to join 
the ANC’s armed wing. He said: “The SADF defeat in 1976 played a major role in 
raising our consciousness.”130 Another activist, “Jacob,” was more expansive, describing 
the impact as:  
 Enormous! Militants who had been subdued because of the 
tremendous repression started to surface again. Workers and 
students held lighting mass rallies in support of the Angolans and 
Mozambicans although these are banned…It is no secret that since it 
became clear that the Portuguese were going to have to get out of 
Angola and Mozambique, there has been a great upsurge of 
militancy in South Africa. From 1974 onward there have been 
repeated strikes in many industries. For a country where trade 
unions and strikes are illegal, this is very significant and testifies to 
the growing militancy of workers. But it was the defeat of Vorster’s 
troops in Angola which completely transformed people’s thinking, 
especially the young people…131 [Emphasis added]. 
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Having had a radicalizing effect on black youth, regional developments had played a 
significant role in re-igniting the anti-apartheid struggle within South Africa. The Soweto 
Uprising and other black rebellions that followed in Soweto’s wake created an 
unprecedented crisis for the regime, signaling the collapse of Pretoria’s ability to confine 
black politics within the limits defined and permitted by apartheid. The uprising was a 
watershed in the history of apartheid, heralding “the demise of white supremacy and 
made real the possibility of liberation, perhaps for the first time…An unquenchable spirit 
of rebellion was becoming manifest…”132  
The events of 1974-1976 demonstrated the interconnectedness of the struggles 
outside and inside South Africa. Both the apartheid state and the anti-apartheid forces 
recognized this link. The demise of Portuguese colonial rule led “many in Africa to 
conclude that the struggle against white rule and oppression in southern Africa will 
become much easier.”133 Anti-apartheid forces outside of Africa also shared this view.  
For example, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement argued for the interconnected nature 
of the liberation struggles in southern Africa.  Its 1972-73 annual report argued that in 
southern Africa “the economic, political and military problems of all the territories...are 
directly linked to each other.”134 It further declared “battles fought in any one of the 
southern African territories will be battles for the future of the whole region.”135 
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 These statements could be dismissed as politically motivated pronouncements by 
parties, which had vested interests in how the events in Mozambique and Angola were 
portrayed. As opponents of Pretoria engaged in an effort to internationally isolate the 
apartheid state and increase their own support, it was to their advantage to present these 
events as setbacks for apartheid and victories for the liberation movement. However, the 
events inside South Africa in 1974-76, and Pretoria’s internal and external responses, 
gave credence to the analysis that regional events were redounding inside South Africa to 
the benefit of the anti-apartheid struggle.  This was the prelude to the transformation of 
southern Africa into an immense battlefield.  
TOTAL STRATEGY & THE MILITARIZATION OF THE APARTHEID STATE 
The Soweto Uprising and regional developments represented the most serious challenges 
yet faced by the apartheid regime. The failure of the SADF’s 1975 invasion to thwart the 
consolidation of a MPLA government in Angola had significant repercussions on the 
nature of South African governance.  Events (internal and external) of 1974-76 a Rand 
Daily Mail editorial predicted would strengthen the position of the hardliners in Pretoria, 
who would now “demand an entrenchment of white power.”136 South African ruling 
circles viewed the apartheid regime as under a growing multi-pronged attack.  In 
response, Pretoria adopted a strategy that would have profound consequences for the 
nature of the apartheid state and the subsequent course of the struggle for and against 
apartheid: intensified repression inside South Africa and war waged outside it.  
 The 1977 White Paper on Defence, written under the direction of Botha, 
concluded that regional changes had resulted in “an increase in the tempo of 
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developments and this has brought the threats nearer in time.”137 What was at stake was 
“the right of self-determination of the white nation.”138 This view was elaborated and 
encapsulated in the concept of a ‘total onslaught’ on South Africa. Magnus Malan, then 
SADF Chief of Staff, declared that “total onslaught” was driven by the objective of “the 
implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressors’ will on the target state.”139  
This required a response encompassing all spheres, a “total strategy” that would contest 
all arenas of social and political life. The 1977 White Paper defined “total strategy” as 
the “interdependent and coordinated action in all fields–military, psychological, 
economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural etc.”140 
 The central idea guiding total strategy was the proposition that the main threat to 
South Africa originated outside the country. The external arena now assumed heightened 
strategic significance. The emergence of black-led states on the borders was considered a 
primary component of the “total onslaught” on South Africa. General Malan declared 
that South Africa was “involved in a total war.”141  While Pretoria sought to use the 
economic dependence of the surrounding countries on South Africa as a lever to force 
them to come to an accommodation with the apartheid regime and accept its regional 
domination, it also increasingly relied on a program of destabilization of what became 
known as the Frontline States.  The initial aim was the imposition of pliable and client 
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regimes. If Pretoria could not install client regimes, then it would undermine the political 
and economic stability of its neighbours. This task could only be accomplished by 
military means. The projection of armed might was seen as indispensable to the 
preservation of the apartheid regime, which required the reassertion its regional 
hegemony.142 While it could not restore colonial rule it “could dominate its region with 
overwhelming military and economic superiority, then it could call all the shots in the 
area and there would be little anyone else could do. The loss of the buffer would cease to 
matter.”143  This approach was reaffirmed in subsequent white papers on defence, which 
evaluated and re-affirmed the implementation of “total strategy” and the project of 
destabilizing the surrounding countries.144  
 The war of destabilization reflected Pretoria’s determination to attack its 
designated enemies anywhere and everywhere.  On 6 February 1986, Magnus Malan 
publicly affirmed this position, telling the South African parliament that South Africa 
forces would hammer apartheid adversaries “wherever they find them. What I am saying 
                                                
142 C. Alden, Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security 
State (London, 1996.), 272-273; S. Chan, Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in 
Southern Africa, 1978-1988 (New York, 1990), 13-28 & 145-217; G. Evans, South 
Africa in Remission: The Foreign Policy of an Altered State, Journal of African Studies, 
34:2 (1996) 251; W. Gutteridge, South Africa: Strategy for Survival?, in W. Gutteridge 
(ed.), South Africa: From Apartheid to National Unity, 1981-1994 (Aldershot, 1995), 6-
21; R.S. Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy Under 
Pressure (London, 1988.), 68-158; M.E. Lee, Southern Africa, in M.E. Crahan et al. 
(eds.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (New York, 2001), 786-787; J. 
Seiler, ‘South Africa’s Regional Role’, in John Seiler (ed.), Southern Africa Since the 
Portuguese Coup (Boulder, 1980), 99-113 
 
143 Sparks and Green, Namibia: The Nation after Independence, 307  
 
144 White Paper on Defence and Armament Production (Pretoria, 1981); White Paper on 
Defence and Armament Production (Pretoria, 1984); Interview with Nial Barnard, 
Johannesburg, 20 August 2006 
 
  
 50 
is the policy of the government.”145 On 18 May 1988, he explicitly tied the regime’s 
survival to regional intervention:  “To a large extent the solution lies in proceeding with 
cross-border operations so that the internal political problem can ultimately be 
solved.”146 The SADF submission to the TRC confirmed that Pretoria’s “national 
security policy made explicit provision for pro-active actions beyond the borders of the 
RSA [Republic of South Africa].”147 The TRC noted that the testimony of the SADF 
“was consistent with a view frequently expressed at State Security Council (SSC) 
meetings that the defence of South Africa should take place outside its border.”148 
The overriding importance accorded to armed intervention throughout southern 
African put the military at the forefront of the implementation of “total strategy.” 
Consequently, considerable state power and prestige were marshalled behind the 
military. This had significant consequences not only on the policy front but also on the 
structure of the apartheid state, with direct and profound impact on the nature of 
governance in apartheid South Africa. New structures were created, leading to the hyper-
centralization of decision-making.  
 In 1979 Botha (now Prime Minister) established the National Security 
Management System (NSMS). Its mandate was to prevent “a revolutionary climate.”149 
This was the crystallization of the 1977 White Paper on Defence’s call for a 
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comprehensive restructuring of the decision-making and implementation process for 
“total strategy.”  Restructuring was apocalyptically justified as “required for the 
continued survival of the RSA and its people.”150 The White Paper called for the 
“coordinated action between all government departments, government institutions and 
other authorities to counter the multidimensional onslaught against the RSA…”151 The 
core of the NSMS was the State Security Council. In 1972 during Vorster’s premiership, 
under the Security, Intelligence and State Security Act, the SSC had been established as 
an advisory body to the government that only met intermittently. Botha elevated the SSC 
from its advisory role to that of the central – and in many cases – the only decision-
making body. It became the de facto government.  
 The SSC stood at the apex of the NSMS system that dominated the state.152 Every 
government department was required to participate in the NSMS at all its levels. In 
practice, it meant that the existing government structure had to integrate into the NSMS. 
Ultimately every government sector was subordinate to the SSC.153 The 1979 White 
Paper on Defence codified the SSC’s new status; it was though the SSC that national 
policy and planning were to be conducted and coordinated. The 1979 White Paper was 
quite unambiguous: 
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Preparation for modern warfare, whether conventional or unconventional, 
necessitates highly coordinated action…co-ordinated at the level of the 
Work Committee and approved by the SSC. 154 
 
The SADF played a central role in transforming the SSC into the centre of concentrated 
power.155 Malan, then Chief of the SADF, stated that the necessity for the elevation of 
the SSC was demonstrated by the war in Angola. According to Malan, Angola had 
“focused attention on the urgent necessity for the State Security Council to play a much 
fuller role in the national security of the republic than hitherto.”156 In March 1977, he 
explicitly argued that in certain aspects “the democratic system of government” was 
incompatible with the “total strategy.”157 Lieutenant  General J. R. Dutton, then SADF 
Operational Chief of Staff, concurred: “Conventional organizations in democratic 
systems do not as a rule lend themselves to these procedures. Therefore organizational 
changes or adaptations would appear to be imperative.” 158  
 If the SADF was the central institution in elevating and then consolidating the 
SSC as the decisive body in the reconfigured system of governance, Botha was the 
central figure. While, the policy of overt military regional intervention had begun under 
Vorster (particularly, the invasion of Angola in 1975), it was the accession of Botha to 
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the office of Prime Minster that heralded the paramountcy of the military. The SADF at 
its highest levels considered Botha “one of them,” someone who was firmly rooted in 
their milieu. Riaan Labuschagne, who worked in the headquarters of the National 
Intelligence Service (an organization represented on the SSC), stated that Botha 
“preferred a cabal or inner circle of ministers advised by the security services through the 
organs of the State Security Council and the security management system.”159  Botha had 
very close ties to the military and had been Minister of Defence from 1966 -1978. Thus, 
there was a fundamental coincidence of worldviews between him and the military 
leadership. The White Papers on Defence were written under Botha’s direction and 
supervision. F. W. De Klerk, who as a cabinet member from 1978 had observed Botha at 
close quarters, described him as “a hawk.”160   
 The military dominated the SSC. Among the permanent members were: the 
Prime Minister and later the President (Botha), Minister of Defence (General Magnus 
Malan), the Chief of the SADF and the heads of SADF Intelligence, the South Africa 
Army, Air Force and Navy. Joining them were the Foreign Minister (Roelof “Pik” 
Botha), the chief of the South Africa Police and the head of the (civilian) National 
Intelligence Service. Only members and invitees could participate in the SSC meetings 
and often the invitees would be other members of the military. For example, General 
Chris Thirion, deputy head of SADF Intelligence would participate.  
All military or security operations inside and outside South Africa, overt and 
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covert, were authorized by the SSC.161  The reach of the military also extended into all 
areas of government. The military, thus, became “an active participant in policymaking. 
Not merely in military matters, but in wider security issues, both domestic and external, 
and even in matters concerning…economic and foreign policy.”162 In effect, foreign, 
defence and internal security policy was kept out of the hands of civilians.163 Retired 
General Chris Thirion stated,  “the military wanted to take over everything.”164  
 The generals viewed the SADF as the vanguard, because in their view only the 
military understood the extent of the danger facing South Africa. General Constand 
Viljoen, SADF Chief of Staff from 1980-85, was very clear on this point: “From the 
military point of view, we realized the seriousness of the situation.”165 This militarized 
approach to apartheid’s survival had necessitated a militarized governing apparatus. This 
was unequivocally demonstrated by the overweening power and composition of the SSC.  
Through the SSC, Botha in concert with the SADF general staff ruled South Africa. The 
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military’s ascension to state power was described as a “bloodless coup.”166  The 
relationship between the civil and military spheres had been reversed. 
SOUTH AFRICA’S WAR OF DESTABILIZATION 
From 1975 to 1988, the South Africa armed forces embarked on a campaign of massive 
regional destabilization. The campaign was an unrelenting military assault. In June 1986, 
the Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report: The Findings of the 
Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa summed up the nature of 
Pretoria’s war against its neighbours: 
 South Africa’s intimidation of its neighbours has rested upon a 
persistent campaign of destabilization and economic disruption; many 
of its neighbours have suffered as a result. Military pressure takes 
many forms…It includes action within neighbouring countries, like 
bombings and other acts of sabotage, as well as independent military 
action, involving air strikes and commando raids; and sometimes it 
takes the form of well-planned incursions.167 
 
The war of destabilization wrought a terrible toll on the region. The financial and human 
cost can not only be measured in direct damage and deaths but also in the premature 
deaths and projected economic loss caused by destruction of infrastructure, agriculture 
and power networks. While, it is very difficult to estimate the economic cost and 
damage, it was undoubtedly immense. One study for example, calculates that up to 1988, 
the total economic cost for the Frontline States was calculated to be in excess of $US 45 
billion: for example, Angola: $US 22 billion; Mozambique: $US 12 billion; Zambia: 
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$US 7 billion; Zimbabwe: $US 3 billion.168 The loss of life was also immense. The TRC 
underscored that: 
the number of people killed inside the borders of the country in the 
course of the liberation struggle was considerably lower than those 
who died outside…the majority of the victims of the South African’s 
government attempts to maintain itself in power were outside South 
Africa. Tens of thousands of people died as a direct or indirect result of 
the South African’s government aggressive intent towards its 
neighbours. The lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands others 
were disrupted by the systematic targeting of infrastructure in some of 
the poorest nations in Africa.169 
 
Between 1981 and 1988, an estimated 1.5 million people were (directly or indirectly) 
killed, including 825, 000 children.170 This was the result of Pretoria sponsored 
insurgencies (namely, UNITA in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique) and direct 
military actions by the SADF. The SADF launched numerous bombing raids, armed 
incursions and assassinations against surrounding countries.171 One notorious example 
was the 4 May 1978 massacre in a camp for Namibian refugees, located in the town of 
Kassinga, southwestern Angola, where a South African air and paratrooper attack killed 
hundreds of people and, also, took hundreds of prisoners.172  
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CUBA’S INTERNATIONALISM 
Cuba’s involvement in Angola was an integral part of the foreign policy pursued by the 
Cuban Revolution. Havana characterized this policy as internationalism, the extensive 
support of national liberation and ant-imperial struggles.  The specialist literature on 
Cuban foreign policy since the advent of the Cuban revolution in 1959, almost invariably 
places the emphasis on post-1959 dynamics and factors.173  At the heart of these analyses 
lie the figures of Fidel Castro and Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. Indubitably the regional and 
international projection of the ideals of the Cuban Revolution was central to the thinking 
of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.  George, for example, characterized Havana’s pursuit 
of an activist foreign policy – internationalism as “the brainchild of its two leading 
figures – Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.”174  However, while, Castro and Guevara were 
central to the construction of post -1959 Cuban foreign policy, the very conception of 
what should be the Cuban revolution’s foreign policy drew on deeply rooted themes in 
Cuban history, especially in the 19th century wars of independence and the work of José 
Martí.  
George argued that the Cuban government’s valorization of Cuban history as a 
major source of Cuban foreign is a post priori or post hoc justification.175 Nevertheless, 
the deployment of these motifs has had considerable influence in Cuba. Indeed, it is 
argumed that the origins of internationalist themes can be traced to the early phase of the 
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European colonization, even before the emergence in the 18th and 19th centuries of Cuban 
national identity. In this projection of internationalism to the period before the 
emergence of Cuban nationhood, Hatuey - a 15th century Taíno cacique (roughly chief) 
from the island of Hispaniola - is often identified as the first internationalist of the 
Columbian age.176   
After resisting Spanish colonization on Hispaniola, Hatuey fled to Cuba, where 
he led further resistance against the Spanish.  Hatuey is viewed as having other parallels 
in Cuban history, such as, Máximo Gómez, the military commander of the 1895-1898 
War for Cuba independence, who was from the Dominican Republic. Jose Luis 
Carnazares Cardenas from the Nico Lopez School of Politics asserted: “Internationalism 
has deep roots in Cuban history. Cuba has benefited, for example, from the 
internationalists acts of Hatuey and Máximo Gómez.”177    
While the projection of the historical roots of Cuba’s internationalism to the 15th 
century can be dismissed as ahistorical and presentist, it is indisputable that at the core of 
Havana’s conceptualization of its international obligations are the political and 
intellectual formulations of José Martí.178 Martí, the intellectual author and main 
organizer of Cuba’s 1895-1898-independence war, is considered the father of the modern 
Cuban nation. Martí did not see himself as leading a struggle that was confined solely to 
Cuba. Martí viewed Cuba’s fight for its independence as part of a continental-wide 
struggle. For Martí the aim of war against Spanish colonial rule “was not simply fighting 
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to overthrow the Spanish and win political independence for Cuba but was also fighting 
as an international revolutionary to secure the liberation of his continent, and indeed of 
the world.”179 This internationalist perspective resonated in Cuba and was reflected in the 
hundreds of Cubans who volunteered to fight against fascism during the Spanish civil 
war. Such was Cuba’s support for the anti-fascist cause that Jorge Risquet, a key Cuba 
official in Cuba's internationalist missions, argued that in  “proportion to its population at 
the time, Cuba was the country that sent the most volunteers to Spain.”180  It was this 
tradition of internationalism that the Cuban Revolution would amplify and transform into 
an explicit sphere of state activity. Cuban historian José Canton Navarro notes that while 
the “Cuban people’s internationalist consciousness” was a product of Cuba’s long 
struggle for independence it “attained its highest expression in the work and ideals of the 
Cuban Revolution…”181 The revolutionary government frequently publicly articulated 
that its pursuit of internationalism was a fulfillment of its ethical responsibilities on a 
world-scale and were ideals deeply rooted in the Cuban historical experience.182  
Nevertheless, internationalism was also viewed as an imperative for both the 
survival of the Revolution and the creation of socialism.  On the question of survival, 
Castro asserted that internationalism, apart from its ethical dimensions, also served as a 
means of revolutionary self-defense: 
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The United States actually declared war against us. It globalized the 
struggle against Cuba, in order to suffocate the revolution, took the war 
to Latin America, Africa, Asia, everywhere. Therefore, we also 
globalized the revolutionary struggle against the United States. It was a 
question of globalizing our struggle in the face of the U.S. global 
struggle against the Cuban Revolution… As to the revolutionary 
movements, for us it was not only our duty but also a necessity.183 
 
Che Guevara underlined this imperative in his February 24, 1965 address to the Second 
Economic Seminar of Afro- Asian Solidarity held in Algiers: 
There are no borders in this struggle to the death, we cannot be 
indifferent to what happens anywhere in the world, because a victory by 
any country over imperialism is our victory, just as any country's defeat 
is a defeat for all of us. The practice of proletarian internationalism is 
not only a duty for the peoples struggling for a better world; it is also an 
inescapable necessity.184 
 
This perspective was evident in the island’s approach to Latin America. The necessity to 
extend the revolutionary and national liberation movement to the rest of Latin America 
was embodied in the First and Second Declarations of Havana adopted at two national 
mass assemblies on September 2, 1960 and February 24, 1962, respectively.  Both 
rejected U.S. imperialism (especially, its embodiment in the Monroe Doctrine) and 
explicitly linked Cuba’s destiny to the fate of continent. The First Declaration affirmed 
Cuba was guided by “the liberating Latin Americanism of José Martí and Benito 
Juarez.”185  The Second Declaration, a much longer and more encompassing document, 
argued that unity of Latin America and the necessity for Revolution was immanent in the 
region's shared and common history. Cuba and Latin America were seen as indissolubly 
linked: “What is the history of Cuba but the history of Latin America.”186  
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Concomitantly, the Cuban Revolution and Latin America’s redemption were inseparable.  
Washington’s hostility to the Cuban Revolution was as much to do about Cuba as about 
forestalling revolution in Latin America: “By crushing the Cuban Revolution they hope 
to dispel the fear that torments them. By eliminating the Cuban Revolution, they hope to 
eliminate the revolutionary spirit of the people.”187 An inevitable and ineluctable 
uprising of the peoples of Latin America is envisaged, a regional historical catharsis 
presaged by the Cuban Revolution.  
However, beyond the extension of revolution and anti-imperialism, the Castro 
government considered internationalism a crucial tool in the radical transformation of the 
society.  The praxis of internationalism was very much entwined with the creation of the 
socialist ethos; it was seen as essential to the creation of a new society. In this context 
voluntary work, originally spearheaded by Guevara, is often considered as the principal 
means by which the revolutionary leadership sought to neutralize and negate capitalist 
values.  But physically and conceptually it was not confined to activities on the island 
itself but also incorporated the missions carried out in other countries. Proletarian 
internationalism - embodied in the slogan “Workers and Oppressed Peoples of All 
Countries Unite!” - was integral to the development of socialist consciousness and values 
that would underpin the new social order.  On February 24, 1985, at the Second Afro-
Asian Economic Solidarity Seminar, Guevara emphasized: 
 
Socialism cannot exist unless there is a change in people's 
consciousness, creating a new fraternal attitude toward humanity, both 
individually, within the society in which socialism is being or has been 
built, and in relation to the world, with respect to all of the nations that 
suffer imperialist aggression.188  
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In a June 7, 1972 speech, Fidel Castro emphasized the role of internationalism in the 
transformation of consciousness as essential to countering "[i[ndividual selfishness.”189  
In an April 7th, 1977 speech to Cuban students in Moscow, Castro addressed to necessity 
to combat egoism and egotistical values, which where antithetical to building an 
authentic socialist society. The development of an internationalist ethos was seen as 
vital: “When these feelings begin to reach man’s heart and conscience, then we are more 
than mean, egotistical individuals; we will have gone beyond individual, family and even 
national egoism…”190 Thus, internationalist ideals were an important part of the 
ideological and ideational struggle to construct socialism.  
CUBA & ANGOLA 
Cuban support for national liberation movements extended beyond Latin America, 
especially to African anti-colonial and national liberation movements.  Diplomatic 
solidarity, training, military aid and other forms of concrete material assistance were 
provided to, for example, the National Liberation Front of Algeria in its struggle for 
independence from France; the Congo where Che Guevara led a guerrilla group; training 
material, aid and medical personnel were given to Guinea-Bissau‘s liberation struggle 
against Portugal. There was, of course, a natural affinity between the Cuban 
revolutionary government and the anti-imperialist and marxist-leninist rhetoric and 
stances of those groups that were supported.  
Cuba’s extensive presence in Angola was one episode –albeit a major one – in its 
engagement with Africa. Havana’s relationship with the MPLA dated back to at least 
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1965.191 Diplomatic assistance and military training was provided to the MPLA. At the 
end of Portuguese colonial rule in 1975 there were several hundred Cuban military 
advisors in Angola. When South African invaded Angola in October 1975 there were 
480 Cuban military instructors in Angola.192  Cuba’s extensive military intervention in 
Angola was initiated on 5 November 1975. The deployment of Cuban troops was 
designated Operation Carlota, named for an enslaved African woman who on 5 
November 1843 led a revolt against slavery in Cuba.   
The Cuban intervention was the direct result of the South African invasion. 
Facing military disaster, the MPLA issued a general proclamation that declared the 
necessity for “a general mobilization of all men between 18 and 45” because the 
“situation very serious.”193 It called on “All patriots to take up arms and go to front to 
defend the country.”194  Luanda also issued an international call for assistance, It made a 
special request to Havana. Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Nigeria sent small troop 
detachments, however, Cuba was the only country to respond on a scale large enough to 
have significant impact. General ONambwe de Carvalho, member of the MPLA Central 
Committee noted: “When we decided to ask Cuba for help, we made a formal request. 
Fidel’s response to our request went further. It went far beyond what we expected.”195  
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  The first Cuban detachment consisted of 652 soldiers from an elite division. By 
the end of November 1975, more than 5,000 Cuban troops were in Angola. This number 
would rise to more than 36,000 in 1976. Among those dispatched were Cuban pilots who 
initially flew MPLA MiG 17s and MiG 21s.  Havana also sent artillery, tanks and aircraft 
(MiG 23s). When the first Cuban troops began arriving the situation was critical for the 
MPLA.  Cuba was to prove instrumental in defeating the South Africans. With South 
Africa forced to withdraw, Havana had won an “overwhelming victory” that “humbled in 
no uncertain terms” South Africa.196  
Cuban involvement in Angola has often been characterized as surrogate activity 
for the Soviet Union, an instrument of Moscow’s foreign policy directives. The 
prevailing view was that Moscow “brought in Cuba troops” into Angola.197 This reflects 
the thinking that understands the Angolan civil war solely in East-West terms. Here 
Cuba’s role is considered simply a function of Moscow’s contestation with Washington 
for influence and control over Africa.198 The Ford, Carter and Reagan U.S. 
administrations condemned Havana for “mercenary steps carried out at Soviet request in 
order to ‘take advantage’ of African conflicts and bring resource-rich Africa under 
Soviet domination.”199 However, while publicly denouncing Cuba for acting at the 
behest of Moscow, Washington had concluded the opposite: Cuba had made the decision 
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to intervene on its own terms and independent of the Soviet Union. Several U.S. officials 
who were involved with the formation and implementation of Washington's Africa 
policies confirm this.  
John Stockwell, the director of CIA operations in Angola during the South 
African invasion and in the immediate aftermath, stated “we learned that Cuba had not 
been ordered into action by the Soviet Union. To the contrary, the Cuban leaders felt 
compelled to intervene for their own ideological reasons.”200 Chester Crocker, the chief 
U.S. diplomat in southern Africa from 1981-1989, stated that in contrast to the Soviet 
Union the “Cuban interest in Angola had a sharper ideological focus and a distinct logic 
of its own.”201 Herman Cohen. U.S. assistant secretary of state for African Affairs from 
1989-1993 and former African Director, U.S. National Security Council, said that in 
relation to Havana’s decision to intervene “[t]he Soviets were not responsible.”202  
It seems that the Ford administration had concluded quite early on that Havana's 
involvement had been solely a Cuban decision. On February 5, 1976, the New York 
Times reported that Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, had concluded that Cuba was 
“exporting revolution on its own initiative.”203 Kissinger “rejected the theory held until 
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recently by most of the administration's leading specialists on Cuba that Prime Minister 
Fidel Castro had been forced by Soviet pressure to send the troops.”204  
Cuba’s independent action is strongly supported by former high-ranking Soviet 
Official N. Brutents. Brutents was director of the Foreign Policy Department of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and stated the Soviet government was unaware of 
Cuba’s decision to send combat troops to Angola: “When the Cuban military forces got 
to Africa, they took us completely by surprise. I had no idea. I got a telegram from our 
ambassador in Guinea saying that Cuban forces were landing. It was a shock.”205 
Brutents also noted that there was discomfiture that Moscow had not been consulted 
beforehand: “We were not happy. We were not happy because the Cubans had acted 
without informing anyone first. I remember that some members of the government said: 
“Why didn’t they ask us? They’re adventurers.”206 
Piero Gliejeses, in his book Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and 
Africa, 1959-76, has provided what is now widely accepted as the definitive account of 
the reasons Cuba became involved in Angola. On the basis of a comprehensive study of 
archival and declassified documents in the United States, Cuba, Britain, Belgium, and 
Portugal and interviews with more than 150 individuals (including CIA officials), he 
concluded that the Cuban government decided to dispatch combat troops to Angola after 
South Africa had invaded, refuting the assertion of the U.S. government (particularly 
those of the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations) that South African forces 
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intervened in Angola only after the arrival of the Cuban forces. Gliejeses also concluded 
that the Soviet Union had no role in Cuba’s decision and was not even informed of it 
prior to deployment.207 Even The Economist, a publication not favourably predisposed to 
the Cuban Revolution, acknowledged that the Cuban government acted on its “own 
initiative.”208 
Havana repeated asserted that they had intervened in Angola at the request of 
Luanda and independent of any directive from Moscow. For example, in an interview 
with Barbara Walters of ABC News (in the United States), Castro stated: “Do you want 
to know if the Soviets asked us to go there (to Angola)? The Soviets did not ask us. They 
never said a single word…It was exclusively a Cuban decision.”209 The late Carlos 
Rafael Rodriguez, a former Cuban vice-president, who was an important member of 
Cuba’s leadership, emphasized that the deployment of troops began “as a purely Cuban 
operation…Cuba will go on giving the African liberation movements the help they need 
with or without coordination with other countries.  It will be according to what we 
decide.”210 
Upon receipt of the Angolan request for assistance, the Castro government had 
initially planned to dispatch combat troops on November 11, the scheduled date for 
Angolan independence. However, the rapid South African advance precipitated the 
decision to start deploying troops earlier. Jorge Risquet, head of Cuba’s Africa missions, 
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said: “It was then that we understood that the South Africans had invaded.”211 Castro 
asserted: 
When South African regular troops invaded Angola, we couldn’t stand 
by and do nothing. When the MPLA asked for our help we offered them 
the help they needed to prevent apartheid being installed in Angola.212  
 
Jorge Risquet, who oversaw Cuba’s Africa missions, emphasized that Luanda’s appeal 
was an urgent, rapid request…The fact is that no country in Africa 
was in a position to send in forces with the speed, efficiency, and 
numbers the moment demanded. It was not simply a case of 
sending in a battalion. [The Republic of] Guinea sent in forces. 
Guinea-Bissau also sent in a small unit - in accordance with its 
resources. These were wonderful gestures of solidarity. But the 
scope of the danger required enormous forces. We sent in 36,000 
men and began to push the enemy south. This required a fully 
fledged army, with all the necessary weapons.213 
 
On December 22, 1975 Castro invoked internationalism to justify Cuba’s intervention: 
We are carrying out an elementary internationalist duty when we help 
the Angolan people. We are not seeking oil, nor cooper, nor iron; we 
seek absolutely nothing. We are simply applying our political 
principles. We do not fold our arms when we see an African people, our 
brother - that the imperialists want devoured - suddenly and brutally 
attacked by South Africa.  We do not fold arms and we will never fold 
our arms!214 
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These statements indicate an outlook that not only existed in the Cuban leadership but 
also among rank-and-file soldiers. This was invariably reflected in the 17 interviews 
conducted with Cuban veterans. They expressed their pride in extending assistance to a 
people in need, to have served the internationalist principles of the Cuban Revolution 
and to have demonstrated human solidarity.  For example, Javier Dominguez, who 
served in Angola from 1975-77, said: “The Angolan mission was a fulfilment of our 
internationalist duty.”215 Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Saria Gonzalez served three tours 
in Angola as a combat pilot. His first tour of service was in January 1976. He stated: 
When we went to Angola we felt a little like Che [Guevara]. The 
principles of helping another people are very important. Angola was 
invaded by two countries: South Africa and Zaire. They could not 
face those invasions, so we went. It is biblical. I am not a believer. 
Solidarity, friendship are biblical principles.216 
 
This sense of internationalism was also reflected among those who served in later phases 
of Cuban military involvement. Moreno Hildago, who served in a tank brigade in Angola 
from 1987-1989, said: “I was a volunteer and understood that we were defending Angola 
from racist aggression.”217 Another member of the Cuban armed forces explained: 
Angola had freed itself from colonialism and was attacked by South 
Africa, so Angola asked Cuba to help against South Africa. We’ll help 
any poor country in need…It’s true that many comrades fell, some 
from my own unit, people who’d been with me in the army. It’s sad 
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but we all have to do die one day. And to die for the freedom and 
independence of a country is to die for a just cause.218 
 
The issue of race was also directly engaged. The revolutionary leadership openly located 
the Angolan mission within Cuba's history of slavery. The military intervention was 
justified as both defending an independent country against foreign invasion and repaying 
an historical debt owed by Cuba to Africa as a result of slavery and the slave trade.  This 
was reflected in the decision to name the mission Operacion Carlota, in honour of the 5 
November 1843 slave revolt. Fidel Castro frequently evoked Cuba's historical links to 
Africa at several prominent occasions where traditional policies and directions were re-
affirmed or new policies and directions announced.  For example, at the the April 19th, 
1976 gathering to mark the 15th anniversary of the victory at Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs), he 
declared that Cuba was a Latin-African nation: 
Those who once enslaved man and sent him to America perhaps never 
imagined that one of those peoples who received slaves would one day 
send their fighters to struggle for freedom in Africa…We are a Latin-
American people…219 
 
Castro was the not the only one in the leadership circles to express these sentiments. 
Risquet was also unambiguous in explaining Cuba’s military intervention in terms of 
Cuba's commitment to Africa.220 However, George argued that Havana’s invocation of an 
historical debt owed by Cuba to Africa was opportunistic and manipulative.221 
Nevertheless, the sentiment of indebtedness to Africa was not a discourse that existed only 
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among the top leadership. It resonated with the Cuban public, especially black Cubans who 
were able to make symbolic connection with their African roots. While George argued that 
these sentiments were manipulated by Havana, there is no doubt that there are enduring 
themes, motifs and traditions of Cuban history that link Cuba and Africa. As Terrence 
Cannon noted that for many black Cubans volunteering was akin to defending Cuba except 
that the fight was “this time in Africa.  And they were aware that Africa was, in some 
sense, their homeland.”222    
Reverend Abbuno Gonazalez of the Cuban Pentecostal Church served in Angola 
and was able to make both a symbolic and concrete connection: "My grandfather came 
from Angola. So it is my duty to go and help Angola. I owe it to my ancestors.”223    
General Rafael Moracen, who is black, stated: 
When we arrived in Angola, I heard an Angolan say that our 
grandparents, whose children where taken away from Africa to be 
slaves, would be happy to see their grandchildren return to Africa to 
help free it. I will always remember those words.224 
 
 
Whether Cubans, as a whole, freely volunteered or were coerced into participating in the 
military mission continues to be debated.225  The research of this author points to the 
voluntary participation of Cubans in the military mission.  Eduardo Sarria Gonzalez, who 
served three tours in Angola stated: “If you decided not to go it was not a problem.” He, 
also, added (reflecting a universal concern of machismo): “But you might not get a 
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woman.”226 Moreno Hildago, who served in a tank brigade in Angola from 1987-1989, 
said: “I was a volunteer and understood that we were defending Angola from racist 
aggression.”227  Carlos Fundora who served in Angola from 1985-87 stated, “up to the 
last minute, you had the right to say you weren’t going. There was one compañero who 
afterwards said he wasn't going.”228 
There were also cases of people who, though turned down for military service in 
Angola, still attempted to smuggle themselves to Angola. One of the most famous 
instances is that of Esther Lilia Diaz Rodriguez. She had repeated been rejected on the 
basis that “it is much harder there for a woman.”229  As she was preparing to smuggle 
herself aboard a troop ship, she was granted official permission to go. Her experience 
was a reflection of the sexism in Cuban society. While women could serve as nurses, 
journalists or technicians, there existed “conventional wisdom” that outright military 
roles, especially combat, was not only not suitable for women but not in keeping with 
their abilities. This, of course, directly contradicted the history of women combatants 
during the 1956-1953 Revolutionary War and the programs instituted by the Federación 
de Mujeres Cubanas (Federation of Cuban Women).  Eventually the leadership 
intervened resulting in the deployment of several anti-aircraft battalions that were solely 
comprised of women.   
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ROAD TO CUITO CUANAVALE 
Angola bore the full weight of Pretoria’s policy of regional military intervention through 
a series of South African military operations launched against it, from 1975 to 1988. 
Pretoria deemed the interventions imperative because an independent Angola was 
considered a direct threat to South African control of Namibia, and by extension the 
apartheid state. Angola became the strategic area in South Africa’s drive for regional 
hegemony. The interventions reached the most intense level in 1987-88. The focus of 
this chapter and the next is the 1987-88 military engagements that eventually centred on 
the Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale.  This Chapter concentrates on the lead-up to the 
battle of Cuito Cuanavale. This necessitates asking a number of interrelated questions, 
for example: Why did Pretoria intervene? What were its objectives? Did it ever intend to 
capture Cuito Cuanavale? Why and under what conditions did Havana intervene? 
 Engaging these questions and constructing a narrative requires navigation though 
interviews, memoirs, documents and accounts from the two warring sides and their 
allies, as well as the articles in the contemporary major western, South African and 
liberation movement newspapers and magazines. Among other documents, of particular 
interest are the declassified documents of the United States Defence Intelligence Agency, 
consisting of two briefing reports on the conflict.  The Reagan administration was a close 
ally of the Botha regime, and these documents reflect the information that was shared 
between Pretoria and Washington. Interviews with Angolan Generals Jorge Dumba and 
Antonio dos Santos and other Angolan soldiers are also important sources.      
 However, the most detailed firsthand accounts come from Cubans and South 
Africans sources, serving as very important primary sources. South African accounts are 
more comprehensive in the treatment of each phase of the conflict. The personal 
experiences of SADF officers and soldiers form the main substance of these accounts. 
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The most substantial is the series of extensive interviews conducted by Frederick 
Bridgland with SADF officers. The SADF high command granted Bridgland, former 
southern African correspondent for The Sunday Telegraph, unprecedented access to 
personnel who fought in Angola during 1987-88. His compilation of interviews and 
commentary is considered the SADF authorized version of the conflict. Colonel Jan 
Breytenbach’s commentary is invaluable as he was not only a high-ranking SADF 
officer but also privy to the decisions and decision-making process of the SSC and 
SADF general staff. These two are the most authoritative and comprehensive South 
African accounts. They are supplemented by other South Africans memoirs and 
interviews conducted with SADF officers and soldiers. 
 Most interestingly, at the highest decision-making levels of the Botha regime, 
SADF Chief General Geldenhuys’ memoirs only dealt in depth with events from August 
to October 1987. He does not address the siege of Cuito Cuanavale in any detail.  The 
interview with Major General Chris Thirion, Deputy-Director of SADF Intelligence 
Services, offered a different perspective on the aspects that Geldenhuys does cover and a 
window on those he does not.  Illuminating further the decisions made at this state 
echelon are the minutes of the meetings of the SSC. Although neither stenographic, 
verbatim nor an otherwise complete record of what was said and discussed, and despite 
being heavily edited, the minutes nevertheless provide significant insight into the 
decisions, aims and concerns of the Botha regime.  
 From the Cuban side, there are numerous speeches and several memoirs by 
officers, soldiers and officials, who were directly involved. However, none of these, by 
itself, represents a sustained or detailed treatment.  The sole exception is the classified 
Cuban armed forces report on the battle. This constitutes the longest and most detailed 
official Cuban description, and includes verbatim renderings of the discussions at the 
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Cuban leadership level. The primary focus of official Cuban accounts falls on strategic 
issues and on what are deemed to be crucial moments in the confrontation, rather than a 
detailed treatment of each phase.  The many Cuban memoirs provide the personal 
dimension by detailing various individual experiences.  
 Taken separately, Cuban and South African accounts would provide a one-sided, 
limited, fragmented and inherently untrustworthy narrative. However, taken together 
they provide the material upon which to assemble a coherent and plausible account of the 
battle, the intent and goals of the various parties, and the actual outcome.  Where, given 
the diametrically opposed vested interests, sharp and irreconcilable contradictions would 
be anticipated, instead remarkable agreement and coincidence is found on key aspects 
among the overwhelming majority of the Cuban and South African accounts. In many 
critical areas of the various accounts, the descriptions and evaluation of what occurred 
converge.  What distinguishes them is emphasis. South African accounts focus on valour, 
esprit de corps and fighting qualities of the South African troops, Cuban accounts on 
strategic issues. 
SOUTH AFRICAN INVASIONS OF ANGOLA, 1975-1986 
As Portuguese rule in Angola began to fade, SWAPO’s fortunes were enhanced. General 
Geldenhuys underscored that Angola was now a threat to South African control of 
Namibia as SWAPO now had the “springboard for renewed infiltration.”230  SWAPO 
was now able to establish a presence and bases inside Angola. This made access to 
Namibia much easier because “a much shorter route awaited insurgents of SWAPO’s 
People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) on their way home.”231 Increasing 
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numbers of prospective recruits crossed over from Namibia to the SWAPO bases inside 
Angola. This influx of new people was estimated to be around 6,000.232  By November 
1974, “SWAPO camps of up to seventy men were already in place.”233  
Initially South Africa adopted a policy of covert intervention in Angola against 
the MPLA through financing and supplying both the UNITA and the Frente Nacional de 
Liberataçáo de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola, or FNLA). The 
collapse of the 21 January 1975 Alvor Agreement, which proposed a transitional 
government encompassing the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, resulted in the outbreak of 
civil war. As the fighting intensified, Pretoria increased the level of its support to the 
FNLA and UNITA. Weapons and money were sent. This was followed by the 
dispatching of military instructors because the SADF had successfully argued for greater 
and more direct South African involvement as the necessary condition for success.234  
 U.S. involvement paralleled growing South African intervention, resulting in 
close cooperation. In 1975, as the Portuguese were in the process of withdrawing from 
Angola the U.S. government had already begun to manoeuvre, in order to stop the 
MPLA from ascending to power by funding UNITA and FNLA.235  Henry Kissinger 
(then U.S. Secretary of State) coordinated U.S. efforts with South Africa.  Vorster had 
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consulted Washington on his decision to support UNITA and FNLA.236 Despite the 
extensive assistance by South Africa and the United States, the FNLA and UNITA were 
unable to defeat the MPLA. An MPLA victory seemed inevitable.  
At this juncture Pretoria decided to launch a pre-emptive invasion. Pretoria saw 
Angola as the most direct and greatest threat facing South Africa, and it was in Angola 
that it decided to act with the most direct and greatest urgency, otherwise, a policy of 
non-interference “would without doubt encourage a takeover by a pro-communist force 
friendly to SWAPO.”237 Die Burger, the influential Afrikaner nationalist newspaper, 
characterized the situation in Angola as “the tremendous struggle between the forces of 
order and chaos in Southern Africa.”238 General Geldenhuys succinctly summed up 
Pretoria’s fear: “war was now on its doorstep.”239 
Washington also encouraged Pretoria to “intervene militarily against the 
MPLA.”240 The decision to invade was made without consultation of the Parliament or 
the full cabinet and was not made public.241 The decision was driven by then-Defence 
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Minister Botha and the SADF general staff.242 The goal was to protect Namibia by 
preventing the formation of an MPLA government by installing either UNITA or FNLA 
in power.243 The 1977 White Paper on Defence stated that the invasion was necessary to 
protect Pretoria’s control of Namibia “in order to deflect the effects of the Angolan civil 
war from the Northern border of South West Africa and inhibit SWAPO’s efforts to 
capitalize on the unstable situation in the southern region of Angola.”244 There were also 
broader ideological and geopolitical considerations. The SADF submission to the TRC 
stated the objective was to halt “further Soviet-led expansion in the region.”245  
 On August 22-23 1975, South Africa occupied the Calueque Dam in southern 
Angola. The August incursion laid the basis for a major invasion that was launched on 
October 14 1975.   Code-named Operation Savannah, the invasion involved four battle 
groups of 2,000 – 3,000 troops. They went into combat with Angolan allies from UNITA 
and FNLA. Angola was also invaded from the North as troops from Zaire joined the 
FNLA. Pretoria also provided military advisors to the FNLA/Zairean formations, which 
totalled 3,000 soldiers.246 By the end of the operation the SADF had deployed 4000 to 
5000 soldiers. The South African operation was divided into four distinct but 
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overlapping phases. The first three focused on clearing FAPLA from the approaches to 
Luanda, the Angolan capital: securing the border-area, the south and centre of Angola, 
respectively. The fourth and final phase “provided for the capture of Luanda, the ultimate 
military objective.”247 The objective was for both invading forces to eventually unite and 
occupy Luanda before 11 November 1975. The capture of Luanda before 11 November 
was considered imperative, as it was date set for the official declaration of Angola’s 
independence. Whoever had control of Luanda (the MPLA or an UNITA/FNLA 
coalition) would have the political advantage and a greater chance of being recognized as 
the legitimate government by the international community.  
  Facing the South African advance from the south and a Zaire supported FNLA 
attack from the north, the MPLA found itself in a perilous situation. The South Africans 
were better equipped (in terms of weapons and transport) and trained than their FAPLA 
counterparts. They also enjoyed air supremacy.248 At one point, The Times (London) 
reported that the FNLA was only 18-miles from Luanda.249 As previously noted in 
Chapter One, the MPLA called for “a general mobilization of all men between 18 and 
45” as the “situation is very serious.”250  To counter the situation, Luanda made a 
specific request for assistance from Havana.  
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 As noted in Chapter One, on 5 November 1975 Havana began Operation Carlota, 
leading to the deployment of 36,000 troops, MiGs, tanks and artillery. This military force 
transformed the balance of power on the ground. The South Africans were stopped, and 
then forced to retreat from Angola. On 27 March 1976, the last South African troops 
withdrew from Angola into Namibia.251 Pretoria’s decision to withdraw was prompted 
not only by the SADF’s inability to overcome Cuban/Angolan resistance and the success 
of the Cuban/Angolan counter-offensive but also by the collapse of concrete U.S. 
support for the ongoing campaign. On December 19 1975 and January 27 1976 the U.S. 
Senate and U.S. House of representatives voted 54 to 22 and 323 to 99, respectively, to 
support Senator Richard Clarke’s measure to suspend any financial or material support 
for any “military or paramilitary operations in Angola.”252 Pretoria had hoped to obtain 
more sophisticated weapons systems to use against the Cuban and Angolan forces.253 
The Clarke Amendment dashed those wishes. The collapse of U.S. support was reflected 
in Washington’s decision not to veto the 31 March 1976 UN Security Resolution 367 
condemning South Africa’s invasion, which was adopted by a vote of 9 to 0, with the 
U.S. abstaining.254 
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 Despite the South African withdrawal, Havana apparently wanted to continue to 
pursue the South African forces into Namibia in order to end the South African 
occupation and establish Namibian independence.255 However, the Castro government 
did not carry out its planned military offensive because Moscow opposed any such 
action, refusing to provide any support because of concerns that such an action could 
provoke direct U.S. intervention to prevent the defeat of South Africa.256 
THE ANGOLAN LYNCH PIN 
Despite the failure of the invasion, Pretoria deemed Angola to be not only a key arena in 
the contestation between apartheid and anti-apartheid forces but also the most critical 
one outside of South Africa. This preoccupation is reflected in F. W. De Klerk’s account 
of the first cabinet meeting he attended in April of 1978. According to De Klerk “[t]he 
normal agenda was set aside” to determine to what extent South Africa should intervene 
in Angola to preserve its control of Namibia.257 The designation of Angola as a central 
threatre of struggle to preserve the apartheid regime was formally codified in two 
documents approved by the SSC in March 1979 unambiguously articulating and 
encapsulating Pretoria’s policy towards Angola for the following decade. Central to this 
approach was the dislodging of the MPLA. The first document established the long-term 
goal of overthrowing the MPLA and instituting South African control of the country.258 
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The second was much more specific, focusing on the short-term actions that were 
considered essential to eliminating the MPLA. To achieve this “the political situation in 
Angola would be kept as unstable as possible...”259 It authorized a series of clandestine 
operations in Angola and support for UNITA, which included actions to “disrupt the 
national infrastructure of Angola...”260 There were four elements to this strategy:   
a. Subjecting southern Angola to a national strategy for as long 
as it takes to pressure the MPLA to abandon its support for 
SWAPO;  
b. Enlisting UNITA and other movements as partners against the 
Marxist onslaught; c. Destroying SWAPO bases in Angola 
through coordinated actions; d. Making preparations for 
conventional operations against Angolan, Cuban and SWAPO 
forces.261 
 
An integral element of this strategy was establishing a UNITA government in southern 
Angola as the direct prelude to the “partition of Angola” into two separate countries: a 
MPLA controlled north and a UNITA south.262 As UNITA played a central role in this 
stratagem, its preservation was considered essential.  The SSC and SADF viewed 
UNITA’s survival as contingent on and directly tied to the fate of its leader, Jonas 
Savimbi. The centrality of UNITA and Savimbi to the apartheid regime is further 
demonstrated by a March 6, 1979 letter by SADF Chief Magnus Malan to Maj. Gen. 
Earp, head of SADF Operation. Malan declared that Savimbi’s “continued existence 
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directly influences the future of Southern Africa. He has become so important that we 
will have to ensure his safety.”263 
 Toward this end, the Botha regime devoted considerable resources and planning 
to the destabilization of the MPLA, with the SADF intervening in Angola throughout the 
1980s to preserve UNITA and prevent its defeat – and even destruction – from several 
FAPLA offensives. During the 1980s, the SADF launched several military invasions. 
Operation Skeptic occurred in 1980; and was followed by Operation Protea in 1981. 
Operation Protea was the archetype for the other operations that followed. The 
subsequent SADF interventions were extensions of the objectives of Operation Protea.  
Operation Protea was a direct attempt to implement the SSC directives of March 1979. 
Under Operation Protea, the SADF launched an invasion of southern Angola with the 
aim of seizing Cunene and Cuando Cubango provinces, thereby establishing a region 
under UNITA control. Protea was followed by a series of interventions: Daisy in 1981; 
Super and Meebos in 1982; Phoenix and Askari in 1983. In 1985, Operation Boswilger 
was launched in response to a FAPLA offensive against UNITA, leading to the capture 
of Jamba, the provincial capital of Cuando Cubango. These interventions were not 
limited incursions. They amounted “to full-scale invasions involving armored cars, 
fighter bombers and large detachments of troops.”264 These repeated invasions resulted 
in a South Africa military presence in the province of Cunene that lasted until 1988.  
 The largest, longest and most intensive intervention took place in August 1987 
under Operation Modular. It was to last into July 1988, with the South African 
appellations changing from Operation Modular to Operation Hooper to Operation 
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Packer and, finally, to Operation Displace.265 The military contestation, which began as 
an SADF response to a FAPLA offensive against UNITA in Cuando Cubango province, 
eventually centred on the south-eastern Angolan town of Cuito Cuanavale in a siege and 
series of battles that lasted from October 1987 to April 1988. It was to end in a military 
standoff on the Angola-Namibia frontier.  
THE 1987 FAPLA OFFENSIVE 
In the first half of 1987, the MPLA government initiated a substantial rearmament 
program.  Luanda refitted and rearmed several FAPLA brigades with significant 
deliveries of new Soviet weapons, particularly T-55 and T-62 tanks and MiG fighter 
aircraft. The refitting and rearmament were in preparation for a summer offensive in 
Cuando Cubango province that was planned for August 1987. While the exact size of the 
supplies for 1987, materiel and financial value, is not known, the Soviet archives provide 
an indirect indication of the level of the military assistance. From 1976 to February 1989, 
Moscow delivered to Luanda military equipment worth 3.7 billion roubles. Using the 
estimated exchange value for the Soviet rouble, this would amount to US$1.48 billion 
US.266  The annual average for the period would be approximately 284 million roubles 
(US$113.6 million).  Given, the preparations being made for a major FAPLA offensive, 
it is reasonable to assume that the actual value of the military supplies provided would 
have exceeded - probably quite considerably - the 284 million rouble average. For 
comparison purposes, the Soviet documents indicate that in 1989, 600 million roubles 
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(US$240 million) worth of military supplies were delivered to Angola.267  As this was 
the year after the principal military confrontations, it appears logical to conclude that the 
value of the military supplies for the 1987, the year of the FAPLA offensive, would have 
been equivalent, if not much larger.  
 The 1987 offensive was the largest and most complex military operation initiated 
by FAPLA. The objective of the offensive was to wrest from UNITA’s control the towns 
of Jamba and Mavinga in Cuando Cubango province. Jamba served as the headquarters 
of UNITA. Mavinga was an important communications and transport node, whose 
strategic value was enhanced by its airstrip. The capture of these towns would have cut-
off South African supply routes to UNITA, dealing a significant - if not decisive blow - 
to UNITA’s capacity to operate effectively in southern Angola.   
It has been asserted that that the Cuban forces were directly involved in the 
planning and execution of the FAPLA offensive.268 For example, the SADF Chief of 
Staff General Jannie Geldenhuys described the offensive as “the Cuban-FAPLA 
advance.”269 However, the evidence indicates that the Cubans were not involved in the 
Angolan offensive, except to register their strong opposition.  Havana had had serious 
reservations about the efficacy of the military operation. This was reflected in the very 
definite points of divergence between the Cuban and Soviet military assessment of the 
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Angolan situation. These differing perspectives and even disagreements are attested to 
by Cuban and U.S. sources.  
 Havana has repeatedly stated that the offensive was initiated in accord with 
Soviet military advice and that they had no role in its planning or implementation. 
Various Cuban officials and documents consistently and unambiguously affirm the 
Cuban opposition to the offensive. The detailed Cuban armed forces internal report on 
the war in Angola states that the FAPLA offensive was launched “in accord with Soviet 
military advice.”270 Castro stated several times that Havana disapproved, describing it on 
one occasion as a military operation that “we had nothing to do with” and one “with 
which we did not agree.”271 On another occasion he said that the Cubans were quite clear 
in expressing their opposition to the Soviets and Angolans on the matter, telling them: 
“Don’t count on us.”272 
 The Cuban denial that they had any role in the planning or execution of the 
offensive is supported by declassified U.S. documents and the assessment of Chester 
Crocker, Washington’s chief diplomat in Africa.  The consensus in Washington was that 
Havana was not involved.  In a memorandum of 11 May, the United States Defense 
Intelligence Agency characterized the FAPLA operation as “[t]he Soviet, Cuban and 
Angolan strategy...”273  However, in the later fuller report of 12 December 1988, this 
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assessment changed.  The FAPLA operation was now solely described as both a “Soviet 
designed” and a “Soviet planned offensive.”274 Chester Crocker in his memoirs echoed 
this assessment referring to the offensive as “the sweepingly ambitious Soviet-Angolan 
military plan,”275 in which the Cubans “played only a minimal role.”276  
 This reflected not only Cuban non-participation in but also a serious 
disagreement on the viability of the military operation. The planning of the offensive 
exposed the different perspectives that existed between Soviet and Cuban military 
advisors.  Soviet military advisors not only advocated the offensive but, also, developed 
the strategic framework.  Cuban military advisors had opposed the operation from the 
outset, arguing that it was strategically mistaken. In an understatement of Havana’s 
objection, Jorge Risquet said that the offensive “may not have been well-planned.”277  
 Cuban opposition centered on two issues. First, Cuban military advisors had 
advised against the offensive because it would create the opportunity for a significant 
South African intervention, which in turn would place the Angolan forces in a precarious 
situation. Jorge Risquet, who worked closely with Luanda, argued that the “FAPLA 
offensive took very little regard or consideration of what the enemy forces would or 
could do,” and did not have enough military force “to confront a South African 
intervention.”278  Consequently, the Cuban armed forces (FAR) decided not to participate 
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in the offensive. This conflicts with George’s assertion that the Cuban forces had 
received authorization “to become involved in the 1987 offensive.”279  
Havana asserted that the offensive was the origin of the crisis that would grip 
FAPLA in 1987-88.280  Castro underscored that the Cuban military had always been 
opposed to these offensives against Jamba, because South Africa invariably: 
  intervened at the last moment with its modern air power, its powerful 
artillery and its armoured forces able to inflict such heavy losses on the 
Angolan troops - and they couldn’t be stopped, We discussed this matter 
with the Soviets and the Angolans every year: ‘Don’t carry out X 
offensive, don’t get into such wasting, costly and finally pointless 
offensives. And count us out if you do.’281    
 
Crocker’s memoirs clearly indicate that the Reagan administration were very much 
aware of the strong differences between the Cuban and Soviet advisors. He noted that 
Havana “did not share Soviet assumptions about likely countermoves; a debate had 
broken out over probable SADF ground and air responses to yet another FAPLA thrust 
toward Mavinga and Jamba. The Cubans argued against the 1987 Soviet-Angolan battle 
plan...”282 Pretoria, through its intelligence operations had its own independent 
knowledge of the Cuban disagreement with the Soviets. Riaan Labuschagne, who served 
in the headquarters of South Africa’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), stated that he 
had recruited Colonel Anatoly Polozok, the Soviet military attaché at the Soviet Embassy 
in Botswana. Polozok informed Labuschagne of the disagreement over the planned 
August 1987 offensive. Polozok said that if the military operation went ahead, the Cuban 
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advisors “predicted defeat by the South Africans.”283 This view of Soviet-Cuban 
disagreement was also reflected in several contemporary media reports.284  
 Cuban military advisors argued that Moscow did not appreciate the differences 
between the Angola and Europe. Soviet advisors relied heavily on the experience of the 
Second World War, mechanically transplanting strategy and tactics. Castro stated that 
Moscow adopted an “academic concept”285 rather than a realistic appraisal of what was 
required in Angola.  The Soviet military approach in Angola was guided by “military 
conceptions that were appropriate for a European theatre of war.”286 Castro emphasized 
that the Soviets “believed they were fighting the battle of Berlin, with Zhukov in 
command, and with thousands of tanks, with 40,000 artillery guns...They did not 
understand, nor could they understand the problems of the Third World, the theatre of 
the fight and the kind of war that we had to fight in this scenario.”287   
 The Soviet focus was on large-scale operations that involved concentrating troops 
and materiel, and then directing those concentrations against various targets. Cuban 
military advisors argued that this was neither suitable nor applicable to Angola, stressing 
that mobility and flexibility were necessary. They argued that large-scale operations 
were too ponderous for southern Angola and would create severe logistical problems.  
Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Sari Gonzalez observed: “The problem with Soviet advisers 
was the fact that they under-appreciated any other forum or theatre of fighting other than 
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the frontlines on a European scale. They were not open to the reality that Africa was 
different.”288  Jorge Risquet, the main Cuba representative in Angola, observed: 
 For many years our military thinking in Angola did not agree with the 
Soviet advisers, who were brilliant at taking Berlin during the Second 
World War, they did not understand what had to be done in Angola. But the 
Soviets were the advisers of the MPLA. The Soviets, not the Cubans.  They 
called the shots, but we did not agree. We left it up to them. We did not 
control Angola, the MPLA or the USSR. We kept out of it.289 
 
Cuban objections aside, it also appears that both the United States and South Africa 
anticipated an offensive in the summer of 1987.  Launching military operations at that 
time of year was considered to be the FAPLA modus operandi, as reflected in the United 
States Defence Intelligence Agency’s December 12, 1988 memorandum, noting: “the 
Angolan government has launched annual dry season offensives against the UNITA base 
area in recent years.”290 Washington’s and Pretoria’s anticipation of the offensive was 
not only based on past experience but, also, on specific foreknowledge of FAPLA’s 
military plans for 1987.  Crocker stated that in July 1987, Washington “became aware 
that dos Santos [president of Angola] had decided to mount a long-planned military 
offensive against UNITA.”291 He further indicated that Washington had known of the 
operation by at least 2 July 1987.292  As already mentioned, Pretoria also had 
foreknowledge of the planned FAPLA offensive, though the Colonel Anatoly Polozok, 
the Soviet official recruited in Zambia by the South African intelligence service.293  
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While, Crocker did not indicate the actual source or means by which the information was 
obtained, it seems plausible, given the close relationship between the Reagan and Botha 
governments, that this information would have been shared between Pretoria and 
Washington. Whether, Washington or Pretoria had acquired their information 
independently or in co-operation, clearly the Angolan military operation did not catch 
either by surprise.  
 Despite Cuban objections, the FAPLA offensive, designated Saudação de 
Outubro (October Salute) was launched on 10 July 1987. With the small southeastern 
town of Cuito Cuanavale in the province of Cuando Cubango as the staging area, the 
FAPLA offensive set out from two directions (see Map 2).  The goal was to catch 
UNITA in a pincer movement. One arm of the pincer proceeded from the east, the other 
from the southeast.  Eight brigades - the 8th, 13th, 16th, 21st, 25th, 47th, 59th, and 66th - 
were deployed with more than 150 tanks. The 21st, 25th, 47h and 59th were considered the 
elite formations in FAPLA, and spearheaded the drive.   
The exact number of troops committed by Luanda to the offensive is difficult to 
ascertain. Unlike the Cuban and South African militaries, there exists no detailed record 
or registry of the number of Angolans who served and fought in the battles that were 
waged in the 1970s and 1980s.  FAPLA was comprised of soldiers who were recruited 
en masse from villages and other communities. The resources and infrastructure for 
precise recordkeeping were not available. Susan Hurlich, an advisor to the MPLA in the 
1980s and early 1990s, noted: “FAPLA was largely an unregistered army.”294 The 
official SADF account, estimated that at least 10,000 were deployed.295 
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Though forewarned by Pretoria, UNITA was unable to repel the offensive and 
was forced to retreat. The SADF noted that the FAPLA offensive against UNITA had 
achieved “speedy progress,”296 The U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency described the 
offensive as “impressive,”297 and noted that the “offensive seriously challenged 
UNITA’s base region.”298 As the FAPLA operation continued, UNITA was further 
driven back and was on the verge of defeat. With UNITA in retreat, the first critical 
phase of the campaign was reached as the FAPLA units approached Mavinga in the 
south of Cuando Cubango province in pursuit of retreating UNITA forces.  
Map2: FAPLA 1987 July offensive.299 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION  
As UNITA’s military position deteriorated, Pretoria grew increasingly worried, viewing 
the developing Angola situation as a direct threat to its regional interests.  The defeat of 
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UNITA would have meant its end as a force in Angola and a severe blow to the SSC 
objective of removing the MPLA and establishing a compliant regime. The Washington 
Post and New York Times both linked South African military intervention to Pretoria’s 
immediate objective of preventing the defeat of UNITA by the Angolan armed forces.300  
This assessment is supported by a number of statements made during and after the 
intervention by leading generals and representatives of the apartheid regime. In a 
November 1987 press conference, General Geldenhuys, SADF Chief of Staff, 
acknowledged that South Africa had intervened to prevent the defeat of UNITA. Magnus 
Malan told the South African parliament that given the situation “we have no choice.”301 
Colonel Jan Breytenbach wrote that the SSC decided, “to pull Savimbi’s chestnuts out of 
the fire.”302  General Meiring was quite succinct: “Savimbi couldn’t stop the MPLA, so 
we had to.”303  
 The Botha regime cast the intervention as an imperative and unavoidable 
necessity to protect South African regional security interests, and South Africa itself.  
For example, Geldenhuys tied the invasion to broader issue of maintaining control of 
Namibia, which was essential to protecting South Africa from armed incursions. An 
SADF officer underscored the centrality of UNITA to Pretoria’s regional ambitions: “If 
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Savimbi takes over Luanda our war would be over.”304 Colonel Gerhard Louw, an SADF 
ground force commander at the time, emphasized that the intervention was driven by 
Pretoria’s determination to put UNITA in a superior tactical and strategic position and, 
thus, “entrench Savimbi’s control of southern Angola.”305 This was a prerequisite for 
maintaining Pretoria’s grip on Namibia. A UNITA defeat would render Namibia more 
vulnerable to SWAPO infiltration. Geldenhuys justified the intervention on the basis that 
it prevented “Swapo from activating the east and West Caprivi and Kavango.”306  He 
emphasized that the “capture of UNITA’s headquarters would render northeast Namibia 
vulnerable to SWAPO incursions from Angola and open new routes for ANC guerillas to 
infiltrate South Africa from Angola.”307 He went on to add that: “The Defence Force’s 
action is in line with the policy of the South African government to protect its own 
interests wherever and whenever necessary.”308   
 Broad consensus existed within the regime for military action to preserve UNITA 
and avoid a major setback to its regional goals.  Any challenge to South African control 
of Namibia was considered a challenge to the apartheid itself: a more vulnerable 
Namibia meant a more vulnerable South Africa. In his May 17, 1988 address to the 
South African parliament, Defence Minister Malan defended the military intervention on 
the same basis, arguing that 
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last year’s events in South Eastern Angola had the South African 
government facing two options, i.e., that of allowing the communist 
surrogate forces and the Fapla army to destroy Unita or of trying to help 
Unita with South Africa forces. Faced by [sic] these choices, the 
Government decided on the latter, if we had decided on the former, Unita 
could have been brought to its knees. That would have cleared the way for 
the infiltration of communist forces, the ANC and Swapo terrorists into 
South West Africa/Namibia’s whole northern and eastern territory. These 
forces of violence and terrorism could then have spilled over into the 
neighbouring states in Southern Africa, even bringing them to within 
striking distance of the Transvaal.309 
 
The date of the SADF intervention remains to be established. However, it seems that by 
the middle of August the SADF was involved in the fighting in Angola through 
operations carried out by the elite 32nd Battalion,310 increased military supplies to 
UNITA and air-strikes on FAPLA positions. This can be inferred from various sources. 
Cuban sources have identified 17 August as date when the first South African artillery 
barrage was unleashed against the Angolan forces.311 On the South Africa side, Malan in 
his 18 May 1988 parliamentary presentation on the South African military intervention, 
mentioned “the past nine months when the SA Defence Force was involved there 
[Angola]”.312 This implicitly indicated that SADF involvement began in August 1987. 
Geldenhuys supported this dating, stating in his memoir that in August 1987 the SADF 
began to extend military support for UNITA.313  
At the end of August, the South African Air Force (SAAF) was bombing FAPLA 
positions, advancing columns and supply routes. By September 1987, officially 
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designated as Operation Modular, the SADF military engagement escalated to 
significant ground-force deployment.  In the November 1987 press conference, 
Geldenhuys was quite vague on the actual date when troops were committed, merely 
stating: “In recent days elements of the South African Defense Force and the South West 
African Territorial Force were compelled to take limited action against surrogate 
forces.”314 According to the Bridgland’s SADF authorized account, the 61st Mechanized 
Battalion was assembled in southern Angola on 7 September, in preparation to attack the 
FAPLA 47th Brigade.  On September 17, the 61st launched its counter-offensive.315 Two 
declassified documents of the U.S. Intelligence Agency pin-point mid-September as the 
time of SADF troop deployment.316  In a later press conference, Geldenhuys admitted 
that Pretoria had militarily intervened with troops in September 1987.317  
SADF NUMBERS 
The eventual deployment of ground-forces in a combat role encompassed nine divisions 
with five regular white detachments.  The deployment included the following battalions: 
the 32nd Battalion (the “Buffalo,” soldiers made up of recruited Angolans), 61st 
Mechanized, 4th South African Infantry, 20th South African Infantry, 91st and the 101st 
special-forces battalions. In September 1987, the SADF account mentions the 
deployment of 126 vehicles, including 55 Ratels (armoured troop carriers) and 62-supply 
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trucks.318 Arrayed alongside were units of UNITA and the SWATF. The consensus is 
that the SADF operation was the largest military invasion of Angola since 1975.319  The 
May 11, 1988 U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency report stated that UNITA was “backed 
up by unprecedented levels of South African support.”320 The New York Times described 
the South African intervention as “biggest single engagement since its troops fought in 
World War II.”321 The black South African newspaper The Sowetan characterized the 
eventual siege of Cuito Cuanavale as “the biggest ever battle fought in southern 
Africa.”322 Several post-conflict academic accounts even went so far as to characterize 
the SADF invasion as the largest military operation on the African continent since the 
North African battles waged during the Second World War.323  
 This qualitative consensus is not, however, paralleled by a quantitative 
consensus. The actual number of South African troops deployed during the intervention 
from September 1987 to withdrawal in August 1988 remains controversial and difficult 
to determine. Differing assertions have been made about the actual numbers involved in 
the South African intervention. Pretoria always insisted that not more than 3,000 SADF 
soldiers were deployed during the entire 1987-88 conflict. For example, in a 16 May 
1988 address to the South African Parliament, Malan said that the numbers of SADF 
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troops “never exceeded 3,000.”324  On several occasions, Geldenhuys repeatedly stated a 
maximum of 3,000 SADF and SWATF troops were involved at any one point in the 
1987-88 conflict.325 Helmoed-Romer Heitman, who served in the South African armed 
forces, also stated that the numbers never exceeded 3,000.326  
 The U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency’s 12 December 1988 report indicated a 
somewhat higher number was involved, stating that in mid-September 1987 South 
African troops numbered “almost 3,500.”327 Given the close cooperation and intelligence 
exchanges between Pretoria and Washington, this figure must be given some credence. 
Nevertheless, what is of note is that this figure is for mid-September and does not 
include the arrival of re-enforcements as the SADF expanded its role in the campaign.328 
For example, Bridgland implied that eventually more than 3,000 South African soldiers 
were involved as the conflict developed, writing that in November 1987 there were 
“scarcely 3,000 men at that stage.”329 Havana, Luanda and the ANC have insisted that at 
the height of the conflict, at least, 9,000 troops were deployed (i.e., more than three times 
the figure admitted by Pretoria).   Colonel Stuart Watson, a former MK fighter who was 
present at Cuito Cuanavale throughout the battle, is adamant that South African 
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reinforcements raised the number of SADF troops to between 8,000 or 9,000 troops.330  
Several reports in western newspapers placed the size of the South African force within 
that range. For example, Karl Maier, South African correspondent for The Independent 
and The Christian Science Monitor put the size of the SADF force at 8,000.331 The 
Washington Post quoted the higher figure of 9,500.332 
 These higher numbers reflect the rumours pervading South Africa at the time. For 
example, Jacobus van der Merwe, a Conservative Party member of the South African 
Parliament, noted the rumours circulating “that between 15,000 to 20,000 of our troops 
are involved.”333 However, while General Chris Thirion said only 3,000 to 4,000 troops 
were deployed, he also emphasized that the operation involved directly or indirectly (in 
combat and in support functions) at least 20,000 troops.334 A higher estimate than 3,000 
also appears to be justified by the fact that Pretoria deployed at least 6 battalions at the 
beginning of the South African intervention.  A battalion was usually comprised of three 
to five companies, with each company having 200-300 troops. Thus, a battalion’s 
strength was usually around 1,000 soldiers. Extrapolation would, therefore, place the size 
of the initial South African intervention at approximately 6,000 troops. With later 
reinforcements and support troops, the figure of 9,000 does not seem to be improbable.  
Nevertheless, while it may be difficult to precisely pin down the actual numbers, the 
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intervention was both the largest deployment of the SADF in Angola and the largest 
military operation launched during the apartheid era.  
FAPLA DÉBÂCLE & SURVIVAL 
The deployment of South African combat formations transformed the military situation. 
The SADF, in conjunction with UNITA, launched a counter-offensive, halting the 
Angolan armed forces at the Lomba River. FAPLA sustained considerable casualties and 
loss of equipment as they tried to stem and stop the SADF advance. The South Africans 
estimated that by November they had destroyed more than 400 vehicles, including 90 
tanks and armored vehicles.335 It is in the loss of life that the impact of the SADF 
intervention is revealed. Due to its unregistered nature, the actual levels of FAPLA loss 
of life are difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, it is clear from testimonies from both sides 
of the conflict that the loss of life by the Angolan forces was quite extensive.  
 On 3 October alone, the SADF estimated that it had killed 600 Angolan 
soldiers.336 SADF Major Perre Franken who observed the fighting on October 3 stated: 
“I felt sorry for them [FAPLA soldiers]. The MRL [multiple rocket launchers] ripples 
were inflicting devastating casualties among them.”337 Colonel Breytenbach described 
the “slaughter” as “awful.”338  Another SADF officer Mac da Trinidad noted that the 
FAPLA soldiers “were mown down like grass.”339 The U.S. Intelligence Agency 
calculated that some FAPLA units had “suffered losses of 20-25 percent,” which when 
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extrapolated amounted to “10-15 per cent of the entire” Angolan army.340 Malan put the 
Angolans losses at 7,000 to 10,000.341 Cuban sources corroborate that FAPLA suffered 
significant and extensive casualties. Cuban Brigadier General Ernio Hernandez 
Rodriguez, who served in Angola stated, “the Angolan forces had suffered great losses in 
personnel and material.”342 Fidel Castro noted that the FAPLA “was hit hard by South 
Africa, and the Angolans suffered heavy losses of both men and the brand-new armoured 
equipment that had been supplied by the Soviets….”343 The scale of carnage and 
destruction is also attested to by those who not only where there in Angola at the time 
but also partisans of the MPLA. Susan Hurlich, who worked with the MPLA, estimated 
that “thousands of Angolan soldiers perished in the effort to stop the South Africans.”344  
Colonel Stuart Watson observed that: “It was a meat market for the SADF when it came 
to FAPLA soldiers.”345  
 Soviet military planning contributed to the high death toll. By insisting on massed 
attacks, the Soviet military advisers ensured a high level of casualties.  Watson argued 
that the excessive human toll was the direct result of the strategy employed by FAPLA, 
which “was the tactic of sending wave after wave of troops.”346 He attributed this to the 
strict adherence to Soviet advice. Often without prior preparation, Angolan soldiers, both 
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veterans and new recruits, were sent into the fighting. Cuban Lieutenant  Colonel Saria 
Gonzalez observed this deficit in training, stating that the “Angolans were very brave. 
They had a lot of fighting experience but very little training. They went straight to the 
front.”347 Magnus Malan echoed this assessment by Watson and Saria Gonzalez, 
underscoring FAPLA’s profligacy in the face of the joint South African and UNITA 
counterattack: 
You had the Soviet doctrine coming through, hard and clear: you 
don’t stop, you attack, you attack, you attack. You do the same 
thing. You get a hiding everyday. But you couldn’t care less. You 
come. You come. That’s what happened. First of all, they threw 
in 21st battalion. It got a hiding. Then they threw in 59th battalion. 
It got a hiding. Then they threw in 47th battalion. It got a hiding. 
Then they withdrew.348 
 
Forced onto the defensive by the South African assault, the Angolan brigades received 
on 5 October 1987 the order to fall back to a new defensive line in the north.349 
Eventually the brigades were forced into a full retreat to Cuito Cuanavale, from which 
the FAPLA offensive was launched. The SADF followed in hot pursuit with the goal of 
destroying the Angolan brigades.350 With the Angolan forces in full flight, the SADF 
attempted to encircle the brigades and cutoff their route of retreat.  To ensure a 
successful retreat to Cuito Cuanavale, the FAPLA brigades had to reach and cross the 
Chambinga Bridge, which spanned the Chambinga River.  The SADF’s goal was to 
catch and surround the brigades before they arrived at the bridge. The 61st mechanized, 
the 4th South African Infantry and 20th South African Infantry spearheaded the drive to 
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ensnare the retreating Angolans. Several encirclement attempts failed, with the brigades 
eluding the pursuing South Africans. In retrospect, the escape of the Angolan brigades 
was a key moment in the 1987-88 conflict.  In his discussion of this SADF intervention, 
George, however, does not mention the successful FAPLA flight from destruction and 
the failed SADF pursuit.351 If these brigades had been destroyed, the SADF would have 
had an unopposed path to Cutio Cuanavale.  
After these repeated failures, General Geldenhuys ordered a halt to the offensive, 
due to the increased concerns about South African vulnerability to the Angolan 
deployment of MiG fighter aircraft. Captain Piet van Zyl, an officer of a 32nd Battalion 
Company, stated that the SADF commanders “were afraid of attacks by MiGs.”352 Thus, 
despite having suffered significant casualties and loss of equipment, the 21st, 25th, 47h 
and 59th FAPLA brigades were not destroyed. Though greatly diminished in their 
fighting capabilities, they had escaped to Cuito Cuanavale and assumed new defensive 
positions along the eastern banks of the Cuito and Cuanavale rivers, where they 
“concentrated their forces.”353  Cuito Cuanavale was located near the confluence of the 
Cuito and Cuanavale rivers. Due to the particular bends and sinuous route of the Cuito 
River, the town of Cuito Cuanavale’s position was to the west of that river, which flowed 
from north to south.  
 The SADF high command viewed the escape of the Angolan brigades with 
consternation. South African officers were chastened, with many stating that their failure 
had permitted the FAPLA brigades to survive “to fight again yet another day and kill 
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more South Africans and soldiers.”354 Notwithstanding their success in breaking the 
Angolan offensive and inflicting substantial casualties, the SADF command considered 
FAPLA’s survival to a be a serious setback. By failing to encircle and, thus, destroy the 
brigades an opportunity had been missed to inflict an overwhelming defeat. The SADF 
had failed to convert a tactical success into a strategic coup de grâce.  Some SADF 
officers viewed this as the critical moment in the whole conflict. Colonel Breytenbach 
posited that had the SADF successfully completed its plan of encirclement and 
destruction then “the Cuito Cuanavale campaign would probably have had a different 
outcome...”355 With the elimination of the elite FAPLA military formations, Cuito 
Cuanavale would have been left defenceless, as there would be no significant 
concentration of forces to resist a South African advance.  
 The FAPLA command attributed the escape to a well-executed retreat. Fidel 
Castro concurred, stating that the Angolans had retreated “in an orderly manner.”356 The 
United States Intelligence Agency agreed, using very similar wording, acknowledging 
that “Fapla withdrew under pressure in an orderly manner towards Cuito Cuanavale.”357  
In contrast, SADF officers were convinced the Angolan brigades had only survived due 
to South African errors and incompetence. The question of determining who was 
responsible – in other words, on whom the blame for failure should be placed – resulted 
in recriminations being exchanged among SADF officers. In his SADF-authorized 
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account, Bridgland noted that a serious argument - “a terrible storm”358 – broke out in the 
SADF campaign headquarters, with several commanders allocating blame and assigning 
responsibility for “the critical mistakes”359 that had resulted in the FAPLA escape.   
Colonel Breytenbach placed the blame on the commanding officer of the 4th South 
African Infantry who had hesitated “for reasons best known to him” to cross the 
Chambinga River, swing round behind the Angolan brigades and prevent their retreat by 
blocking the escape route.360 He, therefore, missed the opportunity to destroy the 
brigades, instead allowing them “a reasonable chance to reach safety.”361 In short, “the 
bottom line” was that he had failed in his mission.362 For this dereliction, Breytenbach 
declared that the commanding officer should have been immediately dismissed.363  
 With the escape of the FAPLA brigades, the SADF general staff ordered a pause 
in the offensive. Nevertheless, some officers argued that halting the offensive was a 
mistake, and by failing to press their advantage the SADF had let an opportunity to 
inflict a rapid and devastating defeat on the FAPLA slip from their grasp.  For example, 
Captain van Zyl said he “felt despairingly. We should have pressed on the following day 
and taken everything out.”364 Fidel Castro lent his support to this evaluation.  In a 1988 
meeting in Havana with members of the ANC leadership, Castro noted: “The SADF was 
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far too cautious and missed a remarkable opportunity.”365  Exhausted by the retreat and 
the beating they had suffered, the FAPLA brigades were quite vulnerable to an attack. 
Moreover, they were still in the process of assuming and entrenching themselves in new 
defensive positions in and around Cuito Cuanavale and were quite unprepared to face a 
new SADF offensive.  
 However, whatever opportunity may have existed for a rapid and decisive victory 
was tempered in Pretoria’s eyes by the logistical problems facing the SADF.  Against the 
objections of officers in the field, the general staff decided that the continuation of the 
offensive drive would wait until the resolution of those problems. The 61st mechanized, 
the 4th South African Infantry and 20th South African Infantry required re-supply and 
fresh troops. Ammunition had to be replenished, and vehicles repaired and replaced. The 
mental state of the troops presented a more serious problem. Despite the damage and 
decimation they had inflicted on the Angolan military, SADF morale “was low.”366  
Many of the soldiers expected to end their tour of duty in Angola before Christmas. The 
prospect of a prolonged campaign did not appeal to them. SADF Colonel Deon Ferreira 
captured the South African dilemma: 
Ideally we should have finished the job with the old troops. But, on the 
other hand, many of them had seen more action in three months than 
many South African soldiers saw in the whole of the [sic] World War 
II. Fighting spirit was down...A lot of equipment needed replacing. 
And anyway there was no real choice once the general told the troops 
they would be home before Christmas. It would have been very 
difficult to remotivate those guys.367 
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Coupled with the logistical and morale problems were the strategic impasse challenges. 
The unexpected survival and resilience of the FAPLA brigades and their successful 
retreat to Cuito Cuanavale signaled a new phase in the conflict. After more than two-
months of fighting, they now faced an enemy who was now, after the SADF pause, “well 
deployed and dug in” around Cuito Cuanavale.368 As the conflict settled into the siege of 
Cuito Cuanavale, Pretoria publicly admitted for the first time that the South African 
armed forces were in Angola, but  describing the ongoing fighting as solely involving 
UNITA and FAPLA forces. The official stance was to refuse comment on “unsourced 
and speculative stories”369 claiming direct South African involvement.  Nevertheless, 
Pretoria was forced to admit the SADF presence. In an early November 1987 press 
conference, General Geldenhuys officially confirmed South Africa had intervened in 
Angola.370  
 Having failed to destroy the brigades as a fighting force, the SADF general staff 
confronted the question of how to proceed. In response, in early November, P.W. Botha, 
accompanied by members of the SSC, paid a surprise 24-hour visit to the Angolan front. 
This sortie to the frontlines was unprecedented, attesting to the serious impasse that now 
faced the SADF. The European Community condemned Botha’s visit as a “provocative 
action that can only aggravate the situation in southern Africa and impede the 
development of regional dialogue.”371 The Sunday Times described the visit as an attempt 
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to boost morale among the South African troops.372 However, besides raising the 
soldiers’ spirits, Botha’s main aim was to assemble the SADF general staff and the 
ground commanders, and discuss with them the plan for the next phase of military 
actions. Defense Minister Malan declared that Pretoria’s objective was to “‘once and for 
all’ defeat the Angolan armed forces and lead to ‘the turning point’ in the Angolan 
war.”373 
DID THE SADF INTEND TO CAPTURE CUITO CUANAVALE? 
This strategy session proved crucial. Botha and other members of the SSC together with 
the SADF general staff and ground force officers decided that it was still possible to 
deliver a decisive blow to the Angolan armed forces, and resolved to continue the SADF 
offensive with the objective of destroying the FAPLA formations around and in Cuito 
Cuanavale.  Most importantly, this objective encompassed the capture of the town.  
 Central to the competing narratives of the conflict is the question of whether 
Pretoria ever intended and attempted to capture Cuito Cuanavale. This dispute is at the 
heart of the differing evaluations of the outcome of the conflict. If the SADF never 
intended to capture the town, then the holding of the town by FAPLA did not represent a 
significant failure or defeat of South African military strategy. However, if the SADF’s 
goal was the seizure of Cuito Cuanavale, then the Angolan ability to retain control of the 
town constituted a major débâcle for Pretoria.  Not surprisingly the “answer” by the 
apartheid regime and the anti-apartheid forces diametrically diverge.  
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 For the anti-apartheid forces it was clear that the SADF’s goal was to capture 
Cuito Cuanavale. On this point, the South African liberation movement’s literature is 
unanimous. This was the position articulated in the reporting of the ANC’s Sechaba and 
Umsebenz,374 and the SACP’s The African Communist.375 Even The Resister, the banned 
but clandestinely circulated journal of the Committee for South Africa War Resistance, 
primarily published by former SADF conscripts, stated that the capture of Cuito 
Cuanavale lay at the heart of SADF strategy.376 The numerous Cuban accounts echo this 
stance, revolving around their assertion that the SADF’s intention and repeated attempts 
to capture the town were what shaped Cuba’s eventual entry into the conflict.377 Several 
prominent non-South African anti-apartheid scholars have asserted that the capture of the 
town was the South African military objective.378  
 This stance is also reflected in the contemporary reporting of major newspapers 
in the west and South Africa. For example, The New York Times identified South 
Africa’s goal as “to take the town and secure its heavy-duty runway and the strategic 
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main roads to the north.”379 Another article plainly stated that the SADF “tried to capture 
Cuito Cuanavale.”380  A 28 July 1988 front-page story focused on the SADF drive seize 
to the town.381 Several other articles in other western were written in this vein.382 This 
was also the track taken by the South African newspapers, The Sowetan and The Weekly 
Mail. On 28 January 1988, The Sowetan reported that a major battle was being waged for 
Cuito Cuanavale.383  Several articles in The Weekly Mail discussed the seizure of Cuito 
Cuanavale as being at the center of SADF strategy.384   
The SADF intent to capture the town appears to be acknowledged, at least 
implicitly, by an 11 May 1988 declassified briefing report of the United States Defence 
Intelligence Agency. This report indicated that Washington understood that Cuito 
Cuanavale’s capture was on Pretoria’s agenda.  Given the close collaboration between 
the Reagan and Botha regimes, the conclusion of this report is salient in determining 
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Pretoria’s aims in the conflict. Though heavily censored by excisions, the report clearly 
implied that the SADF objective was to seize Cuito Cuanavale. In summing up, SADF 
military operations, the report noted that the “South African belief that the town would 
fall though heavy artillery bombardment proved incorrect.”385   
 However, key figures in the Botha regime were unambiguous in their repeated 
assertions that the SADF’s objective was never to capture or occupy Cuito Cuanavale. 
Defense Minister Magnus Malan in his 17 May 1988 address to the South African 
parliament declared: “Cuito Cuanavale was never an objective, as some newspapers were 
widely speculating at the time…In this type of war; one does not take meaningless 
villages which are, furthermore, weakly situated from a tactical point of view.”386  This 
was also SADF Chief of Staff Geldenhuys’ clearly articulated position.  In his discussion 
of South African military operations in Angola from 1987-1988, he stated: “We did not 
attack Cuito Cuanavale.”387 He was much more emphatic in an interview: “I actually 
forbade the Chief of the Army (General Kurt Liebenburg) to take Cuito Cuanavale.”388 
Geldenhuys goes on to add that the only time he would have countenanced the seizure of 
the town was if “Cuito Cuanavale fell into our lap and we could capture it without 
fighting for it, then our troops would occupy it.”389 Helmoed-Romer Heitman, also, 
asserted that the SADF objective was not to seize Cuito Cuanavale.390 
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 However, members of the SADF who fought at Cuito Cuanavale contradict these 
statements, including one major figure from the ranks of the SADF general staff, the 
ground force field commanders and combat soldiers. Colonel Gerhard Louw, current 
commanding officer of the 3rd South African Infantry Battalion based in Kimberly, was 
quite clear that there was indeed a decision to take Cuito Cuanavale. At the time of the 
conflict, he commanded the 82nd Battalion, which was deployed in the Cuito Cuanavale 
area.  Louw stated that one of the directives that he and other SADF ground force 
commanders received was to seize Cuito Cuanavale if the “option was available during 
the military operations that we were involved in carrying out.”391 The military operations 
that he engaged in around the town were aimed at putting the SADF “in position to take 
Cuito Cuanavale.”392 
 This was also the understanding of ordinary SADF soldiers, the non-officers. 
From October 1987 to March 1988, Hein Groenewald drove an armoured vehicle (a 
‘Ratel’) in a mechanized battalion in the Angolan conflict. He stated that the general 
thinking in his battalion was that the SADF was “going to take Cuito Cuanavale and 
everything we wanted to.”393 Clive Holt, who also fought in Angola, echoed this in his 
memoirs: “The notion of crossing the bridge and taking the town of Cuito Cuanavale was 
being freely bantered about, and in one conversation we started discussing taking Cuito 
and just continuing in a northerly direction.”394 Jose Kupussu, who served as a sergeant 
in the 32nd Battalion, was even more emphatic about the South African objective: “We 
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were told by our commanders that the goal was to wipe FAPLA and the Cubans out of 
Cuito Cuanavale all the way to Menogue. To wipe them out and take all of Cuando 
Cubango province.”395 
 Compelling evidence that the SADF intended to capture Cuito Cuanavale 
emerges from the level of the SSC. Major-General Chris Thirion, who as deputy-director 
of Military Intelligence and member of the SSC’s secretariat, participated in the planning 
of the campaign.  Thirion asserted that at SSC meetings, he argued against the scope of 
the intervention, particularly the drive to Cuito Cuanavale: “I thought we should not have 
been involved to the extent we became involved. I argued that we should focus on 
training UNITA forces.”396  Thirion emphasized that while the capture of Cuito 
Cuanavale was not the initial aim when the SADF first intervened, it emerged as the goal 
because of the success the SADF enjoyed against FAPLA.  Emboldened by the Angolan 
retreat, the SSC and the SADF general staff were caught up in the euphoria of victory. 
Pretoria decided that it could inflict a much more serious and decisive defeat on the 
MPLA government by seizing Cuito Cuanavale, the staging area of the failed FAPLA 
offensive. Therefore, Operation Modular’s objective expanded to encompass the capture 
of Cuito Cuanavale. Thirion stated the aim was no longer limited to saving UNITA: 
“When we started the objective was to stop the FAPLA assault. But because the 
campaign went so well, the objective became to take Cuito Cuanavale. Our conventional 
involvement and our ambitions grew and grew.”397 
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 The minutes of the 29 February 1988 and 14 March 1988 SSC meetings provide 
support for Thirion’s and the other SADF members’ statements on SADF’s intentions 
toward Cuito Cuanavale. At the 29 February 1988 SSC meeting, after General 
Geldenhuys supplied a detailed statistical account of the MPLA’s material losses in the 
14 February 1988 attack on FAPLA forces on the east bank of the Cuito River, the 
Council chairman (Botha) then “...inquired whether in the meantime UNITA might well 
conquer Cuito Cuanavale. General Geldenhuys stated that in his opinion this would be 
“merely [slegs - Afrikaans] a matter of time...”398 The minutes of the 14 March 1988 
meeting noted, “Minister P T C du Plessis inquired whether Cuito Cuanavale meanwhile 
could be captured by UNITA.”399 Geldenhuys responded, “within UNITA a conviction 
existed that the conquest of this village has a higher priority than securing the River 
Cuito as an obstacle.”400 
 Prima facie, the 29 February and 14 March minutes seem to indicate that the only 
concern of the SSC is whether UNITA, not the SADF, can or will take Cuito Cuanavale. 
This is misleading. The impression left is that UNITA was in command and the principal 
military protagonist. However, regarding the 14 February attack, as explored in detail in 
Chapter Three, it was the SADF’s elite 61st Mechanized Battalion with more than 100 
vehicles that had led the 14 February assault.  Indeed, it was the SADF that spearheaded 
all the attacks on FAPLA positions, with UNITA deployed in a supporting role. The 
South Africans were the only force equipped with the weapons (e.g., tanks, armoured 
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personnel carriers) necessary to defeat and drive the FAPLA forces from the town. 
Curiously, the meeting has no reference to the 25 February attack led by the 61st 
Mechanized, which after initial success was forced to withdraw. Furthermore, the 
February 29th meeting takes place (see Chapter Three) the same day of another attack by 
the 61st Mechanized, equipped with 22 Olifant tanks organized in two tank squadrons.  
The 14 March meeting occurs nine days before the final attack led by the SADF’s 82nd 
South African Brigade, yet no mention appears. In short, the SADF was in command and 
the main military actor.  
 In this light it seems quite strange and incongruous that the SSC minutes referred 
only to UNITA, as if it was the only party fighting FAPLA. This rendering in the 
minutes is explicable by Botha and Malan’s determination to limit and restrict public 
access to information of SADF military operations in Angola. While Pretoria had already 
publicly acknowledged in November 1987 the SADF involvement in the Angolan 
conflict, it announced in December 1987 that the South African armed forces were 
leaving Angola. General Geldenhuys stated: “The process of withdrawing members of 
the Defence Force and the South West Africa Territory Force [sic] from Angola has 
begun.”401 Magnus Malan later that month asserted that SADF troops had withdrawn 
from Angola.402  Nevertheless, to the contrary, the SADF was not withdrawing but 
reinforcing its troops. As Chapter Five explores, Pretoria heavily controlled and censored 
any news on the situation in Angola.  Central to this control and censorship was 
Pretoria’s insistence in late 1987 and early 1988 that no SADF forces were involved in 
the fighting in Angola.  
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 This control of information extended to the minutes of SSC meetings.  While, the 
meetings were secret and confined to a tightly closed circle, the minutes circulated to a 
broader group.  For example, the minutes of the 29 February 1988 meeting circulated to 
39 persons, including: the President, Prime Minister, SADF-Chief, 16 Ministers, 2 
Deputy-Ministers; 3 Directors-Generals and 4 Deputy-Director-Generals. The March 
14th minutes were circulated to 33 persons. Thus, there always existed the possibility 
through happenstance that a copy could end up the hands of someone outside the desired 
circle. To preserve secrecy and ensure no information leaked-out, Thirion and De Kock 
stated that Botha and Malan carefully reviewed and sanitized the summaries of the 
discussions and decisions reported in the minutes.403  
 Any direct mention of SADF actions in Angola were redacted from the first draft.  
Instead code words and phrases would be deployed, whose meaning would be clear and 
unambiguous to the SSC members and designated recipients of SSC meeting minutes, 
but opaque and ambiguous to others.  Frequently, UNITA was often the code word for 
the SADF, indicating what the South African armed forces had done or planned to do 
with or without UNITA participation.  Reference to UNITA actions were often actual 
disguised references to the SADF dominated and controlled military operations. Of 
course, the challenge is determining when a reference to UNITA was actually a reference 
to the SADF. Given the extensive SADF presence in the Cuito Cuanavale area in 
February and March 1988, and its central role in the military operations, clearly the 
February 29th and March 14th UNITA references pertain to South African forces. Thus, 
Geldenhuys’ February 29th reply that the fall of Cuito Cuanavale was “merely a matter 
of time” indicated the anticipated SADF conquest of the town.  Also, any SADF setback 
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could be disguised in the minutes as a UNITA failure. His March 14th response 
reaffirmed the strategic significance the SADF general staff attached to the capture of 
Cuito Cuanavale.  
 The evidence contradicts Pretoria’s official denials that the objective of the 
SADF was to capture Cuito Cuanavale. There is almost unanimous consensus in the 
contemporary media reporting that the SADF’s intention was the seizure and occupation 
of the town. What is most persuasive and conclusive are the testimonies from a member 
of the Botha regime’s inner circle (Maj. Gen. Thirion), a commander (Colonel Louw) of 
troops deployed in the Cuito Cuanavale campaign.  Colonel Louw’s testimony is 
particularly compelling given the fact that as a ground-force commander the SADF 
general staff would have charged him with very specific orders and objectives.  Gen. 
Thirion as an active participant in SSC and SADF general staff meetings was privy to the 
discussions and decisions at the highest levels of the Botha regime. This is further, 
buttressed by the SSC minutes, the testimony of SADF soldiers and the two United 
States Defence Intelligence Agency reports. Moreover, Malan’s public statement about 
“the meaningless” and “weakly situated” Cuito Cuanavale is somewhat incredulous, 
given the strategic significance of the town, and the efforts and resources that the SADF 
expended in the battles around the town. The evidence seems to be quite persuasive that 
the SADF objective was to capture the town of Cuito Cuanavale. 
THE BEGINNING OF THE CUITO CUANAVALE CAMPAIGN 
Once the decision was made to destroy the FAPLA formations and capture Cuito 
Cuanavale, the discussion among the SSC, the SADF general staff and ground force 
officers centred on what military strategy to pursue. On this, a clear division emerged 
between those whose sole focus was achieving a decisive military victory in the shortest 
time, and those who, while aiming for a decisive victory, were also worried about the 
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domestic political implications and ramifications of a costly assault on the town. On one 
side stood the SSC and SADF general staff, on the other, the ground commanders.  
     The disagreement centered on whether to attack Cuito Cuanavale from the east or 
west. The ground commanders Commandant Mike Muller, Commandant Henri Marais 
and Commandant Gerhard Louw advocated that the SADF forces should launch a large-
scale outflanking attack from the west.404 They argued that this was the most effective 
and quickest way to defeat the FAPLA brigades. First, it would cut the Angolans’ lines 
of supply and reinforcement.  Second, they argued that an attack from the west was more 
logical than an attack from the east. An attack from the east had had little chance of 
success because it would directly confront the strength of the FAPLA positions, which 
were heavily entrenched on east and west banks of the Cuito River. The ground 
commanders declared that because the “FAPLA defences in front of Cuito Cuanavale 
were virtually impregnable to an attack from the east,”405 the best course of action was to 
swing around from the “rear” and avoid playing into FAPLA defensive strengths. Louw 
emphasized that the “military commanders wanted to try and take Cuito Cuanavale from 
the west instead of the east.”406 Commandant Robbie Hartslief stated: “All the combat 
group commanders wanted to launch an attack from the west as early as November 
1987.”407 This would have isolated Cuito Cuanavale. In Hartslief’s judgment, this would 
have ended the war as FAPLA would be forced to abandon the town.  The ground 
commanders emphasized that the array of forces dictated an outflanking operation from 
                                                
404 The rank of commandant was the equivalent of Lieutenant Colonel. 
 
405 Bridgland, The War for Africa, 227 
 
406 Interview with Colonel Gerhard Louw  
 
407 Bridgland, The War for Africa, 292 
 
  
 119 
the west, encircling all the Angolan formations in Cuito Cuanavale and not just the ones 
on the east bank of the Cuito River; this would lead to their destruction “at the SADF’s 
leisure.”408   
 However, the SSC and the SADF high command rejected the proposal of a large-
scale attack from the west.  This rejection was based on three assessments. First, there 
was a desire to limit the number of SADF casualties and loss of equipment.409 
Geldenhuys’ previously noted admission that he preferred to capture Cuito Cuanavale 
“without fighting for it”410 reflected this prevailing concern. Ground commander Louw 
stated that the “SADF did not want to lose people. It was not a popular war. Casualties 
would have been bad news.” 411 Second, given the logistical problems already outlined, 
the SADF did not have enough troops or materiel in Angola to launch a military 
operation of that magnitude.412 Third, the high command considered FAPLA to be a 
beaten force, incapable of putting up effective resistance. Thus, any SADF operation 
should result in an Angolan rout. The high command reasoned that FAPLA could not 
have recovered from the series of serious defeats that it had endured. Botha, Malan and 
Geldenhuys concluded: 
FAPLA was so demoralized that it would have little fight left in it. Just 
the threat of one last major push by the SADF with its formidable 
reputation enhanced by the Lomba triumphs, would be enough to make 
the Angolans cut and run.413 
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Therefore, instead of taking Cuito Cuanavale in one swift blow, the general staff adopted 
a staged approach to the town’s capture. In their estimation this would deliver a decisive 
and crippling blow to FAPLA with the least loss of South African life and expenditure of 
resources. What emerged was a combination of the proposal focusing on the destruction 
of the FAPLA forces on the river’s east bank and the ground commanders’ plan to 
destroy all the FAPLA brigades.414  Accordingly, strategic goals would be accomplished 
one at a time, culminating in the eventual seizure of Cuito Cuanavale. Consequently, the 
first new offensive that SADF high command opted for was a less ambitious operation 
than proposed by the ground commanders. It occurred on a smaller front and with a more 
limited objective. Its aim was two-fold: to drive the FAPLA brigades from their eastern 
positions on the Cuito and Cuanavale rivers and to destroy the Chambinga bridge.  This 
was the prelude to a direct assault on the town. 
 The operation to dislodge the FAPLA brigades was launched on 25 November. 
Under the command of Mike Muller, the 4th South African Infantry and the 61st 
Mechanized battalion, together with UNITA forces, focused their attack on FAPLA’s 
25th Brigade, which has assumed a defensive position at the Chambinga Bridge.  
However, the South Africans failed to achieve any of these objectives.  FAPLA 
reinforced their positions with an additional tank battalion. This together with intense 
shelling of advancing SADF and UNITA troops by Angolan artillery located in Cuito 
Cuanavale proved sufficient to repel the South African attack.  
 At this point the SADF general staff decided to call an end to Operation 
Modular. Despite the failure to destroy the FAPLA brigades, Pretoria and the South 
African generals deemed Operation Modular a success.  This evaluation was based on 
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two considerations. First, the SADF “had stopped and inflicted savage losses”415 on the 
Angolan armed forces and forced them to fall back to Cuito Cuanavale.416 Second, the 
general staff believed that Operation Modular had laid the foundations for the 
destruction of the FAPLA formations and the seizure of Cuito Cuanavale.417 With the 
end of Operation Modular, preparations were made for the initiation of Operation 
Hooper, which would complete the elimination of the FAPLA brigades on the east bank 
of the Cuito River, leading to the capture of the town.  
 Colonel Breytenbach disagreed with this optimistic appraisal. In his estimation, it 
was a “delusion” to believe and then act as if it were still possible to fulfill the strategic 
goals as outlined by Pretoria and the SADF general staff.418 In his judgment, “[n]o hope 
remained of destroying the FAPLA east of Cuito Cuanavale.”419 Breytenbach based his 
evaluation on a factor that transformed the balance of forces in the conflict, viz., the 
ongoing reinforcement of the FAPLA brigades by Cuban armed forces, and the Cubans’ 
assumption of overall command of Angolan forces at Cuito Cuanavale.  The 
underestimation by the SADF of FAPLA and the impact of Cuban reinforcements 
combined with overestimation of its own forces was to have profound consequences for 
the future conduct of the conflict. 
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THE CUBAN INTERVENTION 
The escape and survival of the brigades did not relieve the situation for FAPLA. Given 
their losses, their forced retreat and pursuit by the South Africans, the leadership of the 
MPLA viewed the developing situation in and around Cuito Cuanavale as extremely 
dangerous. The loss of the town would have constituted a potentially mortal blow to 
FAPLA, and, therefore, a serious blow to the MPLA regime. Cuito Cuanavale’s strategic 
significance lay in its function as a FAPLA staging area and as an airbase to patrol 
southern Angola.  Angolan General Antonio dos Santos outlined Luanda’s evaluation: 
“We thought that if they [the South Africans] won at Cuito Cuanavale, the road would be 
open to the north of Angola. Strategically, it was an important place to defend.”420  
Several western specialists on South Africa characterized the confrontation as a 
critical moment for Angola, arguing, for example, that an SADF capture of the town 
would have constituted a “knock-out blow against the MPLA”421 and “a decisive victory 
which would change the course of the war.”422 Contemporary western and South African 
newspapers echoed this assessment. The [South African] Weekly Mail described Cuito 
Cuanavale as part of a strategically important “line of steel” across southern Angola 
“from Lubango in the West to Menogue.”423 Havana concurred in this assessment.  The 
Cuban military command, in constant contact with its Angolan counterpart, was well 
aware of the débâcle and significant losses that had been inflicted on FAPLA. Cuban 
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General Jesus M. Bermudez Cutino noted the “gravity of the military situation” 
confronting FAPLA.424 
In response to the rapidly deteriorating situation, the dos Santos government 
requested Cuban assistance.425 Castro described the request received from Luanda as 
“desperate calls.”426  In Havana’s assessment, after the success of their intervention, the 
SADF, now “emboldened, was advancing in depth towards Cuito Cuanavale.”427  The 
Cuban leadership believed the SADF was poised to destroy the FAPLA formations that 
had now assumed new defensive positions in Cuito Cuanavale.  In their view, the fall of 
Cuito Cuanavale would have rendered the Angolan armed forces’ position untenable.  At 
a 15 November meeting of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Cuba, Fidel Castro 
stated “the South African intervention had led to an extremely serious situation and there 
was the danger of the destruction or annihilation of the largest and best formations of 
Angolan troops.”428 
 Havana also cast the unfolding struggle to hold onto the town as a serious 
existential threat to the Angolan nation: Angola’s future lay in the balance. Castro 
repeatedly stated the Cuban government’s belief that Angola’s “national stability was 
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threatened.”429 In Havana’s estimation, a South African victory would have meant not 
only capture of the town and destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but 
quite probably also the end of Angola’s existence as an independent country. Brigadier 
General Ernio Hernandez Rodriquez, who was later appointed commander of Cuban 
troops in Cuito Cuanavale, stated that Havana could not allow Cuito Cuanavale “to fall 
into the hands of the South Africans because of its strategic importance and political 
symbolism.”430  In short, the SADF capture of Cuito Cuanavale would be “a mortal blow 
against Angola.”431  
 Moreover, if the SADF succeeded in crushing the Angolan forces at Cuito 
Cuanavale, the Cuban forces then in Angola would be placed in a precarious strategic 
situation. They stood on a line 800km from the border with Namibia, stretching from the 
port of Namibe to Menogue. The Angolan loss of Cuito Cuanavale would render Cuban 
troops vulnerable to SADF attacks. Moreover, a crippling Angolan defeat would have 
meant that the Cuban intervention, which had lasted more than a decade, expended 
considerable resources and resulted in Cuban deaths, would have been a costly failure. 
Havana also shared the SADF general staff’s conclusion that FAPLA brigades’ morale 
“had been destroyed”432 and would be unable to withstand a concerted South African 
attack. Consequently, the Cuban government viewed prevention of South African 
capture of Cuito Cuanavale as imperative, deciding that without a significant Cuban 
intervention the Angolans would be dealt a severe defeat.  Havana felt “obliged one more 
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time [as in 1975] to come to the defense of Angola”433 and decided to reinforce its forces 
in Angola by expanding the number of Cuban ground troops, pilots and aircraft.434 Jorge 
Risquet, a member of Cuba’s leadership and present at the 15 November Politburo 
meeting, recounted Havana’s decision to intervene: 
On November 15th, the high command got together, with Fidel 
presiding and decided to resolve the problem once and for all: to kick 
the South Africans out of Angola. But doing this was impossible with 
the 10- or 20-thousand troops we had there. It required anti-aircraft 
batteries, aircraft, armoured units and artillery from Cuba. We sent our 
best anti-aircraft batteries, which we took from our own positions here 
in Cuba…We had to sort out the situation435  
 
Havana took this decision without consulting Moscow. The Cuban government waited 
eight days before informing the Soviets through General Ulises Rosales del Toro.  
Rosales del Toro arrived in Moscow on November 23, the same day the first Cuban 
detachments departed for Angola. Jorge Risquet stated the Castro government had 
planned that when Rosales arrived, the Cuban decision would be “already an 
accomplished fact.”436  On December 1, 1987, during a visit to Moscow, Fidel Castro 
replied to Soviet criticisms of Cuban actions.  Castro told Mikhail Gorbachev that Cuba 
accepted no fault for the error that led to the crisis but could not avoid taking action: 
We have not the slightest responsibility for the military situation 
created there [Angola]...The responsibility falls solely on the Soviet 
advisors...The situation of the country [Angola] has continued to 
worsen. The facts demonstrate that our decision to send reinforcements 
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immediately was absolutely correct...Cuba will do all that it can to help 
out of this difficult situation.437 
 
On 23 November, Cuban troops left the island for Angola by air and by sea. Among the 
detachments was the elite 50th Brigade stationed around Havana. The first detachments 
arrived in Cuito Cuanavale on 5 December.  Under Operación Maniobra 31 (Operation 
Manoeuvre 31), more than 18,000 personnel in 140 flights were transported to Angola 
from Cuba.438 By May 1988, according to several statements by Fidel Castro, the number 
of Cuban armed forces personnel in Angola had risen to an estimated 55,000.439 Division 
General Ulises Rosales del Toro confirmed that the troop strength reached more than 
50,000.440 These figures are consistent with General Orlando Almaguel Vidal’s 
statement that at the end of the conflict he supervised the return to Cuba of 52,000 
military personnel.441  
 The arrival of Cuban reinforcements did not pass unnoticed by the United States. 
Washington was aware that Havana had decided to embark on a significant military 
buildup. The extensive U.S. satellite surveillance system detected not only a qualitative 
shift in the Cuban military presence, but was also able to estimate the actual numbers by 
examining the number of recreational facilities that were constructed. Chester Crocker 
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noted: “The Cubans made the decision to double the forces they had in Angola. 
Basically, if you wanted to find out how many Cubans there are, you started counting 
baseball diamonds from satellites.”442  
 A recurrent theme in contemporary reporting by western newspapers was the 
dramatic increase in the number of Cuban troops. It was always a story element, even 
when an article’s focus was not specifically on the Cuban military contribution. An 
article in The Times mentioned Cuban troops and materiel “streaming into the besieged 
town” of Cuito Cuanavale.443  The size of the Cuban contingent in Angola was 
frequently an item of speculation, with estimates usually ranging from 30, 000 to 
50,000.444  The 50,000-estimation is quite close to the actual number that Havana has 
consistently stated was deployed.445 Also, articles written at the time of the battles for 
Cuito Cuanavale often portrayed the Cubans as a new and possibly decisive factor in the 
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conflict.446 Cuban air power was particularly singled out in several newspaper 
accounts.447 
 A significant transfer of supplies and equipment accompanied Cuban troop 
reinforcement.  During Operación Maniobra more than 57,000 tonnes of medical 
supplies and equipment and a squadron of MiG-23s were transferred. The armament 
build-up included hundreds of tanks. Some Cuban sources indicate that the tank force 
assembled rose to more than 600.448 General Ulises Rosales del Toro stated that the 
actual total Cuban tank strength reached more than 1,200.449 Along with the arrival of 
new tanks, the ground forces were further strengthened by a Cuban artillery battalion450 
and an estimated 1,000 anti-aircraft weapons.451 Cuban air power increased to 150 
fighter aircraft and helicopters.452  
 The Cuban intervention encompassed more than the deployment of better-
equipped troops: Havana sent one their most trusted generals, Leopoldo Cintra Frias to 
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Angola.453 Cintra Frias had served in Angola in previous missions.  He would not only 
provide experience but also be able to increase the Cuban influence on the military 
decisions made.  Castro on several occasions declared that Cuba had “put everything at 
stake in that action”454 and that a military débâcle “would have meant a major defeat for 
the [Cuban] Revolution.”455 Carlos Fernandez de Cossio, an official of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs concurred: “A defeat at Cuito Cuanavale would have had a devastating 
psychological and moral impact on the Cuban people.”456 Cuba would have had to 
grapple not only with defeat, but the realization that loss of life and allocation of 
considerable resources over more than a decade was a failure. 
Due to the perceived stakes, the situation in Angola was the major preoccupation 
of the Cuban leadership. Fidel Castro devoted most of his time from November 1987 to 
June 1988 to the military situation in Angola.  A coded radio communications system 
established a direct link between Havana and Cintra Frias’ and FAPLA’s headquarters in 
Luanda, enabling the rapid transmission of detailed information and instructions.457 
Division General Samuel Rodiles Planas, who served as head of the Cuban delegation to 
Angola in 1987, stated that Fidel Castro frequently contacted the command centre: “We 
spoke twice a day, once in the evening and the other time in the night. In one 
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conversation he asked me more than twenty questions, including, asking if it had rained 
in Cuito Cuanavale.”458 
CONCLUSION 
Unable and unwilling to countenance the defeat of UNITA, Pretoria had intervened in 
Angola. In essence, it was the most dramatic manifestation of the drive for regional 
hegemony as encompassed in the “total strategy” doctrine, the ideology of the militarized 
apartheid state. The fact that Angola was designated as the strategic arena of struggle 
outside of South Africa rendered the invasion a logical and almost ineluctable outcome.  
 With the defeat of the July offensive and the forced headlong retreat of the 
FAPLA brigades, Pretoria committed itself to inflicting a devastating blow to the MPLA 
government. Towards this end it devoted significant resources and personnel. In 
response, to growing crisis, Havana decided that the moment for a decisive trial of 
military strength and strategy had presented itself.  This trial, the battle for Cuito 
Cuanavale, is the subject of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE BATTLE FOR CUITO CUANAVALE 
The 1987-88 conflict unfolded in several phases. The first began in July 1987 with the 
FAPLA offensive against UNITA. The second unfolded in September with the South 
African intervention after FAPLA crossed the Lomba River. With Savimbi’s forces 
pushed to the brink of defeat, the SADF invaded and inflicted heavy casualties and 
material damage. They eventually forced the Angolan forces into a full retreat to Cuito 
Cuanavale. The war aim of Pretoria had changed from simply preventing the destruction 
of UNITA to inflicting a devastating defeat on the Angolan armed forces. This chapter 
deals with the third phase, which began in December 1987 and ended in March 1988.  
During this period, the SADF made several concerted attempts to destroy the Angolan 
military formations in Cuito Cuanavale and seize the town. This phase encompasses the 
arrival of significant Cuban reinforcements, which would alter the course of the conflict. 
It ends with the last attempt on 23 March 1988 by the SADF to capture Cuito Cuanavale. 
 The series of battles at Cuito Cuanavale defined the 1987-88 conflagration. The 
resources expended attest to the overriding importance attached to the struggle by 
Pretoria, on one side, and Luanda and Havana, on the other. At the beginning of 1988, 
the western media increased their coverage of the South African offensive, running 
several articles on the extent of the invasion and the SADF advance through southern 
Angola in late 1987. On 7 January 1988, Associated Press reported on the SADF 
destruction of several strategic targets and “the drive to capture key towns.”459 Reuters 
reported the diplomatic assessment that the fall of Cuito Cuanavale “would be a major  
                                                
459 “S. African troops drive in Angola: AP”, The Montgomery County Intelligence 
Record, 7 January 1988. See also; “South Africans reported out to seize Angolan base”, 
The Christian Science Monitor, 24 March 1988; “Angola says troops quell S. African 
attack in south”, The Christian Science Monitor, 28 March 1988 
  
 132 
defeat for the Angolan government.”460  A Reuters’ Angolan source declared: “We 
cannot lose this area...It is a question of survival.”461 As the battle progressed, The New 
York Times cast it as a strategic confrontation that would have profound consequences 
for Angola and “repercussions throughout southern Africa.”462 The Economist identified 
Cuito Cuanavale as “a key point.”463  A special report to The Times described Cuito 
Cuanavale as “the strategic town.”464  
 This chapter reconstructs the series of engagements that occurred from November 
1987 to March 1988, focusing on the military dimensions and outcome of the battle for 
Cuito Cuanavale. Reconstructing the battle is essential in evaluating the competing 
interpretations of the outcome of the battle; interpretations often reduced to an assertion 
of who won and who lost. The central questions engaged are: What were the respective 
strategies employed? What was the impact of the Cuban intervention?  In engaging these 
and other issues, the chapter draws on the accounts, documents, interviews and other 
sources mentioned and discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter Two). Both chapters 
taken together constitute a detailed treatment of the lead-up to and the actual clashes that 
constitute the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, Also, the account in these chapters draw 
extensively on sources from both sides of the conflict. As noted in the last chapter, what 
stands out is the remarkable agreement between the first-hand accounts of the warring 
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parties. While the South Africans and Cubans tend to emphasize different events and 
aspects of the struggle, the unexpected shared consensus permits the contruction of a 
coherent narrative of what unfolded. 
Map 3: Cuito Cuanavale.465  
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THE FIRST CLASH 
With FAPLA forces driven back to Cuito Cuanavale, the conflict entered a new strategic 
phase: the SADF siege of and effort to capture the town.  However, Cuito Cuanavale’s 
size belied the importance attached to it. As FAPLA General Antonio dos Santos 
underscored:  
 But it was only a village,” people talk about Cuito Cuanavale. But it was 
only a village! So when we brought troops from the centre or north to 
Cuito Cuanavale, they would get off the plane, go to the barracks, and 
then ask: “Chief, when are we going to Cuito?” “You are there!” “What I 
came here to defend this?466 
 
The successful FAPLA retreat to the town did not reduce the human toll: the casualties 
continued to mount as South Africa bombed and shelled the FAPLA positions in and 
around Cuito Cuanavale. The SADF repeatedly bombed and UNITA forces extensively 
mined the supply routes from Menogue to Cuito Cuanavale. UNITA committed itself to 
disrupting any FAPLA and Cuban transportation. Igor Zhdarkin, a Soviet military 
advisor at Cuito Cuanavale, stated, “the road from Cuito Cuanavale to Menogue was 
controlled by UNITA.”467 As the troops in Cuito Cuanavale could only be supplied from 
Menogue, this transformed any supply column into a perilous mission. The 250km 
journey from Menogue to Cuito Cuanavale became known among Angolan soldiers as 
“the road of death.”468 Cuban First Lieutenant Pedro Campos Perales, who served as an 
artillery officer, stated that everyone had to be constantly on their guard as mines could 
be planted anywhere: “The enemy put mines in the most incredible places: in the 
                                                
466 Cuba! Africa! Revolution! 
 
467 Quoted in Shubin, The USSR and Southern Africa, 13 
 
468 Interview with General Jorge Dumba 
 
  
 135 
trees...in the potholes of the highway and even, under the asphalt. They would appear in 
the most unsuspected places.”469   
 Cuban Lieutenant Colonel Ruben Jimenez Gomez, who served in the south of 
Angola from 1987-89, wrote that the work of medics had “no end” due to the numerous 
deaths and injuries caused by the mines and UNITA attacks.470 He noted: “The mines 
were the greatest threat to our troops, causing many fatalities and many mutilations, 
mostly the loss of arms and legs...creating a state of psychological insecurity.”471 The 
fear and fatalism that pervaded FAPLA, was reflected by an Angolan soldier, who said: 
“Imagine every 50 metres there was a mine. I would leave Menogue and I would not 
know if I would reach Cuito Cuanavale alive, if I would die on the way.”472 Death was 
the fate of many. General Jorge Dumba, who was in command of FAPLA troops at Cuito 
Cuanavale noted: “During the day 100-200 deaths would occur. This was normal 
because of South African bombing and UNITA attacks.”473 Given that the siege lasted 
into April 1988, this indicates a considerable loss of life. 
 On 13 November the SADF had begun shelling Cuito Cuanavale with their G5 
and G6 long-range cannons.474 The G5 and G6 were 155-mm artillery guns with a range 
of 25 miles (40 kilometers). In preparations for their assault on the town, the SADF 
intensified the artillery barrage.  Malan stated that the goal was to destroy the new 
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defensive formations: “We started hitting it [Cuito Cuanavale]. We knew where the 
operation headquarters were. We knew where the anti-aircraft and the artillery were. And 
we opened fire.”475 From December to April 1988 the SADF subjected the town to an 
almost continual artillery bombardment. Raul Castro, then Cuba’s Minister of Defence, 
stated that during this period an estimated 20,000 150-mm shells fell on Cuito 
Cuanavale: a daily average of more than 130.476 Colonel Villgas Tamayo concurred 
stating that more than 100 artillery shells fell on Cuito Cuanavale each day during this 
period.477  The barrage was so incessant that during lulls, Angolan soldiers remarked: 
“What is wrong with the enemy? They are not attacking us today.”478  Luis Moreno 
Hildago, a Cuban who served in a tank brigade in Cuito Cuanavale from March to May 
1988, described the terror and uncertainty that gripped the soldiers who faced the 
continual shelling: “Many times we were terrified. We were like cats, just holding on to 
our lives.”479 In November and December 1987, bombing raids by the SAAF 
accompanied the artillery barrages. These air attacks were so indiscriminate that FAPLA 
General Dumba observed: “There was a small island in the Cuito River where villagers 
sought refuge. The South Africans even bombed that island. They were attacking and 
killing everything.”480  
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 During December 1987 and the first two weeks of January 1988, FAPLA 
strengthened their positions on the east bank of the Cuito River by positioning three 
brigades - the 21st and 25th infantry and 59th mechanized - as a block to any South 
African advance from the east.  They were deployed in an arc of 18 to 20 km.481 The 
objective was to prevent the SADF and their UNITA allies from seizing the east bank 
and then crossing the Cuito River. A South African crossing of the River would probably 
have rendered the FAPLA positions in Cuito Cuanavale untenable.  The Cuito River 
represented a natural defense barrier. For General Dumba “the Cuito River was strategic 
to the defence of Angola.”482 The 21st, 25th and 59th brigades were spread quite widely 
across the eastern bank, with approximately five kilometers separating each one.483 To 
the rear of the 21st, 25th and 59th brigades, the 16th and 66th brigades took up positions 
in the Tumpo Triangle, a 10-square kilometer area, bounded by the smaller Tumpo and 
Dala rivers, tributaries of the Cuito and Cuanavale rivers, respectively. Most of this area 
consisted of a large depressed flood plain. 
 As the FAPLA brigades redeployed in and around Cuito Cuanavale, there 
continued to be significant disagreements between the Cuban and Soviet officers on what 
military course to pursue.  This was underscored during the interregnum when South 
Africa had ended Operation Modular and was preparing to launch Operation Hooper.  
For example, on 20 December 1987, Havana sent a message stating that they “were 
annoyed by the unexpected ideas which are inexplicable and run counter to our views 
about the struggle in the south against South Africa, which is the main way to solve the 
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problems created in Angola.”484  The disagreements centred on how and where the 
FAPLA forces should deployed, particularly the 58th and 10th FAPLA brigades based in 
Menogue. The Soviets wanted to dispatch these brigades to Cuanza in central Angola. 
The Cubans objected on the basis that it did not seem logical to redeploy the 58th and the 
10th while the fight for Cuito Cuanavale was still ongoing and before there was any 
indication of what plan the SADF would pursue. If the South Africans renewed their 
attack on the FAPLA positions in and around the town, the 58th and 10th brigades would 
be too far away to render rapid support. In a 12 January [1988] dispatch, the Cuban High 
Command was adamant on this point: “Until South African intentions were made clear, 
the 58th and 10th shouldn’t be moved.”485 Unfolding events justified this stance. On 13 
January the SADF launched the first major offensive of Operation Hooper.486 
 Operation Hooper began with an intense bombardment of the bridge across the 
Cuito River. In preparation for their first assault on the Angolan positions around Cuito 
Cuanavale, the SAAF carried out an intense bombardment of the Cuito bridge.  Missiles 
and pilot-less drones were used in the attack.487 The SADF general staff considered the 
bridge to be a significant point of Angolan logistical vulnerability.488 The bridge’s 
destruction would have left the brigades stranded with no possibility of retreat or re-
supply, thus dividing the Angolan forces between those stranded on the river’s east bank 
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and those stationed on the west bank and in Cuito Cuanavale. 489 While, the Cuito bridge 
was viewed by the South Africans as the most strategic river crossing, they targeted all 
the bridges for destruction.  General Dumba observed: “All the bridges were destroyed 
by the South African army.”490 However, while the SAAF destroyed the Cuito bridge, 
the Angolans were able to rebuild it, which allowed the brigades to be reinforced by 
Angolan troops already based in Cuito Cuanavale.  
 The attacks on the Cuito Bridge were followed by the SADF’s 13 January 
offensive, which occurred in the early hours of the morning. An intensive air strike and 
artillery barrage preceded a ground assault spearheaded by the 61st Mechanized and the 
4th South African Infantry.491  FAPLA’s 21st Brigade bore the brunt of the South African 
attack.492  The battle lasted around three hours. In the end, the 21st Brigade could not 
withstand the SADF pressure and abandoned its position. The Cubans described the 
withdrawal as a “disorganized retreat.”493 Colonel Breytenbach was more categorical, 
stating that the 21st “cracked and ran.”494 Eventually, on 14 January, the brigade 
withdrew into the Tumpo Triangle. UNITA troops occupied the 21st’s trenches and 
bunkers.495 As the 21st brigade had been deployed between the 25th and 59th brigades, 
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its flight left a gap in the middle of the defensive line. The breach extended to five km.496 
The opening presented the SADF and UNITA with the opportunity to penetrate and 
surround the 25th and 59th brigades.497 The dislodging of the 21st, therefore, endangered 
the defensive perimeter that had been established.  Moreover, Cuban reinforcements 
were more than 200 km away in Menogue.498 
 The next day, 14 January, the SADF continued its artillery barrage, and at 
approximately noon, four columns, comprising around 30 tanks and 60 armoured 
personnel carriers attacked through the gap between the 25th and 59th brigades. The 
South Africans managed to penetrate the Angolan positions and then swing around and 
attack the 59th from both the flank and rear. However, despite being attacked from two 
sides, the 59th launched a counter-attack. FAPLA artillery also opened fire on the South 
Africans. Angolan tanks and artillery were now crucially augmented by Cuban air 
power. In January two new squadrons of Cuban MiG 23s and MiG 21s arrived at 
Menogue.499  Cuban pilots had begun flying missions from Menogue against the 
SADF.500 On 13 January alone, Cuban pilots flew 22 sorties, heavily bombarding South 
African positions, dropping 32 tons of bombs.501 This air assault continued throughout 
14-16 January.  The Cuban air attacks were seen as pivotal in halting the South African 
assault on the FAPLA positions.  Several newspapers, for example, reported Angolan 
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assertions that Cuban pilots had played a major role in the air strikes that stopped the 
South Africans.502  
 In the two-hour tank battle that ensued, the SADF drive was stopped. Cuban 
sources assert that that the combined firepower of Cuban aircraft and FAPLA T-55 tanks 
and artillery destroyed seven SADF tanks and a number of other armoured vehicles.503 
The Angolan forces and Cuban pilots had thwarted the SADF efforts to encircle and 
destroy the 59th Brigade.  In the evening, the 61st Mechanized and 4th South African 
Infantry withdrew.504  Rather than the combined effort of Cuban Migs and FAPLA tanks, 
George ascribes the withdrawal to the SADF’s need to replenish its supplies, a decision 
that “let the FAPLA of the hook.”505 Nevertheless, if the 59th brigade was in such 
disarray, why did the SADF not press home the advantage? The most plausible 
conclusion is that the SADF was compelled to withdraw. 
THE CUBANS TAKE COMMAND 
At the time of the SADF attack of 13 January, most of the Cuban reinforcements were 
stationed at Menogue and had not made the 250-kilometer journey to Cuito 
Cuanavale.506 The only Cuban personnel present at Cuito Cuanavale were military 
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advisers, weapon specialists and technicians flown in by helicopter.507 With the threat of 
encirclement facing the 25th and 59th brigade, Havana also decided to send 
reinforcements to Cuito Cuanavale. On 14 January, a battalion of tanks and artillery were 
dispatched to Cuito Cuanavale.508 Leaving Menogue on 17 January, the Cuban 70th 
Tank Brigade and the Angolan 10th Brigade arrived on 21 January.509 Upon their arrival, 
the Cuban reinforcements encountered the Angolan brigades in a state of disarray.  
Yusmari Martinez Fuentes, a Cuban soldier, described the situation when his squadron 
arrived during an Angolan South African clash:  
Already there were many FAPLA injured and many more dead, 
and in the middle of this bad situation, us, the Cuban squadron.  
We decided that neither the wounded nor the dead could be left in 
that situation.  So we left with them and spent two or three days 
in the bush, until we meet up with another Cuban squadron.510 
 
Before the decision was made to send the battalion, Havana insisted on assuming 
command of the defense of Cuito Cuanavale and all the Angolan forces in southern 
Angola. Castro emphasized that the Cuban representatives in Angola ask Angolan 
President Eduardo Santos “to turn over command of all the Angolan troops on the 
southern front to us.”511 Castro outlined the Cuban rationale: “our forces were engaged in 
the battle, so we asked for the responsibility.”512 The Cuban government reasoned that 
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because Cuba’s escalated involvement brought with it significant risks then they also had 
to ensure that (at least from their perspective) the proper military strategy was followed.  
 According to Havana, the proper military strategy required a unified command 
structure under General Leopoldo Cintra Frias. A unified command structure would 
ensure Cuban strategic and tactical choices dominated, while precluding those of the 
Soviet advisors. On assumption of overall command, the Cubans implemented a different 
approach. As Colonel Watson noted the “Cubans developed their own strategical 
thinking.”513 At the heart of the disagreements between the Cuban and Soviet military 
advisors lay a strategic issue broader than the redeployment of specific brigades.  
Dismayed by the FAPLA débâcle, the Cuban government decided that the opportunity, 
with all the implied risks, presented itself to inflict a military defeat on the SADF that 
would force Pretoria to leave Angola.    
While, of course, Pretoria was not privy to Cuban strategic planning, the SADF 
General Staff was aware of the growing influence of Havana in the military operations. 
Geldenhuys noted that it was clear that “Castro and the Cuban generals had already taken 
command of all operations since January.”514 As Castro was the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Cuban armed forces, his increased role posed a new challenge to the South Africans. 
General Geldenhuys stated that the SADF general staff had “to take the Castro factor 
into account when assessing future Cuban intentions.”515  They were not familiar with 
his command style or his military abilities.  Magnus Malan outlined the problem: 
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 It gave us a problem from our side. We did not know his way of 
thinking. What kind of personality he was. Because that’s the thing you 
need to know in war. You’ve got to know the chap on the other side as 
well as you know yourself. You must know his strong points and his 
weak points. That’s how you are successful. Otherwise you are not.516  
 
The main directives of the Cuban military command were to “maintain at all cost the 
defense of Cuito Cuanavale and guarantee that the town was not occupied by the 
enemy,” and, in coordination with FAPLA “to take all the necessary measures to ensure 
the stabilization of the defense.”517 In its first major decision, the Cuban command 
insisted on the necessity to reduce the defensive lines, which required redeploying the 
FAPLA brigades to the west bank.518  On 17 January, Havana communicated to General 
Arnaldo Ochoa, the Cuban military’s liaison officer with FAPLA in Luanda, the need to 
move the Angolan brigades:  
The current positions of the 59th and 25th Brigades are very risky 
since they are exposed to the possibility of a breakthrough in the 
area the 21st was located. We can’t continue running those 
risks...The defense perimeter of the river should be reduced by 
pulling back the 59th and 25th Brigades towards positions that are 
well fortified and closer to the river.519 
 
The 21st assumed a new defensive position in the rear of the Tumpo triangle, with Cuban 
and Angolan artillery repositioned on the west bank and in Cuito Cuanavale.  Colonel 
Jan Breytenbach described these defensive line adjustments as an “astute move.”520 
These modifications would make it more difficult for the South Africans to find and hit 
military targets.  It would also make it more difficult for opposing infantry and tanks to 
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advance, eliminating or at least minimizing the dangers that had been exposed by the 13 
January attack. This adjustment of lines, coupled with continued Cuban MiG-23s sorties 
stabilized the military situation.   
 However, the readjustment of the defensive lines did not go smoothly. While 
General Cintra Frias had de jure command of the forces in Cuito Cuanavale, he had yet 
to achieve de facto overall command and control.   Apparently, there continued to be 
resistance from both Luanda and Moscow to Havana’s assertion of control and 
implementation of a new approach to the defense of Cuito Cuanavale.  Castro stated that 
the Cuban high command had to contend with initial reluctance “from our Angolan allies 
or Soviet advisors, to a readjustment of the defensive lines.”521 This dissent apparently 
encompassed a Cuban officer, General Ernio Hernandez Rodriquez, the commander of a 
tank company assigned to Cuito Cuanavale.  After initially obeying the order by Cintra 
Frias to withdraw to the west bank, the Angolans decided to reclaim their abandoned 
positions. General Dumba and Hernandez Rodriquez decided to reorganize the remnants 
of the 21st Brigade. On 20 January, the 21st, together with the 59th, crossed the Cuito 
River, driving out the UNITA troops and reoccupying its previous position.522 Dumba 
and Hernandez Rodriquez ordered the crossing of the Cuito River and reoccupation of 
the east bank positions “although we knew that the front was being restructured and 
better, more defensible positions were being taken up.”523 They reasoned that it was 
necessary to seize back the lost positions in order to raise the morale of and convince the 
FAPLA soldiers that they could successfully resist the South African attacks. General 
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Hernandez Rodriquez underscored the significance he attached to the military actions: “It 
was a month of gaining and losing territory. It was our first victory in Cuito 
Cuanavale.”524 
 Nevertheless, regardless of the success, the Cuban command vehemently 
disapproved of this redeployment and ordered the 21st and 59th brigades to return to the 
west of the river.525 Havana was so upset, that on 26 January Castro cabled: “I don’t 
understand what’s going on in Cuito? Who’s in charge in Cuito?”  Castro argued that it 
was premature to engage in any action on the east-bank because “the danger hadn’t 
passed” that the South Africans would launch another major attack.526 This apprehension 
was borne out on 14 February at 8:45 am when the SADF attacked the 59th brigade.527 
Due to the failure to readjust the lines, Castro described the resulting situation as “the 
same thing all over again.”528  In the initial stages the 14 February battle mirrored the 13-
14 January engagement.  
 The SADF committed a considerable force to the 14 February offensive, 
deploying more than 100 vehicles.529 The attack consisted of “three prongs.”530   First, 
several UNITA battalions attacked the 21st Brigade. Cuban sources indicate that UNITA 
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deployed six battalions.531 Second, the 4th South African Infantry, including a tank 
squadron and many Ratel armoured cars, attacked the 59th Brigade. The goal of these 
two attacks was to distract the two FAPLA brigades from the main thrust led by the 61st 
Mechanized under the command of Commandant Mike Muller. Third, the 61st drove 
through the gap between the 59th and 21st. The 61st consisted of a tank squadron, two 
companies of mechanized infantry, two armoured car squadrons, a mortar platoon and an 
engineer platoon.532  
 The 61st Mechanized advanced through the five-kilometer gap and, together with 
the 4th, encircled the 59th.533 The 59th Brigade broke under the pressure and was routed, 
suffering high casualties as “FAPLA soldiers were mown down as they climbed out of 
their positions and tried to flee.”534 In full retreat, the soldiers of the 59th fled to the 
safety of the Tumpo Triangle.  The decimation of the 59th placed the 21st and the 25th - 
which was also on the east-bank of the Cuito River - in grave danger. The SADF was 
poised to capture the Cuito Bridge, which would have blocked the brigades escape route, 
allowing the South Africans to “completely surround all three Angolan brigades.”535 This 
was only prevented by “a desperate counter-attack”536 by a Cuban-Angolan tank force.   
 The tank battle that ensued lasted more than eight hours, pitting the South 
African Olifants (South African redesigned and upgraded 1950s British Centurions) 
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against the Cuba-Angolan Soviet T-55s and T-62s.537 Colonel Breytenbach described the 
confrontation as “an exciting tank” battle.538 In the ensuing clash, the steadfast 
performance of the Cubans and Angolans impressed the South Africans.  Mike Muller 
praised them for fighting “valiantly to protect 59th Brigade as it fled...”539 Though 
outnumbered the Cuban-Angolan force managed to provide the required cover for the 
59th’s retreat.  However, the 59th’s escape and survival was secured at a considerable 
cost.  According to Castro seven Cuban tanks were lost, with fourteen Cubans killed.540  
Hernandez Rodriquez’s tank company lost five of their seven tanks through enemy 
fire.541  The Cuban figures coincide quite closely with the South African accounts.  Mike 
Muller also stated that the 61st destroyed seven tanks.542 SADF Colonel Deon Ferreira 
stated that fourteen tanks had been destroyed and four Cuban tank commanders killed.543 
The additional seven tanks mentioned by Ferreira might be a miscount or refer to 
Angolan tanks that were also destroyed.  Overall, FAPLA’s loss of equipment and life 
was quite high.  Besides the Cuban-Angolan tank-forces losses, Ferreira stated that four 
hundred Angolan soldiers were killed and eight armoured vehicles, one BM-21 Stalin 
Organ, and a SAM-133 antiaircraft system destroyed.544  
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 The South Africans did not escape unscathed, though their losses were a mere 
fraction of the Angolan and Cuban losses. By mid-morning, Cuban MiG-23s, based in 
Menogue, began a series of unrelenting attacks. Brigadier General Hernandez Rodriquez 
said he and others considered the intervention of the MiG-23s as the key to successfully 
securing the safe retreat of the three Angolan brigades.545 The constant bombing runs 
forced the South Africans to stop their operations and seek cover. Mike Muller, the 
commanding officer of the 61st, stated “the enemy craft were permanently in the air 
dropping thousands of tonnes of bombs all over the show...in the course of hundreds of 
attacks.”546 For most of 14 February, the SADF had managed to evade the attacks and, 
thus, avoid casualties.  However, later that day, a MiG-23 bombing run killed four 
soldiers from the 4th South African Infantry.547  
 Artillery also claimed South African victims. The Cuban-Angolan counterattack 
had been supported by an artillery barrage of more than four hours.548 Particularly, 
dangerous were the Zu23 guns, which fired 23mm shells. On more than one occasion, 
the salvos hit a South African target. Artillery fire knocked out the Ratel of Hein 
Groenewald, who served in a mechanized infantry battalion attached to the 61st 
Brigade.549 While Groenewald emerged alive, others were not so fortunate. As artillery 
shells killed another Ratel crew, Mike Muller witnessed their deaths:  
                                                
545 Interview with Brigadier General Ernio Hernandez Rodriquez, 396; General Ruben 
Martinez Puente, El aire siempre fue nuestro, in La Guerra De Angola (La Habana, 
1989), 168 
 
546 Bridgland, The War for Africa, 280 
 
547 Ibid., 280 
 
548 Interview with Brigadier General Ernio Hernandez Rodriquez, 396 
 
549 Interview Hein Groenewald Pretoria, 2 August 2006 
 
  
 150 
A burst of four shells hit their vehicle directly: the holes were 20cm 
apart. All four were killed instantly by flying metal and by the speed of 
the shells that caused a massive displacement of air. They were badly 
wrecked up and weren’t human beings anymore, just a hand here and a 
head there, a piece of rib there.550  
 
George characterized the counterattack as a “disaster” because of Cuban losses.551 
However, the counterattack accomplished its goal; it saved the Angolan brigades. The 
counterattack gained the necessary time for the FAPLA brigades to withdraw and 
regroup. Eventually, all three Angolan brigades retreated into the safety of the Tumpo 
Triangle. In response, the SADF withdrew its forces. While inflicting heavy losses on the 
Angolan and Cuban forces, they had failed to destroy the brigades and achieve a major 
breakthrough.  In combination with the counterattack, the artillery bombardment and air-
strikes prevented the South Africans from achieving their objective.  
THE READJUSTMENT STRUGGLE 
Despite the success of the counter-attack, Castro and the Cuban high command were 
incensed.  They viewed the escape as a near disaster that could have been easily averted, 
the inevitable result of not following the instructions to adjust the defensive lines by 
pulling the Angolan forces back to the west of the Cuito River. As the SADF prepared its 
next major attack, this was the theme that dominated Cuban preoccupations: the correct 
strategic approach was paramount. From 15 February until month’s end, Havana waged 
a constant struggle to readjust the defensive lines and deployment of the FAPLA forces. 
This is reflected in a series of frenetic and almost frantic communications between 
Castro and General Ochoa.  On 15 February, Castro sent a message to Angola 
admonishing those in charge: 
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After the mistake made and the time that was lost in adjusting the defense 
of Cuito[Cuanavale], it is necessary to keep a cool head...We must be 
more alert and aware to avoid surprises and mistakes. I must frankly say 
that here we feel bitter over what happened because it was repeatedly 
anticipated and warned about.552 
 
However, the lines were still not adjusted to Havana’s likening as the FAPLA brigades 
remained on the east bank. This only increased Havana’s frustration and apprehension at 
the tardiness in withdrawing the brigades to the west of the river. In a 20 February 
message, Castro outlined the ramifications of delaying the necessary readjustments, 
painting the situation in the direst terms. He argued that if the adjustment did not occur, 
FAPLA faced a serious military defeat, claiming that such a defeat would have profound 
implications for Angola: 
You must keep in mind the dangers of the situation on the east of the river. 
If the enemy is able to break though our defenses, the Angolan forces will 
have their backs to the river and might suffer heavy losses including those 
drowned, killed or captured and it would be a total disaster. Should that 
happen, it would be hard to hold Cuito [Cuanavale] and the political and 
morale consequences for FAPLA and the Angolan government would be 
terrible.553 
 
This was followed the next day by another - even more frantic - message reiterating the 
calamitous prospects that faced Angola if the proper defensive measures were not 
adopted. Again the imperative of redeploying Angolan forces on the west of the Cuito 
River was underscored. Especially alarming to Havana was the condition of the Cuito 
Bridge.  The continual South African bombardment of the bridge rendered the only 
effective route of evacuation almost impassable. If the SADF launched another 
offensive, the Angolan forces would be trapped, with no means of escape, leading to 
their annihilation. An existential threat loomed over Luanda. Unless the defensive lines 
                                                
552 Case 1/1989, 386 
 
553 Ibid., 387 
 
  
 152 
were measures were immediately readjusted, FAPLA faced a crippling débâcle from 
which it would be unable to recover.  The 21 February cable outlined these 
repercussions: 
We really fail to understand the slow pace of action in Cuito Cuanavale. A 
whole week has passed since the events of February 14 and so far only 
two battalions of the 21st Brigade have crossed to the west of the river. 
According to our estimates, there are still about 3,500 Angolan soldiers 
and a lot of equipment that should have been taken west. Worst of all, is 
the news received today is that the bridge is totally useless with several 
different sections destroyed and it is almost impossible to get across...A 
great many days have been lost...we feel there is a lack of foresight, that 
those in charge there don’t realize the terrible effects on the military and 
political situation and on morale a disaster with the forces east of the river 
would have, and we don’t even have a few boats to do what the British did 
with theirs in Dunkirk.554 
 
Despite the sense of desperation, almost fatalism, pervading, this message, Havana 
prevailed and the lines were readjusted. The SADF general staff noted the adjustment.  
At the 14 March meeting of the SSC, Geldenhuys acknowledged that the FAPLA 
brigades “became compelled to move round to the west of the River Cuito.”555 By the 
beginning of March, under the supervision of General Cintra Frias, all the Angolan 
forces, except for one battalion of the 25th brigade, had moved to the west of the river.  
The battalion stayed on the east bank as a foil to and monitor for any forthcoming South 
African offensive. All artillery was, also, repositioned on the west side, with tanks 
stationed in the rear. While, George does not discuss the readjustment of defensive lines 
in detail,556 it was a key episode in the 1987-88 conflict as this redpolyment was to have 
a significant impact on the subsequent course of the battle for Cuito Cuanavale.  
 
                                                
554 Ibid., 387 
 
555 SVR 5/88, 2, from MoD [Group 6] 
 
556 George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, p 221 
 
  
 153 
THE CLASH OF STRATEGIES 
The struggle for Cuito Cuanavale now entered the decisive phase: the struggle over the 
Tumpo Triangle.  The SADF general staff viewed the 14 February mauling of the 59th 
Brigade as restoring the initiative that they had lost when the FAPLA brigades had 
successfully retreated to Cuito Cuanavale from the Lomba River. In their assessment, the 
opportunity now existed “to press home the military ascendancy that they had thrown 
away” in December 1987, when the FAPLA brigades had escaped destruction.557  In 
their view the Angolan forces in the Tumpo Triangle were extremely vulnerable.  With 
these forces now concentrated in this salient, the SADF decided to drive them out as the 
prelude to capturing Cuito Cuanavale.558  
 The ground commanders did not share the optimism of the SADF general staff. 
As in their previous objections, they did not agree that the correct plan was an attack 
from the east, which played into the strengths of the Angolan-Cuban defensive lines.  As 
before, they favoured an outflanking attack from the west that would avoid the well-
organized eastern defences of Cuito Cuanavale, allowing the SADF to capture the town 
from the “rear.” They did not share the assessment that the Cuban-Angolan formations 
were weak. The withdrawal into the Tumpo Triangle had concentrated these forces, 
which now made them a formidable foil to any attack. Moreover, the ground 
commanders knew that the Cubans and Angolans had laid extensive minefields in front 
of the brigades’ positions, and redeployed artillery to cover the Tumpo Triangle.  
Nevertheless, the general staff persisted in their determination to seize the Tumpo 
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Triangle. Breytenbach unequivocally condemned the General Staff’s plan as oblivious to 
the reality of the military situation: 
Circumstances had changed and only a fool would force an attack on a 
hardened and contracted bridgehead covered by deep and extensive 
minefields...It was too late to do anything effective in the Tumpo 
Sector...The SADF, however, did have its fair share of fools in the rarified 
atmosphere at the top...Instead it was decided that only more of the same 
would succeed.559 
 
This persistence directly played into Cuban and Angolan hands. Cintra Frias, now having 
effective control of the forces in Cuito Cuanavale, anticipated the South African attack 
on the Tumpo Triangle and took steps to strengthen the defenses.   From the previous 
attacks, it became clear that the destruction of the Angolan brigades deployed to the 
town’s east was integral to the SADF’s strategy. In anticipation, Cintra Frias began 
mining the approaches to the flood plain inside the Tumpo Triangle.560 He also deployed 
artillery on the highest points on the west bank of the Cuito River, overlooking the 
Tumpo Triangle. Some of the “FAPLA artillery was placed on a hill in Cuito 
Cuanavale.”561 The minefields ensured that any South African attack would either fall on 
the mines or take a route that would expose them to a concentrated and continual artillery 
barrage.  Breytenbach described the minefields as “cunningly developed,” which “would 
canalize any future South African attacks against the Tumpo Triangle into well-placed 
killing grounds.”562 The SADF field commanders knew they faced a daunting challenge: 
Get through the minefields and the trench lines and then you would 
become sitting ducks for the artillery. At the same time the enemy 
warplanes would be overhead all the time, and your own Air Force would 
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be unable to help out because despite all the skills, ingenuity and courage 
of South Africa’s pilots, the Mirage obsolescence factor outweighed all the 
qualities of the SAAF’s men could bring to bear in the Tumpo Triangle.563 
 
THE TUMPO TRIANGLE 
The next and last phase of the battle for Cuito Cuanavale was characterized by three 
separate South African attacks on the Tumpo Triangle, on 25 and 29 February and 23 
March. At this point, a clear difference of emphasis emerges between the South African 
and Cuban sources. The most authoritative South African accounts, principally 
Bridgland and Breytenbach, provide considerable detail on each of the attacks, 
highlighting the broader strategic issues, especially the readjustment of the defensive 
lines. In the Cuban accounts, this is clearly considered to be the most important aspect: 
the struggle for Cuito Cuanavale was settled by these readjustments. The Cuban sources, 
however, focus on the main and last of the three attacks. The greater detail provided on 
this attack (23 March), is due to it being the final effort by the SADF not only to drive 
the Angolans and Cubans from the Tumpo Triangle, but also capture Cuito Cuanavale. 
This reflects the Cuban tendency to treat all three attacks as being part of one episode of 
the conflict, whose denouement was the 23 March attack.  
 On 25 February, Colonel Pat McLoughlin, the commanding officer of the 20th 
South African Brigade, and in overall command, and Mike Muller, as field commander, 
led the first attack against the Tumpo Triangle. The 61st Mechanized spearheaded the 
assault, with 20 Olifant tanks, a paratrooper regiment, an anti-aircraft group, anti-tank 
specialists, a mortar squad and a contingent of engineers. UNITA’s 800 strong 5th 
Regular Battalion accompanied the 61st.  Three companies of the SADF 32nd battalion, 
a squadron of Ratel armoured vehicles, and another mechanized infantry battalion 
provided flank support. Two UNITA battalions were also committed to the flank 
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operation.  The 4th South African Infantry stood in reserve, ready to be called in for any 
supporting action that might be required. 
 Colonel McLoughlin’s plan targeted the 25th Brigade, the only FAPLA force on 
the east bank of the Cuito River. While, the 61st comprised the main thrust, the 32nd 
Battalion, with the UNITA forces, went into action first. At 3:00 a.m., the 32nd attacked 
the 25th Brigade, from the south. This was a diversionary action designed to disguise the 
main point of attack.  An artillery and mortar barrage accompanied the assault.564  In 
response the 25th Brigade withdrew from their positions.  What is unclear is whether the 
25th abandoned their positions in a disorganized flight or as part of a planned retreat. 
The sources offer no definitive answer. Both Bridgland and Breytenbach unequivocally 
stated that the 25th took flight in fear: according to Bridgland “running away,”565 with 
Breytenbach concurring that the 25th “broke and ran to the rear.”566  
 Cuban sources do not comment extensively on the 25th’s flight or retreat. This 
lack of commentary is not a question of silence on this particular issue, but a result of not 
dealing in detail with the 25 February attack.  By the time of the 25 February attack, the 
defensive lines around Cuito Cuanavale had been readjusted according to Cuban 
instructions. However, Lt. Colonel Jimenez Gomez disagreed with Bridgland’s and 
Breytenbach’s evaluation of the actions of the 25th Brigade, stating that the 25th had 
been ordered to withdraw to positions nearer the river that had been prepared earlier.567 
With Cintra Frias now in effective control, it is quite plausible that the 25th Brigade was 
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instructed to withdraw in the face of any South African attack, as opposed to attempting 
to hold onto to their positions, given the preparations already in place for the defense of 
the Tumpo Triangle.  
 Nevertheless, whether the 25th Brigade were driven out or left their positions in a 
planned retreat, the Angolan-Cuban artillery began to shell the 32nd Battalion, which 
took shelter in the vacated trenches. Major Tinus van Staden, the field commander of the 
32nd, stated: “We were pinned down in the artillery bombardments for nine hours that 
day. It was just bombs, bombs, bombs all day.”568  Also, as support for the artillery, 
Cuban fighter aircraft began heavy bombing raids that lasted throughout the day. Mike 
Muller stated that the Cuban fighters “appeared shortly afterwards and subsequently 
there were MiGs in the sky all day.”569 Major van Staden noted: “We were bombed from 
all sides and from the air that day. The MiGs crossed our positions 56 times dropping 
bombs...”570 With the occupation of the 25th Brigade’s positions by the 32nd Battalion, 
the next phase of the South African attack started with the main thrust by the 61st 
Mechanized Battalion. However, the advance immediately floundered in the newly laid 
minefields. As Breytenbach noted, General Cintra Frias, in anticipation of the SADF 
attack, “had sufficient time to prepare a few surprises.”571 While the ground commanders 
knew that minefields had been laid, they were unaware of the extent, depth and density.  
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 Thus, while SADF engineers successfully cleared a path though one minefield, 
the 61st ran into “another unsuspected one.”572 Four tanks lost their tracks and were 
immobilized.  Mike Muller, the field commander, was in one of the disabled tanks. 
Having cleared the first minefield: 
after another 100 m we ran into another minefield. I was about 20 m 
behind the first line of Olifants, but my tank was the first to be hit. It was 
one of the new Soviet M-57 anti-tank mines. It took the tracks off my 
tank.573 
 
The explosion of the anti-tank mines revealed the location of the 61st, allowing the 
artillery in Cuito Cuanavale to target the advancing South Africans.  A Cuban tank 
battalion deployed on the river’s west bank assisted the artillery barrage by turning their 
guns on the South Africans.574 The shelling was so intense that Muller described being 
“engulfed by the biggest FAPLA artillery barrage of the war. It was bloody hellish.”575  
The SADF could not respond with its own artillery because muzzle flashes would have 
exposed the positions of their guns, allowing the Cuban pilots to pinpoint them and 
attack. The continual presence of MiGs neutralized the G5s and G6s, ensuring that the 
SADF artillery was a non-factor. 576 Muller pointed out that the SADF “G5s had stopped 
firing because there was [sic] always two, three or sometimes four MiGs is the air and 
our artillery could not afford to betray their position.”577  As a consequence, the 61st 
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began to sustain casualties. For example, shrapnel killed a Corporal Hendriks.578 Also a 
vehicle sent into to recover one of the disabled tanks was hit by a shell and destroyed.  
Muller stated, “it burned out completely.”579 
 A special team was dispatched to clear the path for the tanks. The position of 
each mine had to be marked and then detonated. This process was very slow. In the end, 
the 61st took more than five hours to transverse the minefield. Around 12:30 pm the 
tanks started moving along the path into the Tumpo Triangle.580 As Muller drove into the 
Tumpo Triangle, an advance company of the 32nd Battalion linked up with the 61st.  
However, to mark its location so that it could be easily found by the 61st, it released a 
yellow smoke marker.  This proved to be a serious error, as it revealed to the Angolan-
Cuba artillery the positions of the approaching 61st and the waiting company of the 
32nd. Muller observed: “That was a mistake as it drew heavy and accurate artillery 
fire.”581 Major van Staden stated: “Soon the enemy artillery was shooting at us. It was 
worse than before. They hammered us.”582  As a result the casualties mounted.  By 3:00 
p.m., the artillery barrage had destroyed five Ratels.  In one of the destroyed Ratels, the 
commander lost both of his legs. In another case, a shell killed the driver of an Olifant 
tank. The casualties were so severe that Muller said: “All our ambulances and recovery 
vehicles were busy taking the dead and wounded to medical posts in the rear.”583 
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 With the delay in the minefield, growing vulnerability to artillery and the 
mounting casualties, the attack came to a halt, leading to the withdrawal of the 61st 
Mechanized and the 32nd Battalion. Muller cited the delays and the casualties as the 
reasons he requested permission from Colonel McLoughlin to cease the attack and 
withdraw.584 The minefields and the Cuban-Angolan artillery proved to be too much of 
an obstacle. Despite occupying the abandoned position of the 25th Brigade, the 61st and 
the 32nd battalion could not retain them in the face of the constant artillery 
bombardment. In Breytenbach’s assessment, the Angolans and Cubans had 
“overwhelming artillery superiority.”585 One SADF observer estimated that there had 
been 1,350 accurate artillery hits that day.586 As previously noted, the SADF could not 
neutralize the artillery in and around Cuito Cuanavale, as South African artillery could 
not be deployed under the constant presence of the MiGs. Moreover, Cuban air 
superiority also ensured that the SAAF could play no role.  The absence of South African 
aircraft was not lost on the South African troops.  Major van Staden observed that in the 
February offensive, they had “had no support from our own Air Force.”587 
 Minefields, artillery and fighter aircraft were central factors in the failure of the 
SADF’s 25 February offensive. Of equal - if not greater - importance was the SADF 
general staff’s underestimation of the defensive measures deployed by the General Cintra 
Frias, particularly the redeployment of artillery and the laying of the minefields.588 Both 
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had proved critical in blunting the impetus of the attack, and then making it impossible 
not only to continue further but also to hold territory already occupied. Nevertheless, 
despite these experiences - and these lessons - the 29 February and 23 March attacks 
would, in turn, repeat the same pattern. 
To address the problems revealed by the 25 February attack, Colonel 
McLoughlin decided to launch a night attack. McLoughlin reasoned that the South 
African artillery would be able to operate at nighttime, challenging the Angolan-Cuban 
artillery.  Also, the dark would make it extremely difficult for the Angolan artillery to 
acquire targets, rendering them ineffective.589   Moreover, the MiGs’ ability to locate and 
hit targets would be greatly compromised, thus, neutralizing their “superiority over the 
Tumpo Triangle.”590 McLoughlin selected Mike Muller to lead the second attack on the 
Tumpo Triangle scheduled for the night of 29 February.  Muller would lead the 61st into 
the Tumpo Triangle along the southern bank of the Dala River. Mcloughlin hoped that 
by taking this route, the advance would remain unobserved.  The 61st Mechanized was 
equipped with 22 Olifant tanks organized in two tank squadrons. Also, attached were a 
Ratel squadron, a mechanized infantry company, a platoon of mortars, two infantry 
Battalions of the 32nd and two UNITA infantry battalions. As in the 25 February attack, 
the 4th South African Infantry was held in reserve.591  
 However, the attack was delayed due to a lack of mine-clearing vehicles and the 
malfunction of five tanks. As a result, Muller was left with only 16 tanks.592 It had also 
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begun to rain heavily, limiting visibility.  Consequently, Mike Muller “requested 
permission to delay the attack until first light.”593 By 10:00 a.m. the next day, 1 March, 
the 61st had advanced approximately one kilometer into the Tumpo Triangle along the 
southern bank of the Dala River, entering thick bush cover. As the 61st slowly pushed 
onwards, Muller ordered the tanks not to fire on any enemy positions or targets in order 
to avoid giving away their position.  Eventually, they reached a position four kilometers 
northeast of the Cuito Bridge.  
 The delay meant that the attack was not launched at night, but in full daylight. 
The element of surprise was lost before the 61st had the opportunity to engage any 
FAPLA troops as it was now exposed to air and artillery attack. At noon Cuban MiG-23s 
and Angolan MiG-21s began flying sorties against the 61st.  Soon after the air attacks 
began, the lead tanks hit a minefield. The exploding mines allowed the Angolan-Cuban 
artillery to determine the location of the advancing South African formation and 
effectively target them. The resulting artillery barrage gave the 61st “a really torrid 
time.”594 In response, the SADF command decided to respond in kind. The G5 guns, 
together with the mortars and Ratels of the 61st opened fire on the gun emplacements on 
the west bank of the Cuito River.  However, despite firing “many hundreds of rounds”595, 
the SADF could not neutralize the Angolan-Cuban artillery.  
 Moreover, the 61st was trapped in the minefield, its speed and degree of 
movement limited by the surrounding mines. Also, several tanks had been immobilized 
by the mines or had broken down. This only increased its vulnerability to the shelling.  
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The Zu23 artillery guns deployed by FAPLA were again particularly effective. Muller 
described these cannons as “daunting.”596  According to Muller, the UNITA infantry 
fared the worst as they had very little protection from the relentless shelling.  The 
UNITA infantry either traveled on foot or rode on the outsides of the tanks. Muller 
witnessed the carnage:   
Those 23-mm guns were just wiping the UNITA blokes off the tanks. 
Even when I close my eyes now I can still see it clearly...Ahead of my 
command Ratel was an Olifant with five UNITA infantry sitting on its 
engine plate. When the 23-mm burst came they began getting off to 
take cover. As they jumped off one of them was hit with a 23-mm shell. 
His head just disintegrated.597 
 
As on 25 February, the shelling and minefields proved an insurmountable barrier to the 
SADF advance.598 Exposed to an incessant artillery barrage and bogged down in the 
minefield, Muller decided to tactically withdraw from the minefield to regroup. He 
wanted to find an alternate route and develop a plan for eliminating the 23-mm guns. 
However, despite the withdrawal, the shelling of the 61st continued: the Angolan-Cuban 
artillery continued to target the 61st as it withdrew. Compounding Muller’s problems, 
only five tanks were operational.599 At this point, the SADF general staff decided to end 
the attack. The second effort to seize the Tumpo Triangle had failed.  This failure did not 
go unnoticed in western newspapers. The Economist noted that the SADF was “bogged 
down in Cuito Cuanavale.”600  Another article in The Economist returned to the theme of 
the SADF inability to seize the town: “Something could be happening in Angola’s 
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interminable war. A strong South African force, advancing in support of Mr. Jonas 
Savimbi’s UNITA rebels, has been stuck for six weeks at Cuito Cuanavale.”601  
 This second failure appears to have unsettled, or at least evoked concern in, the 
upper echelons of the SSC and the South African military. George noted that the SADF 
command was alarmed by the casulaties and loss of equipment, leading to their decision 
to implement “tactical changes.”602  However, he does not convey the sense of crisis that 
gripped Pretoria, indicated by the replacing of ground commanders and senior SADF 
figures to the South African field headquarters.  During the 29 February /1 March 
offensive, General Geldenhuys (SADF Chief of Staff) and General Kat Liebenberg 
(South African Army Chief of Staff) and several other generals arrived at the command 
headquarters.  Breytenbach captured the agitated state of the generals, describing the new 
arrivals as “anxiously ensconced” in the field headquarters dispensing “unwarranted 
advice and even orders whenever they felt like it.”603 Nevertheless, whatever the 
psychological state of the generals, with the failure of the second attack, they decided to 
formally end Operation Hooper, designating the next set of military actions as Operation 
Packer.   
 The SADF General Staff concluded that changes were required at the overall and 
field command levels.604  The General Staff attributed the failure of the two Tumpo 
attacks to the inability of the Colonel McLoughlin and Commandant Muller to prosecute 
the actions correctly and competently. On 8 March 1988, Colonel Paul Fouche, 
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commanding officer of the 82nd South African Brigade replaced Colonel McLouglin as 
the overall commander of the South African forces at Cuito Cuanavale. Commandant 
Gerhard Louw, a tank and armoured combat vehicle instructor, succeeded Mike Muller 
as ground commander.  
THE THIRD & LAST ATTACK ON THE TUMPO TRIANGLE 
The SADF faced a more daunting problem than a change in command personnel. As in 
November 1987, when it failed to destroy the retreating Angolan brigades, the SADF had 
to contend with serious logistical problems. New troops and supplies were required. The 
long campaign had worn equipment out. Armoured personnel carriers, G5 artillery pieces 
and tanks had to be repaired or replaced.  For example, many G5 guns were so worn out 
that a battery of older G2 guns from the Second World War were deployed to buttress 
the South African artillery. These guns had a much lower range of 16 km (10 miles).605  
Compounding the equipment problem, many of the troops were physically and 
emotionally drained. Due to their exhaustion, many succumbed to “the sheer strain, 
fatigue and tension” of the long campaign.606 
 The Angolan intervention, especially the actions in the Cuito Cuanavale theatre, 
had exhausted the SADF battalions. Consequently the SADF faced a serious personnel 
shortage. The militarization of the apartheid regime led to the expansion of the military. 
Between 1975 and 1989, the SADF more than doubled its number of troops: from 50,000 
to 103,000. Also, compulsory national service in the armed forces for South African 
white males was increased to two years from one year. There was a parallel increase in 
the size of the armed forces reserves and the Citizen Force, a separate institution that 
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supplemented the professional and permanent SADF troops. By the late 1980s, the 
reserves had increased to 140,000, while the Citizen Force had grown to 325,000. 
Together the SADF, reserves and the Citizen Force could mobilize between 500,000 to 
600,000 men.607 
 Therefore, to counter the problem of physical and mental fatigue, after the failure 
of the second attack on the Tumpo Triangle, Pretoria turned to the Citizen Force. The 
SADF drew new and fresh replacements from the Citizen Force regiments as opposed to 
regular, career and seasoned soldiers. The exhaustion of the SADF soldiers amounted to 
more than that the simple wearing-down of individual soldiers; it represented the 
wearing down and exhaustion of the most experienced battle-ready South African troops. 
A significant distinction separated the Citizen Force from the permanent SADF 
formations.  On one hand, the SADF regular formations constituted the professional 
soldiers: a permanent force of the most experienced and committed soldiers. On the 
other, the Citizen Force represented a civilian militia that could be called up on a 
temporary basis. The Citizen Force consisted of reservists, who having completed their 
terms of national service, continued to be on the active military rolls, though they had 
returned to civilian life. For example, among Louw’s new recruits were a teacher and a 
car-salesman.608 
 Several Citizen Force regiments were called up and integrated into the 82nd 
South African Brigade. Among them were the Orange Free State President Steyn, Rivier 
De la Rey and Groot Karoo regiments. Nevertheless, the ability of Pretoria to call up 
members of the Citizen Force could not solve the SADF’s personnel problem, as mere 
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numbers could not compensate for the deficit of combat-ready and battle-hardened 
soldiers.  As these new reinforcements were not seasoned veterans or regulars, the SADF 
subjected them to training and preparation for the new attack on the Tumpo Triangle 
under the supervision of Commandant Gerhard Louw. Two problems beset Louw. First, 
he did not have enough time for training or preparation. He observed that the SADF 
“didn’t really have enough time to train the men thoroughly...it takes more time to get 
men who have been back in civilian life ready for battle than it does career soldiers and 
national service men.”609 Second, the reservists did not have the same seriousness, 
dedication or esprit de corps as the SADF regulars. Louw described these new recruits as 
“naïve and innocent, who thought of the war as a big adventure.”610 Louw had less than a 
month to prepare these new formations for an attack on the Tumpo Triangle.  
 The plan for the new attack on the Tumpo Triangle called for the 82nd Battalion, 
led by Louw, to dislodge the Angolan brigades and seize the area.  To accomplish this 
task the South African force would drive directly into the flood plain, hitting the 25th 
Brigade on its left flank and then swing around to attack the 66th Brigade. The Regiment 
President Steyn would spearhead the assault by advancing along (from their perspective) 
the downward slope of Dala River, following it until the slope began to rise, and then as 
they reached the slope’s crest begin firing on the 25th Brigade. The objective was to 
isolate the FAPLA brigades from each other by driving a “wedge between” them.611 The 
isolated and disorganized brigades would then been driven into the Cuito River. The 
reconstructed Cuito Bridge was also a target of the assault. As the strategic link between 
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the east and west banks, its seizure or destruction would have made it impossible for the 
Angolan and Cuban forces in Cuito Cuanavale to come to the assistance of the 25th and 
66th brigades. Breytenbach and Bridgland diverge on whether the immediate goal was to 
destroy or to capture the bridge, with Breytenbach asserting the goal was capture, 
Bridgland destruction.612 Louw asserted the mission encompassed both possibilities: if 
the bridge could not be captured, it was to be destroyed.613    
 As preparations for the attack continued, the ground force commanders again 
expressed their reservations about the viability of the military strategy of attacking the 
Tumpo Triangle. As Helmoed-Romer Heitman observed after previous recent FAPLA 
encounters, under the command of Cintra Frias “[t[he situation at Cuito Cuanavale had 
stabilized.”614 Therefore, the decision to launch a new assault on the fortified FAPLA 
position in the Tumpo, using the same approach as in the other two failed attempts, 
violated basic military logic. Louw had not been surprised that the other attacks had 
failed, questioning “the wisdom of sending tank forces into open ground sown with 
minefields and enfiladed by a formidable array of heavy artillery overlooking the 
battleground.”615 The SADF deficit in artillery accentuated the difficulties faced by any 
South African attack.  The 82nd would be unable to counter the Angolan artillery with 
their-own concentrated fire. Breytenbach noted that to oppose more than 60 Angolan 
large artillery pieces, an array of Zu23 guns and dozens of tanks deployed for fire 
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support on the river’s west bank, the SADF had only a battery each of G5 and the WW 
II-vintage G2 guns.616  
 This disparity did not augur well for the success of the South African attack. 
Breytenbach emphasized that “[t]he overall imbalance of combat power could only point 
to a disastrous outcome for Regiment President Steyn.”617 Given the experiences of the 
previous two Tumpo Triangle offenses, it should have been apparent that the SADF was 
unable to overcome the minefields and the artillery. As the SADF artillery would now be 
reduced to only two batteries of major artillery, the probability of success was not high. 
A direct attack into the Tumpo Triangle once again played directly into the Cuban and 
Angolan hands.  Breytenbach incredulously noted that it was “remarkable that this stark 
reality did not occur to the General Staff.”618 Not surprisingly, the Cuban command 
concurred with Breytenbach. They also considered it foolhardy to launch a direct attack 
on the Tumpo Triangle. Moreover, they had expanded the minefields and deployed 
artillery in greater numbers and depth. Joaquin Soria, who served as a Lieutenant 
Colonel at Cuito Cuanavale, outlined the Cuban assessment: 
According to our own conclusions, it was very unfavourable to deploy 
troops on the Cuito Cuanavale defense front because there was a very 
big flood plain between the Tumpo and Dala rivers, which was under 
the control of the direct fire of the tank cannons and artillery...It was 
disadvantageous to do this on such an uncovered terrain.619 
 
The direct presence of General Liebenburg, Chief of the South African Army, and his 
staff at Colonel Fouche’s command headquarters attested to the importance attached by 
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Pretoria to the third attack on the Tumpo Triangle. General Liebenburg not only wanted 
to monitor the attack but intervene with orders if he deemed it had “become necessary to 
do so.”620 Considered unwarranted interference, these interventions were not viewed 
kindly by the ground commanders. For example, Louw complained about unreasonable 
orders that were at odds with the reality of the situation he faced.  While Louw would not 
single out or identify specific orders he disliked and rejected as unsound, he stated that 
during the attack he “almost resigned over bad command decisions.”621 
 In early March, troops of the 32nd battalion, the Regiment Groot Karoo and 
UNITA’s 4th Battalion swept the proposed attack route for mines. They detected and 
removed more than 200 mines.622 On 19 March, the SAAF carried out a bombing raid on 
the Tumpo Triangle.  Two days later, as a prelude to the attack, the South African 
artillery unleashed an artillery barrage against the Angolan-Cuban positions.623 The 
Regiment Groot Karoo and the 32nd Battalion also engaged in a series of actions 
southeast of the Tumpo Triangle, designed to preoccupy and divert the attention of the 
Angolan and Cuban forces from the impending main attack. They also failed in an 
attempt to outflank the Cuban/Angolan position, suffering, according to General Lorente 
Leon, 18 deaths.624  On the morning of 23 March, another bombing raid by the South 
African Airforce and artillery barrage specifically targeted the 25th Brigade. The 
Regiment President Steyn then advanced along the Dala River.  Originally, the advance 
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was planned for 6:00 a.m., but Louw, due to the overcast conditions, delayed it until the 
light was better. Once the light had improved, the Regiment President Steyn, with a 
battalion of UNITA infantry, advanced with the two squadrons of 26 Olifant tanks 
organized in a double column.  Only one column had their lead tank equipped with a 
mine roller. Attached to the mine roller was a viper, a device used to explode mines 
ahead of an advancing formation.  
 At 9:00 a.m., as they were approaching the 25th Brigade’s position, with Cuito 
Cuanavale visible in the distance on the west side of the Cuito River, the columns ran 
into a minefield. A tank in the column that did not have a mine roller hit a mine. Its 
tracks were blown off. Louw decided to halt the advance, recover the immobilized tank 
and to call up more mine sweepers. However, the mine-sweeping devices (a series of 
explosives tied together, called plofadders) malfunctioned. The immobilization of the 
tank and the mine-sweeping equipment malfunctions delayed the offensive by two-and-
a-half hours. At around noon, with the tank recovered and a path cleared, Louw 
continued the advance along the Dala River toward the Tumpo Triangle.  
 Nonetheless, any chance of surprise was gone. The minefield that Louw’s 
formation had run into was a “warning” mine field. It served to alert the Angolan and 
Cubans of any approaching South African troops.   As Louw’s forces came over the crest 
of the slope of the Dala River, they “could see the whole of Cuito Cuanavale spread out 
before us.”625 Alerted, by the explosion of the tank in the warning minefield, the FAPLA 
artillery began targeting the Regiment President Steyn as they came over the crest, with 
the advancing columns “drawing heavy fire because, for the first time, the FAPLA 
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artillery could see exactly where we were...It got heavier and more accurate”626 Despite, 
the growing artillery barrage, Louw now deployed his forces in open formation with 
tanks nine abreast.  
 However, the deployment occurred in the main minefield in front of the FAPLA 
Tumpo Triangle positions.  Cuban and Angolans engineers had laid the minefield as part 
of a system of minefields designed to funnel the SADF (especially, tanks and armoured 
vehicles) into territory covered by the Angolan artillery.627  To guide the laying of the 
mines, Cuban and Angolan scouts had identified the areas where tanks could be 
deployed. Bridgland described these as areas as “determined kill zones covered by 
massive artillery.”628 The artillery had been arranged so that a South African attack from 
either direction could be targeted. Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin Soria stated that they had 
“set up our posture such that we could change our fire pattern in relation to any changes 
in the South African thrust.”629   
 To divert the South African advance into these zones, the minefields had been 
laid in such a manner that “[a] small gap was left where the South African army could 
enter” the Tumpo Triangle.  Moreover, the areas through which the South Africans had 
launched their first two attacks had been re-mined.630 Areas that the SADF had cleared in 
the previous attacks and assumed safe were again hazardous terrain for tanks or 
armoured personnel carriers to transverse. Also, the mines at the very front of the main 
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minefield had been reinforced.  The Cuban engineers created new booby traps, more 
powerful than conventional mines with “one or two boxes of TNT mounted on top of 2 
or 3 anti-tank mines.”631 The engineers had also laid the mines in an unconventional and 
unpredictable fashion, which “ran parallel, perpendicular and diagonally.”632 Thus, 
Louw’s forces found themselves in extensive minefield, one measuring approximately 
300m by 50m.633  
 Almost immediately upon entering the minefield and before reaching their 
designated firing positions,634 at least three tanks of one squadron hit mines and were 
lost.635 Louw decided to recover the tanks before continuing the advance. He ordered 
recovery vehicles to attempt towing the tanks out of the minefield. By this time, FAPLA 
artillery had launched another intense bombardment, targeting and “hitting the South 
Africans.”636 Louw testified to the intensity of the fire: “By now the enemy seemed to be 
throwing everything towards us...Out of the corner of my eye, I saw missiles whistling 
over our heads...Mortar shells landed over all the place and 23-mm slugs crashed through 
the sound barrier.”637 Due to the “danger of being well and truly pinned down in a sea of 
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mines,” Louw ordered the other squadron to retreat.638 He planned to withdraw from the 
Angolan fire, regroup and resume the advance.  
 At 2:00 p.m., after efforts to retrieve the tanks failed, and amid the incessant 
FAPLA shelling, Louw requested from Colonel Fouche permission “to break off the 
attack.”639  With shells falling all around the tanks, Louw decided “hell, let’s get out 
range.”640 He abandoned the idea of re-launching the attack. The saturation of the 
shelling and the minefields were an insurmountable barrier.  To continue the advance 
would have meant “moving into an area 2 km by 2 km that was exposed to concentrated 
fire.”641 The attack, therefore, had come “to a grinding and definite assault.”642 The 
SADF high command decided that the “potential casualties and loss of equipment were 
not worth it.”643 Before the offensive, Louw had received orders to minimize “losses” 
among the South African forces.644  As they withdrew, Louw tried to find a path by 
which to circumnavigate the minefield, stating that he was “loathe to move into the 
minefield”645 and “really scared that we were going to veer into the minefield and lose 
more tanks.”646 Compounding Louw’s predicament, the Cuban MiGs began to execute a 
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series of sorties against Louw’s squadrons. Due to the overcast conditions, the Cuban 
fighters could not attack during the morning, but as conditions improved they were able 
to take to the air. 
 The artillery barrage continued. It was so intense that the area was covered in 
clouds of dust.  General Dumba noted “you could smell the air.”647 Surrounded by mines 
and exposed to artillery and air bombardment, casualties of the retreating forces 
mounted.648 For example, though actual numbers are not available, it seems clear from 
the accounts that the UNITA death toll was very high. The UNITA infantry had very 
little cover from FAPLA fire. To avoid the fire, they often rode on the backs of the 
SADF tanks and armoured cars. Of course, this provided very limited protection. 
Breytenbach stated that the FAPLA guns “swept the passengers from the tanks like 
chaff, while shrapnel from the artillery and mortar shells took a further toll.”649 Sergeant 
Jose Kupussu, who served in the 32nd Battalion concurred: “Thousands of UNITA died. 
Ah! You can’t count the numbers.”650  Often the tanks’ very actions would kill the men 
seeking shelter. UNITA soldiers would seek refuge from the fire by sheltering in the bins 
behind the turrets on the tanks’ rears.  When the tanks’ turrets rotated to locate targets, 
the UNITA soldiers in the bins would be crushed.  Louw bemoaned their fate: “It breaks 
my heart to think of the UNITA soldiers trying to seek shelter under the bin in the back 
of the turrets.”651 
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 Despite Louw’s efforts during the retreat, the tanks continued to hit mines. The 
minefields proved to be too extensive to avoid. At least one squadron was bogged down. 
Breytenbach described the tanks as “a dozen flies caught in the sticky mess of 
flypaper.”652  In his 30 May 1988 address to the Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned 
Movement, Fidel Castro ironically compared the status of the SAAF planes to that of the 
SADF tanks: “The South African planes were on the ground, and the South African tanks 
were flying.”653 It is disputed and not clear how many South African tanks were 
destroyed in the minefields and captured by FAPLA. From the South African side both 
Louw and Breytenbach stated that the SADF lost only three tanks.654 While giving no 
exact figure, the Angolans and Cubans, however, insisted that considerably more than 
the three captured tanks were destroyed. General Dumba insisted that along with the 
three tanks there were other “destroyed and abandoned tanks still in those heavily-mined 
fields.”655 He insisted so many South African tanks were destroyed, that when Angolan 
President Dos Santos visited Cahama in neighboring Cunene province, “you could see 
the smoke from Cuito Cuanavale from the burning tanks.”656   
 Nevertheless, whatever the level of destruction of the SADF tank squadrons, the 
third attack on the Tumpo Triangle had failed. The attempt to outflank the 25th Brigade 
had been turned back before the Regiment President Steyn reached its firing positions. 
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Without the destruction of these brigades, FAPLA would probably have not been able to 
hold onto the Tumpo Triangle. However, the SADF and its UNITA allies never posed a 
direct threat to the west side of the Cuito River where the majority of the Angolan forces 
were located. The repulse of the 23 March offensive “was a clear defeat of the SADF.”657 
This symbolized the failure of the three-month campaign to seize the beachhead on the 
east bank of the Cuito River and destroy the Angolan brigades. This was also the 
evaluation of the U.S. government. The reports of the United States Defence Intelligence 
Agency explicitly acknowledged the inability of the SADF to defeat the Angolan and 
Cuban forces.  The 11 May 1998 report concluded that the South Africans had failed “to 
dislodge Cuban/FAPLA forces.”658 The 12 December 1988 report concurred: “South 
African probes of defensive positions were firmly rebuffed.”659 The decision to cease 
operations against the Tumpo Triangle also marked the end of the campaign to capture 
Cuito Cuanavale. 
CONCLUSION 
Having launched three unsuccessful attacks on the Tumpo Triangle, Pretoria decided not 
to make any more attempts. Instead, the SADF elected to continue shelling the town and 
maintain a troop presence in the area. The SADF and UNITA laid a series of minefields 
around the entrance to the Tumpo Triangle to prevent or hamper any FAPLA offensive 
against South African positions.660 On April 30th, 1988, the SADF general staff 
officially ended Operation Packer and implemented Operation Displace, under the 
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command of Commandant Piet Nel. The Citizen Force recruits were demobilized and 
bulk of the SADF forces withdrawn.  
 The minutes of the 11 April 1988 SSC meeting revealed evidence of the sense of 
crisis in the Botha regime generated by the failure at Cuito Cuanavale.  Normally, the 
first item on the agenda for the 1988 meetings was the situation in Angola. However, the 
following comment appeared: “Note - In light of the pressing questions that the daily 
proceedings of the Council in the Cabinet Room must look after, the Chair indicated that 
the proceedings in the Situation Room were shortened.”661 The note is then followed as 
usual by Agenda item 1, except that the subject matter is no longer Angola but Natal. 
This would have been the first opportunity to place anything on the Council record about 
the change in the situation in Cuito Cuanavale since the events at the end of March.  
However, all discussion of these events had presumably been solely reserved for the 
situation room meeting that had occurred beforehand.  This is an example of the 
elaborate system of redaction the SSC maintained to keep out of the record any mention 
of South African forces beyond the country’s borders.  In this instance this objective was 
aided by the mechanism of designating one set of discussions for “the Cabinet Room” 
while all discussion of “situations” are reserved for “the Situation Room.” When the 
military situation around Cuito Cuanavale was mentioned it was about UNITA forces, 
with no mention whatsoever of the SADF. 
 The end of the struggle for Cuito Cuanavale did not conclude the 1987-88 
conflict: the last phase was yet to unfold. It overlapped the battle for Cuito Cuanavale, 
beginning on 10 March 1988 and culminating in the second half of 1988 with the 
outflanking of the SADF in southern Angola by Cuban, Angolan and SWAPO forces.  
The crucial component of this outflanking operation was the subsequent military buildup 
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on the Angolan/Namibian border, culminating in the 27 June 1988 battle of Calueque 
and Tchipa. The consequences and broader implications of this military buildup and 
quasi-encirclement of South African forces in Angola are explored in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: AFTERMATH: MILITARY CONSEQUENCES 
The outcome of the battle on the banks of the Cuito River had military and long-term 
implications beyond the immediate theatre of Cuito Cuanavale. It was increasingly 
viewed as a contest that would decisively influence the future trajectory of the conflict. 
The western media unambiguously reflected this view, casting Cuito Cuanavale as a 
strategic confrontation that would have profound consequences for Angola and 
“repercussions throughout southern Africa.”662 Several newspapers presented it as a 
serious débâcle for the SADF. In March 1988, for example, the South African The 
Weekly Mail reported on “[t]he failure of South African and Unita forces to take Cuito 
Cuanavale despite months of heavy shelling could be Pretoria’s most crucial military 
setback in Angola since 1975...”663  In the Boston Globe, Cuito Cuanavale was viewed as 
possibly marking “a turning point in the Angolan civil war.”664  A Reuters report, 
reproduced in the Sydney (Australia) Morning Herald, mentioned that for the Angolans 
and Cubans there were signs that “a pivotal battle for the future of southern Africa was 
turning in their favour.”665 The New York Times also echoed this assessment, describing 
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the siege as “a pivotal battle for the future of southern Africa” that was “turning in the 
favour” of the Angolans and Cubans.666  
 However, the “turning in favour” of the battle for Angola and Cuba encompassed 
more than the military engagements in the geographical locale of the town and the South 
African failure to capture Cuito Cuanavale. At the centre lay subsequent developments in 
southern Angola. When Havana assumed overall command of the Angolan and Cuban 
forces, it had a broader strategic goal beyond simply the defense of Cuito Cuanavale. 
When the 15 November 1988 decision to send troops to Angola was made, Castro and 
the FAR general staff also decided that an opportunity existed to deliver a serious defeat 
to the SADF.  Havana developed the military plan for the defense of Cuito Cuanavale as 
part of a larger operational undertaking in which combined Cuban and Angolan forces, 
though a coup de main would seize the initiative from Pretoria and reverse the military 
situation in Angola by forcing the SADF unto the defensive. 
 This chapter examines this coup de main by describing and analyzing the military 
consequences of the failure of the SADF to capture Cuito Cuanavale. The Cuban-
directed and -led operation in southern Angola and the South African reaction to these 
actions form the core. Certain key issues are engaged. Central among these is 
determining the significance of the military manoeuvres and engagements that occurred 
on the Angolan/Namibia border in the second half of 1988. The chapter also addresses 
what is probably the most controversial question, viz., how many South Africans troops 
were killed during the 1987-1988 conflict? 
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OUTFLANKING THE SADF 
The Cuban tactic was to adopt a solely defensive posture at Cuito Cuanavale, aiming to 
block the South Africans there while at the same time eschewing the mounting of any 
offensive in that particular area. The FAR general staff viewed Cuito Cuanavale as an 
unsuitable threatre for deployment of the bulk of its forces. While they would defend the 
town, it would not be the site for the decisive strategic Cuban military operation. From 
their perspective, it did not make sense to massively engage the South Africans in an 
area where the SADF had already deployed the bulk of its best troops and equipment. 
Havana’s objective was to execute a holding operation at Cuito Cuanavale, while striking 
the SADF where it was weakest.   
 Havana’s plan envisioned drawing the South Africans into Cuito Cuanavale, so 
that it would become the SADF’s major preoccupation.  With the South Africans focused 
on the town, Castro and the FAR general staff envisioned that the successful defense 
would allow the Cubans and Angolans to concentrate forces to the southwest of Cuito 
Cuanavale, resulting in the outflanking of the SADF. By Havana’s reckoning, this would 
place South African forces in an untenable military situation, thereby transforming the 
balance of forces and hence fundamentally altering the strategic situation. Aware that 
Pretoria had committed its most seasoned and experienced troops to the Cuito Cuanavale 
theatre of action, Havana now firmly grasped the corollary that, as a result, Namibia, 
which constituted South Africa’s rear, had been left relatively undefended. In its drive to 
capture Cuito Cuanavale, Pretoria had left Namibia’s defence in the hands of sparsely 
distributed and inexperienced troops, rendering it militarily vulnerable to Cuban and 
Angolan forces.   
 Castro stated that FAR planned to convert Cuito Cuanavale into a “deadly trap” 
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for the SADF.667 With the SADF forces concentrating on the town, a drive from the west 
to the Namibian border would in-effect result in their encirclement. Castro frequently 
used the analogy of boxing to explain the Cuban strategy. In his address to the May 1988 
ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, he used that analogy to describe 
what had happened: “Cuito Cuanavale was the jab that kept the South Africans at bay 
and in place, while the outflanking manoeuvre was the right power and knock-out 
punch.”668 
 In early March, as it became apparent that the SADF would not succeed in their 
assault on the Tumpo Triangle, the implementation of the outflanking advance began. As 
noted in Chapter Two, with the South African siege of Cuito Cuanavale in progress, 
Havana assembled a considerable military force in southern Angola, considerably 
outstripping those at Cuito Cuanavale. Several Cuban sources emphasize the magnitude 
of the Cuban reinforcement. What stands out is not only the quantity of the weaponry 
and troops dispatched but also the quality. Havana decided to send not only the bulk of 
its armaments but also its most experienced and highly trained troops. For example, the 
elite 50th Brigade, normally charged with the defense of Havana, had been transferred to 
Angola.  
 Eventually, as noted in Chapter Two, the Cuban deployment rose to more than 
50,000 troops, supported by more than 1,200 tanks.669 The ground forces included a 
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Cuban artillery battalion670 and an estimated 1,000 anti-aircraft weapons.671 Cuban air 
power rose to 150 fighter aircraft and helicopters.672 Jorge Risquet, the Cuban 
Communist Party’s special attaché to Angola, stated that 998 tanks, 600 armoured 
transports, and 1,600 artillery guns, mortars and anti-aircraft weapons were deployed in 
southern Angola.673 Havana had assembled in Angola what it considered to be “force 
necessary to strike a final blow to the South African forces.”674  The extent of the Cuban 
concentration of military power is further confirmed by sources from the former Soviet 
Union, which assert that by February 1989 Cuba had assembled an estimated 1,000 
tanks, 200 armoured personnel carriers, 500 artillery guns and rocket-launchers, 70 anti-
aircraft missile batteries and 44 fighter aircraft.675 It is important to note that the Soviet 
figures refer to a period after the signing of the 22 December 1988 New York Accords, 
ending the military confrontation, leading to the gradual withdrawal of Cuban forces. It 
seems reasonable to assume that when hostilities were ongoing, the Cuban military 
strength would have been at least equal to the numbers mentioned in the Soviet 
documents. 
 On 6 March 1988, General Cintra Frias, who was in charge in Cuito Cuanavale, 
assumed command of all the Cuban/Angolan forces in southern Angola. Havana 
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assigned him overall responsibility for the operation.676 Cuban General Miguel Lorente 
took over command responsibilities at Cuito Cuanavale. On 10 March, under Cintra 
Frias’s command, FAR and FAPLA forces began advancing toward the Namibian 
border.677 The initial advance included four Cuban tank brigades (the 40th, 50th, 60th 
and 80th). They were accompanied by three Angolan brigades, which took up positions 
in the rear of the advance.678  
 By 20 March, the 40th, 50th and 80th Tank Brigades established a line in 
southern Angola from Humebe to Mucope to Cahama.679 Eventually the 30th and 60th 
Tank Brigades, with the 60th, assumed a position in the town of Xangongo.680 Three 
Angolan light infantry brigades provided additional support.681 The tank compliment 
accompanying these troops grew to at least six-hundred Cuban tanks.682 While the SADF 
was executing its last attack on Cuito Cuanavale, Cuban forces continued driving 
southwards, taking up positions near the border. Eventually, the bulk of the Cuban troops 
in Angola — approximately 40,000 — spearheaded the buildup along the 
Angolan/Namibian frontier (see maps 4 & 5).  Deployed with them were 30,000 Angolan 
and more than 3,000 SWAPO troops. Towards the end of May, Cintra Frias completed 
the deployment of the combined Cuban/Angolan/SWAPO forces along the border. 
                                                
676 Blanch, Cuba: pequeño gigante, 73 
 
677 Gomez, En El Sur, 217 
 
678 Ibid., 220. 
 
679 Gomez, En El Sur, 224-225, 268; and Perales, Victoria Al Sur, 59-60 & 128 
 
680 Perales, Victoria Al Sur, 128 & 136 
 
681  Ibid. 
 
682 See for example, Castro, My Life, 329; Blight, Cuba on the Brink, 245 
 
  
 186 
On March 20, 1988, the Cubans started constructing a new airfield and base at 
Cahama, an Angolan southwestern town in Cunene Province located only 120km from 
Namibia.683 Havana sent the necessary construction equipment, including trucks and 
bulldozers.684 The airfield was completed in a few weeks and, by 3 June 1988 Cuban 
aircraft began operating from Cahama.685   With the construction of the Cahama airstrip, 
the Cuban Air Force could now provide almost immediate support for the troops 
concentrated on the Namibian border.  Major Emilo Palacio Blanco, a Cuban fighter 
pilot, underscored the advantage conveyed to Cuban pilots: “They can come anytime 
they are wanted.”686 This stood in contrast to South African pilots.  
THE NUCLEAR QUESTION 
 
One of the most controversial aspects of the conflict revolves around the South African 
nuclear weapons program. On several occasions, Castro has declared that the deployment 
of Cuban troops took place despite the Cuban government’s knowledge that South Africa 
possessed nuclear weapons, and the apprehension that Pretoria might even been prepared 
to use them to stave off defeat.  Accordingly, Havana insisted that Cuban and Angolan 
divisions assume formations that ensured there was enough distance between them to 
guarantee that the entire military force would not be destroyed by a single South African 
nuclear strike.687 Castro stated that they adopted “asymmetrical methods in keeping with 
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the fact that we were facing a South African army with nuclear weapons. We decided to 
form tactical groups consisting of no more than 1,000 men, heavily armed with tanks, 
armoured personnel carriers, artillery and anti-aircraft weapons…”688  
 This was demonstrated to have been neither an unnecessary nor outlandish 
precaution, when during a 24 March 1993 meeting of all three houses of the South 
African parliament, President F.W. de Klerk disclosed that Pretoria had constructed six 
atomic bombs (and had been working on a seventh) in the 1980s.689 In its pursuit of 
nuclear weapons, apartheid South Africa had produced 440 kg of enriched uranium.690 In 
his autobiography, De Klerk directly linked the decision to embark on a nuclear weapons 
program to regional developments, especially in Angola. He asserted that the decision to 
develop nuclear weapons reflected Pretoria’s siege mentality. The decision he wrote 
“was taken in 1974, against the backdrop of the Soviet expansionist threat in southern 
Africa, the deployment of Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards and the 
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knowledge that because of our international isolation, we could not be able to rely on 
outside assistance in the event of an attack.”691  
During the development of its nuclear program, Pretoria not only sought 
assistance from but also discussed acquiring nuclear weapons from Israel. On March 31, 
1975, Israel and South Africa signed a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation, 
specifically covering nuclear weapons.692  For example, Pretoria considered not only 
buying the Israeli Jericho missile delivery system but also nuclear warheads with which 
to arm the missiles.  In his memorandum on the meeting, then-SADF Chief of Staff, 
Lieutenant General R.F. Armstrong, outlined the SADF’s evaluation of the missile 
system:  
In considering the merits of a weapon system such as the one being 
offered, certain assumptions have been made: a) That the missiles will be 
armed with nuclear warheads manufactured in RSA (Republic of South 
Africa) or acquired elsewhere.693 
 
De Klerk stated that the nuclear program was conducted in utmost secrecy, “managed on 
a strictly need-to-know basis.”694 While the subject of nuclear weapons may never have 
been discussed within the SSC or the cabinet, the SADF general staff (as would be 
expected) had extensive discussions on the deployment of these weapons. According to 
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Major General Thirion this discussion also occurred at the level of the SSC.695 Along 
with Armstrong’s memorandum, these discussions illustrate that, at the very least, the 
SADF took the nuclear option quite seriously. The memorandum indicates that the 
military discussed a missile delivery system. General Meiring corroboratesthis, noting: 
“We could have delivered them [nuclear weapons] by missiles.”696  Nevertheless, 
Thirion stated that while the missile deliver system was broached, it was never 
developed.697 Missile delivery systems were not the only deployment options 
contemplated by the SADF.  General Meiring emphasized that the general staff discussed 
other means: “But there were a lot of other means we could have used. We could have 
delivered them by aircraft. We made all the preparations.”698  Thirion stated that there 
were a variety of suggestions of how to deliver the bombs to the various states 
surrounding South Africa. In the case of Mozambique, the suggestion was made of 
placing a nuclear bomb on one of the trains returning to Maputo from South Africa.699  
 The discussion over delivery means was not some merely pro forma affair, in 
which all options — no matter how far-fetched — were set out.  It was also part of a 
significant debate within the regime about whether nuclear weapons represented a viable 
and feasible line of defense.  Thirion emphasized that in the SSC and the SADF there 
were persons who argued for “the use of nuclear weapons. There were people in the 
political and military circles, both in the SADF and the State Security Council, who 
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considered using nuclear weapons.”700 He noted that the Foreign Minister Botha 
expressed no qualms about deploying, if deemed necessary, nuclear weapons in Angola: 
“Pik Botha said he had no problems dropping a nuclear device on Luanda.”701   
The debate within the South African ruling circles established the circumstances 
under which Pretoria would countenance the use of nuclear weapons. Central to these 
deliberations was the military situation in Angola and the fear of internal revolution. 
According to Thirion, the use of nuclear weapons would have been “an absolute last 
resort.”702  Nuclear weapons would only be used if Namibia was about to fall to a Cuban 
invasion and Black South Africans had launched a nationwide insurrection. SSC 
deliberations established that the conditions that justified the nuclear option were “if 
there were no buffer zone combined with a massive internal rebellion.”703 However, in 
the end, Thirion pointed out that the SSC and SADF arrived at the consensus that the use 
of South Africa’s nuclear capability was never a viable option, due to the international 
condemnation and the crippling sanctions that would have ensued.  
SADF VULNERABILITY 
 
The Cuban advance towards the Namibian border caught Pretoria completely by 
surprise. Colonel Breytenbach, who had excellent connections in the SADF upper 
echelons, stated that the Cuban drive to the border “caught the SADF’s top structure off-
guard.”704 With their attention focused solely on Cuito Cuanavale, the SADF high 
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command never contemplated that Cuba and Angola could amass such a formidable 
military force in southwestern Angola and then execute a classic outflanking manoeuvre. 
An editorial in the The [Johannesburg] Star focusing on the Cuban/Angolan military 
buildup conveyed the SADF’s seeming failure to consider that very possibility: “Last 
week military sources pooh-poohed reports of a massive Cuban push southwards, saying 
this was blatant propaganda...to create the impression that Cuba was a major force in the 
region.”705 Bernard Trainor, who also had cultivated a series of contacts in the SADF, 
reported in the New York Times that the military developments in southern Angola “came 
as a surprise to the South Africans.”706   Minutes of the 6 June 1988 SCC meeting 
confirm that the highest levels of the Botha regime were unprepared, initially attaching 
no significance to the Cuban military deployment. The participants speculated on the 
actual intentions of Havana, with Geldenhuys expressing indifference, stating the Cuban 
buildup was a development that the regime should “not be concerned about.”707   
 Pretoria’s incredulity soon turned into concern about Havana’s intentions.  SADF 
Chief of Staff Geldenhuys poignantly captured Pretoria’s discomfiture in the face of this 
unexpected development, describing his own confusion as the Cuban/Angolan advance 
continued: “While this build-up was in progress, we naturally had to ask ourselves what 
the Cubans were up to.”708 A number of scenarios were discussed among the SADF 
general staff about Cuban plans, from a new offensive within Angola to an invasion of 
Namibia.  However, confusion about the objectives of the Cuban advance to the border 
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still prevailed. Geldenhuys’ own comments again underscored the confusion. Describing 
his own ruminations on the various scenarios presented to him in May 1988, he stated 
“All these thoughts kept crossing my mind. What is Castro up to?”709  At the June 20 
1988 SSC gathering, Botha speculated that the Cuban troop movement aimed at only 
strengthening the position of SWAPO forces.710  He added that the “situation had to be 
watched closely.”711 
 Events demonstrated that the SADF general staff had badly miscalculated in their 
drive to seize Cuito Cuanavale.  Having overcommitted forces to the Cuito Cuanavale 
arena, the SADF failed to realize its rear (specifically the Ovamboland area in northern 
Namibia) would be vulnerable to a Cuban/Angolan riposte. Breytenbach stated that this 
danger should have readily been obvious, observing that the Cubans would have easily 
recognized this vulnerability and deployed their forces accordingly to take advantage of 
the situation.712  He scathingly observed that due to “a lack of foresight the South 
Africans had allowed the bulk of their combat power to become tied down on the Cuito 
Cuanavale front.”713 Havana shared Breytenbach’s judgment. Anatoly Adamishin, then 
the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, described a meeting with Fidel Castro in Havana, in 
which Castro castigated South African military planning: “Such fools, they [the South 
Africans] attacked us [at Cuito-Cuanavale] on 23 March; while from 18 March we were 
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advancing south, getting into their rear.”714 The massing of the Cuban troops had 
exposed the vulnerability of the South African troops in southern Angola and northern 
Namibia.  
Map 4: Cuban troop movements, 1987-88.715  
 
Pretoria’s confusion soon turned into alarm. As Havana’s intentions became clear, South 
African uncertainty gave way to fear about the SADF military positions in Angola and 
Namibia. From being on the offensive in the Cuito Cuanavale theatre, Pretoria was 
forced unto the defensive in southern Angola and Namibia.  A number of key 
government officials made several sobering declarations about the deteriorating military 
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situation and the growing threat to Namibia.  Their high-level positions within the SSC 
and the SADF necessarily imbued these statements with significant gravity. Defence 
Minister Magnus Malan told the 9 May 1988 session of the South African Parliament 
about “the great danger a war escalating in this south western portion of our continent 
constitutes for us.”716 He later added that: “Southern Africa is facing a military conflict 
of incalculable consequences.”717 
 The Star reflected this apprehension.  On 16 May, two reports and a front-page 
editorial appeared in The Star about the advance of Cuban troops toward the Namibian-
Angolan border. One covered Foreign Minister Roelof ‘Pik’ Botha’s declaration that 
there would be “no talks” if Cuban troops continued to advance.”718  The other 
emphasized that “[t]he only possible obstacle to such talks will be an obstinate refusal by 
Angola to stop the current advance of Cuban and SWAPO into southern Angola.”719 The 
editorial declared: “Hostilities in southern Angola and northern Namibia could escalate 
dramatically as South Africa squares up to face a possible new Cuban/SWAPO 
onslaught in Ovamboland.”720 Magnus Malan warned that the continuing advance of 
Cuban and SWAPO towards Namibia posed the danger of a regional conflagration, 
which “could be the spark that starts the fire.”721 The editorial ended by quoting 
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Pretoria’s declaration that the continued Cuban/SWAPO advance would result in a 
“terrible battle.”722 
Geldenhuys outlined Pretoria’s fears: “Heavily armed Cuban and Swapo forces, 
integrated for the first time, have moved south within sixty kilometers of the Namibian 
border.”723 In another front-page story, this time in The Star, Geldenhuys unambiguously 
stated that Namibia and the South African troops were in a “precarious” situation.724 In 
the 6 June 1988 session of the South African parliament, Foreign Minister, Roelof ‘Pik” 
Botha, expressed concern about the “Cuban presence, not only in numbers, 
but...spreading...out over a wider area in the southern part of Angola, approaching the 
border.” 725 On 9 June 1988, Die Burger (Cape Town) carried Geldenhuys’ bluntest 
statement yet. In his evaluation, a fundamental and disadvantageous shift in the balance 
of military power had occurred: “The southward advance of very heavily armed Cuban 
troops, along a front 450 kilometers wide, has changed the status quo decidedly with 
serious military and political implications.”726 
 These public declarations where not just fear-mongering gauged to buttress and 
engender continuing support for SADF military operations outside South Africa, but a 
serious expression of actual perceptions and evaluations about the deteriorating military 
situation. A palpable sense of anxiety and alarm gripped Pretoria. Statements and 
testimonies from SADF officers and rank-and-file soldiers underscored the seriousness 
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of the situation. An unnamed senior South African officer articulated the sense of 
vulnerability that now beset the general staff: “This was more than we could handle. Had 
the Cubans attacked [Namibia] they would have over-run the place. We could not have 
stopped them.”727   
 In response, the regime began mobilization of South African troops by 
initiating a call-up of inactive and reserve troops. Botha stated that it was necessary to 
respond to the Cuban buildup.728 In justifying the call-up, Geldenhuys gave a blunt 
appraisal of the military situation, which was a sharp departure from his earlier “not to be 
worried about” stance at the 6 June 1988 SSC meeting.  Outlining the reinforcement of 
Cuban and SWAPO forces, which had now deployed across a 450-kilometer front, 20 - 
30 kilometers north of the Namibian border, he announced “in response to the Cuban 
presence the SADF was calling up Citizen Force members.”729  He went on to add that 
“there was no reason for panic and that “the SADF was capable of dealing with the 
situation...Suffice it to say that we have the forces to handle the situation, although the 
situation is serious - and more serious than it was - but we can handle it.”730 
 Apprehension was not only confined to the senior officers; it pervaded all levels of 
the SADF. Sergeant Jose Kupussu, who served in the 32nd Battalion, stated that the white 
commanders of the battalion “were frightened that the Cubans would invade and take 
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Namibia, something they could do nothing about.”731 SADF soldier Clive Holt captured 
the general nervousness among South African soldiers generated by the massing of 
Cuban/Angolan forces, noting that there was a general fear of “Castro’s objective of 
getting his conventional forces into SWA (i.e., Namibia] and launching an assault on SA 
[South Africa].”732  This fear was based on the belief that “if Fapla and the Cubans 
decided to advance into SWA, the SADF would have a tough time keeping them out.”733 
Taken together the newspaper accounts, contemporary and personal commentaries 
illustrate the sense of crisis that engulfed the Botha regime. The military reversals 
suffered by the SADF had created a direct threat to Namibia and, thus, by extension to 
the apartheid state, itself.  
HAVANA’S INTENTIONS 
Was Havana preparing an invasion of Namibia? Pretoria’s anxiety was heightened by an 
exchange during the 3-4 May 1988 London round of talks that had been initiated in 
January 1988 between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States on the situation 
in Namibia and Angola.734 Pretoria wanted to ascertain Cuban intentions. The report 
presented to the 10 May 1988 SCC meeting stated that Cuba’s representatives made it 
clear that as Cuban forces massed in southern Angola, Havana “would also be crazy 
enough to enter Namibian territory.”735 On 17 May, the New York Times reported that 
South African officials “asked Cuban officials earlier this month [May] to guarantee that 
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the Cuban troops would not cross the border. The Cubans refused.”736 According to 
Geldenhuys, Cuban representative General Ulises Rosales del Toro called him aside to 
say that Havana had assembled a significant concentration of their military might and 
that “[n]ot even the Namibian border would stop them.”737 Geldenhuys interpreted this as 
a threat: if Pretoria did not accede to Havana’s demands then it would face “a big war - a 
war that will destroy you.”738 He wondered: was “Rosales serious? Would they invade 
South West Africa? Did Fidel Castro aim to crush the South African Forces decisively 
and so bring an end to the war? Was it blackmail?”739  
 Crocker corroborated the tenor of the meeting between Geldenhuys and Rosales 
del Toro.740 However, Crocker was more than a mere witness to this exchange. The 
Botha regime was not the only one preoccupied by the question of whether Cuba 
intended to enter Namibia. As the Cuban/Angolan military buildup continued, the 
Reagan administration also became very concerned about the Cuban deployment in 
southern Angola and wanted to ascertain Havana’s intentions. As an intimate 
relationship existed between the Botha Regime and the Reagan administration, Maj. 
Gen. Thirion (as Deputy-Director of SADF Intelligence) and Breytenbach (through his 
contacts in the SADF’s higher echelons) would have been privy to U.S. anxieties 
regarding Angola. Both noted Washington’s growing alarm.  Colonel Breytenbach stated 
that the U.S. was greatly disturbed by Cuban military moves, noting that “[s]hock waves 
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were felt in Washington.”741 According to Breytenbach, Havana’s significant role led the 
Reagan administration to conclude that communism posed a “real threat of expansionism 
in the region.”742 Thirion observed that as the battle of Cuito Cuanavale intensified and 
the Cubans massed in southern Angola “the Americans realized the temperature was 
going up.”743  
We do not have to rely solely on these South African statements to ascertain 
Washington’s apprehensions. In his memoir, Crocker presented an equivocal evaluation 
of the military situation, writing that while the military activity “seemed...ominous”’ it 
was also “ambiguous,” as the Cubans did not represent a serious threat to the SADF 
forces in Namibia.744 Nonetheless, two declassified documents indicate that Crocker was 
being disingenuous. A 12 May 1988 intelligence report sent to U.S. Secretary of State, 
George Shultz underscored that U.S. analysts considered that South Africa faced a 
serious dilemma, entailing serious dangers:  
  At any other time Pretoria would have regarded the Cuban move 
as a provocation, requiring a swift and strong response. But the 
Cubans moved with such dispatch and on such a scale that an 
immediate South African military response would have involved 
serious risks.745  
 
This analysis was supported by the 17-page report of the United States Defence 
Intelligence Agency of 12 December 1988, which challenges Crocker’s “ambiguous 
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assessment.” It unequivocally acknowledged that Cuban forces had altered the military 
balance of power to the disadvantage of South Africa.746 It thus appears incongruous that 
the position of Crocker (the chief U.S. diplomat in Africa) on the import of the Cuban 
military buildup should not be reflected in a secret and only recently declassified U.S. 
government document. The disagreement between Crocker’s memoir and this document 
could have reflected either a difference opinion within the U.S. government, or perhaps 
an effort by Crocker to minimize the impact of the unexpected Cuban actions. Just as the 
U.S. Department of State and intelligence services had been caught off-guard by the 
Cuban deployment in 1975, it is quite possible that Crocker did not want to publicly 
acknowledge that they had once again been taken by surprise by Havana.  
 Nevertheless, Crocker was apparently concerned enough by Cuban actions to 
voice his concerns to both the Soviet and Cuban representatives separately and at 
different times. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin wrote that, during an 18-19 
May 1988 meeting in Lisbon, Crocker said that he was worried by the Cuban drive to the 
Angolan/Namibian border.  Crocker stated the Cuban actions constituted a “dangerous 
game” that had to be ended.747 Crocker noted that during the 24-26 June 1988 Cairo 
round of negotiations, he asked Jorge Risquet (Cuba’s Chief negotiator) what were 
“Cuba’s military intentions at the Namibian border.”748 In short, would they cross it or 
not? Crocker noted that Risquet’s reaction was to smile “menacingly,” remarking “that 
he could offer [Crocker] ‘no tylenol’.”749 While confirming this exchange, Risquet 
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provided a more detailed and nuanced account, disputing the menacing tone Crocker had 
ascribed. Risquet stated he had refused to confirm one way or the other Cuba’s 
intentions, placing his “non-answer” within the context of the ongoing negotiations. 
According to Risquet, Crocker inquired: “Does Cuba intend to stop its advance at the 
border between Namibia and Angola?” Risquet replied:  
I cannot respond to this. I cannot give you a meprobamto [a Cuban 
painkiller], neither to you nor to the South Africans. I have not said that 
that we are not going to stop nor we are going to stop.  Understand me 
well, I am not threatening.  If I told you that we are not going to stop, I 
would be hurling a threat, If I told you that we are going to stop, I would 
be giving a meprobamato, a Tylenol, and I do not want to threaten neither 
do I want to soothe you...What I said was that only the agreements [about 
Namibian independence] can provide guarantees.750 
 
While, the Cubans believed that they had assembled enough military force to drive the 
SADF out of Namibia, a drive into Namibia was rejected as a course of action. Vic 
Allen, former professor at Leeds University and official historian for the National Union 
of Mineworkers, reported that in a 27 December 1988 meeting in Havana (which he 
attended), Fidel Castro stated that after the battle for Cuito Cuanavale the Cuban armed 
forces “could have rolled the South Africans forces back over their own borders and into 
their own territory and…for a brief moment they thought of doing just that.”751  
Nevertheless, while the Castro government wished to keep the threat of a Cuban drive 
into Namibia alive in the minds of Pretoria and Washington, it decided that Cuban forces 
were not going to enter Namibia.   
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 First, Havana viewed military action as a means to an end, a way by which to 
create conditions on the ground that would dictate the direction and terms of 
negotiations. The Cuban government calculated that the change in the balance of forces 
was sufficient to guarantee that the outcome of the negotiating process would be 
favourable for Namibian independence. On several occasions during 1988, Castro 
outlined this approach. He argued that while the South Africans had been repelled at 
Cuito Cuanavale, and a massive Cuba force had gathered on the Namibian frontier, 
Havana was not interested in a major military clash, adding that it wanted the conflict 
resolved at the negotiation table. While not categorically ruling out a Cuban push into 
Namibia, Castro stressed Cuba’s desire to resolve the conflict diplomatically.  After 
describing in his address to the May 1988 ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned 
Movement how the SADF had been defeated at Cuito Cuanavale, Castro said: “But we 
are not interested in a military victory, in military glory. We want these problems 
resolved once and for all at the negotiating table.”752 He, also, argued that the resolution 
of the conflict in Angola and the attainment of Namibian independence would have 
repercussions inside South Africa, asserting:  “I think we will then stand on the threshold 
of the end of apartheid.”753 Angolan President Eduardo Dos Santos, who was in constant 
contact and consultation with Havana, confirmed the Cuban decision not to attack the 
SADF inside Namibia, saying in a May 1988 interview that while “Cuban forces are 
indeed moving south... there is no intention of invading Namibia.”754 
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 Second, Havana and Moscow were worried that an advance into Namibia might 
lead to U.S. intervention.  Adamishin noted that this was the jointly agreed stance of 
Havana and Moscow: “We had a secret understanding with the Cubans that they would 
not cross the border with Namibia.  But – it was also agreed upon – there was not reason 
to declare it publicly.”755  He stated that the Soviet advocacy of this approach was part of 
Moscow’s policy of supporting the Cuban military strategy in southern Angola, while 
ensuring that an unmanageable regional conflagration did not break out. Moscow 
endeavoured “not to hamper it [Cuba’s military strategy], even help it in every possible 
way, but to see to it that it does not go out of control.”756   
 Third, Cuba wanted to minimize casualties. Castro and other Cuba officers often 
mentioned that one of the FAR principles was to limit the deaths and injury rates.  Castro 
stated that the aim was “to obtain the basic objectives without sacrificing thousands of 
lives. If we had to wage big battles, we’d fight, because there was no alternative, but the 
idea was to achieve the goals with a minimum of casualties...”757 Many of the Cuban 
memoirs emphasize that at many points in the planning of every military operation great 
efforts were made to avoid Cuban and Angolan casualties.  
 Fourth, as previously noted, Havana knew that South Africa possessed nuclear 
weapons and was seriously concerned that Pretoria might even be prepared to use them 
to stave off defeat.  However, until the negotiating process concluded with the signing of 
the 22 December 1988 New York Accords, Havana never denied or confirmed whether 
its forces would advance into Namibia.  Indeed, from the beginning of the advance to the 
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border in March 1988 to the conclusion of the negotiation process in December 1988, the 
very real possibility - the threat - of a Cuban intervention into Namibia hung over 
Pretoria.  
THE CALUEQUE CLASH 
 
In response to the threat of a major Cuban offensive, the SADF had begun withdrawing 
its forces from around Cuito Cuanavale to more southerly positions in Angola, 
regrouping in Cunene province.  The withdrawal was an attempt to redress the military 
balance, by not only extricating the troops at Cuito Cuanavale but also redeploying them 
to face the perceived Cuban threat.  Robert Ross stated that the SADF had been 
outflanked, and “forced to retreat to Cunene, leaving behind all its equipment,” asserting 
that “annihilation was a real possibility” confronting the SADF.758  
Hyperbole and exaggeration aside, out-manoeuvred strategically, the SADF now 
faced a serious military situation. In response, the SADF made preparations for a major 
military clash in northern Namibia, with Pretoria initiating the callup of 14,000 Citizen 
Force reserves for deployment in Namibia.759 An article in The Economist observed that 
South Africa had “called up some reserve soldiers” to deal with the new military 
situation.760 On 8 June, Geldenhuys formally announced the mobilization.761  
Geldenhuys stated that aim the activation was “to provide for the necessary force levels 
in the event of an attack into South West Africa, but also it was also meant to convey a 
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message to the Cubans of what they would expect if indeed it should happen.”762  Botha 
told him that if the Cubans entered Namibia, the SADF had to launch a massive 
retaliatory strike: “If they put one foot across the border hit them with everything you’ve 
got. If that happens then the Ovamboland becomes the battlefield.”763 Nevertheless, 
despite the developments in Angola, the Botha regime seemed unwilling to publicly 
concede that any fundamental transformation had occurred in the regional balance of 
power. Foreign Minister Botha reflected this inability to accept the change by telling the 
South African parliament on 9 June: “South Africa is the powerhouse not only of Africa, 
but in particular of the southern African region.”764  
 To redress the military situation and dissuade the Cubans from entering Namibia, 
Pretoria decided to attack the Cuban forces. Havana was aware that the SADF was 
preparing a military operation. However, while Havana had intelligence that the SADF 
was planning a major attack, it did not know where and when it would occur.  Crocker 
was aware that the Cubans were concerned that the South Africans “would launch a 
surprise attack on their forces...”765 On 7 June, Castro sent a cable to General Cintra Frias 
outlining the danger of a SADF strike and the defensive measures that should be taken:  
News of possible South Africa surprise air raid against Cuban-Angolan 
forces should not be underestimated for it has a certain logic. Our troops 
should take strict security measure in their shelters; anti-aircraft 
equipment should be on full alert, especially at dawn, dusk and all other 
hours of the day; possible defence action by our airforce using planes 
stationed in Cahama should be considered; plans should be made for a 
counterattack...766 
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Castro presciently instructed: “Tchipa personnel should be kept alert and underground; 
planned movements should make allowances for these risks. Decisive moments may be 
at hand.”767 Castro also sent a letter that day to Angolan President José Eduardo dos 
Santos echoing the issues and information raised in the cable on the anticipated South 
African attack:  
As you know, we have received intelligence reports saying that the South 
Africans are planning a large-scale surprise air raid on the Angolan-
Cuban troop grouping in southern Angola. There is a certain logic to this 
report if we consider the desperate position of the South Africans as a 
result of the defeats and failures they have suffered in the military and 
diplomatic fields. They may be tempted to try a sudden blow to change 
the balance of forces using planes to incur the least possible number of 
white casualties.768 
 
 
Deployed at Tchipa - a town 55 km from the border - was the bulk of the 80th Tank 
Brigade, a missile battery, an artillery regiment and the 2nd Angolan Infantry Brigade.769 
In response, the SADF had, under the supervision of Brig. Gen. Chris Serfontein, moved 
reinforcements to the border.  The specific focus was the area around Tchipa.  Pretoria 
viewed the Cuban deployment at Tchipa as a direct threat to the Calueque dam and the 
Ruacana hydroelectric complex. Also, the size of the forces arrayed at Tchipa indicated 
to some SADF officers that preparations were underway for a “possible invasion” of 
Namibia.770 To meet this threat, reinforcements, under the command of Colonel Michau, 
were dispatched to Tchipa.  Joining the 61st Mechanized, the 4th South African Infantry 
and the 32nd Battalion were two battalions of tanks and armoured cars, an artillery 
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brigade.  The artillery deployed included a battery of G5 155-mm guns, supported by G2 
guns.771  
 During April and May several skirmishes occurred in the Tchipa area.772 On 31 
May and 1 June the SADF attacked Tchipa by air, but caused little damage.773  On 14 
June two South African planes tried to launch a strike on the 60th tank brigade but were 
driven away by two MiG-23s from Cahama.774 Towards the end of June the engagements 
with the South Africans increased in intensity. From 20 to 25 June Cuban artillery in 
Tchipa and South African artillery based on the Namibian border exchanged fire. For 
example, on June 20th, the SADF launched a 20-minute barrage from positions16 km 
from Tchipa. The Cubans replied with an artillery and air attack against these South 
African forces.775  Cuban and South African ground forces also clashed during this 
period in the Tchipa area. An SADF armoured column ambushed a joint Cuban-SWAPO 
patrol. Two Cubans were killed. However, the South Africans came under attack by 
MiG-23s and were forced to withdraw.776  On 24 June, the South African aircraft tried to 
stage another air attack but were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles.  Major Daniel Elias 
Rodriguez described what happened: 
At 5:20 in the evening the chief of the Volga group [the designation of an 
antiaircraft battery] called out: “An enemy target has appeared...” Raise 
the alarm for the Cuban tank brigade and the Angolan infantry brigades 
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and make sure the information makes it to Cahama... Jesus! There are two 
planes...Fire!777 
 
On 26 June, the SADF launched a major attack.  At 18:00 [6:00 p.m.], the South 
Africans unleashed a massive artillery assault with its G-5 guns, showering the town 
with hundreds of 127-mm shells.778 Castro stated that 200 shells fell.779 The attack was 
launched just after the Cubans had concluded a game of baseball.780  Breytenbach 
alleged that the “devastation was phenomenal,” resulting in the deaths of 500-600 
Cubans, Angolans and SWAPO personnel.781  The clash soon turned into an artillery 
duel between Cuban and South African artillery.   
 Havana demanded an immediate response, ordering a Cuban air strike against the 
dam in the town of Calueque located on the Cunene River in Cunene province.  In a 
cable to General Cintra Frias, Castro stated: “We must respond to today’s artillery attack 
against Tchipa. We feel the first step must be a strong air attack against South African 
camps, military installations and personnel on Calueque and the surrounding area.”782 
Havana designated Calueque a strategic target because the dam was a critical water 
source for the South Africans in Namibia. It was the principal water supply for much of 
Ovamboland and, also, provided water to the important Ruacana hydroelectric power 
station, located 20 km away from Calueque within Namibia.  Geldenhuys underscored 
the importance of the dam, noting that South Africa had been “pumping water 
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uninterruptedly from the Cunene [river] at Calueque. There was no water in Ovambo. It 
was important to keep the water flowing for as long as possible.”783 
 Castro was also worried about a follow-up ground attack on Tchipa, instructing 
that troops be put “on alert for any attack by land against Tchipa.”784 These instructions 
proved, once again, to be serendipitous.  On 27 June the Cubans ambushed an SADF 
column of military vehicles near Tchipa.  Three of the five trucks in the column were 
destroyed, with the South Africans abandoning a fourth.  One truck managed to escape, 
leaving behind 20-30 dead and a number of abandoned armoured vehicles. Documents 
discovered in the vehicles indicated that many of the troops killed were from the 32nd 
“Buffalo” Battalion.785 While Havana stated that only two Cubans were killed, the SADF 
claimed that the Cuban and Angolan death toll was at least 200.786 In his memoirs, 
Geldenhuys claimed the death toll was 302.787 Breytenbach put the death toll lower at 60 
Cubans, with 2 tanks, 2 anti-antiaircraft guns and a number of vehicles destroyed.788  
 In South African accounts, the SADF emerged victorious.  Both Geldenhuys and 
Breytenbach assert that the Cubans were forced into retreat, at which point the SADF 
forces, under the Command of Commandant Muller, withdrew.789 However, given that 
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Havana anticipated an attack and had taken the necessary defensive measures, it seems 
unlikely that they would have sustained such a high casualty rate, either in the 26 June 
artillery barrage against Tchipa or in the clash of ground forces.  Moreover, if the SADF 
had been so successful in their attack, having inflicted so much damage, then it seems 
logical to expect that they would have pressed home their advantage and pursued the 
Cubans, seeking deliver a devastating blow.  
 Also, on 27 June, in retaliation for the artillery barrage against Tchipa, the 
Cubans launched the planned air strike against South African positions at Calueque.  On 
22 June, a shipment of more advanced MiG-23s — MiG-23 BNs — arrived had arrived 
from Cuba. They could carry more and heavier payloads and were equipped with more 
accurate targeting instrumentation.790  At 12:30 p.m, six MiG-23s from Lubango, and 
two from Cahama took off with the mission of bombing the Calueque Dam. The eight 
aircraft separated into two groups. To avoid detection by South African radar, Maj. Jorge 
Rodriguez Marquetti, one of the pilots, said the MiG-23s flew less than 30 meters above 
tree level.791  Ten tons of bombs were dropped, specifically designed for demolition and 
fragmentation.792 At 13:00 [1:00 p.m.], the first squadron destroyed the section of the 
bridge next to the dam’s floodgates, the SADF engine room and the crane. This was 
followed by the second squadron’s attack, which inflicted more damage.793  The strike 
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had succeeded in its objective of knocking the dam out of action. SADF Colonel Dick 
Lord described the Cuban attack as “very well planned.”794 
 The SADF claimed that 12 of its soldiers were killed by the air strike. 
Geldenhuys asserted that an off-target bomb exploded between two SADF vehicles, 
killing11 soldiers.795 Breytenbach wrote that the soldiers had been hit by a “stray bomb” 
while they were brewing tea.796 Luanda contradicted the SADF account, stating that 26 
SADF soldiers were killed.797 Cuban sources also argue for a higher South African loss 
of life than admitted by Pretoria. Lieutenant -Colonel Jimenez Gomez stated that later 
that week, a squadron of Cuban T-62 tanks arrived at Calueque, discovering scattered 
military supplies and widespread debris from buildings and machines, as well as, “blood 
and pieces of flesh, fragments of uniforms in trees.”798  The Cubans estimated that at 
least 50 South Africans were killed and 100 wounded, basing these figures on the 
carnage found.799  
UNDERSCORING SADF VULNERABILITY  
 South Africa lost control of Calueque. Defence Minister Malan downplayed the 
significance of the air raid, pointedly denying that South Africa had suffered a military 
débâcle, declaring that the SADF did not have “a bloody nose.”800 Instead, he declared 
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the SADF was ready to be thrown at Cuban forces if hostilities expanded.801 
Nevertheless, the “heavy loss of life…was disasterous.”802  The engagement was seen as 
a crucial event by some South African commentators. They portrayed it as underlining 
the reversal of South African military fortunes, with the SADF now placed in a clearly 
disadvantageous position.  For example, a front-page story in The Weekly Mail quoted a 
news release from the South African Conservative Party, which described the clash as a 
“crushing humiliation” for the SADF.803 The Weekly Mail argued that “the inescapable 
impression is of the Angolans showing unprecedented confidence and the South Africans 
looking defensive.”804 While, noting Malan’s denial of an SADF “bloody nose,” it 
asserted that “recent developments point to an important change in the conflict in 
Angola.”805  
In the same issue, Peter Vale argued that South Africa was “in a war which more 
closely resembles the trenches of the Somme than more familiar counter-insurgency war 
of modern times.”806 These various contemporary newspaper accounts demonstrate the 
understanding and perception that events had abruptly shifted against South Africa was 
neither isolated nor anomalous. While not as hyperbolic as Vale, the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency echoed the analysis that Calueque underscored the SADF’s 
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vulnerability and loss of military dominance in the region.  In a 29 June 1988 report it 
argued: 
The successful way with which Cuba has utilized its air force and the 
apparent weakness of the anti-aircraft defenses of Pretoria...providing the 
proof of the dilemma Pretoria has confronting the Cuban challenge. The 
South African Armed forces can strike hard blows to individual Cuban-
Angolan units, but Cuba has the advantage, especially in antiaircraft 
defense and the number of airplanes and troops.807 
 
The loss of military dominance was graphically reflected in the arena of air power. One 
of the most critical developments in the conflict was the deployment of Cuban military 
aircraft and elite pilots. Cuban air power increased to an estimated 150 aircraft.808 Out of 
these, 126 were fighters and fighter-bombers: 51 MiG-23s and 75 MiG-21s. Arrayed 
against the Cubans, the South Africans had an estimated 100 Mirages.809  However, 
almost half of the South African fleet was in need of repair and, therefore, not air-
worthy.810  Many of the Cuban planes almost never made it to Angola. The Las 
Coloradas, the Cuban ship on which a considerable number were being transported, lost 
power before it reached port. As it floundered, the entire ship, along with its cargo, was 
in danger of sinking. Eventually, partial power was restored and the ship was towed into 
Luanda.811 According to a Cuban officer, that night the aircraft were unloaded and pulled 
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through the streets of Luanda by tractors to the airport, from which they were then flown 
to Menogue.812 
Map 5: Red arrows – FAR; Dark Blue- SADF-UNITA; Green- Cuban air-attack on 
Calueque; Orange- Frontlines, June 1988; Light-blue- Calueque.813  
 
Of particular significance were the MiG-23s.  At the time, the MiG-21 was the most 
advanced aircraft in the Angolan Air Force. The arrival of the Cuban MiG-23s 
significantly augmented the air power arrayed against the SADF, as they were superior 
to the Mirages, which were the most advanced warplanes in the South African Air Force. 
This decisively altered the balance of power in the struggle for air supremacy, forcing 
South African pilots to contend with circumstances that had now become unfavourable 
to them. This transformation did not go unnoticed by South African soldiers on the 
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ground. Hein Groenewald said that it was clear that the “Cubans now had superiority in 
aircraft, tanks and other advanced weaponry.”814 Groenewald noted that this change in 
the balance of air power was reflected in the attitudes of South African pilots as it 
became clear during the struggle for Cuito Cuanavale and afterwards that they respected 
“Cuban air power and Cuban pilots.”815  
South African aircraft no longer took to the skies as frequently or in the same 
numbers.  This reflected the trepidation of confronting opponents who outmatched 
anything in the SAAF. Cuban pilot Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Saria Gonzalez summed 
up this transformation: 
Up to the first half of 1987, we were even with the South Africans in air 
power. But during the battle for Cuito Cuanavale and after, we had more 
planes and the better trained pilots. We gained a distinct advantage. The 
South Africans were good pilots. They were not cowards. We just beat 
them on the battlefield.816 
 
The number of South African aircraft and pilots shot down remains a controversial issue. 
Anecdotal evidence and media reports indicate greater losses than Pretoria admitted.  
The Cubans, for example, asserted a F-1 Mirage piloted by Maj. Edward R. Every was 
shot down on 20 February 1988 by a combination of artillery fire and an anti-aircraft 
missile.817 The South African Air Force Roll of Honour, which lists alphabetically its 
members who died while in active service from May 1946 to April 1994, confirms that 
Major Edward R. Every died on 21 February 1988.818  The discrepancy between the 
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Cuban date of his shooting-down and the South African date of his death is perhaps due 
to his survival of the initial shooting-down, ultimately succumbing to his injuries. Also, 
as already mentioned, on 24 June the Cubans reported shooting down two South African 
aircraft; however, no deaths are listed for 24 June, but the pilots may have ejected and 
survived. While the Roll of Honour only lists names and dates of deaths, not the location 
or cause, the information it does provide suggests higher losses than the Botha regime 
was ready to acknowledge. It lists 5 officers who died within the period of 3 September 
1987 (Lieutenant R.W. Glynn) and 8 June 1988 (Colonel A. Bekker). This time falls 
within the major military engagements at Cuito Cuanavale and the Cuban drive to the 
Namibian border. As all five were officers (the other three were two majors and a 
captain), it is not unreasonable to assume that they would have been pilots.819  
 The increase in Cuban air power, of course, was particularly alarming for 
Pretoria. Malan captured this concern: “When you see this type of aircraft traffic, you’ve 
got to think. You’ve got to say what the hell is going on.”820  This concern was raised in 
the South African parliament. On 17 May 1988, Roger Hulley, Progressive Federal Party 
member, said to his fellow parliamentarians that the Angolans and Cubans had “gained 
some air superiority or, at least, it would appear that we have lost the clear air superiority 
we once enjoyed.”821 Calueque, Vale noted in a The Weekly Mail article, had 
demonstrated “Angolan air superiority in the battle for supremacy.”822 The air superiority 
gained by the Cuban pilots over their South African antagonists was a theme that 
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dominated several western newspaper articles discussing the shift in military power. The 
New York Times reported: 
The Cubans also fly advanced MiG-23 fighters, which many experts say 
will outperform South Africa’s top fighter plane, an updated version of 
the French Mirage F-1 called the Cheetah. South African Air Force 
officers say they are confident that the Cheetah and their flying skills are 
more than a match for the MiGs, but concede they cannot afford to lose 
many planes.823  
 
Coupled with the dramatic increase in the quantity and quality of Cuban air power was 
the forward deployment of this air power at the new airfield at Cahama.  The proximity 
of the airfield to the border enhanced Cuban air superiority. Geldenhuys noted that the 
South African airforce “had to operate from much further...The disadvantages were 
obvious.”824 He added that the distance the South African fighters had to fly only 
allowed “17-20 minutes over the combat area,” while Cuban and Angolan pilots had 
“approximately 45 minutes over the battlefield.”825 The June 29, 1988 CIA report 
emphasized the advantage the proximity of the Cahama airfield and the deployment of 
antiaircraft batteries now conferred on Cuban forces: 
They have established forward bomber and fighter bases to support their 
ground forces near the frontier at Cahama, Xangongo and Mupa. This 
includes the most advanced array of surveillance, fire-control radar and 
antiaircraft missile defenses on the African continent, South African and 
American officials say.826 
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The military advantage and, with that, the military initiative had now passed firmly into 
the Cuban hands. Former SADF soldier Helmoed-Romer Heitman stated unequivocally 
that South Africa lost “the total air supremacy they had been used to.”827 Castro agreed, 
arguing that it was Cuba’s air power, augmented by the Cahama airstrip, that tipped the 
strategic scales against the SADF, pointing out that “with the construction of the airport, 
and anti-aircraft support, Cuban air superiority was so significant the enemy backed 
down...”828 South African could no longer compete in the battle for the skies. Its airforce 
was decidedly outclassed.  
 Moreover, it could not afford to lose the aircraft that it did have. As The Times 
noted South Africa had lost “irreplaceable aircraft.”829 Voices within the South African 
establishment now also raised the alarm.  The Johannesburg Business Day in an editorial, 
also, weighted in with its own assessment of the dire military situation: 
The price of renewed engagement in Angola, it appears increasingly 
plain, is a heavy battle against Cuban forces in which the loss of life will 
surely be considerable and in which our under-equipped, obsolescent air 
force may well be ruined.830 
 
H.H. Schwarz, a Progressive Federal Party member of parliament, underscored the 
inability of South Africa to compete with Cuban air power, noting:  
 that there is no way that South Africa can have the kind of aircraft which 
can be supplied by East Bloc countries to neighbouring states...the quality 
of aircraft which they can supply is of such a nature that South Africa 
really cannot compete.831  
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Schwarz also noted that the problem extended to other areas of military equipment: 
“There is a similar problem in relation to armour, and that is the question of heavy 
tanks...”832 While air-power illustrated the growing gap in armaments, the gap was, also, 
increasing in other areas.  Ronnie Kasrils, then an ANC military strategist, observed that 
SADF command now faced a serious crisis due to “loss of superiority to the Cubans and 
Angolans in the air and the outclassing of many of the Armscor weapons…”833 This was 
echoed an article in The Times: “The Cuban tank force in Angola now exceeds that of the 
entire South African army. Cuban aircraft and radar-assisted missile defences now 
technically outmatch anything South Africa can send against them...”834 
 In the wake of the Calueque débâcle, Pretoria’s fears of a Cuban invasion of 
Namibia heightened. To prevent or at the very least delay this prospect, the SADF 
destroyed a bridge near Calueque, spanning the Cunene River, which marked the border 
between Angola and Namibia. The CIA noted that the South Africans had destroyed the 
bridge “to make it more difficult for the Cuban and Angolan forces to cross the 
Namibian border, and to reduce the number of positions they would have to defend.”835 
At the 25 July SSC gathering Botha asserted if the SADF had remained in Angola, it ran 
the risk of incurring 1,000 to 1,500 deaths.836 
The fear of a Cuban invasion of Namibia widely pervaded the SADF.  The New 
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York Times reported: “Several South African officers say they believe that the Cubans 
will attack in South-West Africa and cite what they believe to be frequent violations of 
the airspace over Namibia by Cuban and Angolan MIG’s as an indication of a 
willingness to cross the border.”837 These South African fears were paralleled by 
continued U.S. alarm over developments in Angola and was, perhaps, responsible for the 
July 1988 visit of David Sullivan, a staff-member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. According to his declassified itinerary, Sullivan met on 13 July with SADF 
Military Intelligence. While the content of his discussions are not known, the meeting 
occurred during a period when there was considerable speculation on whether Cuban 
forces planned to cross the border.838  
Fear that Namibia would become the next battleground pervaded the upper 
echelons of the regime. The 25 July 1988 SSC meeting reflected these apprehensions. 
Botha, in summing up the ramifications of regional developments, declared “the situation 
in South West Africa and southern Angola is the worst the RSA [Republic of South 
Africa] has recently faced.”839 He added that Cuban operations in Angola were part of a 
“carefully calculated plan,”840 stating that if the military conflict reignited then South 
Africa would have to fight in “northern South West Africa.”841  Botha revealed his 
trepidation over such a confrontation when he stressed that “a large-scale war can only 
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be accepted if there is no alternative.”842 At the 8 August 1988 SSC meeting these 
apprehensions were still rife. Botha warned that Cuban forces were preparing to strike in 
Namibia, aiming to catch the SADF unawares during ongoing negotiations.843 As late as 
October 1988, Pretoria continued to express anxiety about Havana’s intentions. In a 
Weekly Mail front-page story, Malan issued the warning that “Havana might even have 
designs on South Africa.”844  In reference to Cuba’s considerable military presence, he 
asserted: “Where are they going? Will they wipe out Unita and is South Africa their 
goal?”845  
 Whether the Cubans would have been able to defeat the SADF in Namibia is, of 
course, unknown, given that they never crossed the border, and the military clash did not 
occur.  Jeffrey Herbst, then at Princeton University, argued that the SADF would have 
presented a serious military obstacle to the Cuban forces: “South Africa still had a 
formidable military capability. If they decided to confront the Cubans in southern Angola 
they would have a good chance of defeating them.”846 However, their failure at Cuito 
Cuanavale and the débâcle at Calueque indicate that it would not have been an easy task 
for the SADF, and that the Cuban and Angolans would have had a not insignificant 
chance of emerging victorious, or least, of inflicting considerable damage on their South 
African foe. 
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 The deployment of Cuban/Angolan forces to the Angolan/Namibian frontier 
radically transformed the regional balance of the military power.  The United States 
Defence Intelligence Agency recognized this new situation, describing the Cuban 
military operation as a “strategic coup,” stating that the Cuban-orchestrated and led 
operation “ended Pretoria’s military dominance of southern Angola.”847 The report 
further argued that this development had import that extended beyond Angola, declaring 
that the Cuban deployment “threatened to significantly alter the balance of power in the 
region” and had “redressed the military balance by challenging South African dominance 
along the Namibian border.”848 It is interesting that Chester Crocker in his memoirs 
published in 1992, disagreed with this evaluation, asserting that Cuba posed no real 
threat to the South African forces in Namibia.849 However, his later inquiries about 
Cuban intentions, contradict his earlier stance.850 Moreover, the South African 
government, as a principal protagonist, demonstrated did not share Crocker’s assessment.    
 Unprepared for the bold Cuban move, Pretoria initially was unwillingly to accept 
that the tables had shifted decisively against them. While worried about the Cuban threat 
to its control of Namibia, Pretoria sought to restore the military status quo that had 
previously prevailed. However, the attacks on Tchipa not only did not redress the 
situation, but their failure, together with the Cuban counter-strike against Calueque, 
firmly established that a new regional dispensation of power existed. The Cuban 
deployment along the Namibian border altered the trajectory of the war in Angola.  
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DETERMINING SADF CASUALTIES: THE SADF HONOUR ROLL 
In the aftermath of the bombing of Calueque, the SADF withdrew from Angola, 
completing the process in August 1988. On crossing the border back into Namibia, the 
last of the returning SADF troops, mounted in armoured personnel carriers, were greeted 
with a banner that said in English and Afrikaans: “Welcome Winners/Welkom 
Wenners.”851 Nevertheless, despite this celebratory return, many commentators insisted 
that Havana could have inflicted greater damage on the SADF.  Victoria Brittain noted 
that there was “little doubt that the Cubans could have hit the retreating South African 
forces much harder than they did, causing many more casualties.”852 In Calueque’s wake, 
Peter Vale, anticipating more military clashes, predicted that “the casualty rate seems 
tragically set to rise...”853 However, no further major military engagements transpired, 
pre-empted by the SADF withdrawal. Mark Patrick, an SADF soldier, opined that the 
SADF retreat also prevented greater South African casualties: “If they [the SADF] 
hadn’t withdrawn, I think there would have been a lot more [South African] lives 
lost.”854 
 The plausibility of significantly higher South African casualties if further military 
clashes had occurred is supported by the existence of unexecuted plans for a series of air 
strikes by the Cuban armed forces in the event of retaliatory SADF military actions in 
response to the Calueque raid.  While the Calueque clash proved to be the last major 
military engagement of the conflict, Havana considered further and larger air strikes 
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against SADF positions in Namibia. Castro sent a cable instructing that preparations be 
made to respond any SADF action: “You must be ready to strike a strong blow at enemy 
bases in northern Namibia, that is, the response prepared for a large-scale enemy air raid. 
You must consider which variants would inflict the largest casualty toll on the 
enemy.”855 Even though the SADF attack never materialized, Havana stiil considered 
launching an airstrike. Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo Gonzalez Saria described a planned 
operation to bomb SADF military installations in Namibia. It was deemed too dangerous 
and also rejected as unnecessary and dishonourable because the SADF had not retaliated 
for the Calueque and involved attacking the South Africans as they slept:  
In 1988, we had the opportunity of hitting the main South African military 
base in Namibia. A plan was proposed. But it was turned down. The 
commander was told that the plan was not only risky but that a full attack 
would not be authorized that would result in the soldiers and officers 
being targeted while they slept in their barracks. This was an ethical 
principle. Some of us were upset that we were not going to hit those sons 
of bitches. But that was our ethical principle.856 
 
The discussion of hypothetical and potential South African casualties aside, the question 
remains: How many SADF soldiers were actually killed during the battles of 1987-88, in 
particular, and the entire period apartheid South Africa was militarily intervening in 
Angola, in general?  The number of white deaths has been a central point of debate, 
proving to be probably the most controversial issue of the entire conflict. Both sides of 
the conflict, as we have seen, gave very different figures for various engagements. This 
divergence and the Pretoria’s reluctance about releasing casualty rates fueled speculation 
in the western media. Pretoria’s reticence was reflected in the refusal to present broad 
figures, or to identify those who were injured or killed.  A 1976 decision had established 
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“official SADF policy not to reveal their names or provide statistics.”857  
 Increasingly, the scale of white casualties was a significant topic in western 
newspapers.858 The Economist discussed what it termed Pretoria’s conundrum: the SADF 
needed to “keep more white conscripts than it wants” in service, when there were “not 
enough young white men to call on.”859 As the conflict lasted into late 1987 and then 
stretched into 1988, a central thread in two articles published in the Guardian and The 
New York Times was the sensitivity of Pretoria to the mounting death toll.860 Both The 
Independent and The New York Times reported SADF Chief of Staff General 
Geldenhuys’ statement that Pretoria had only suffered 31 deaths. 861 A 5 August 1988 
report by Hirsch Goodman, the Johannesburg-based correspondent for the U.S. News & 
World Report, put the death toll at 80862  
 However, none of the reports, whether in the western or South African 
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newspapers, could resolve the contradictions between the conflicting death figures 
provided by Luanda and Pretoria. For example, a Weekly Mail article reported 
conflicting statements on the actual number of SADF deaths and aircraft shot down, with 
Luanda asserting 230 deaths and 16 aircraft downed, Pretoria 35 and 3.863    In a 20 
November 1987 report, The Sowetan cited a figure of 21 deaths.864 A follow-up article 
stated that the South African armed forces had sustained casualties “on a scale that has 
shocked the white South African community.”865 The Star ran two articles on South 
African losses, challenging Pretoria’s figures by emphasizing that the SADF failed to 
disclose actual casualties by admitting that only 31 soldiers, 3 tanks and 1 fighter-plane 
had been lost.  To add weight to its claims, The Star quoted Roger Hully, who during the 
parliamentary debates on the budget challenged Malan’s figures, observing that Malan 
had not mentioned the losses of the SWATF. Hully further stated: “In contrast oversea 
estimates put the combined losses of the SADF and SWATF at hundreds of troops and 
up to 20 aircraft and more equipment.”866   Malan’s response to Hully was to reaffirm his 
statement that only 31 members of the SADF died. He also gave a casualty figure for the 
SWATF of 12 killed.867 
 Western and South African newspapers could speculate on a higher death toll 
than officially acknowledged by the Botha regime, but they could not offer definitive 
evidence to support their claims. What prevailed was the contest of opposing warring 
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parties’ statistics. Pretoria and SADF officers always insisted on a comparatively low 
death toll. In two addresses in 1988 (16 and 18 May) to the South African parliament, 
Malan admitted to only 31 deaths.868 As noted, General Geldenhuys supported Malan’s 
low numbers. In his memoirs, Geldenhuys reiterated that only 31 SADF soldiers were 
killed in combat, with another six dying from malaria.869 Major General Thirion asserted 
that at most there were “not more than” 50 SADF deaths in 1987-88.870  While 
acknowledging that he was airlifted from the Cuito Cuanavale theatre in a helicopter 
with “four or five dead bodies,” Hein Groenewald stated that there not many white 
deaths: “We would not have had that many. Maybe 20.”871 While admitting that he 
“heard rumours of extensive losses,” Colonel Gerhard Louw, denied there were high 
SADF casualties.872  
 While not releasing its overall estimates of SADF mortality figures for the 1987-
1988 conflict, various Cuban accounts have asserted death figures for specific military 
engagements. Taken together these claims indicate a higher death toll than the 31 
asserted by the apartheid regime.  For example, Cuban sources claimed that the March 
1st attack on Cuito Cuanavale resulted in 20 SADF deaths.873 The 27 June Calueque air-
raid, they asserted killed a minimum of 50 South Africans.874 Rafael Tamayo, who was 
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director of the Cuban community development projects in South Africa, recounted a 
dinner hosted by a white South African family. A guest disrupted the dinner because he 
became very upset when he discovered that a Cuban was present. Tamayo stated that the 
man was upset “because he said he had lost sixty of his men at Cuito Cuanavale.”875 
 Non-Cuban sources are adamant that the death toll was much higher than South 
African admissions. Jose Kupussu, a former sergeant in the 32nd Battalion, who fought at 
Cuito Cuanavale was adamant that the death toll was much higher than the officially 
admitted 31-deaths. He stated that he personally saw the SADF dead.  According to 
Kupussu, after one of the attacks on the Tumpo triangle, the 32nd Battalion was given 
the task of cadaver retrieval:  
Many whites died at Cuito Cuanavale. This story of only about 30 is a lie! 
I saw it for myself. Members of the 32nd Battalion were sent in to help in 
the recovery of the bodies. But later the fire was too intense and we had to 
get out of there and bodies were left behind.876 
 
This charge of mendacity against the SADF has been a frequent one.  Ronnie Kasrils, a 
member of the ANC leadership, stated that the SADF “covered up the number of 
deaths.”877 This is the stance of Susan Hurlich, an activist with the MPLA and SWAPO 
during the 1987-88 conflict: “The South Africans didn’t want to admit how many had 
actually died, because of the demoralization this would cause at home [i.e., among white 
South Africans]. They claimed a South African victory rather than a defeat.”878 Among 
the highest figures claimed is a death toll of 300-400 by Colonel Stuart Watson, who was 
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stationed at Cuito Cuanavale during the battle.879 Perhaps the most persistent proponent 
of a higher SADF death toll is SANDF Colonel Patrick Ricketts, a former MK member 
and currently the Chair of the Ex-Combatants Association.   He has led several trips to 
Cuito Cuanavale (including the actual battle sites), asserting the remains of numerous 
SADF soldiers still lie in the Tumpo Triangle: 
Hundreds of remains of SADF soldiers (skeletons in SADF as well as 
UNITA uniforms) are still trapped in the minefields at the Tumpo 
Triangle.  We visited the site recently (April 2004) and established this 
unknown reality to the SA community...Many SADF members also wish 
to deny this reality as a result of their loyalty to the Apartheid [sic] 
military generals as well as to Apartheid [sic] itself...Lastly, whoever 
wants to deny this reality, I wish him or her to accompany us by 
helicopter with a media team and then explain the current reality at the 
Tumpo Triangle to the South African population.880 
 
In lieu of a professional and comprehensive forensic survey of the Tumpo Triangle, 
Ricketts’ claims cannot be confirmed or denied. Such an undertaking is probably not 
going to happen in the short term, as the area remains extremely dangerous due to the 
numerous active mines that suffuse the area.  Any survey under the present conditions 
would be a hazardous, death-defying enterprise, best left to the time when Cuito 
Cuanavale and its environs have been thoroughly de-mined. Thus, notwithstanding the 
extent of the anecdotal evidence or the “eye witness accounts,” the onus is on those who 
argue for a higher death rate to present persuasive evidence that supports their case. It 
would seem that without compelling physical and documentary evidence to the contrary, 
prima facie, the SADF official figures must be accepted (albeit with caution and 
reservations).  
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While the declarations by Ricketts and others of a higher death toll than officially 
admitted by the SADF appear speculative, evidence pointing to a much higher death toll 
than officially acknowledged comes from two sources. First, evidence exists in a 
surprising, very public and virtually unnoticed form: the South African War Memorial 
(officially known as the South African Defence Force Memorial) in Pretoria. The War 
Memorial includes plaques listing names of the SADF members who died while in 
active-service in military operations from its inception in 1957 to when it was replaced in 
1994 by the SANDF.  It includes plaques for the years 1987 and 1988. While the place 
and exact date of each death are not recorded, the plaques make for interesting reading 
and extrapolation. There are two series of plaques for 1987 with a total of 138 inscribed 
names.  For 1988, there is one principal series of plaques, with one entry for 1988 
appearing elsewhere. The total of names recorded for 1988 is 109. Thus, for 1987 and 
1988 a total of 247 SADF deaths are recorded.  
 The vast majority of names appear to be Afrikaner or English names. Out of the 
247 names, only 32 seem to be non-Afrikaner and non-English.881  While, the names in-
and-of themselves are not indicative of the number of white deaths, they are suggestive. 
By the mid-1980s an estimated 24 per cent of the SADF troops were nonwhite. The most 
experienced and battle hardened troops where white, comprising the frontline formations 
deployed to southern Angola. Their loyalty, as whites, to the apartheid state was 
unquestioned by the SADF, while nonwhite troops were deemed to be less trustworthy. 
The exception was the 32nd battalion (the Buffalo Soldiers), which often fought on the 
frontlines. The 32nd battalion aside, white-troops predominantly shouldered the fighting 
in Angola.    
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 While the memorial does not indicate where, when and how each person died, it 
does indicate that at least 247 persons died, in one way or another, while on active 
SADF-service during 1987-88. The qualification “at least” is used because the War 
Memorial only contains the names of those buried in the National Military Cemetery, 
located at the Thaba Tshwane military base in Pretoria. Many soldiers who died in 
Angola or elsewhere were buried in their hometowns.882 The cemetery is divided into 
sections that correspond to different years.  However, it includes the graves of those who 
did not die in while in active-service in military operations, which accounts for the more 
than 300 graves in the sections set aside for 1987 and 1988.  Nevertheless, as would be 
expected these sections contain various graves of SADF soldiers whose date of death 
corresponded with the military engagements in southern Angola.883  
 While, the War Memorial is suggestive, in and of it self, it is not conclusive. It 
does not indicate when in 1987 and 1988 the deaths occurred, and if they were in 
Angola. However, the second source of evidence is, however, more authoritative and 
comprehensive: the South African Defence Force Roll of Honour.884 This internal SADF 
document lists all the SADF personnel who died during active military service from 
1962 to its dissolution in 1994.  Its authenticity is attested to by a number of factors; it 
was procured from a senior officer in the SANDF who copied it at the SANDF’s 
headquarters, all the names at the War Memorial appear in the Roll of Honour with the 
years of death also corresponding, and lastly, names that do not appear on the War 
Memorial because those SADF personnel were buried elsewhere appear in the Roll of 
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Honour. An example is William Wallace who was killed in Angola on March 9, 1987, 
and was buried in Paarl, just outside Cape Town.885 While his name does not appear on 
the War Memorial, it appears in the Roll of Honour.  
 From August 1987 to June 1988, the Roll of Honour lists 145 SADF soldiers who 
died while in active service. However, its authority and detail does have limits. First, the 
SADF Roll of Honour is exactly that, the catalogue of the members of the SADF who 
died in military service. It does not include the deaths of those who were called up from 
the Citizen Force, as they would not have been recorded on service or payroll rosters. 
While the SADF Roll of Honour provides more information than the War Memorial 
(giving the date of death, location and cause), it does not do so consistently. The date of 
death is the single most reliably recorded piece of information; it is available for 2,080 of 
the 2,084 deaths recorded. However, quite often location and cause is omitted. This is 
particularly applicable for the information given for 1987 and 1988. While it was an 
internal document, precautions were taken (as with the SSC minutes) to ensure if it ever 
fell into the hands of someone outside the desired circle, it would be difficult to 
determine where the deaths occurred and what were the causes.  This would make it 
difficult to ascribe the deaths to the war in Angola.  
 From August 1987 to the end of June 1988, covering the Battle of Cuito 
Cuanavale and the confrontations on the Namibian border, 145 deaths are recorded.  Of 
these, 17 are recorded to have died at specified locations within South Africa. Of these 
17 deaths, 6 were acknowledged to have been killed by “enemy” forces (Black South 
Africans, including many based in Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe; as well as Angolan and Cuban armed forces) operating in South African 
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territory or Namibian (“South West Africa”) territory administered by the South African 
government. The other 11 deaths were recorded as the result of training accidents, acts of 
personal negligence, or inflicted by other SADF members. During this period, another 
128 deaths were identified without any explicit information as to location: whether in 
South Africa, Namibia or Angola.  Of these 64 were recorded to have been killed by the 
“enemy,” i.e., external enemy, forces in operations sometimes initiated by the SADF (but 
sometimes not). The other 64 were the result of training accidents, acts of personal 
negligence or inflicted by other SADF members. 
 The number of deaths attributed to training accidents or acts of personal 
negligence by SADF members was quite high: 75 out of 145 for 51.7 per cent.  Ann-
Marie Wallace said that the SADF gave her and other mothers of sons who had died 
while in active service “the impression that most died in accidents.”886 Maj. Gen. Thirion 
stated that most of the deaths in 1987-88 were the result of accidents or other mishaps, 
such as crashes, illness or accidental shootings, with one SADF soldier “killed by a 
crocodile.”887 However, it has been asserted that the category of accidental death was 
used to hide the actual number of deaths in combat, with any battle related deaths 
reported as accidents.  
 It has been alleged that the SADF deliberately and liberally assigned deaths to the 
accident and disease categories, minimizing the reported combat deaths. Therefore, the 
assertion is not only that the actual death toll was low, but the deaths were primarily the 
result of a variety of accidents: incidents that probably would have happened during 
peacetime in the normal course of armed forces activities.  Drawing on official figures 
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released for the 1979-1983, Christopher Coker noted that according to the SADF’s 
public admission there had been 647 accidental deaths, with more than 3,000 injured as a 
result of accidents. Those who were killed in combat amounted to 107.888   Coker 
concluded this led to the conclusion that “the South African army is unusually accident 
prone or else casualties in the field have been deliberately disguised as accident 
statistics.”889 
 Obfuscation by accident aside, it seems reasonable to assume that the larger the 
military operation the greater the number of accidents that will occur. Thus, accidental 
deaths, while not directly a result of combat, could be indirectly linked to the military 
operation aimed at capturing Cuito Cuanavale and challenging Cuban forces along the 
border.  Major General Thirion stated the SADF Cuito Cuanavale campaign grew to 
involve thousands of troops, with increasingly “a large number of them drawn from the 
national service men.”890 Eventually the operation, he stated, grew to encompass at least 
20,000 troops, either in combat roles in Angola or in a support capacity in Namibia.891 
Whether, these “death by accident numbers” are accurate or truthful, it seems reasonable 
to ascribe them, at least, indirectly to the SADF 1987-88 military operations in Angola.  
 However, these rates of “attrition by accident” do strain credulity. The SADF was 
engaged in active military combat in southern Angola for 11-months, with 7-months 
devoted, first to the determined pursuit and destruction of retreating Angolan forces, and 
then to the siege and repeatedly efforts to capture Cuito Cuanavale.  This was then 
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followed in the final four months by the series of confrontations in and around Tchipa 
and the Cuban air-raid on Calueque. The size, duration and intensity of this deployment 
would support projections of a higher death toll from combat than the publicly and 
officially claimed 31 deaths. The SADF Roll of Honour, the War Memorial, Cuban 
accounts, personal testimonies and the various media reports provide objective 
confirmation of a higher death toll. Together they constitute a solid basis for the 
conclusion that more than 31 SADF soldiers were killed in the fighting in southern 
Angola in 1987-1988. Or, at the very least, the onus in now shifted on to those who 
advocate for the SADF official death toll to rebut this evidence. The Roll of Honour and 
the War Memorial, however, seem very difficult to rebut, as they are products of the 
SADF itself. While the other sources can be diminished in value as being a species of 
hearsay, the Roll of Honour and the War Memorial constitute a form of direct SADF 
documentary testimony.  
 Beyond the number of deaths, the Roll of Honour also indicates which were the 
most intense casualty periods (whether in accident or combat categories) for the SADF 
during the 1975-1988 South African interventions and invasions of Angola. It lists 2,084 
deaths for the years 1962 to 1994. From August 1975 to December 1988, 1,611 SADF 
personnel are recorded as being killed while in active-service.  Thus, more than 77 per 
cent of SADF deaths occurred during the SADF’s military interventions throughout 
southern Africa.  
 Some periods of fighting were more intense than others. The most intensive 
period was the Cuito Cuanavale period from August 1987 to June 1988, in which 145 
died. In the 12 years preceding the 1987-1988 conflict, August 1975 to July 1987, some 
1,424 are recorded as killed in repeated South African incursions at the Namibian-
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Angolan border and-or in the Ovamboland territory in northern Namibia on the Angolan 
border, with the most intense period being from February 1985 to August 1986 when 133 
SADF members were killed in numerous incidents.  These skirmishes ranged in 
geographic extent from the eastern tip of the Caprivi Strip border region between 
Namibia and Angola (plus Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia) to the Ovamboland zone 
of the Namibian-Angolan border. Over that 18-month period, there were very few 
months in which the SADF did not record fatalities in these zones. Similarly, during the 
21-month period from November 1980 to July 1982, some 290 SADF members died at 
various locations along the Namibian-Angolan border. 
 Beyond the intensity of casualties, the most telling information provided by the 
Roll of Honour is the demographic breakdown. It is a window through which to 
specifically determine which age groups sustained the greatest number of dead and had 
the highest death rate.  The Roll of Honour is unequivocal on this matter. This, of course, 
does not provide us directly with the quantitative death rates for each age group. For this, 
the roster of all those who served in the SADF (with their ages) would be required. 
Together with the Roll of Honour, it would then be possible to calculate accurately the 
death rates. What can be determined is what age groups made-up the greatest proportion 
of the SADF dead. Nevertheless, from the available information a reasonable qualitative 
inference and extrapolation can be made about which age groups were dying in the 
greatest proportionate numbers. 
 According to the Roll of Honour, the 20-29 age group made-up the highest 
average proportion of recorded deaths.  Of 2,084 SADF members whose date of death is 
recorded, there are 78 whose age at the time of their death is unknown. Among the 
remaining 2,002 deaths: 8 were more than 60 years of age; 18 were 50-59; 58 were 40-
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49; 230 were 30-39; 1,005 were of 20-29, and 683 under 20. Thus, 50.2 per cent of the 
dead (i.e., more than half) were 20-29 years, with 34.1 per cent (i.e., more than one-third) 
being under 20-years old. Thus, those under 30 constitute 84.3 per cent of all recorded 
deaths.  Of 1,352 (whose ages are known) to have died during the 12-year period, from 1 
August 1975 to 31 July 1987, preceding the Cuito Cuanavale period, while recorded to 
be involved in SADF actions at the Namibian-Angolan border or in the Ovamboland area 
in northern Namibia on the Angolan border, 21 were aged 50 years or over; 37 were 40-
49; 56 were 30-39; 644 were 20-29, and 494 were under 20. Thus, those under 20-29 
years old represent 47.6 per cent of deaths, those under 20 36.5 per cent. Those under 30 
years old make up the largest proportion (84.2 per cent) of deaths. While this figure is 
slightly lower than the mean for this age group in the total death count, the statistic for 
those under 20 (36.5 per cent) is 4.1 per cent higher.   
 The death percentages for the Cuito Cuanavale period, August 1987 to June 
1988, are revealing. Of the 145 deaths whose ages are known: 0 were age 50 or over; 3 
were 40-49; 10 were 30-39; 98 were 20-29, and 33 were under 20.  The death percentage 
for the 20-29 year olds of 67.6 per cent  (i.e., more than two-thirds) is 42 per cent  (i.e., 
more than two-fifths) higher than the average mean during South Africa’s 1975-88 
military intervention in southern Africa, and 34.7 per cent higher for this age group in the 
total death count.  The death mean for those under 20 (22.8 per cent) is lower (37.5 per 
cent) than the mean for the period of intervention, and lower (33.1 per cent) than the 
mean for this age-group in the total death count.  However, the entire set of those under-
30 constitute 90.3 per cent (i.e., more than nine-tenths) of all the deaths.  
 What do these figures imply? While the under-30 Cuito Cuanavale figure is 
roughly similar (being only seven per cent higher) to the figures for the entire history of 
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the SADF and the period confined to regional incursions, it demonstrates the continuing 
and increasing attrition in the ranks of those aged 29 and younger. The figures do not 
indicate how many or the percentage of the under 30s registered in the SADF were 
killed. Nevertheless, the fact that so many of the SADF dead was under the age of 30 
warrants the conclusion that not only did this group have the highest death rate but that 
they must also have been deployed in the field in the greatest numbers. The testimony of 
Hein Groenewald supports this conclusion, as he stated that most of those who fought in 
his unit and others deployed in southern Angola ranged in age from 18 to early 
twenties.892   
 Of course, it is always this age grouping that comprises the majority of combat 
troops and consequently suffers the most casualties in any active armed forces. It is a key 
group, constituting the fittest and most freshly trained core of battle ready troops. 
Therefore, the inability to keep the death rate down necessarily marked a crisis for the 
SADF. Also, as previously noted, the Roll of Honour does not include those who were 
killed in the Citizen Force. During, for example, the last South African assault on Cuito 
Cuanavale several Citizen Force regiments was integrated into the 82nd South African 
Brigade. Therefore, it is plausible that the actual numbers of deaths and the death rates 
are probably higher than what can be ascertained directly or indirectly from the Roll of 
Honour. What seems clear is that the number of deaths that can be attributed to the 
SADF’s 1987-1988 campaign in Angola exceeds the officially admitted figure by at least 
two to four times, and quite probably was even higher.  
 Prima facie the death toll does not appear high. Nonetheless, the increase in the 
number of deaths in 1987-88 over previous periods is a strong indication of the intensity 
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of the battles. It also highlighted the growing wear and tear on the SADF, and the 
mounting challenges it faced to retain its fighting prowess.  The Botha regime was, of 
course, quite sensitive and cognizant that the SADF could not sustain or absorb such a 
death rate. At the 20 June 1988 SSC meeting, Botha observed that South Africa could 
not maintain a prolonged presence in Angola.893 At the 25 July 1988, he projected a 
potential death toll of 1, 000 to 1,500 if the SADF stayed in Angola.894  
 Pretoria had a core of well-trained and battle-hardened troops. However, their 
numbers were limited and much more difficult to replenish as the SADF drew the vast 
majority of its conscripts from the white community, especially on short notice as in the 
1987-1988 conflict. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, at various points during 
the campaign in Angola, the SADF confronted the problem of exhausted troops who 
were physically and psychological drained. While the number of FAPLA deaths was 
magnitudes higher, they had a much larger pool to draw on, and could and did have the 
capacity to absorb this death toll and still carry on fighting. These troops might not have 
been as well trained or equipped as those of the SADF, but there were always more to 
call on.  
In the final assault on Cuito Cuanavale, the SADF was forced to rely heavily on 
inexperienced troops from the Citizen force. Valuable fighting assets had been brought to 
the front lines in a series of unsuccessful attempts to seize Cuito Cuanavale and assert the 
SADF’s supremacy, either as an actual-fact on the ground or as a very real psychological 
fear among its enemies. The consequence was the degradation of not only the fighting 
capacity but, also, as will be argued, the fighting spirit of the SADF.  
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SADF MORALE  
During the 13-year intervention in Angola, morale among South African soldiers 
increasingly declined.  Months of combat and being in the field had had a significant 
psychological effect. Bridgland stated that many South African soldiers who fought from 
December 1987 to February 1988 had to be treated for post-traumatic stress syndrome 
(PTSS).895 Gary Baines, a Rhodes University researcher, documented the impact of 
PTSS on SADF troops of the prolonged Angolan campaign. His work uncovered several 
instances of what, he termed, the “psycho-social casualties” of the war.896 Hein 
Groenewald, an SADF soldier at Cuito Cuanavale and a recipent of the Pro Patria Medal 
for service in the defence of the Republic of South Africa, stated that many of those 
whose who served with him suffered from what were clearly symptoms of post traumatic 
stress syndrome. He himself was afflicted, declaring: “My brain wanted to wipe the war 
from my memory. I am now trying to put the pieces together.”897 Clive Holt also 
expressed the notion that there were unpleasant experiences that he could not escape 
from, particularly memories of the SADF dead: “The stench of the body bags remain 
with me.”898 
                                                
895 Bridgland, The War for Africa, 315 
 
896 G. Baines, Blame, Shame or Reaffirmation? White Conscripts Reassess the Meaning 
of the ‘Border War’ in Post-Apartheid South Africa, InterCulture, ‘V’, (2008), 214-228; 
G. Baines. n.d. [but probably 2008; see bibliographical entry infra].Trauma in 
Transition: Representing Psychological Problems of South African War Veterans 
(published online — see Bibliography entry for details); G. Baines, Breaking Rank: 
Secrets, Silences and Stories of South Africa’s Border War, paper presented at 4th 
Global Conference of Interdisciplinary [dot]Net — a Global Network for Dynamic 
Research and Publishing, (Budapest, 2007) 
 
897 Interview with Hein Groenewald  
 
898 Herman Jansen, Reuk van lysak bly die soldaat by, Rapport, 6 March 2005, 15 
 
  
 241 
 The conditions of living and fighting in Angola or Namibian, a country of 
unfamiliar terrain, culture and, often, unwelcoming people, contributed to generating a 
feeling of disorientation and estrangement. Soldiers often spoke of many of their 
colleagues succumbing to bossiekoors or “bush fever.” Uys du Buisson described this 
condition as the ultimate manifestation of the feeling of demoralization and disaffection 
that many SADF soldiers felt.  Those in this state would hallucinate and engage in self-
destructive behaviour.  The ground troops often referred to this as being bosbefok or 
“bush fucked.”899 
 This sentiment or condition was often exacerbated by a general sense of 
confusion on the nature and purpose of their military missions.  Hein Groenewald stated 
that most of those he served with had no idea why they were fighting in Angola, and did 
not even know they would be going to Angola when they were called up for SADF 
service.  When he was deployed, Groenwald acknowledged that he “did not know we 
were going to Angola.”900  Most, according to Groenewald had a vague concept of 
fighting against communism. Part of SADF indoctrination was persuading recruits they 
were serving the good of all South Africans by preventing communist expansion 
throughout the region. Ann-Marie Wallace said that her son “saw the war as defending 
South Africa from communism. My son wanted to go fight for his country.”901 Andre 
Zaaiman stated that he and his fellow recruits “were told our occupation of Namibia was 
in the interest of all South Africans and Namibians. That the SADF was a neutral force – 
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SWAPO and the ANC had little support.”902 
 In Groenewald’s opinion, beyond superficial anti-communism, SADF recruits 
and even seasoned soldiers had little understanding of the context of political or 
international relations that framed and affected South Africa. He argued that this was due 
to their youth.  He was 18 years old when he was conscripted, “straight out of high 
school with very little political education.”903  Ian Liebenberg, who served in the SADF 
in the 1970s, agreed with Groenwald’s characterization of the average conscripts 
understanding of the conflict: “South African troops were conscripted. They were not 
given the full picture.”904 Groenewald asserted that this lack of information on behalf of 
the conscripts was a product of the general state of consciousness in South Africa about 
the SADF’s intervention in Angola: “No one knew. There was very limited knowledge 
of our involvement in Angola. It was a very important war but no one knew about it.”905 
The SADF recruits being products of South African society necessarily reflected this 
limited awareness. Liebenberg’s experience also illustrated this situation:  
 I worked as a young graphic designer. A friend came from London 
and told me: “Your army is in Angola.” I replied: “No. That’s not 
true.” Then two weeks later I got a telegram from the SADF and next 
thing I was in Angola. I suddenly realized there was a world outside 
South Africa.906 
 
Demoralization and disaffection was not only manifested in psychological dissonance 
but also in active and conscious acts of opposition to the war and service in the SADF. 
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Some personnel in the SADF saw their time in the armed forces as “forced service.”907 
SADF troops viewed their time on the border as vasbyting (“biting the bullet’). They 
described their experience as vasbyt (“grinding their teeth and baring it”) until their tour 
of duty was completed.908 Anthony Feinstein stated that he lost faith in the SADF war 
goals, his “priority in Owamboland had become a selfish one: to survive the tour of duty 
and get home to safety, family and friends.”909 
 Disaffection, or at least ambivalence, towards service in the SADF led to acts of 
defiance. Despite SADF efforts to suppress public knowledge of these acts, reports 
surfaced of equipment been deliberately damaged.910 Desertion almost began to emerge 
as a problem. This was reflected in the 1981 desertion figures for Namibia, where of the 
577 SADF personnel held in military prison “519 were serving sentences for refusing to 
serve in the field or for going absent without leave.”911 This opposition to military 
service was not confined to the SADF.  In November 1987, the SWATF, a SADF 
auxiliary force, suffered a mutiny of its 10lst Battalion. Four hundred soldiers, comprised 
of blacks from the Ovambo region, refused to fight in Angola. This was reported as “the 
first significant sign of discontent among South African and allied forces with the 
invasion of southern Angola.”912 One soldier who refused to serve is quoted as saying: 
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“To go and fight Swapo in Angola is a crime against our society. To go and fight against 
Fapla in their own country is a fight against God’s will.”913  
 Opposition to the war in Angola began in the 1970s and continued into the 1980s.  
SADF soldiers publicly expressed ethical and political rejection of South African 
intervention in Angola, and the system of apartheid.  Opposition to apartheid was 
Lieutenant Ivan Toms’ justification for his refusal to continue serving in the SADF: “To 
put on this brown uniform [of the SADF] is to identify with that system, to be part of 
apartheid.”914 David Kimber, active in the End Conscription Campaign, publicly 
denounced the SADF role Namibia: “It was clear from my experience that the SADF 
was seen as a foreign force, a colonizing force that was not contributing to any peaceful 
process.”915 A poem written by an unknown soldier echoed and captured Kimber’s sense 
of alienation from the local population:  
This foreign land,  
where a white boy  
on white sand  
listens –  
to the clicking tongue  
of a foreign people  
saying –  
Bwana, go home…916 
 
Perhaps, Mark Patrick, whose brother was killed in Angola, gave the strongest 
denunciation:  
 One of the tragedies was I know what my brother was like. But he 
died fighting for the South African Defence Force. And the way I 
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saw my involvement in the SADF, and the way I would see his 
involvement in the SADF, and what we were doing, and what he 
was doing in Angola, most Angolans and most South Africans 
would call terrorist actions.917 
The military setbacks in southern Angola in 1987-88 led to further deterioration of 
SADF morale. Several SADF soldiers testified to this, stating unequivocally despite 
Pretoria’s denials, that the SADF had been decisively defeated. David Kimber 
underscored that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale “was a massive defeat” for the South 
African armed forces.918 Andre Zaaiman, a former captain, affirmed that South Africa 
“lost the war at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.”919 For Ross Mardon, the SADF defeat 
was multi-dimensional, as it had been “definitely by far out-gunned, out-maneuvered, 
out-fought, out-tacticed, out-everything you want to say.”920  These series of battlefield 
reversals not only conclusively demonstrated the failure of the SADF’s Angolan 
campaign but, also, demoralized many of the soldiers in the field. This was most clearly 
illustrated by the Cuban air strike against Calueque.  
 After the Calueque air-raid, the Cubans found scrawled on a wall in Afrikaans 
either: “MIK 23 sak van die hart”, “MIK 23 sake van die hart,” or “MIK 23 saak van die 
hart.” 921 It is difficult to determine whether the word is “sak” or sake.” Directly 
underneath was clearly written 27/06/88, unambiguously referring to the June 27, 1988 
date of the Cuban air attack. Whether, a South African soldier wrote the message or one 
of the civilians working at the dam has not been ascertained. Translation has been 
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controversial, as the scrawl appears to be a fragment of a larger message, the rest of 
which did not survive. This has lent a definite veneer of ambiguity. SADF partisans 
argue that not only is the scrawl ambiguous, it is gibberish, constituting meaningless 
graffiti.  
 The literal English translation is: “MiG-23s bag of (or to) the heart” or “MiG-23s 
matters of (or to) the heart.”  Cubans argue that actual meaning is more accurately 
rendered as: “The MiG-23s went straight to the heart,” or “The MiG-23s broke our 
hearts.” This rendering would provide a clear illustration of South African 
demoralization. The scrawl’s fragmentary and ambiguous nature could be the result of 
the haste and disorientation that it was written in during of after the air raid. In addition 
to the scrawl, the Cubans also found the personal diary of an SADF soldier. Written in 
English, the soldier reflected on his growing disillusionment with the war and a loss of 
belief that South Africa could match the Cubans in the military sphere.922 While the 
scrawl (graffiti?) and the diary may have directly signified the demoralization of only 
one or two particular soldiers, the suspicion of a general demoralization of SADF 
personnel is supported by the testimony of other SADF members. Clive Holt wrote that 
his morale was significantly affected by the Calueque attack: “My patriotic pride was 
running low and I just wanted to get out of the fucking war and go home.”923  
The capacity of the SADF to wage war was now seriously compromised. One 
diplomat summed up the situation, stating that SADF general wanted “to retreat because 
army morale is a fragile thing and it has taken a big knock at Cuito Cuanavale.”924 SADF 
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morale was sufficiently a regime concern that at the 25 July 1988 SCC meeting, 
Geldenhuys was asked about the level of troop confidence.925  Coupled with the physical 
exhaustion and degradation of its best and most seasoned troops, the SADF also faced 
ongoing psychological deterioration. This further undermined its fighting capability.  
CONCLUSION 
The defeat of the SADF at Cuito Cuanavale and the strategic failure on the Namibian 
border constituted the decisive blow to Pretoria’s drive for regional domination. If Cuito 
Cuanavale is viewed in isolation then what resulted was, as George argues, inconclusive 
and a “stalemate.”926 However, if the battle is considered within the wider context of the 
military situation unfolding in southern Angola it is evident it was not a Cuban victory 
that “was at best ambiguous”927 but a significant Cuban success, constituting an 
unambiguous victory for Havana’s strategy.  
The power relationship between the contending parties had been radically 
transformed. The United States Defence Intelligence Agency observed that Pretoria was 
“unable to reassert its military ascendancy in southern Angola.”928 A crucial pillar of the 
apartheid regime’s preservation strategy had failed. It could no longer maintain apartheid 
by force of arms at home, while simultaneously waging war against its neighbouring 
countries, particularly Angola. Both sides of the anti-apartheid struggle viewed the battle 
inside and outside South Africa as organically interconnected. Chapters Five and Six 
examine the impact on South Africa of the débâcle at Cuito Cuanavale and the ensuing 
military events in southern Angola.  
                                                
925 SVR 13/88, 5, from MoD [Group 6] 
 
926 The Cuban Intervention in Angola, pp 213 & 3 
 
927 The Cuban Intervention in Angola, pp 277 
 
928 USDIA Lessons Learned (1988), 13 [declassified] 
  
 248 
CHAPTER FIVE: AFTERMATH: NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
While Pretoria’s decision to capture Cuito Cuanavale was a direct product of the pattern 
of the 1987 military confrontation between the SADF and FAPLA, it was also the logical 
extension of the ultimate goal of dislodging the MPLA from power and establishing a 
quasi-vassal state (akin to South West Africa) in southern Angola. As Angola was 
central to its project of regional hegemony, the opportunity to deal a mortal blow to 
FAPLA - and by extension to the MPLA - could not be resisted. However, the conflict 
did not unfold as Pretoria anticipated, resulting in a new alignment of military power in 
southern Angola. Faced with this new alignment, Pretoria’s position as the region’s 
aspiring hegemon was now, at the very least, called seriously into question.   
 This new alignment had almost immediate implications for South Africa’s 
occupation of Namibia. This chapter begins by examining the influence of the SADF 
military reversals on South Africa’s continuing occupation of Namibia. The questions 
that pose themselves are: what role did the SADF military defeat in Angola play in the 
process leading to Namibia’s independence, and was it a significant factor?  While the 
war in Angola, as an integral part of the project of establishing regional hegemony, was 
waged specifically to preserve South Africa’s control of Namibia, the military reversals 
it suffered in Angola are not considered to be the critical factors in a significant section 
of the body of the literature on Namibian independence. The dominant themes are that 
the changes in global geopolitics, specifically, U.S. and Soviet diplomacy, and the 
impact of international economic sanctions created the conditions that were central to the 
attainment of Namibia’s independence. The assumption of power by Mikhail Gorbachev 
in the former USSR is often seen as a  (if not the) key moment, leading to the 
implementation of a new Soviet foreign policy.  
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 The end of the Cold War resulted in cooperation between the two superpowers. 
This diplomatic understanding between Moscow and Washington is seen as facilitating 
the South African government’s ‘momentous’ and ‘path breaking decision’ to end South 
African domination of Namibia.929 With Pretoria determined to ensure a stable country 
on its frontier, Brian Wood argued that the new Soviet foreign policy alleviated 
Pretoria’s security concerns. Namibian independence was the result of the combined 
rationality of Pretoria, Washington, and Moscow.930 Leys and Brown commented, that in 
the Angolan war “neither side was interested in taking further heavy casualties; the 
Cubans looked to the Russians, and the Americans looked to the South Africans, to reach 
a settlement.”931  According to Roger Fieldhouse, with Gorbachev’s ascension to power, 
Pretoria was persuaded “to come to terms with its neighbours because the ‘communist 
threat’ was perceived to be much diminished.”932 Heather Deegan argued the stage was 
set by Washington-Moscow cooperation based on the recognition that: 1. both had 
interests but not critical interests in the region; 2. neither could mould or control the 
region as they wished; 3. the regional conflict should be resolved through political means 
and negotiations; and, 4. both powers needed a non-violent transition from apartheid.933 
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In these renderings, the military events in Angola were peripheral to the independence of 
Namibia.  
 George takes a different tact, arguing that Cuito Cunavale provided Washinton 
with the opportunity it sought to advance the negotiations to end the conflict. Cuito 
Cuanvale had become for both Cuba and South Africa “a costly stalemate.”934 Chester 
Crocker, the chief U.S. diplomat in Africa, was able to use the Cuban and South Africa 
desire to extricate themselves from the conflict to broker an agreement. The U.S. 
negotiating strategy is thus seen as the decsive factor in process that led to Namibain 
independence.935  In short, Cuito Cuanavale was a factor that Washington was able to 
manipulate. However, this chapter will challenge this view by arguing that the military 
situation in Angola (particularly events in southern Angola subsequent to Cuito 
Cuanavale) pushed the U.S. to make concessions in its negotiating strategy that it would 
have otherwise not countenanced.  Interestingly, while George asserts that the U.S. 
seized Cuito Cuanavale as the opportunity to realize its own goals and interests, he does 
does at one point implicitly acknowledge that the change in the military balance of 
power played a role in pushing the negoiations forward. He noted that the 23 March 
failure of the SADF attack “could not have come at a better moment for Havana,” as it 
prepared for its participation in the negoatiations.936 
 The events in Angola of 1987 and 1988 had other effects on South Africa. This 
chapter also examines the economic dimension of the war in Angola within the context 
of the South African economy. Perhaps, the most interesting and least explored aspect of 
the conflict was the influence on the South African public. The chapter assesses the 
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extent to which these events reverberated amongst white South Africans, exploring how 
as part of the ongoing war in Angola, Cuito Cuanavale and its military aftermath affected 
white attitudes to the “war on the border,” and the various forms of these responses. In 
the case of non-white South Africans, especially blacks, the impact on the anti-apartheid 
movement, particularly on the liberation organizations, is discussed. 
NAMIBIA: WASHINGTON & PRETORIA 
 
While geographically separate from the Republic of South Africa, Namibia was treated 
by Pretoria as a de facto fifth province. South Africa had occupied Namibia, a former 
German colony, since 1915. In 1920, the occupation was formalized under a mandate 
granted by the League of Nations.  However, in 1966, the UN revoked South Africa’s 
mandate, and the UN General Assembly passed several resolutions declaring South 
Africa’s occupation illegal.  On 29 September 1978, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted Resolution 435, which called for the withdrawal of South African troops, the 
end of the illegal occupation of Namibia and an UN-supervised transition period 
followed by free elections leading to Namibian independence. However, despite growing 
international pressure to relinquish its control of Namibia, Pretoria had strong support 
from Washington. While the Carter administration had chosen to support the resolution, 
the election of Ronald Reagan to the U.S. presidency in 1980 ensured that Washington 
would reverse its policy regarding South Africa’s occupation of Namibia. From its 
assumption of power in 1981, the Reagan administration rejected Resolution 435.  
 Reagan’s election heralded a more intimate and deeper cooperative relationship 
between Washington and Pretoria. The Reagan administration considered its southern 
African policy as integral to its objective of combating and rolling back Soviet influence 
and power globally.  As Alexander Haig, the U.S. Secretary of State, prepared for his 
first meeting with South African Foreign Minister Roelof “Pik” Botha, Chester Crocker, 
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U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, advised him to emphasize the shared 
strategic concerns that united the Reagan and Botha regimes. In a briefing paper, Crocker 
wrote that Botha should be assured that the Reagan administration sought “a new era of 
cooperation, stability and security in the region. We also share their view that the chief 
threat to the realization of that hope is the presence and influence of the Soviet Union 
and its allies.”937  
 Haig clearly articulated this coincidence of strategic interests in a 20 May 1981 
memorandum to President Reagan, outlining “a new relationship with South Africa 
based on a realistic appraisal of our mutual interests in the Southern African 
region...They know that we are determined to roll back Soviet influence throughout the 
world and in the region.”938  This continued to be the Reagan administration’s position 
throughout the 1980s. Crocker summed up this stance when he told New York Times 
correspondent Joseph Lelyveld: “The whites are here to stay and the only way that 
constructive change can come is through them.”939 Crocker praised the SADF general 
staff as “modernizing patriots,” stressing that it was not the U.S. “task to choose between 
black and white but to defend Western interests…economic, strategic, moral and 
political.”940 He went even further in declaring Washington’s ideological affinity and 
kinship with the apartheid regime: “[h]istorically, South Africa is by its nature a part of 
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the U.S.”941 With South Africa deemed a crucial ally in reducing the Soviet presence in 
the region, southern Africa became a strategic testing ground for this new aggressive 
policy of meeting the perceived threat of communist expansion.  
 The policy of constructive engagement with South Africa directly emerged from 
the Reagan administration’s aim of not appearing publicly to support the apartheid 
regime, while, in reality, working closely with the Botha regime.942 The basis of the 
policy of ‘constructive engagement’ pursued by the Reagan administration was ensuring 
that white South Africans controlled “the pace and scope of changes.”943 This is 
illustrated by Chester Crocker’s memoirs. Throughout the memoir on U.S. diplomacy in 
southern Africa (specifically his own role), Crocker stressed the Reagan administration’s 
efforts to pressure Pretoria to moderate its regional policy and initiate the dismantling of 
the apartheid system.  Yet this portrayal is contradicted not only by the remarks 
previously quoted but also by an exchange he had in December 1987 with Pieter G. J. 
Koornhof, the South African Ambassador to the U.S.  On 23 December 1987 the U.N. 
Security Council adopted Resolution 606 condemning the South African invasion of 
Angola. Before the vote, Crocker informed Koornhof that Pretoria should not be 
concerned. Even though Washington had to vote for the resolution because South 
Africa’s invasion had been so flagrant, it would ensure there would be no meaningful 
sanctions or measures taken against South Africa. Crocker stated that the U.S. had 
worked to ensure that the resolution remained devoid of any concrete action, telling 
Koornhof: “The resolution did not contain a call for comprehensive sanctions, and did 
                                                
941 Ibid.  
 
942 For a detailed discussion see Davies, Constructive Engagement 
 
943 A. Seidman, The Roots of the Crisis in Southern Africa (New Jersey, 1985), 91 
 
  
 254 
not provide for any assistance to Angola. That was no accident, but a consequence of our 
own efforts to keep the resolution within bounds.”944 Senator Edward Kennedy summed 
up the Reagan administration’s stance on South Africa in an 18 November 1988 letter to 
Bernard Judels, a white South African who had written to him opposing economic 
sanctions. Kennedy replied that:   
[instead of] working with other nations to develop a concerted approach to 
South Africa, the Administration has actually worked to defeat such efforts. 
On 20 February 1987 and 8 March 1988, the United States vetoed resolution 
[sic] in the United Nations Security Council that would have imposed 
economic sanctions against South Africa.945 
 
Washington’s support extended to opposition to forcing Pretoria to accede to U.N. 
Security Resolution 435. For example, on 9 April 1987, the U.S. vetoed a proposed U.N. 
Security Council Resolution that would have imposed comprehensive mandatory 
sanctions against South Africa and declaring its occupation of Namibia a violation of 
international law and a “serious threat to international peace and security.”946 In 1987, 
Edward Perkins, the U.S. ambassador to South Africa clearly communicated this 
unequivocal support when he informed the Botha regime of the Reagan administration’s 
“implacable hostility” to Namibian independence.947 Instead, the U.S. adopted a policy 
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linking Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, 
resisting any efforts to impose sanctions on Pretoria. 
NAMIBIA: THE NEGOTIATIONS 
The U.S. policy of linking Namibian independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola also included refusal to grant any official role for Cuba in the diplomatic 
process. When negotiations began in June 1987 between the U.S. and Angola about 
ending the ongoing conflict, the U.S. rejected the proposal that Cuba be part of the 
negotiations. The Botha regime adamantly stated that it would not participate in 
negotiations until all Cuban troops had completely withdrawn from Angola. It wanted to 
ensure that any process leading to Namibian independence would be under its control.  
The Economist noted that Pretoria would only allow Namibian independence if it “kept 
control both of the mineral wealth and of its geostrategic utility.”948 Meaningful 
negotiations seemed a very distant prospect, with The Economist asserting that due to 
this South African approach “hopes for change in southern Africa by peaceful means 
seem to have gone out the window.”949 In August 1987, Luanda put forward to the U.S. 
and through them to South Africa, a proposal to establish an agreement that would lead 
to the withdrawal of Cuban troops and the implementation of Resolution 435. Pretoria 
rejected Luanda’s overture. In September 1987 the SADF intervened in Angola. 
 While Pretoria refused to participate in any negotiations, Washington’s objection 
to any Cuban role changed towards acquiescence. On 28 January 1988, Washington 
acceded to Havana’s participation, with the Cubans joining the Angolan delegation’s 
discussions with the U.S in Lusaka. What led to this change in Washington’s position? In 
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1986, William Minter envisaged that any shift in Washington’s stance would be 
integrally linked to a transformation of the fortunes of the contending forces in the 
region: “The future course of US policy will depend in large part on the balance of forces 
in the conflicts in southern Africa itself...”950 This proved a prescient observation. 
Concern about the dangers of a regional conflagration provided the impetus for 
Washington to ask Havana to formally join the discussions. Crocker identified the 
military events, particularly the Cuban buildup in southern Angola as the decisive new 
factors. As previously noted, SADF Major General Thirion and Colonel Breytenbach 
both observed that the Reagan administration had become gravely concerned about 
Angolan military developments, jostled into action by the resultant “shock waves”951 and 
rising regional “temperature.”952  
 Given Cuba’s military formidable military deployment, Washington decided that 
Havana now needed to be given a formal role in the talks. As substantial reinforcements 
poured into Angola at the end of 1987, Washington decided that it needed to deescalate 
the situation.  In his memoirs, Crocker stated that the negotiating process was at an 
impasse in 1987 until “the great turning point in the long history of the Namibian and 
Angola conflicts.”953 This great turning point, according to Crocker, was the defeat 
inflicted on FAPLA by the SADF and “the impact of these developments on the Cubans 
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and the Cuban response to them.”954 However, while Washington reversed its previous 
position on Cuban exclusion from the talks, Pretoria still refused to participate.  
 The Botha regime viewed the negotiations as a means by which SWAPO would 
assume power, ending South African control of Namibia, which would render the 
apartheid state vulnerable to external subversion.  Pretoria was determined to exclude 
SWAPO from state power.  A SWAPO government, The Independent opined “would be 
an anathema to the South African military, whose officers are in no mood to hand 
Namibia over to the guerrillas.”955 As outlined in Chapter One, the war in Angola was an 
essential component of Pretoria’s strategy to maintain its occupation of Namibia. Control 
of southern Angola was necessary for Pretoria to ensure that Namibia was a “pliable 
neighbour.”956  
 In March 1988, as the battle for Cuito Cuanavale was still unfolding and the 
Cubans were two weeks into their drive to the Namibian border, The New York Times 
stated that “several analysts in and out of government contend that South Africa has little 
interest in pursuing negotiations that would result in ceding control of Namibia.”957 
Before and during the battle, the SADF command was emphatic that it was “not going to 
let go of Namibia.”958 An unnamed U.S. official was quoted as saying “[t]he internal 
domestic politics make it very difficult for [the South Africans]... [Botha] would be 
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afraid of being accused by far-right wing opponents of selling out Namibia.”959 The 
growing and continued Cuban military presence in Angola was viewed as unacceptable 
and a threat that had to be countered by a demonstration of South African strength. As 
the Cuban armed forces massed on the Namibian border, meeting this threat was viewed 
as a paramount task of the apartheid state.   
 That this was a pervasive concern of Pretoria and of the entire diplomatic corps 
was illustrated by C. A. Basson, vice-consul of the South African Embassy in Japan, who 
in a letter to the editor of the Asahi Evening News (Japan) argued “the continued 
presence of 40,000 Cuban troops and military advisers from the East Bloc countries 
threatens the legitimate security interests of South Africa.”960  Basson’s letter represented 
the preoccupation that now gripped the Botha regime. In a 2 May 1988 statement before 
the South African parliament, President Botha declared that before his government 
would accept Namibian independence “[t]he Cubans must go.”961  
 Nevertheless, despite these protestations, Pretoria joined the London round of 
negotiations on 3-4 May 1988.962 However, as the negotiations progressed, South Africa 
continued to reject Resolution 435 and demand that Cuban troops must leave Angola 
before it would countenance Namibian independence. Despite this intransigence, the 
government faced heavy criticism for even entering the negotiations, which the extreme 
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nationalist sector viewed as an unacceptable concession by Pretoria.  Dr. A. P. 
Treurnicht, the leader of the Conservative Party and the official opposition, 
unambiguously articulated this stance, challenging Foreign Minister Botha on the 
character of the ongoing negotiations: “I have the resolution here. I should like to ask 
whether it is possible that even the government, let alone those who disagree with it, 
could have agreed to each of these items.”963 Treurnicht then accused Botha of 
dissembling: “He cannot look us in the face, because we would tell him that he is not 
telling the whole truth.”964 
 Despite this exchange, Pretoria appeared intractable on Resolution 435 as the 
vehicle for Namibian independence. Foreign Minister Roleof Botha declared that there 
would be “no talks if Cuban troops continued to advance.”965  A 17 May editorial in the 
South African newspaper The Star stated that the South African position remained 
“hardline and unyielding.”966 On 24-25 June 1988, Foreign Minister Botha, during the 
Cairo round, participated for the first time in the negotiations. However, he still insisted 
on the complete withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as the necessary precondition 
before Pretoria would withdraw its forces from Namibia and before any substantive 
agreement could be made on that country’s independence.967  Crocker noted that 
the South African demands represented a “lack of candor and realism at the top of the 
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South African leadership about what it could obtain at the bargaining table.”968 Crocker’s 
criticism reflected Washington’s concerns about whether Cuba intended to invade 
Namibia.  Major western newspapers also singled out South African intractability, noting 
that Namibian independence was unpalatable to many in the Botha regime.  Writing in 
The New York Times, Bernard Trainor noted that the task confronting Neil Van Heerden, 
the head of the South African negotiating team, was “selling it [Namibian independence] 
to P.W. Botha and the security establishment.”969 The Christian Science Monitor noted 
that even as the concept of Namibia’s independence was gradually being accepted there 
continued to be “significant opposition in South Africa’s military and elsewhere in the 
government to pulling out of Namibia.”970 South African commentators, Phillip Van 
Niekerk and Mark Verbaan, agreed with The Christian Science Monitor that Pretoria’s 
negotiators had to “face their biggest hurdle: convincing their bosses to accept these 
principles. The big question now is whether the South Africa government - and 
particularly the militarily-dominated State Security Council - will go along with the 
process.”971  
 Several articles singled out the linkage between Pretoria’s control of Namibia and 
the security of the apartheid state.  One South African general declared: “We would 
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rather fight in Ovamboland than along the Orange River.”972 A Times article argued that 
many in the Botha regime feared the repercussions inside South Africa, arguing “[t]hat 
an agreement to pull-out of Angola and grant independence to Namibia would send a 
signal to radical black groups in South Africa, currently in a demoralized state, that white 
power was once more on the retreat...”973 The Economist  noted the fear of the 
emergence of an unfriendly Namibia,  stating that “[m]any white South Africans hate the 
idea of an independent Namibia, where SWAPO would quite likely win a free 
election.”974   
 However, the Botha regime’s hardline position began to soften. During the 11-13 
July round of talks in New York City, South Africa began to retreat from its position that 
there had to be a total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola before the SADF would 
leave both Angola and Namibia. The 22-28 July issue of The Weekly Mail captured the 
general perception that a sudden and significant change had occurred in Pretoria’s 
position. What had seemed to be an improbable (if not impossible) outcome now 
appeared on the verge of realization: 
If South Africa is indeed committed to the current peace talks with 
Angola and Cuba, President PW Botha must be thinking seriously about 
the possibility of a President Sam Nujoma in Windhoek.  The possibility 
seemed so startling yesterday that pro-independence Namibians were not 
yet popping the champagne corks after the news of an agreed ‘set of 
principles’ for a sub-continental settlement. If Botha has accepted the 
possibility of a President Nujoma, one can begin to think the unthinkable: 
a majority government in an independent Namibia...975 
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The 11-13 July round of talks was followed by the 2-5 August meeting in Geneva, in 
which Pretoria fully accepted Resolution 435. That the Botha regime had radically 
retreated from positions that it had previously deemed to be non-negotiable was 
demonstrated by its efforts to defend the agreement that had been reached. The 25 July 
SSC meeting presaged this radical change in Pretoria’s position. Botha acknowledged 
that the South African occupation of Namibia was no longer sustainable: “South Africa 
can no longer stay involved in SWA [South West Africa] on the current basis” and 
“should be reconsidered.”976 Geldenhuys, at the 8 August 1988 SSC meeting that 
followed the Geneva round, pointed out that in response to “South African concessions, 
Cuba was willing to pull back from the border.”977 The SCC then agreed to finalize the 
Geneva agreement, withdraw its remaining troops from Angola and implement 
Resolution 435.978 The 22 August 1988 SSC meeting decided to accept the finalized 
Geneva Protocol that enshrined Resolution 435 as the framework for Namibian 
independence.979 
 In the 24 August 1988 joint sitting of the South African Parliament, entitled 
“Peace Negotiation on South West Africa,” the Conservative Party (CP) put the Botha 
government on the defensive.  In response, the government adopted the unusual stance of 
both condemning and justifying the acceptance of Resolution 435.  President Botha 
described “as the most farcical opinion ever” the ruling by the International Court at The 
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Hague (which laid the legal basis for Resolution 435) that the South African occupation 
of Namibia was illegal.980  This did not, of course, exempt the government from sharp 
attacks from nationalist circles, led by the CP parliamentary opposition. Dr. Treurnicht 
took the government to task, declaring that given: 
the price in the form of the lives of hundreds of young men and millions 
of rands in South West Africa, the obvious justifiable questions are, 
amongst others, the following: Was it a futile exercise? Of what use has it 
been to us? Have we been humiliated? Could we have done anything to 
check the communist influence and expansion of power?981 
 
Treurnicht then painted the negotiation process as an extension of communist aggression, 
arguing that to “promote expansionism...and achieve the goal of the revolution, Russia 
and Cuba have had to decide on one of two alternatives...A political method or the 
military option...”982 Dr. Ferdinand Hartzenberg, another CP representative, was blunter 
in his censure: 
I am afraid that this peace plan represents peace which stems from 
capitulation because the peace plan loads the scale overwhelmingly in 
favour of the communist to help Swapo win the election...These matters 
have consequences for South Africa…This does not discourage South 
Africa’s enemies. This instils new fire and enthusiasm into the enemies of 
this country. In addition, South Africa is left in a weaker diplomatic 
position than it was in previously. The renewed pressure on South Africa 
is increasing.983 
 
Hartzenberg went even further in his condemnation, describing the agreement as “not a 
peace plan; it is a plan to destroy South Africa.”984 Despite Botha’s excoriation of the 
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International Court and Treurnicht’s biting criticism, Defence Minister Malan 
acknowledged and defended the decision to accept Resolution 435, arguing that that it 
was now a fait acompli: “The possibility of implementing Resolution 435 is a fact.”985 
He argued that the agreement was a favourable one, as it would lead to the removal of 
Cuban troops from the region. Malan endeavoured to satisfy nationalist circles and ally 
their concerns by fulminating against those who accused Pretoria of “giving South West 
Africa away or selling out.”986   
 By 25 August 1988, all South African troops in Angola had been pulled back into 
Namibia, while Cuban troops still remained massed on the Namibian border. The 
negotiating process then shifted to the implementation process, centred on timetables for 
Cuban and South African troop withdrawals. Eventually the negotiating process resulted 
in the New York Accords of 22 December 1988, directly leading to Namibia’s 
independence. The Accords established the framework for the implementation of 
Resolution 435, setting the timetable for Cuban withdrawal from Angola and United 
Nations supervised elections in 1990.  They went into effect on 1 April 1989 and 
culminated on 21 March 1990 with SWAPO’s decisive victory in the elections. Under 
the terms of the agreement, Cuban troops began withdrawing from Angola in April 1989, 
completing the process in July 1990. 
WHY DID SOUTH AFRICA CONCEDE NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE?  
In the end, the Botha regime accepted conditions that previously it had adamantly 
rejected: the withdrawal of the SADF from Angola and Namibia and implementation of 
Resolution 435 before Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola. What accounts for 
this remarkable about-face? Pretoria’s retreat from its previous positions happened in the 
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period after the 24-25 June round of negotiations in Cairo.  It was in this period, on 27 
June, that Cuba staged the successful air-raid on Calueque, demonstrating that the 
balance of military power had shifted significantly against the SADF. Particularly with 
respect to the deployment of air power, the SADF was no longer able to compete with 
the Cuban and Angolan armed forces.  As explored in Chapter Four, the Botha regime 
perceived that it faced a serious, if not insurmountable, threat from the Cuban forces in 
southern Angola.  
 Pretoria understood that the balance of power on the ground in Angola would 
dictate the course of the negotiations. Geldenhuys acknowledged this when he publicly 
stated that in accessing the military situation, “[t]he point is how does it affect the 
negotiations.”987  Jorge Risquet, a leading Cuban negotiator summed up the situation:  
As you know very well, what is decisive in negotiations is the relationship 
of forces on the ground, independent of the brilliance of this or that 
negotiator. And given the arrogance of the South Africans, one thing was 
clear. If they crushed the Angolan forces at Cuito Cuanavale, they would 
have demanded nothing less than Angola’s full surrender at the 
negotiating table. With the defeat of the South Africans at Cuito 
Cuanavale, the situation changed in our favour, so that we were the ones 
negotiating from a strong position…988 
 
The 25 July 1988 SSC discussions, where Botha declared that the South African 
occupation of Namibia was no longer viable, encapsulated the dilemma that faced 
Pretoria. The major preoccupation was the military situation.  While a number of inter-
related factors were presented, considerable time was spent discussing the Cuban forces 
in Angola. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Botha identified the military situation “as the 
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worst that Republic of South Africa has recently faced.”989 He then added that under the 
prevailing circumstances South Africa could no longer carry the financial burden of 
defending Namibia, nor was he willing to risk the considerable loss of life that would 
result if they attempted to challenge the Cubans in Angola. He also acknowledged the 
lack of support inside Namibia for South Africa by noting the refusal of Namibians to 
fight SWAPO. The discussion of the economic cost of occupying Namibia and the lack 
of support for the repression of SWAPO was sandwiched between two analyses of the 
Cuban threat.990 As mentioned in Chapter Four, Botha wanted to avoid a military 
confrontation, which would only be countenanced “if there was no alternative.”991 
 Justified or not, this perception (fear) profoundly shaped the actions of the 
apartheid state. The defeat of the SADF exposed the severe limitations of the South 
African armed forces. The SADF was an integral element of the State of Emergency, 
declared in 1986 and extended in 1987. The SADF was not only deployed outside of 
South Africa’s borders; it was often supplementing the internal security forces, 
especially the SAP, in the policing and suppression of the townships. For example, 
35,000 soldiers were deployed in 96 townships in operations of eviction, school 
occupations and strike-breaking.  The close cooperation between the SADF and the SAP 
“was an important indication of the level of violent conflict and the role of the SADF 
within that conflict.”992 Pretoria deemed the deployment of the SADF in townships as 
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indispensable to national security.  W.N. Breytenbach, Deputy-Minister of Defence, 
defended the presence of the SADF in Black communities as necessary to South African 
development and the prevention of revolution: 
We cannot have development unless we first establish stability, and the 
presence of the Defence Force in Black residential areas, in support of the 
SA [sic] police, is helping to achieve that state of stability. There is a 
revolutionary onslaught in South Africa...The people who object to this 
are objecting to the order the SA [sic] Defence Force is striving to 
maintain.993 
 
However, Pretoria could no longer simultaneously wage war in Angola and police the 
townships, as it no longer had the military capacity to do both. Michael Young, an 
adviser to the South African government, stated that the SADF command asserted it no 
longer had the capacity to carry on military operations simultaneously outside and inside 
the country. Overstretched, the SADF faced a stark choice: it “could either continue the 
war and patrol South Africa’s borders, or police the townships, but not both.”994 This was 
also Havana’s estimation. They concluded that as a direct result of having to meet the 
Cuban military threat, South Africa did not have the forces to simultaneously wage war 
in Angola and Namibia, while containing internal rebellion. Castro argued that any 
diversion of troops from one theatre of action would redound to the significant detriment 
of the other: 
South African government could only maintain its illegal occupation of 
South West Africa if it moved two army divisions from the townships and 
it could not do that without leaving the way open for the ANC to advance.  
It had to make a critical strategic choice, therefore, and it chose to leave 
South West Africa and agree to the formation of Namibia as a newly 
independent state.995 
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Contemporary accounts directly connect the end of South Africa’s intractability in the 
negotiations to the changing military situation in Angola, specifically Cuito Cuanavale 
and its aftermath. Jorge Risquet, one of Cuba’s chief negotiators argued that the situation 
on the Namibian border broke the impasse: “In the past few months there has been an 
accelerated change in the situation, both politically and militarily. The presence of a 
strong group of Cubans in Southern Angola has been decisively instrumental in the 
negotiations.”996 This was not merely the biased and partisan view from one belligerent. 
For example, in its 12 December 1988 report the United States Defence Intelligence 
Agency analyzed the SADF’s military reversal as critical in undermining the Botha 
regime’s opposition to Namibian independence: “South Africa concerned with the 
deployment of Cuban troops on the southwest in early 1988, now proved interested in 
Cuba’s willingness to consider withdrawing its forces in exchange for implementation of 
UN Security Council Resolution 435.”997 The Agency went further by ascribing a 
decisive role to the Cuban military intervention in the process leading the signing of the 
New York Accords. In its view the demonstration of Cuban military might had 
“provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the 1988 accords among 
South Africa, Angola and Cuba.”998 Faced with an increasingly untenable military 
situation, the Botha regime was forced first to the negotiating table and then, second, to 
make concessions that it had previously deemed unacceptable.  
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 Several influential western newspapers evaluations coincided with that of the 
now-declassified 12 December 1988 USDIA report. Numerous contemporary reports 
consistently attributed Pretoria’s pliability in the negotiations to the military 
developments in Angola. On 12 July, The New York Times noted: “South Africa has also 
come under increasing military and political pressure to end the war and grant 
independence to Namibia.”999 In that issue, The New York Times also published a report 
from its South African correspondent, Bernard Trainor, emphasizing South Africa’s 
military insecurity: 
South Africa’s military strategy in Angola appears to have backfired, 
placing the Pretoria government in an uncomfortable bargaining position 
in the latest round of talks on the Angolan conflict. And the South 
Africans are finding their image of invincibility in southern Africa 
challenged by the Cuban forces allied with the Angolan government. 
Some South Africans now fear that the Cubans have the military 
advantage along the border between Angola and South-West Africa, the 
South African administered territory also known as Namibia.1000 
 
Other prominent newspapers highlighted the military situation as crucial in determining 
the tenor and direction of the talks. For example, The Christian Science Monitor 
interpreted the Cuban deployment along the Namibian border as giving “South Africa 
more incentive to negotiate.”1001 The Washington Post noted that the Cuban armed forces 
had driven the SADF “back toward South African-controlled Namibia. Since then, 
[Cuban] government officials have been able to argue that Cuba could negotiate its troop 
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withdrawal from a position of military strength.”1002 This was amplified in another New 
York Times report that stated “[t]he reputation of the South African Army as an 
invincible force has been challenged by the war along the Angolan-Namibian 
border.”1003 The Economist argued that the regime turned to negotiations on Namibian 
independence in order to ameliorate the consequences of the military failure, stating that 
Pretoria’s decision to withdraw from Angola and promise to follow suit in Namibia owed 
“much to the failure of South Africa’s campaign there [Angola] last winter.”   1004 
 As the negotiations crystallized into the agreement leading to the implementation 
of Resolution 435, the centrality of the conflict in Angola to Namibia’s independence 
was repeatedly underscored. The Economist noted that “[o]nly a year ago South Africa 
troops were advancing deep into Angola.”1005 As the date for Namibia’s independence 
approached this position was reaffirmed by several newspaper commentaries. The 
Chicago Tribune published an opinion piece by William Minter, a specialist on southern 
Africa, arguing it was the “military situation above all, that accelerated the pace of 
negotiations” that led to Namibia’s independence.1006  The Financial Times published a 
chronology of events leading up to the negotiations that highlighted Cuito Cuanavale.1007  
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Cuito Cuanavale figured even more prominently in a chronology published by The 
Independent, which directly coupled the military outmaneuvering of South Africa with 
Namibian independence.1008 An editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle was even more 
explicit, declaring: “The defeat at the hands of the Cubans and Angolans forced Botha to 
sign the New York Accord of Dec. 22, 1988, requiring South Africa to pull its troops out 
of Angola and Namibia.”1009  
 Perhaps an editorial cartoon published in the December 1988 issue of The Weekly 
Mail gave the most poignant statement. It depicted South Africa’s Foreign Minister 
Botha being forced at gunpoint to sign the agreement on Namibian independence. In the 
sketch, Fidel Castro holds a pistol to the head of a cringing Botha. As Botha signs the 
agreement, he declares: “30 years of conflict and NOW I see the light at the end of the 
barrel!”1010 The intended interpretation was quite unambiguous and unequivocal: Pretoria 
acquiesced to Namibian independence because of its military defeat by the Cuban armed 
forces.  
 Sharing this assessment from different vantage points were four intimate 
witnesses. SADF Colonel Gerhard Louw, leader of the last assault on Cuito Cuanavale, 
stated that the military events in Angola pushed Pretoria to concede Namibia’s 
independence, noting that while “South Africa was preparing to come to an agreement 
on Namibian independence...all this could not be done until the military adventures in 
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Angola were ended.”1011  In 1988, before the negotiations had culminated in the signing 
of the New York Accords on 22 December, Richard Bloomfield, a U.S. diplomat, wrote: 
“It is ironic that if the U.S.-brokered settlement comes into effect, it will be in large 
measure due to the fighting ability of the very Cuban forces that the United States 
insisted for so long were the chief obstacle to such an agreement...”1012 
 While the pitfalls of a mono-causual argument are obvious, the documentary 
evidence strongly points to the conclusion that the Cuban military coup de main was the 
central factor leading to the New York Accords. The testimony of key participants in and 
observers of the negotiation process leading to Namibian independence assign a central 
role, if not the central role, to the military developments, arguing that the Cuban 
intervention had qualitatively transformed the situation. South Africa’s occupation of 
Namibia and refusal to implement Resolution 435 may have proven to be unsustainable 
in the long term. Nevertheless, Resolution 435’s implementation and the attainment of 
Namibian independence occurred precisely in the 1988-1990 period, as opposed to any 
other period, as a direct result of the military events in Angola. As illustrated in Chapter 
One, this is not a novel assertion. The coonection between the war in Angola and 
Namibian independence has been made numerous times. The contribution of this 
discussion is to adduce new evidence to support the conclusion that the military events in 
Angola were central to the attainment of Namibia’s independence.  
THE ECONOMY: IMPACT OF MILITARISATION 
The militarization of the apartheid regime led to the expansion of the military both in its 
actual size and financial expenditure. Between 1975 and 1989, the SADF more than 
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doubled its number of troops: from 50,000 to 103,000.1013 Also, compulsory national 
service in the armed forces for South African white males was increased to two years 
(from one). There was a parallel increase in the size of the armed forces’ reserves and the 
Citizen Force, a separate institution that supplemented the professional and permanent 
SADF troops. By the late 1980s, the reserves had increased to 140,000, while the Citizen 
Force had grown by 325,000.1014  
 Together the SADF reserves and the Citizen Force could mobilize between 500, 
000 to 600,000 men. Also, during this period non-white recruitment into the SADF 
increased. In the mid-1980s an estimated 24 per cent of the SADF troops were non-
white. The non-white recruitment was deemed necessary by the Ministry of Defence as 
the SADF had to expand in order to meet the demands of “total strategy’ combined with 
the impact on South Africa’s economy of militarization. The 1986 White Paper on 
Defence stated “white males can no longer bear the security burden alone without 
harming the economy.”1015 However, the bulk of the SADF, especially its core fighting 
troops, remained white. 
 Calculating the economic costs of an expanded SADF is difficult because official 
figures that were released by the Botha regime on military spending do not include the 
costs, for example, of land for bases and training, fuel, supplies and “conscription and 
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reserve duty.”1016 Nevertheless, based on the official released figures, South African 
expenditure on the military increased dramatically over the course of its military 
intervention in Angola. The growing financial and material toll of the war is attested to 
by the increased military budgets.  For example, from the period of 1977-78 to 1987-88 
the official military budget tripled to 6.684 billion Rand, which consumed 14.7 per cent 
of the overall budget.1017 Some estimates put the actual real expenditure on the military 
at closer to 9 billion, consuming 25-30 per cent of all government spending.1018  Even 
when adjusted for inflation — i.e., using the prices for one specific year as the basis for 
comparison — the rise in military spending is still dramatic. If prices for 1985 are used 
as the base for comparison and each budget recalculated, from 1975 to 1989, the military 
budget still increased by 64 per cent: from 3.546 billion Rand to 5.791 billion Rand 
(based on 1985 prices). Spending per capita had gone from 38 Rand in 1975 to 268 Rand 
in 1989. Military expenditures now consumed an average of 14 per cent of each annual 
budget, representing an annual average of 3.5 per cent of South Africa’s gross domestic 
product.1019 In 1985, the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain estimated that in 1985 the 
police, army and the security apparatus consumed 40 per cent of the budget.1020 By 1989 
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the military and other security activities accounted for more than one third of 
government expenditures.1021 
 As the war escalated during the SADF’s drive to capture Cuito Cuanavale and 
then counter the Cuban build-up on the Namibian border, so did the budget allocation to 
the military. In 1987-1988, the military budget was 6.7 billion Rand, which was 30 per 
cent more than in 1987-1988, consuming 14.7 per cent of the overall budget as opposed 
to 13.7 per cent respectively.1022  For 1988-1989, the military expenditure rose to 8.2 
billion Rand, a 22.4 per cent increase over 1987-1988 and 15 per cent of the entire South 
African budget.  Moreover, in February 1989 the regime allocated an additional 560 
million Rand to the SADF to address “the changes in the security situation in Namibia 
and Angola.”1023  
 Pretoria heavily invested in the development of a domestic arms industry. The 
Armaments Board and the Armaments Development and Production Corporation were 
merged in 1976 to create the Arms Corporation of South Africa (Armscor). The 1977 
White Paper on Defence had underscored the need for South Africa to establish its own 
arms-producing capabilities: “The RSA must, as far as practicable, be self-sufficient in 
the provision of arms and ensure their continued production.”1024  In 1968 Pretoria had 
expended 32 million Rand on arms production; in 1978 its investment rose more than 30-
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fold to 979 million.1025 Additionally, a secret government grant of 1.2 billion Rand was 
given.1026 Pretoria also expended 700-800 million Rand on its nuclear weapons 
program.1027  
 The impetus for this dramatic increase in investment in armament manufacture 
was the international arms embargo imposed in 1977. Pretoria wanted to break or at least 
mitigate its dependence on external suppliers. Armscor was to be the center of an ever-
growing arms producing sector of the South African economy. Eventually more than 
2,000 private South Africa companies were involved, employing more than 150,000 
people, “as contractors or suppliers of military technology and equipment to SADF.”1028 
Armscor was successful in developing several advanced weapons systems, for example, 
the G-5 and G-6 155mm artillery cannons.   
 The G-5s and G-6s were weapons systems that the SADF heavily depended on, 
and were therefore produced in significant numbers. While the actual size of the 
production runs is not available, a visit to the military base in Walmansdal (near Pretoria) 
on 3 August 2006 was revealing.  At least 20 G-6s were stored at the base. Despite, 
being refurbished with 21st century technology, the original manufacture date of 1987 or 
1988 was imprinted on the turrets.1029 The Sgt. Major in charge described Walmansdal as 
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a relatively small storage facility.1030 Notwithstanding, being a survey of only one 
military base, the visit provided an indication of the high numbers of G-6s that may have 
been manufactured.  
 Armscor was able to attain “a relatively high level of self-sufficiency and could 
meet most of the equipment requirements for the SADF.”1031 In 1963, 70 per cent of the 
military budget was expended on arms acquisition from foreign suppliers; by 1984 less 
than 10 per cent was spent outside of South Africa.1032 The only country that South 
Africa developed an extensive military trading relationship with was Israel. Both 
countries collaborated extensively on a range of weapon systems, including tanks and 
fighter aircraft.1033 Pretoria augmented this collaboration by purchasing substantial 
materiel from Israel.  For example, on 31 March 1975, then-Defence Minister P. W. 
Botha committed, at least in principle, to buy 1,000 tanks from Israel for $810,000 US 
per unit.1034 In the 1980s, Israeli upgrades to South African military aircraft cost $2 
billion US. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the total military trade between 
Israel and South Africa is estimated to have exceeded $10 billion US.1035 
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 The government was often on the defensive as it tried to justify its military 
spending.  In November 1987, Minister of Education Piet Clase defended the South 
African intervention in Angola, while acknowledging the financial toll: “We have an 
expensive policy which we all want and for which we are fighting on the borders and for 
which we are having to endure sanctions.”1036  As the war continued into 1988, the 
government faced increasing criticism over the financial cost. The questioning of the 
war’s increasing cost emanated from supporters of South Africa’s occupation of Namibia 
and the intervention in Angola. The editors of Die Vaderland, the Afrikaner nationalist 
newspaper, wrote that they estimated that the war cost about 5 million Rands per day.1037 
Jacobus Hercules Van de Merve, of the Conservative Party stated, “rumours have it that 
the war is terribly expensive. One of the rumours that reached us was that the war has 
cost in the region of R 2,000 million.”1038 As would be expected, criticism came from 
those opposed to the government’s policies. In arguing for the end of the war in Angola 
and the occupation of Namibia, Pat Thungaval Poovalingam, a Progressive Federal Party 
member of parliament, stated that when the SADF returned to South Africa “this country 
will save R (i.e., rand) 1 million a day that it is spending.”1039  
 The ever-increasing expenditure on the military and security apparatus must be 
viewed in the context of the overall deterioration of the South African economy 
throughout the 1980s. For example, the annual GDP growth from 1980 to 1988 only 
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averaged 1.4 per cent.1040 Barend du Plessis, Minister of Finance, underscored the 
inadequacy of this growth rate, noting that the economy needed to expand at least 5 per 
cent per annum “to start catching up with certain backlogs.”1041 Underlying the sluggish 
growth were a number of other serious economic issues.  South Africa faced increasing 
problems with its balance of payments and falling level of investment.1042 The balance of 
payments crisis was precipitated by a sharp fall in export earnings. From 1985 to 1980, 
the value of exports fell from $26-billion US to $16-billion US, a 38.5 per cent 
decline.1043  From 1985 to1988, capital, outflow amounted to an estimated 25-billion 
Rand ($10-billion US).1044  Also, during 1980 to 1988, inflation averaged 14.6 per cent, 
and the value of the Rand continued to decline on international currency markets, losing 
77 per cent of its purchasing power.1045  
 As pressure mounted from the international antiapartheid movement, 
international sanctions began exact a serious toll. At the 18 May 1988 parliamentary 
session, Malan excoriated those countries who had by imposing sanctions compromised 
South Africa’s security:  “Technology is being withheld from the Republic of South 
Africa…Loans are being withheld…The agricultural produce of the Republic of South 
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Africa is being boycotted.”1046 Several banks, most notably U.S. Chase Manhattan, 
refused to extend further loans and grant extensions on already existing ones, forcing 
Pretoria to suspend debt repayments in 1985-86. Major corporations began withdrawing 
from South Africa, with 127 U.S. companies leaving by 1987.1047 This overall economic 
deterioration was reflected in a declining quality of life for most South Africans. Charles 
Feinstein noted that during the economic crisis “real incomes continued to fall and 
unemployment rose remorselessly.”1048 
 As the economy stagnated and international economic sanctions strengthened, it 
was much more difficult to finance the war in Angola. Cuito Cuanavale and its military 
aftermath illustrated the economic problems facing South Africa. With a stagnant 
economy straining under international sanctions, Pretoria did not have the funds required 
to replace and refurbish its equipment or continue waging the war. Hirsch Goodman, a 
correspondent in Johannesburg with informants in the Botha regime, argued that South 
Africa could “no longer afford the arms it needs to counter Luanda’s Cuban-piloted 
MiG-23s, Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks, and an array of antiaircraft missiles.”1049  
Goodman also that the estimated cost of occupying Namibian and prosecuting the war in 
Angola was US$2-billion annually.1050   
 South Africa’s economic inability to wage war became a frequent subject of 
discussion at SSC meetings. As Cuban troops continued to mass in southern Angola, 
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Botha argued at the 20 June meeting of the SSC that South Africa could not afford to 
maintain a prolonged or massive presence in Angola to challenge Cuban forces.1051 The 
25 July 1988 SSC meeting, with its focus now on Namibia, further illustrated the 
economic strain.  To counter the Cuban military build-up in southern Angola, Pretoria 
had increased SADF mobilization and deployment in Namibia. However, Botha stated 
that the apartheid state could no longer finance the military presence. Botha emphasized 
that over the previous year it cost 1.35 billion Rand to occupy Namibia, with 730 million 
Rand allocated to maintain the SADF in Namibia.1052 Botha deemed this outlay to be too 
expensive.1053  
Major General Thirion confirmed that at the highest levels of the Botha regime 
the inability of the economy to support the war emerged as a serious quandary. Thirion 
stated that economics increasingly constrained the SADF, rendering South African 
intervention in Angola and the occupation of Namibia non-viable in the long-term: “The 
South African government would not have been able to make the books balance 
indefinitely in Angola and Namibia.”1054 On another occasion he opined: “It was about 
the economy - how much more could it [the government] spend on the war and the 
military budget.”1055  One anonymous Afrikaner intellectual commented that the 
apartheid ruling circles “forgot to consult the accountants.”1056  
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 The SADF military reversals in Angola generated unprecedented levels of 
anxiety among South African ruling circles. Coupled with the uncertainty over the 
SADF’s ability to hold on to Namibia in the face of a possible Cuban invasion was 
apprehensiveness about the financial costs and South African deaths that would be 
incurred in countering such an invasion. South Africa could no longer sustain the human 
and material toll. Former SADF captain Andre Zaaiman stated that “the cost was too 
heavy” for the Botha regime to continue the conflict in Angola.1057 The war in Angola, 
especially the 1988 reversals, highlighted the lack of an economic base upon which to 
effectively prosecute the war. The economy could no longer support the war effort. The 
war in Angola had revealed and exacerbated the economic problems and deficiencies 
facing the Botha regime.  
WHITE OPPOSITION TO THE WAR 
As in 1975-76, Pretoria attempted to control the information reaching the South African 
public about the 1987-88 military intervention in Angola. The Official Secrets Act of 
1956, allowing the government to censor and control what was published and circulated 
in South Africa, provided the legal rubric under which new legal regimes of censorship 
were established. For SADF personnel, The Official Secrets Act, buttressed by the 1957 
Military Defence Code, imposed severe restrictions on SADF personnel, prohibiting 
them from giving unauthorized interviews about their personal experiences or views in 
relation to SADF activities or where the SADF had operated.  In short, this was an 
attempt to silence all servicemen except those who were assigned the specific task of 
representing the official government position.  
 Government-imposed censorship specifically sought to limit the reportage on 
South African military activities, especially operations outside of the country. 
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Censorship of the media reflected the effort to extensively manage knowledge of the 
war. As a result, John Deegan (who in 1981 served in the Koevoet, the paramilitary 
force) stated that most South Africans “didn’t know the kind of nonsense we were 
getting up to.”1058  Clive Holt justified Pretoria’s stringent control of information on 
events in Angola, arguing that it prevented a wave of hysteria: “The South African public 
was demanding answers as to why their sons were fighting a war in a foreign country 
and the SADF could not tell them the full extent of the communist threat without risking 
massive public panic.”1059  
 The constraints on newspapers were emblematic.  In August 1987, the Botha 
regime announced a new range of newspaper restrictions. These regulations were aimed 
at preventing or at least diminishing the publication of material that, inter alia, promoted 
“revolution or uprisings, breaking of public order, spreading or stirring up of hatred for 
security forces or the state and acts of civil disobedience.”1060  The result was an uneven 
and spasmodic coverage of the 1987-1988 phase of the war in Angola. As a result, for 
example, The Weekly Mail and The Star intermittently published articles on Cuito 
Cuanavale.  
 During the apartheid era, The Weekly Mail (now the Mail & Guardian) and The 
Star were two of the most widely distributed and influential South African newspapers.  
While, the coverage of the war in Angola was not as regular as in the western 
newspapers, each had various periods where the coverage diminished or disappeared.  
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Nevertheless, despite the restriction, the articles that were published reveal that the two 
publications conveyed significant import to the military confrontation that unfolded in 
southern Angola in 1987-88.  As already apparent in this dissertation, these articles, 
particularly in The Weekly Mail, were often quite detailed in outlining the impact on the 
apartheid regime and politics within South Africa. 
 In June 1988, at the height of the conflict in Angola, the censorship regime was 
strengthened, further restricting coverage.1061 New emergency laws dictated that reports 
on security force actions could no longer be published without the permission of the 
Police Commissioner. As the censorship strictures increased, the number of articles and 
commentaries on the conflict in Angola decreased. The previous year a number of 
critical commentaries on South African involvement in Angola had been published.  
 The Weekly Mail was a particular target of the apartheid state.1062 Pretoria 
targeted The Weekly Mail as it had a much wider circulation, occupying a prominent 
position as a voice within the white community against apartheid and the military 
interventions in neighbouring countries. Several of its issues were published with almost 
completely blacked-out front-pages to dramatize the extent of the restrictions. Also, in 
some cases, entire issues were confiscated by the state.1063 This primarily accounts for 
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the limited coverage of Angola in 1988 as compared to 1987. Nevertheless, The Weekly 
Mail published in 1988, a number of articles on Cuito Cuanavale, discussing the impact 
on the apartheid regime.  One article, for example, reported on “[a] serious setback 
suffered by South Africa’s soldiers in Angola…”1064 Also, as illustrated in Chapter Four, 
The Star also published articles in 1988, reporting and sometimes editorializing on the 
situation in Angola. Coverage of the conflict in Angola in 1987-1988 in South African 
print media was not as extensive as in the U.S. or the U.K. This was, of course, a direct 
result of the draconian censorship regime. However, it can be argued that the South 
African coverage has more significance than that of the U.S or U.K. because it was in 
South Africa that any impact or consequences of Cuito Cuanavale would be directly 
manifested. In a society that either saw itself under siege or in a struggle for liberation, 
the stance of the print media provides a window on how the political imprimatur of 
events was evaluated and measured, a gauge of the ideas and opinions circulating among 
the South African public.  
 While The Weekly Mail and The Star were the only papers with sizable 
circulations among white South Africans that were surveyed, it seems evident that the 
war (especially, the military engagement at Cuito Cuanavale) was viewed as a significant 
event. The articles that appeared in all three publications indicate that the military 
situation was considered to be a serious factor in the ongoing peace negotiations that led 
to Namibian independence. Moreover, the military buildup in southern Angola was 
perceived or at least portrayed as a direct threat to South Africa itself (i.e., the apartheid 
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regime).  Many articles portrayed the Angolan developments as serious military reversal 
for the SADF. The Weekly Mail went further. As previously noted on several occasions, 
it assigned to Cuito Cuanavale an influence that went beyond the military into the 
political sphere and beyond Angola and Namibia into South Africa. The sense of the 
apartheid state’s military vulnerability expressed in The Weekly Mail and The Star 
reflected the growing sense of misgiving among white South Africans about unfolding 
events in Angola as the conflict reached its climax.  Various comments by members of 
South Africans parliament conveyed this unease. In November 1987, Progressive Federal 
Party parliamentarian Roger Hulley expressed his trepidation about ongoing SADF 
operations in Angola and the possible unfavourable outcome. He pondered if “there is 
not going to come a time where South Africa might find itself in deeper water than we 
can handle.”1065 This sentiment was, also, expressed from the ranks of the staunchest 
defenders of the apartheid status quo. Conservative Party member Jacobus H. Van de 
Merve echoed this disquietude, alluding to comparisons of the current military situation 
in Angola and South Africa’s occupation of Namibia to the U.S. entanglement in 
Vietnam 
 What does, however, cause anxiety is the feeling one gets that South 
Africa’s involvement in South West Africa is being portrayed to such an 
extent that it is being referred to as a Vietnamese situation. The war has 
indeed been in progress for many years and the important question which 
I think we all ask ourselves is: How much longer?1066 
 
 
During his remarks in the 17 May 1988 parliamentary debate on the defence budget, 
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Hulley also deployed the Vietnam analogy, going further than his comments of 
November 1987: 
Chairman, in last year’s debate on the Defence Vote I expressed my great 
concern about the deteriorating balance of military power in Angola, and 
said that we were slowly but surely being drawn into our own type of 
Vietnam. I have not revised that point of view. Our position has worsened 
significantly...The picture is deteriorating, I would say, to a frightening 
degree.1067    
 
That these two similar comments came from members of parties that were often at 
ideological loggerheads (one liberal, the other fiercely conservative) indicated the 
growing level of unease among white South Africans.  The most telling questioning and 
doubts about the war came from an unexpected quarter: the Dutch Reformed Church. 
This opposition was surprising as the Dutch Reformed Church had been an ideological 
and philosophical pillar of the apartheid state and its policies. In an 8 June 1988 
statement in its newspaper, Die Kerkbode, the Church expressed in theological terms 
substantial misgivings about the war in Angola: 
 We would like to pose the question of whether it would not be morally 
and ethically correct for South Africa to withdraw its troops from 
Angola completely. After all it is not South African property. It appears 
that this more or less permanent presence of South African troops in 
this foreign country can be questioned on Christian ethical grounds. 
The prospect is that South Africa could be drawn into a battle on 
foreign soil with increasing loss of life.1068 
 
Die Kerkbode also quoted the Afrikaner nationalist Die Vaderland editorial, which went 
beyond musings about doubts and efficacy to call unambiguously for an end to the war:  
This is a war that neither side can win and hopes should be fixed on the 
efforts of peace. We might yet have to pay more dearly for such a 
peace, but it is not nearly so expensive as a war without end...it would 
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be to nobody’s comfort to have to stand at the graves of so many young 
men and women and confess that it was all in vain.1069  
 
Die Kerkbode’s and Die Vaderland’s editorials constituted not only a new source of 
dissent to Pretoria’s policies but a source from within a traditional bulwark of the Botha 
regime and the campaign to repel threats from outside South Africa’s borders. In 
response to this criticism from a previously steadfast ally, Defence Minister Malan felt 
compelled to reply, declaring that Die Kerbode had been misguided as it “overlooked 
military strategic interests” of South Africa.1070 An editorial in The Star captured the 
significance of this emerging dissidence: 
 Doubts about the wisdom of the Government’s military strategy are 
not new. But what is especially is significant about Die Kerkbode’s 
querying the ethics of the Angola operations is that the doubts are now 
being expressed from within the National Party’s own constituency. 
Hardly a revolt, but this subterranean questioning from the guardians 
of the Afrikaner conscience cannot be easily ignored by 
government.1071 
 
While the statement by Die Kerkbode constituted a departure for a major institution of 
Afrikaner nationalist circles, support for the war had been waning among white South 
Africans, as a whole.  Two polls indicated this decline. A 1982 poll found that 81.1 per 
cent of white South Africans supported SADF operations against “terrorist/guerrilla 
bases in neighbouring countries.”1072 By 1988, this support had dropped to 63 per 
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cent.1073 This reflected an emerging general feeling of insecurity and vulnerability among 
the white South African population as the number of white casualties continued to rise.  
This sense of unease was palpable enough for The Times to invoke the Vietnam 
metaphor: “White deaths in Angola are already causing ripples of concern in South 
Africa, and there are fears that the country is becoming enmeshed in its own mini-
Vietnam.”1074 Peter Vale also employed the now ubiquitous Vietnam analogy, noting that 
“the spectre of white communities in each town or hamlet burying their war dead - in 
American terms, the “Vietnam syndrome” - will rest uneasily with whites.”1075 
 Quite often white South African misgivings were manifested in frustration over 
the lack of knowledge and uncertainty about the conflict in Angola and the activities of 
the SADF.  Tanya Hannath, whose 19-year old brother (Anthony Steward) died in 
combat, expressed this frustration: “Nobody knows what is going on up there. We’d like 
to know what happened.”1076 Ann-Marie Wallace, who spoke with other mothers whose 
sons were also serving in the SADF, said the reluctance and refusal of the SADF to 
provide information was a common experience. In the case of her own son, William, the 
SADF never told her where he was fighting, who he was fighting or how he was killed: 
“All we were told were that our children were on the border. I was only told he died over 
the border.”1077  
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 This frustration was matched by a growing disaffection of the younger 
generation: those who were being called up to do the actual fighting and dying. This 
decline was particularly dramatic. A 1982, poll indicated that 86.5 per cent of those aged 
16-25 believed that a military victory in Angola was possible.1078 In 1988, among those 
aged 16-24, only 50 per cent now believed South Africa would win.1079 The Resister, the 
banned but clandestinely circulated journal of the Committee for South Africa War 
Resistance, captured this skepticism (perhaps pessimism) about South Africa’s prospects 
of victory, outlining the disadvantageous shift in military fortunes against the SADF that 
had occurred in Angola. Its February/March 1988 issue published an article on the battle 
for Cuito Cuanavale, which focused on South Africa’s invasion of Angola and its failure 
to take the strategic town. Characterizing the invasion as illegal, it argued that”[h]aving 
met with determined resistance and suffered extensive casualties in fighting between 
September and December last year, the SADF ground forces have been reluctant to take 
on FAPLA.”1080  It also noted that “several South African jets had been shot down over 
Angola recently and Cuito Cuanavale has good anti-aircraft defences.”1081  
 Increasing numbers of young white men began refusing service in the armed 
forces, swelling the ranks of the organized white opposition to the war, especially the 
burgeoning End Conscription Campaign (ECC), formed in 1983.  Fuelling the anti-
conscription drive and the opposition to the war was the mounting death toll.  As former 
soldier, Mark Patrick stated: “One of the things that was starting to happen was that 
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white people were starting to die up there and with that there became a lot of pressure for 
South African troops to withdraw.”1082 The editorial in February/March 1988 issue of the 
Resister elucidated this trepidation among white youth, stating “the SADF’s recent 
invasion has shown that the SADF can no longer guarantee conscripts and their families 
that it has military superiority in the region. The relatively high number of troops killed 
and maimed has made many conscripts realise that military service can lead to death or 
permanent injury. “1083  
 This led many youth to question the right of the South African government to 
conscript and order them to fight in Angola or Namibia. This questioning, according to 
Uys du Buisson, only increased as more recruits were conscripted. Buisson, who was 
from Durban, noted that among the youth there was a growing sense of alienation from 
the older generation. Summing up this estrangement he noted: “It was my generation that 
fought the war. I lost friends. Others lost eyes, limbs. P.W. Botha and his generation did 
not fight a war but they made the decision to send the next generation to war without 
consulting them.”1084 A very serious discussion took place among du Buisson’s friends 
about the legitimacy of fighting in Angola.  He stated that most rejected the regime’s 
rationale and justification for the war and did not want to serve in the SADF: “In Durban 
very few people in my community supported the war. No one wanted to go to the 
border.”1085 Anti-war songs reflected this general opposition. A popular song written 
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when B.J. Vorster was prime minister captured sentiments of skepticism, cynicism and 
fatalism:   
    Come on all you big strong men  
    Uncle John needs your help again.  
    Got himself in a bit of a jam  
    Way down yonder in Ovamboland 
 
  So put down your books 
  And pick up your gun. 
  We’re off to have a whole lot of fun. 
 
        And it’s one two three  
            What are we fighting for?  
    Don’t ask me I don’t give a damn  
    Next stop Ovamboland.  
    There ain’t no use to wonder why  
    Whoopie…we’re all bound to die. 
 
  Then it’s five, six, seven 
  Open the pearly gates 
  It aint’ no use to wonder why 
  Whoopie we all going to die.1086 
 
  
Growing disillusion with and opposition to the war in 1988 was captured in the Boetman 
is die bliksem - Boetman is angry - debate initiated by former SABC journalist Chris 
Louw, who wrote a May 5, 2000 letter (later turned into a play) to Willem de Klerk, 
brother of F.W. de Klerk and an influential figure in the National Party.  Boetman refers 
to an Afrikaans diminutive used to address a younger person.1087 Louw castigated the 
former Botha government, accusing the regime of “political cowardice and deceit by 
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sending the younger generation to war to defend apartheid.”1088 Despite being written 
more than ten years after the conflict, Louw’s missive resonated with many SADF 
veterans and opponents of conscription, who saw it as encapsulating their thoughts in the 
1980s.   Du Buisson stated that the Boetman is die bliksem debate articulated many of the 
feelings and discussions of his family and friends had at the time of the war in 
Angola.1089 
 The number of those rejecting National Service also rose dramatically.  For 
example, while in 1984 1,596 conscripts failed to report, in the first half of 1986, alone, 
7,589 refused to serve, representing more than 10 per cent of all conscripts.1090 In 
response, to the growing refusal to serve in the SADF, Pretoria started to make examples 
of those who defied SADF authority.  In March 1988, Dr. Ivan Toms, a leading member 
of the ECC, was given a prison sentence of 21 months after refusing to report for duty 
when called up by the SADF.1091 The regime also denounced the ECC. Daniel Petrus de 
Klerk Van de Gend, member of the ruling National Party, condemned the ECC as “one 
of the extra-parliamentary instruments which our enemies were using, not only to 
discredit the Defence Force and its loyal troops, but also as a way of undermining the 
existing order and system in this country.”1092  
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Denunciations and retaliatory acts did not stop the ECC.   In early August 1988, 
143 men publicly refused to participate in the war, declaring that they would “never 
serve in the South African Defence Force.”1093 In response, the Botha regime imposed 
severe restrictions on the ECC, culminating in its banning on 24 August 1988.1094 This 
action did not discourage expressions of support for the ECC. Jan Van Eck, Progressive 
Liberal Party, defended the ECC and the growing opposition to service in the SADF:  
 I want to tell the hon [sic] State President and his government that 
they have no right to sacrifice the lives of young men on the altar of 
reckless adventures in Southern Africa. It is no wonder that the 
resistance to compulsory military service is still increasing. However, 
the ban of the ECC will not end this resistance.1095 
 
Mothers also became active participants in the struggle against conscription. Some 
women tried to opt their sons out of SADF service or at least ensure their sons served in 
an arm of the SADF that was not involved in the Angolan conflict. For example, Petri Le 
Roux was opposed to her son fighting in the war and managed to have him transferred to 
the navy: “My son was called up for service in 1987-1988. He was called up but I did not 
want him to go fight. I was able to get him transferred to the navy.”1096 Increasingly 
white South African mothers began publicly speaking out against the emotional and 
psychological harm of conscription and the war on their families. For instance, the 
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October/November 1988 issue of Die Suid Afrikaan carried the article “Sameswering van 
stilte” (Conspiracy of Silence) discussing the psychological effects of the war on 
conscripts and their families.1097   
 This dissent assumed its most organized and public expression on 7 February 
1989 at a series of press conferences in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban involving 
an estimated 900 mothers who protested the SADF call-up of reservists for military 
service. The call-up prompted the coalescence of mothers across South Africa into 
collective action as they “pledged to support their sons who felt they were unable to 
serve in the SADF for various reasons.”1098 In their official statement, the mothers 
declared their opposition to the SADF policy:  
 We are deeply aware of the traumatic effect conscription has on our 
sons, many of whom serve against their will while questioning what 
the SADF is doing in the townships and beyond our borders. We also 
suffer with our sons who choose not to serve. The choices for them are 
painful: To leave the country; to be sent to prison for six years; to live 
in the uncertain world of evasion, or as religious pacifists to face a 
punitive six years of government service.1099 
 
The growing public disenchantment with South Africa’s role in the conflict in Angola 
and Namibia was indicated by other Cape Times items. In the same issue and on the 
same page covering the mothers’ press conferences, William Streenkamp, a reservist in 
the Citizen Force, penned an opinion piece, asking “was it really necessary to fight the 
war.”1100 Rolfe Eberhard’s letter of 10 February 1989 to the editor, expressed on behalf 
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of the Conscientious Objectors Support Group solidarity for the mothers’ protest.1101 
However, the expression of discontent was not confined to newspapers, public protest or 
acts of civil disobedience.  One of the most poignant illustrations of growing disaffection 
with and opposition to the war was The Stick, a film made in 1987, but not released until 
1989 due to the SADF’s efforts to censor it by demanding 48 cuts to the final version. It 
opened the Montreal World Film Festival, had a special screening at the 1989 Moscow 
International Film Festival and was nominated for Best Picture at the AA Life/M-Net 
Vita Awards.1102   
 The Stick explores the psychological deterioration of SADF soldiers as they 
succumb to bossie-koors or “bush fever,” eventually ending-up in the condition of being 
bosbefok or “bush fucked.”  Made in the tradition of other antiwar films (such as The 
Deer Hunter, Platoon and Full Metal Jacket), The Stick uses the SADF incursions and 
operations in Angola and Namibia as it subject matter, following a small infantry group 
(a “stick” in SADF jargon) as they carry out a mission in the “war on the border.” The 
film begins with a narrator voice over. The narrator, a member of the “stick’, conveys a 
sense of ambivalence, disgruntlement and opposition to SADF operations outside of 
South Africa’s borders: “It wasn’t enough to give speeches about patriotism, hand out 
medals and talk about the invasion of communism. We were too busy trying to stay alive 
to worry about our mothers and sisters being raped by homesick Cubans. Unhappy but 
going over the border again. We shouldn’t be here.”   
 The opening narration is followed by a dramatic scene in which returning body 
bags are unloaded of an entire SADF platoon, who had been killed by guerillas.  The 
accompanying voice over, declares: “It was demoralizing.”  To avenge and extract 
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retribution for the platoon’s destruction, a “stick” is sent out on a search and destroy 
mission. The orders are simple: find and kill the guerillas, taking no prisoners. Coming 
upon a small village, they massacre everyone. After the massacre, the soldiers experience 
a series of apparent hallucinatory visions, in which the leader of the village, in spirit 
form, slakes his vengeance.  Eventually, after a journey, filled with more violence and 
bloodshed, only one member of “the stick” survives and returns to South Africa.  At the 
end, the sole survivor, now revealed to be the film’s narrator, is discharged from 
hospital. As the film closes, he makes the unambiguous statement underscoring not only 
the futility of South Africa’s intervention but also biting cynicism toward the Botha 
regime: “The war was a lost cause. But they knew that already.” 
 While, the Botha regime through censorship could limit knowledge of SADF 
activities outside of South Africa and the extent of casualties, it could not completely 
hide the mounting death toll.  The regime could not prevent families who had lost sons 
and brothers speaking with other families who had suffered similar losses, nor the 
intermittent publication of news articles. This contributed to a growing sense of 
dissension among whites. The regime was not inured to this dissension, with its inner 
circle cognizant that the war was increasingly unpopular. This was illustrated by the 25 
July 1988 SSC’s discussion of the 1988 military call-up, with Geldenhuys remarking that 
“there were concerns about the reaction of parents to the call-up.”1103   
Botha factored this growing unpopularity, particularly the growing alarm over 
casualties, into his political considerations. This was reflected in the reluctance to risk a 
military escalation in Angola that would have entailed much higher losses. At the 25 July 
1988 SSC meeting, he stated that he was “not willing to have a high number of South 
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African soldiers killed in Angola”, predicting a death toll of 1, 000 to 1,500.1104 While, 
this may have reflected a genuine concern for the well-being of SADF troops, it also 
seems plausible that what was paramount was the political concern about the possible 
reaction by white South Africans to such a high death toll.  
Given the relatively small size of the white population, the growing SADF 
casualties reverberated throughout the society. Ronnie Kasrils has argued that “in small 
societies based on minority rule, a hundred deaths, even a dozen is a big blow.”1105  As 
news of SADF setbacks and the death toll filtered out spasmodically in the various 
newspapers and by word of mouth, misgivings about the war over the border developed 
into opposition. This impact from below on white South Africans was registered in how 
ordinary people began to voice and then organize their concerns, whether in cultural 
forms (e.g., song and film) or eventually finding its most public expression in a more 
expansive anti-conscription campaign that culminated in the mothers protest actions.  
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS & BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS 
During 1986-1987, the anti-apartheid movement inside South Africa appeared to have 
reached an impasse. On 20 July 1985, Botha declared a limited State of Emergency, 
encompassing 36 magisterial districts, which included the Eastern Cape and Pretoria, and 
later expanded to the Western Cape.  On 12 June 1986, the State of Emergency was 
extended to the entire country. It was renewed and extended for two more years on 11 
June 1987.  The South African government arrested or detained more than 40,000 
persons and instituted a policy in which “violence was now lethal and systematic in its 
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assault on the black majority.”1106 In the first half of 1987 alone, an estimated 30,000 
persons were detained.1107  The United Democratic Front (UDF) and Congress of South 
African Unions (COSATU) were “the most heavily affected by Emergency 
detentions.”1108 In July 1987, there were mass arrests of UDF activists and almost all of 
COSATU’s leadership “went into hiding.”1109  
 This wave of repression stymied the internal anti-apartheid struggle. State 
repression had “restored a degree of government control and eliminated the possibility 
that Pretoria might be forced to negotiate a wholesale transfer of power.”1110 Patrick 
Lawrence, a reporter for The Weekly Mail, concluded that the imposition of the State of 
Emergency “clearly fulfilled its immediate objective of containing the intensifying 
rebellion in the black townships,” and “proved that the army and the police can 
effectively counter revolutionary violence, as they did in 1976-77 and as they have done 
on the Namibian border.”1111 The township of Crossroads provided a poignant example.  
A squatter community in the Cape Peninsula, it had been a major reservoir of opposition 
to apartheid. However, in the wake of the State of Emergency, the character of 
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Crossroads was dramatically transformed. As Josette Cole noted, the government 
deliberately altered the community’s demography: 
  By the end of 1986, the political terrain had been radically restructured 
by a state determined to maintain control over the majority of its black 
population…As a result of a political tragedy thousands of its former 
residents were dispersed throughout the black townships in small 
squatter settlements…Old Crossroads formerly a crucible of 
resistance, became the apple in the eye of the South African state and 
a monument to its co-optive strategies.1112   
By all apperances the anti-apartheid struggle throughout southern Africa had 
“declined, contrary to the rather optimistic expectations of many observers.”1113 Anti-
Apartheid forces had “been ground down.”1114  Colonel Patrick Ricketts, an ANC 
activist, stated that the “official organizational leadership of the anti-apartheid forces 
were paralysed” in the face of the nation-wide demonstration of the brute force and 
power of the apartheid state.1115 The TRC noted that: “In the year after the imposition of 
the national state of emergency, the full force of a strategy of counter-revolutionary 
warfare unfolded domestically.”1116 By the end of 1987, the TRC observed, the Botha 
regime had “succeeded in reasserting control and effectively defused whatever potential 
existed for an insurrectionary situation.”1117 The workers movement reflected this 
dramatic demonstration of state power. While, strikes had reached record levels in 1987, 
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with 1,148 actions, in 1988 the number declined substantially.1118 While Pretoria could 
not permanently suppress, the internal anti-apartheid movement, it had temporarily 
subdued it.  
 Despite the scale of state repression and censorship the Black community was not 
oblivious to the ongoing developments in Angola. A survey of the most influential Black 
newspaper, The Sowetan, indicates there was considerable interest. Established in 1981, 
The Sowetan circulated primarily in Soweto.1119 Despite the facing same restrictions 
imposed on other South African newspapers, The Sowetan intermittently published 
several articles on Cuito Cuanavale and the military situation in Angola. In 1987, The 
Sowetan ran a series of articles in 1987 on the battle’s potential impact, with a front-page 
report on SADF deaths.1120 South African casualties and government censorship were 
central themes, with accusations of government manipulation of casualty figures.1121  
 The Sowetan argued that the Angolan conflict had reached a critical phase, 
declaring that the South African armed forces had had lost air supremacy and sustained 
casualties “on a scale that has shocked the white South African community.”1122 To 
address the situation, The Sowetan called for an international conference to address the 
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following issues: 1. Independence for Namibia within the framework of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 435; 2. Withdrawal of the South African army from 
the territory of Angola; 3. The rapid phasing-out of the Cuban combat forces from 
Angola once agreement had been reached over Namibia’s independence, and the 
complete withdrawal of South African troops from Angola; and, 4. Ending South 
Africa’s military support for Renamo and UNITA.1123 This general prescription was 
similar to the overall accord between Angola, Cuba and South Africa that was signed in 
New York on December 22, 1988. 
 On 28 January The Sowetan reported that a major battle was being waged for 
Cuito Cuanavale.1124  However, due to the new government censorship regulations, this 
was the last article to appear for more than two months on the situation in Angola. 
Finally an article published on 2 May characterized the battle for Cuito Cuanavale as 
“the biggest-ever battle fought in southern Africa,” declaring that the “South Africans 
afraid of a Swapo victory in Namibia if they withdraw have occupied part of southern 
Angola to block Swapo guerillas and support Unita.”1125 However, it noted, since 
October 1987 “South Africans have lost tanks, irreplaceable aircraft and most 
importantly, 50 white troops.”1126 The article further noted that Pretoria wanted to avoid 
becoming bogged down in a full-fledged conventional war in southern Africa. This was 
followed by a discussion of the London round of negotiations between Angola, Cuba and 
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South Africa on Namibian independence.1127  
 After a month’s hiatus, portions of Geldenhuys’s declaration of the seriousness of 
the Angolan military situation were published.1128 This was followed by a series of 
articles on the negotiations, with the Cairo round of talks a central focus.1129 In the same 
issue an article on the damage that the conflict had wrought on Angola was published.1130 
As the Cairo round progressed, it was given front-page coverage and presented as a 
framework for peace. Nevertheless, South Africa’s wariness of the military situation was 
noted, noting Malan’s statement that the SADF was ready for any development in 
Angola.1131 The Calueque clash elicited a bold frontpage banner headline, covering 
conflicting South African and Angolan casualty accounts.  The same issue underscored 
the sharpening military confrontation, with Malan threatening that the SADF was ready 
to be thrown at Cuban forces if hostilities expanded.1132 The next issue (the last 
discussing in detail the military situation) quoted extensively from a Jorge Risquet 
interview.1133 
 While The Sowetan attempted to maintain a measured tone in its coverage, it does 
indicate that, at the very least, the editors deemed their audience interested in events in 
Angola. However, black and other non-white South Africans were more than just reading 
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about events in Angola. They were actively discussing and publicizing what had 
occurred. Alleison Lazarus, an ANC and UDF activist in Natal province stated that those 
in the anti-apartheid movement “were excited about Cuito Cuanavale. It was seen as a 
turning point, a definite blow against the regime.”1134  For example, copies of the Cuban 
documentary Respuesta a la escalada de SudAfrica (Response to the South African 
Escalation), with English-language dubbing, were smuggled into the country. In her 
province, Lazarus said “[a] video copy of a Cuban film about the battle of Cuito 
Cuanavale was clandestinely circulated in Natal by unions and anti-apartheid 
organizations.”1135 The Weekly Mail alluded to this circulation when it devoted two pages 
to an extensive discussion of the documentary, covering Castro’s speech to the May 
1988 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, where he argued that Cuito Cuanavale was 
decisive for altering the balance of forces in southern Africa because “a powerful South 
African force, the superior race, were smashed on a small piece of territory defended by 
blacks and mulatos from the Angola and the Caribbean.”1136   
Lazarus participated in secret viewings, after which discussions about the 
significance of the battle for South Africa would occur. She emphasized the emotional 
and morale response the film evoked: “For us watching the video, it was clear to us it 
was a victory. A victory for ourselves.  A generator of change. We came away knowing 
what international solidarity was. Its impact was on a psychological level.”1137 Willie 
Madisha, president of the Congress of South African Trade Unions from 1998 to 2009 
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and a UDF activist during the 1980s, also, ascribed a very important psychological role 
to Cuito Cuanavale. In the wake of the 1986-87 repression, Madisha argued, the South 
African military setbacks refurbished the confidence of the anti-apartheid forces: 
Black South Africans were aware of the defeat of the South African 
armed    forces…In the streets people quoted Fidel’s words about the 
history of Africa having to be spoken of as before and after Cuito 
Cuanavale. It said to the people that the South African armed forces and 
instruments of repression were not unbeatable. The people’s militancy 
grew after Cuito Cuanavale as they were given greater confidence 
because the SADF had been beaten.1138  
 
As discussed in Chapter One, participants in the 1976 upsurge pointed to the SADF 
defeat in Angola as an important factor in propelling the movement forward. Madisha 
asserted the same for the SADF defeat in 1988, stating that it “led to the intensification 
of the popular struggle inside South Africa.”1139 The psychological dimension was a 
critical component in fortifying the confidence of the antiapartheid forces. Nevertheless, 
while testimonies provide a window on the psychologic dimension, it is difficult to 
gauge the actual concrete impact on the antiapartheid struggle.  
 The psychological dimension was reflected in labour movement publications. For 
example, The Cosatu News and NUM News led their international sections with articles 
that ascribed a key role to Cuito Cuanavale in laying the foundations for the New York 
Accords. The the Congress of South African Trade Unions’ Cosatu News affirmed the 
role of “the defeat of South African forces at Cuito Cuanavale, in forcing the Botha 
government to agree to independance [sic] for Namibia...”1140 The NUM News, 
published by, the largest single union in South Africa, also, stated that South Africa’s 
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withdrawal from Angola and Namibia was the result of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.1141  
Strike activity also increased.  In the first six months of 1989, “strikes were 200 per cent 
higher than in the same period in 1988.”1142 Whether this increased strike activity was 
substantively connected to the events in Angola, a similar pattern, as discussed in 
Chapter One, had occurred in 1972-76. Perhaps, this psychological impact, or, at least, 
its value as an emotive boost was best captured by the recounting of a sermon delivered 
by Frank Chikane, the Secretary General of the South African Council of Churches, had 
condemned the South African invasion of Angola as a “blatant act aimed at ensuring the 
protection of apartheid.”1143 Chikane outlined the history of European colonialism and 
neocolonialism in Africa, in general, and the history of racist rule in South Africa, in 
particular, resoundingly exclaiming: “And then there was Cuito Cuanavale!”1144 His 
Cuito Cuanvale exclamation was met with raucous applause.1145 
 The ANC and SACP mirrored this dramatic response with n effusive, if not, 
ecstatic, series of articles according the Cuito Cuanavale a special place.  Ronnie Kasrils 
stated that what had occurred in Angola had an “electrifying impact on the ANC and 
SACP.”1146 Cuito Cuanavale was presented as a decisive encounter and an 
unprecedented defeat of the apartheid regime.  The various organs (Sechaba, Umsebenzi, 
                                                
1141 Cubans celebrate 30 years, NUM News, March 1989, 16 
 
1142 SAIRR (South African Institute of Race Relations), Race Relations Survey 1988/89 
(Johannesburg, 1989), XL 
 
1143 “SADF invasion slammed”, The Sowetan, 20 November 1987 
 
1144 Interview with Kevin Danaher and Medea Benjamin, San Francisco, 24 April 2005 
 
1145 Ibid. 
 
1146 Interview with Ronnie Kasrils. See also Interview with Charles Setsubi Pretoria, 24 
July 2006 
 
  
 307 
Mayibuye, and The African Communist) devoted considerable space and commentary to 
Cuito Cuanavale and its repercussions for Pretoria. Other anti-apartheid organizations 
also described Cuito Cuanavale as a crucial event in the anti-apartheid struggle.  
 The ANC’s Sechaba and the SACP’s Umsebenzi gave the most comprehensive 
and consistent coverage. As the two most respected, influential and broadly based anti-
apartheid organizations, the positions articulated in both organs would have reflected the 
contemporary understanding and perceptions of Cuito Cuanavale within the leadership of 
major anti-apartheid organizations. The articles coupled a matter-of-fact reporting to 
almost unrestrained euphoria for what was acknowledged as a serious setback for the 
SADF.  Descriptions such as, “turning point”, “watershed” and “humiliation” were 
unambiguously and frequently deployed.  
 In December 1987, Sechaba published an article on Namibia’s struggle for 
independence. Focusing on the unfolding military situation, it stated that the SADF had 
“lost air superiority over Angola and on the ground the Angolan forces FAPLA can 
inflict heavy casualties on the racists.”1147 It further added “that the crisis facing the 
apartheid regime is as acute in Namibia as it is anywhere in the region.”1148  The 
February 1988 issue led with a seven-page article, “Pretoria’s War In Angola.” After 
arguing that South Africa intervened to prevent UNITA’s destruction, it noted that 
Pretoria had “announced a growing number of SADF deaths in Angola, revealing that 
the battle is by no means over...”1149 The article attacked the government’s attempt to 
cover-up its intervention, noting that among whites inside the “growing anxiety and 
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anger...over high SADF casualties sustained in battles with FAPLA,” with Pretoria’s 
obfuscations aimed at concealing “the shift in the balance of forces in the region.”1150 A 
report from the British newspaper The Sunday Telegraph discussing the deployment of 
MiG-23s was quoted as evidence of South Africa’s loss of air supremacy.1151 
 Mayibuye, at the time an underground ANC publication, reproduced battlefield 
photographs, including one of a captured South African troop carrier. The last page 
mentioned Cuito Cuanavale for the first time in any of the publications surveyed, 
praising Angola for “setting an example of heroic resistance and challenging the military 
might of the apartheid regime.”1152 As the negotiations on the Angolan war and 
Namibian independence progressed, Cuito Cuanavale was seen as a decisive event for 
the entire region. The National Executive Committee of the ANC declared that the 
“agreement reached thus far is a victory for the peoples of Angola and the region of 
Southern Africa.”1153 The September 1988 Sechaba devoted its editorial to Cuito 
Cuanavale, declaring: 
What the Cubans and Angolans did at Cuito Cuanavale was of 
historic significance for the future of our struggle. When the 
history of our anti-colonial struggle is written Cuito Cuanavale 
will be regarded as a milestone.1154  
 
 
Phambili, a discussion journal published in Johannesburg carried an extensive article on 
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the negotiations for Namibian independence.1155 It also printed extracts from three of 
Fidel Castro’s speeches on Angola.1156 The article on the negotiations concluded that 
Pretoria’s “dramatic reversal” on Namibia was “the result of a special combination of 
factors which have fundamentally shifted the balance of forces in the region...”1157 First 
among these factors was the “defeat of SA forces at Cuito Cuanavale,” which “was a 
dramatic demonstration of the shift in the military balance of forces...”1158 This defeat 
together with the loss of air-supremacy and the approach of Angolan/Cuban forces to the 
Namibian border, further underlined South Africa’s military vulnerability. The military 
débâcle exacerbated South Africa’s economic problems.1159 Consequently, Pretoria could 
“no longer act as it pleases. Reality dictates otherwise...South Africa can no longer 
unilaterally impose its will on the region by force or by any other means.”1160 The article 
concluded by elucidating the impact on South Africa’s internal situation. Phambili 
argued: 
progress for the peoples of Angola and Namibia strengthens the 
struggles of South Africa’s majority for liberation, and weakens 
the forces of apartheid and imperialism...If a global political 
settlement is reached involving independence for Namibia under 
435 and an end to foreign aggression against Angola, it will have 
major implications for the situation in South Africa…it will 
demonstrate that the regime is not invincible.... such a settlement 
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will focus enormous pressure on the regime to negotiate with its 
own people.1161 
 
The November 1988 issue of Sechaba focused on Cuito Cuanavale and its consequences. 
Its front-cover consisted of a photograph of President Castro, the back-cover of Angolan 
troops. Extensive excerpts of Castro’s July 26, 1988 speech were reproduced, where he 
dealt in detail with the battle.1162 Sechaba also printed two maps to illustrate military 
developments from November 15, 1987 to April 30, 1988.1163  The texts of the July 1988 
New York and August 1988 Geneva agreements on troop withdrawal from Angola and 
Namibia’s independence were published in their entirety.1164 One article ascribed 
momentous significance to the Angolan events: 
The failure of the racist forces to capture Cuito Cuanavale became one of 
those watersheds by which history is demarcated...the Botha regime 
moved from confident assurance to uncertainly and defensiveness, 
especially when it lost its command of the skies.1165 
 
Umsebenzi published “Cuito Cuanavale: Turing Point In Southern Africa,” 
enthusiastically describing Cuito Cuanavale as a decisive and unprecedented débâcle for 
Pretoria. Under the article’s title appeared a quote from President Castro: “From now on 
the history of Africa will have to be written before and after Cuito Cuanavale.”1166 
Umsebenzi declared: 
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Has the South African Defence Force met its Waterloo in 
Southern Angola? The SADF has certainly been humiliated. 
The myth of the SADF’s invincibility has been exposed and 
glaring weaknesses made visible…Whatever the outcome of 
the Namibian talks, the very fact of Pretoria’s defeat will 
inspire our people and the Namibian people to greater 
efforts.1167 
 
Inqaba Ya Basebenzi, the journal of the Marxist Workers’ Tendency of the ANC, a rival 
and competing faction to the SACP, also saw Cuito Cuanavale as a key development: 
“During the past year the military balance has shifted in the war in southern 
Angola…SA/UNITA forces failed to capture the strategic town of Cuito Cuanavale. 
Instead, they got a bloody nose…”1168 The article then extrapolated the economic 
consequences for the regime.1169 An article in Mayibuye’ first issue of 1989 contended 
that developments in Angola and Namibia would resonate inside South Africa: “What is 
happening in Angola and Namibia is certainly going to have an impact on the morale and 
confidence of the South African people.”1170 Among the many listed predicaments 
confronting the regime (internal resistance, the economy, corruption, and legal actions) 
Cuito Cuanavale was mentioned first. 
 Because the New York Accords called for the removal of ANC bases in Angola, 
members of MK saw the agreement as “a bitter pill indeed.”1171 The dream of MK 
fighters living in ANC camps inside Angola was to take armed struggle into South 
Africa. Tsepo Sechaba (the pseudonym for a member of the ANC underground) noted 
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that for these fighters, the requirement that the ANC relinquish their bases “was a heavy 
blow. They were now further away from South Africa than they had been ten years.”1172 
However, the ANC leadership viewed the Accords as a major blow against the apartheid 
state and, therefore, an advance for the anti-apartheid forces.  The January 1989 Sechaba 
editorial “History And Time Not On Their Side” characterized 1988 as a watershed year: 
The year 1988 has come and gone. It started on a discordant note 
for the apartheid system. After they were disgraced by the 
Angola and Cuban forces at Cuito Cuanavale, they belatedly 
called for a ceasefire and then negotiations - they agreed to quit 
Angola and to grant Namibia its independence. It is true they 
tried - and are still trying - to salvage what they can still from 
their sinking ship. History and time are not on their side.1173 
 
In the same Sechaba issue, the ANC Heroes’ Day statement, also, stressed Cuito’s 
Cuanavale’s overarching significance: 
FAPLA, the heroic Cuban internationalists fighting forces and 
the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), have 
transformed Pretoria’s aggressive adventure of Angola into a 
quagmire of defeat at the battle of Cuito Cuanavale.1174 
 
The SACP’s theoretical journal, The African Communist, highlighted the singularity of 
Cuito Cuanavale by titling its first issue of 1989: “Botha’s Army in Crisis.” In its 
extensive editorial, it noted that the 22 December 1988 New York Accord represented “a 
significant advance for the cause of peace, freedom and democracy in all of Southern 
Africa.”1175  It further argue that “[a]t the very least, it is a sign of South African 
abandonment, following its defeat at Cuito Cuanavale and the intensification of internal 
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and external resistance to the apartheid regime, of its programme of open military 
expansionism in the region.”1176  Another article assessed the state of the South African 
armed forces, emphasizing the impact of its loss of the aura of invincibility: 
 For an army which regards itself, in typical white racist 
fashion, as superior to anything on the continent, and which 
has built around it a myth of invincibility, defeat in Angola 
was a damaging blow...The SADF tried to put a brave face on 
its retreat from Angola…But it would be hard to imagine a 
more decisive reversal.1177 
   
Mayibuye noted that the New York Accord was “hailed as a significant move in the right 
direction by all progressive mankind.”1178 It argued “South Africa’s hold onto Namibia is 
on its last lap. Its dreams to continually destabilise and finally conquer Angola have been 
buried forever.”1179 Namibian independence was Cuito Cuanavale ws “a result of the 
military defeat suffered by the racist army in Cuito Cuanavale…”1180 
The liberation movement’s literature demonstrates that leading-sectors viewed 
Cuito Cuanavale and the subsequent events in southern Angola as a decisive blow to the 
apartheid regime. The exuberance was a direct function of the political and historical 
meaning with which the anti-apartheid organizations imbued Cuito Cuanavale It 
reflected their overall view that regional hegemony was central to the capacity of 
apartheid to sustain itself. Cuito Cuanavale, thus, represented the objective defeat of this 
hegemonic project. Also reflected in these aerticles was the stance that the struggle 
outside South Africa was linked to the struggle inside South Africa.  Consequently, Cuito 
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Cuanavale and its aftermath were considered a direct inspiration and impetus for the 
internal anti-apartheid movement. Cuito Cuanavale represented more than a military or 
strategic turning point, but what appears to be an affirming collective psychological 
catharsis.   
CONCLUSION 
A grim atmosphere seemed to prevail throughout southern Africa in 1986 and 1987, 
particularly in the frontline states, those who bore the brunt of Pretoria’s war of 
destabilization.  Susan Hurlich, active with both SWAPO and MPLA, noted “the 
perception among people was that they faced a very heavy task.”1181 For many anti-
apartheid activists in southern Africa, Pretoria’s “strategy of total mobilization for 
counter-revolution was successfully knocking out the Frontline states.”1182 There had 
been a series of severe setbacks, such as: unfettered aggression in Mozambique, 
unrelenting and seemingly unstoppable SADF attacks throughout the region and 
intensified repression inside South Africa, nearly crippling many of the anti-apartheid 
organizations.1183 As noted in Chapter One, Pretoria waged in unfettered and extensive 
aggression in the region. However, this bleak scene was transformed by the SADF 
military defeat in 1987-1988, “ushering in a period of hope and optimism in Angola and 
other neigbouring countries.”1184  Charles Setsubi, ANC military attaché in its Lusaka 
office, stated as the events unfolded in Angola, he and his international colleagues 
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“waited with bated breath. The atmosphere was electric.”1185 The reversals in Angola 
stymied Pretoria’s campaign to secure southern Africa as its exclusive sphere of 
influence. Pretoria could no longer wage war on two fronts: on its borders and within its 
borders.   Conceived as the means by which to secure the apartheid state, its prosecution 
had resulted in an unprecedented level of insecurity, both within and without.  
 The project had unraveled in Angola, the lynchpin of the Pretoria’s regional 
stratagem. Its military was overstretched, and no longer had the capacity to effectively 
and successfully project its power regionally. Setsubi noted that after “its defeats in 
Angola the Boers did not enter one frontline state.”1186 Gen. Thirion observed that the 
military reversals in Angola persuaded Pretoria that a SADF panacea did not exist: 
“Cuito Cuanavale was proof that there would not and could not be a military solution to 
the war. If there was one Cuito Cuanavale and another Cuito Cuanavale, Angola would 
become a South African Vietnam.”1187  The New York Accords were the direct result of 
the military events in southern Angola, catalyzed by Havana’s actions.  
 Disillisionment with and active opposition to the war in Angola by whites 
continued to increase. This was paralled by heightened sense of confidence and certainty 
by Black South Africans that the apartheid regime not only could be beaten but had 
actually, been defeated in Angola. Namibia’s independence was viewed as a full-blown 
defeat for Pretoria that would have “incalculable consequences ... both in the confidence 
it would ignite in the black community and in the setback for the morale of many 
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whites.”1188 Peter Vale argued that Angolan and Namibian developments could have a 
significant influence inside South Africa, declaring the “setback at Cuito Cuanavale set 
in train a process, which was unthinkable 12 months ago.”1189  The process leading to 
Namibian independence represented “the first time” that Pretoria “has surrendered 
territory by negotiating...”1190 Vale noted that as result, especially given the international 
situation, “a negotiated end to apartheid itself, may be closer than we dare think.”1191  
Perhaps, Jorge Risquet presented the most expansive evaluation: 
Advances in South Africa have been closely linked with the victory 
of independence in Mozambique, the victory of independence in 
Angola, the defeat of the racist South African troops in Angola in 
1976, the triumph of Zimbabwe. Each of these historic events has 
had a great impact on the people of South Africa...Soon all the 
countries bordering South Africa will be independent. It is apartheid 
that will be surrounded.1192  
 
What had happened in Angola and Namibia could not be sealed off from South Africa.  
A threshold had been passed. Pretoria felt the repercussions in the state and public 
arenas. Chapter Six examines the impact of the events in Angola and Namibian 
independence on the internal dynamics of the Botha regime.  
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CHAPTER SIX: AFTERMATH: IMPACT ON THE BOTHA REGIME 
Cuito Cuanavale and the military engagements in southern Angola, as illustrated in 
Chapter Five, had repercussions for Angola and Namibia. Cuito Cuanavale’ direct and 
immediate bearing on these two countries seems clear. There is compelling evidence that 
the regime’s stance on Namibian independence was changed by the military situation in 
Angola.  However, as illustrated in Chapter Five, Cuito Cuanavale’s implications 
extended beyond Angola and Namibia into South Africa itself, affecting certain sections 
of the polity. White South Africans were increasingly disillusioned by the war, while 
Black South Africans, especially those involved in the organized antiapartheid struggle, 
were galvanized by the SADF defeat.  
 As illustrated in Chapter One several scholars have concluded that the military 
events in Angola were a significant factor in accelerating the end of apartheid.  The 
defeat on the battlefield represented a definitive defeat in the military sphere.  But what 
was its relation and influence on the ebb and flow of politics? What were the 
ramifications for the internal dynamics of the Botha regime and the apartheid state? In 
1987 the military’s hold on the state, as personified and concretized in the SSC, seemed 
unassailable. Yet in 1990 Botha and the military were no longer at the center of power, 
the ANC and the SACP had been unbanned, and Nelson Mandela was released 
unconditionally. While the military events in Angola were immediately antecedent to the 
dissolution of apartheid, how substantive was the connection? Where does the war in 
Angola, particularly Cuito Cuanavale, fit in the apartheid narrative? These are probably 
the most difficult questions to answer given the paucity of documentary material, the 
recentness of apartheid’s end and the enduring controversy over Cuito Cuanavale.  This 
chapter will examine these questions, while drawing some general conclusions about the 
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war in Angola (especially Cuito Cuanavale) and its import for South Africa’s historical 
trajectory. 
INTRANSIGENCE OF THE BOTHA REGIME 
Throughout the 1980s, particularly before 1988, the Botha regime demonstrated resolute 
resistance to domestic and international calls for substantive change. At certain instances, 
the regime was prepared to use various political stratagems, as opposed to outright 
repression, to stifle opposition. The May 1983 constitutional reforms epitomized this 
approach. The reforms amounted to only cosmetic attenuation of the existing 
arrangements and did not alter the underlying power relations.  The new constitution, 
John Iliffe pointed out, represented “a new strategy for entrenching white 
supremacy.”1193 The nationwide township rebellions that broke out in 1984, followed by 
the ANC’s 1985 New Year’s call to render South Africa ungovernable, signaled the 
rejection and the failure of the regime’s strategy.  In response, Pretoria refused to accede 
to the demands for change. Botha’s defiant policy speech of 6 May 1985 (popularly 
referred to as the Rubicon Speech) and the imposition of the 1986 State of Emergency 
and the attendant widespread repression of 1986-1988 demonstrated the regime’s 
opposition to any transition to Black majority rule. The report by the Commonwealth 
Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa, which visited South Africa in June 1986, 
captured the situation, declaring that the South African government was “not prepared to 
negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of genuine democratic 
structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the 
foreseeable future.”1194  The report further concluded that Pretoria “believes that it can 
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contain the situation indefinitely by use of force.”1195 In his foreword, Shridath Ramphal 
(then Commonwealth Secretary-General) concurred, stating that Pretoria was far from 
having the “acceptance” or “readiness” to bring the apartheid regime to an end.1196   
 This “unreadiness” was immediately demonstrated on the day the Eminent 
Persons Group left South Africa by a series of SADF raids on Gabarone, Harare, and 
Lusaka. Botha’s treatment of Geoffrey Howe, British Foreign Secretary, further 
illustrated this “unreadiness.”  Howe visited South Africa in July 1986, in order, as he 
put it, “to nudge the wheel of history towards peace and reconciliation in South 
Africa.”1197  Botha responded by rebuffing Howe, declaring: “We have seen clearly what 
happened in Angola, as well as in Vietnam, Nicaragua, Kampuchea, Afghanistan and 
Iran. We will consequently not allow our heritage of more than 300 years to be placed 
needlessly on the altar of chaos and decay.”1198  He further demonstrated his disdain, 
when on the heels of Howe’s visit the SADF launched additional attacks against Zambia 
and Botswana.  
 The resounding victory of the National Party (NP) in the 6 May 1987 elections, 
winning 52.3 per cent of the vote and 133 of 178 seats, further emboldened Botha’s 
rejection of meaningful reform. With the Conservative Party emerging as the new 
official opposition with 26.6 per cent of the vote and 23 seats, the South African 
parliament was firmly in the hands of Afrikaner nationalists.  Botha had received the 
mandate from the white South African electorate to resist efforts to dismantle the 
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apartheid system. He remained intransigent, continuing to reject the possibility of 
negotiations with the ANC.  
 By the end of 1987 the Botha regime appeared so unyielding and the wave of 
repression unleashed by the 1986 State of Emergency (as argued in Chapter Five) so 
comprehensive, that the situation seemed bleak. The apartheid state had withstood the 
township rebellions and vigorously rebuffed international diplomatic measures.  Several 
African leaders became resigned to accepting “the previously unthinkable possibility that 
‘the inevitable end of apartheid’ was much further off than they publicly predicted.”1199 
Negotiations with the ANC seemed to be a remote prospect. For example, at the 
December 1987 ANC Arusha conference Julius Nyerere, Tanzanian president, stated 
“negotiations [with South Africa] are not possible yet.”1200 
 Mirroring this assessment, the dominant view among many southern African 
specialists and scholars at that time was that the end of apartheid was not going to occur 
in the immediate short-term.  For example, a number of papers from a 1987 workshop on 
the future of the apartheid system argued that the apartheid system and demonstrated 
considerable resilience and staying power, which did not augur well for its demise in the 
foreseeable future. While outlining the structural conditions – economic, social and 
political – that made apartheid ultimately unviable, Brewer asserted that this did not 
mean “that in the short term South Africa will become more unstable…stalemates can 
persevere for a long time.”1201 Rich held that the South African “state has the capacity to 
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survive for a long time.”1202  Among leading U.S. think tanks, the established view was 
that the liberation movement was too weak to threaten the apartheid regime. For Butts 
and Thomas, the overweening power of South Africa was indisputable: “South Africa 
dominates the states of the region…South Africa is the regional power of Southern 
Africa.”1203 Gann and Duignan from Stanford University’s Hoover Institute asserted that 
any discussion of apartheid’s defeat was “military fantasy” and “political fable,” at it was 
evident that “[w]hite control will last indefinitely.”1204  In short, it seemed that 
apartheid’s end was a distant prospect. 
REGIME FISSURES 
As discussed in Chapter One, facing national liberation struggles in Angola, 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe and rising internal resistance, a faction within the elite 
(devoted to a military solution both within and without South Africa) gained control of 
the government and was able to prevail at the state’s helm. Nevertheless, while Botha 
and the military high command, through the SSC, held firmly onto the reins of state 
power; various factions existed within the South Africa elite. The extent of the divisions 
varied over the lifetime of apartheid.  With Botha’s assumption of power, the factional 
contestations initially revolved around the optimum strategy and tactics to secure and 
preserve the apartheid regime.  Central was the debate on the means to defeat and 
neutralize the internal and regional anti-apartheid forces.  
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 Initially, the most powerful sections of the capitalist class accepted that South 
African faced an unrelenting external onslaught, necessitating Pretoria’s total strategy 
response. In 1979 at a conference convened by more than 200 South African corporate 
leaders, Botha laid out the regime’s “proposals for a total strategy to protect private 
enterprise and civilized standards in South Africa against the Marxist threat...”1205  Botha 
outlined a series of concessions that the government would extend to the corporate 
community.  In response many business leaders opted to support “the apartheid 
government, arguing that it was a safer bet than the forces of chaos and communism 
allegedly ranged on the side of the black opposition.”1206 A consensus had been forged 
within the capitalist class.  
 Nevertheless, with rising black resistance and the economy declining under the 
weight of its structural problems and international sanctions, a faction emerged in the 
South African elite (especially, within the business sector) that shifted its position from 
one from based on the best ways and methods to preserve the status quo to one based on 
a debate on the efficacy of maintaining apartheid, even the imperative to dismantle the 
institutions of white supremacy.  Consequently, in the 1980s there were several contacts 
and talks between South African business interests and other ‘dissidents’ with the ANC.  
In January 1985, David Willers, the London director of the South African Foundation 
met two ANC officials in London. The South African Foundation was an association of 
various South African corporations established to transform the image of South Africa, 
in general, and South Africa businesses in particular. Willers informed the ANC that 
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South African businesses wanted substantive change in the country and supported the 
legalization of the ANC.1207 In June 1986 in New York at a conference hosted by the 
Ford Foundation, Thabo Mbeki, then Director of the ANC’s Department of Information 
and Publicity, met and held discussions with Pieter de Lange, president of Rand 
Afrikaans University and the Afrikaner Broederbond. In another June 1986 meeting, this 
time in London, ANC President Oliver Tambo held discussions with Chris Ball, chief 
executive officer of First National Bank in South Africa. In 1987, Ball called for the 
unbanning of the ANC.1208    
 The most conspicuous meeting was held from 9-12 July 1987 in Dakar, Senegal 
between 17 ANC representatives and a group of 61 prominent white South Africans 
(including university professors, farmers, and members of parliament). This meeting 
resulted in the Dakar Declaration, outlining the participants’ unanimous rejection of 
apartheid and the necessity for negotiations between Pretoria and the ANC and 
expressing “a unity of purpose arising from a shared commitment towards the removal of 
the apartheid system and the building of a united, democratic and non-racial South 
Africa.”1209  The Declaration singled out the Botha regime as the major impediment to 
change, noting “that the attitude of those in power is the principal obstacle to progress in 
this regard.”1210 One of the principal objectives aim was to sound out the ANC on its 
economic program and policies. For example, one of the four principle topics discussed 
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at the 9-12 June 1987 Dakar meeting was “the economy of a liberated South Africa.”1211 
The aim was to ensure that the transition would not be revolutionary (read: socialist), 
therefore confining any change within capitalist parameters.  
 On 13 August 1987, in a speech before the South African Parliament, Botha 
condemned the Dakar meeting. He deemed the delegates “useful idiots” of the ANC, 
which planned to use the delegation as tools “to further the aims of the first phase of the 
revolution.”1212 In November 1987, Botha emphasized that Pretoria would never 
negotiate the dissolution of apartheid with the ANC. He insisted that there be no 
unconditional dialogue with the ANC, demanding that it renounce the armed struggle 
against the apartheid state. Botha also declared that the ongoing contacts between South 
African organizations and the ANC would be monitored and measures instituted, 
including passport controls, in order “to prevent South Africans from becoming victims 
of this process.”1213  
 These growing contacts reflected the growing recognition among the South 
African elite that apartheid was not viable and black majority rule inevitable. 
Preoccupied about efforts to undermine policies designed to preserve apartheid, Botha 
was determined to prevent or, at least, neutralize any such contacts and initiatives. Riaan 
Labuschagne, an operative of the South African National Intelligence Service, observed 
that Botha’s fear was that the reformers would end up with “a government with a black 
majority and the disappearance of Afrikaner culture and community life.”1214  
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 Botha was not against contacts with the ANC or the imprisoned Mandela, if those 
contacts were part of a program aimed at disarticulating the liberation movement. In the 
middle of the 1980s there were secret contacts between the Botha government and 
Mandela. There were also secret contacts by Pretoria - through the National Security 
Service- with Thabo Mbeki.  However, the government’s purpose was not to discuss an 
end to apartheid and the transition to black majority. It refused to engage in substantive 
talks. For example, in 1986, Mandela made several overtures to Pretoria, proposing the 
commencement of serious discussions but they were to no avail. However, during the 
course of several meetings there were no “tangible results.”1215 Mandela expressed his 
frustration, declaring to one of the committee’s representatives: “You don’t have the 
power…I want to talk to the man with the power, and that is P.W. Botha. I want to talk 
to him.”1216   Botha’s goal was to create and manipulate divisions (or the appearance of 
divisions) within the anti-apartheid struggle as a means by which to quell internal 
resistance. SADF General Groenewald neatly encapsulated this orientation: “You can 
thus only negotiate from a position of power. If we negotiate with the ANC with the 
purpose of eliminating it, that is acceptable. If we negotiate with the purpose of 
accommodating it, that is unacceptable.”1217 
CUITO CUANAVALE & THE SHIFTING OF THE REGIME 
Botha, nonetheless, was unable to prevent divisions among the South African elite 
becoming manifest in divisions within the NP, eventually spreading to his government. 
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A faction emerged advocating a policy of reform.  This ‘reform’ wing was led by 
Foreign Minister “Pik” Botha, the Foreign Minister, and Constitutional Development 
Minister Chris Heunis. “Pik” Botha had come to believe that the existing policies were 
not viable. According to NIS agent Riaan Labuschagne, P.W. Botha, having become 
aware of his Foreign Minister’s shift, ordered surveillance of “Pik” Botha.1218 In 1988, 
Eschel Rhoodie estimated that there were three camps in the NP: 27 MPs in favour of 
ending apartheid; 40 who were undecided (i.e., waiting to see how events would unfold 
so they could then choose the ‘winning side’) and 55 who were loyal to Botha.1219  
 What role did the events in Angola play in exacerbating and sharpening these 
divisions and tensions within the National Party and the Botha government? As 
illustrated in Chapters Four and Five, the SADF military reversals in 1988 fundamentally 
altered the regional military balance of power. This new ratio of forces had implications 
not only for Namibia but also for the regime within South Africa.  Forced to withdraw 
from Angola, concede Namibia independence and accept its loss of military dominance, 
Pretoria could no longer pursue a military course of action. The retreat from Angola and 
the ceding of Namibia’s independence represented the definitive defeat of the “total 
strategy,” the policy that had been the apartheid state’s guiding framework for more than 
ten years. Moreover, participating in the talks leading to Namibian independence not 
only represented a new course, a radical departure, but also established a precedent for 
negotiation. The Economist reflected on the implications, observing that the negotiation 
process leading to Namibian independence would have an influence on white South 
                                                
1218 Labuschagne, In South Africa’s Secret Service, 180 
 
1219 E. Rhoodie, P.W. Botha: The Last Betrayal (Melville, 1989), 213 
 
  
 327 
Africans, who having seen “communists and blacks talking politely to their leaders” 
might “even start to wonder whether a black government would be so awful after all.”1220 
 Members of the NP and the government had to grapple not only with the defeat 
of total strategy but also with the realization that the loss of life and allocation of 
considerable resources had been in vain. Public support for a military solution to South 
Africa’s problems rested on a diminishing base of white public support. An Umsebenzi 
argued that this diminishing support and confidence in the SADF were reflected in white 
South Africa “by divisions, fear and uncertainty about the future.”1221  The SADF’s 
claim to be the sole arbiters of what was best for South Africa had been under increasing 
challenge within the general white population, this challenge now reached into the ruling 
party’s circles. Having been the driving force behind “total strategy,” the SADF was 
inseparable from its failure and, thus, could not avoid a significant blow to its status. The 
defeat not only represented both a failure of total strategy (the framework, as outlined in 
Chapter One that guided the Botha regime) but also the discrediting of the SADF high 
command. The failure of total strategy equated to the failure of the SADF. The 
credibility of the SADF had suffered a severe blow. Shaun Johnson, a TWM reporter 
argued that due to the débâcles in Angola at Cuito Cuanavale and Caluque, the military 
“lost a great deal of prestige…”1222 
 It seems logical to assume that the members of parliament would have been 
influenced by the blow to the SADF’s stature and reputation, and the burgeoning white 
opposition to the war. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, parliamentarians raised 
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the subject of the anti-conscription campaign, the cost of the war and the mounting 
casualties. Opposition to the war was not only growing quantitatively but also 
qualitatively, spurring sectors of the population (such as women) that had would 
normally have remained outside the political fray (remaining quiescent and acquiescent) 
into organized action and public protest. This would have been a clear indication that the 
social consensus that the regime had forged on the necessity to intervene across the 
region and within South Africa’s townships was increasingly under challenge and could 
eventually dissolve altogether.   
Events in Angola represented more than a serious military setback. It would have 
become clear to politicians that the military program was no longer sustainable, in 
economic or political terms. As discussed in Chapter Five, not only had the SADF been 
outmaneuvered strategically but also Pretoria could no longer bear the financial costs of 
waging the war combined with growing public opposition fueled by mounting casualties. 
The military defeat in Angola contributed to the growing and unprecedented dissent 
within the ruling NP ranks.  Previously, the civilian representatives of the regime were 
united behind and accepted their subordination to the military. 
 With the SADF defeat, civilian politicians from within and without the governing 
party increasingly challenged the SADF’s privileged and paramount position in the state.  
Peter Wellman from The Weekly Mail, argued that due to the military setbacks, the 
contradictions between the military and civilian spheres sharpened, putting them “at 
loggerheads with each other as a result.”1223 One diplomat opined: “The generals blame 
the politicians for not agreeing for a strong enough force” necessary for victory in 
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Angola.1224 An Umsebenzi editorial concurred, stating that Cuito Cuanavale had 
exacerbated tensions within the apartheid regime, noting: “Politically they are more 
divided than ever before.”1225 Some NP parliamentarians began publicly expressing their 
opposition to government policy.  In November 1988, Albert Nothnagel and Lon Botha 
declared at a parliamentary session that the government would have to negotiate with the 
ANC.1226 In January 1989, Beheld, the NP’s newspaper, posed a query that had so 
recently been unthinkable and diametrically opposed by Botha and the SADF high 
command: “Are talks between the government and an African National Congress 
delegation under the leadership of a free Nelson Mandela unthinkable?”1227 The Weekly 
Mail reported that this view was becoming prevalent throughout the NP.1228 
 Unprecedented dissent within the ruling party was also matched by a change in 
Pretoria’s approach to the ANC, raising the level and tenor of its contacts with Mandela. 
On 9 December 1988, Mandela was moved into a house on the grounds of the Victor 
Versten prison in which a series of meetings with government officials was held. An 
unusual incident in January 1989 poignantly captured the fracturing of the regime’s 
approach. Piet Koornhof, South African Ambassador to the U.S., telephoned the ANC 
office in New York, ostensibly to aid in the funeral arrangements of an ANC official. 
John Makatin. Tebego Mafole, the head of the New York office, underlined the 
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uniqueness of the act:  
It’s not every day that a representative of the South African 
government offers condolences to ANC members. Over the 
years we have had South African government forces 
crossing borders and attacking ANC personnel in 
neighbouring states. ANC members have been attacked, 
assassinated and threatened by forces related to the 
government. So we were surprised they should offer 
condolences to us.1229 
 
However, the most important change was not in the behaviour of the regime towards the 
ANC, but in the eclipse of Botha and the eventual dislodging of the military from the 
centre of decision-making. The SADF’s loss of prestige created the conditions for the 
repudiation of government policy from several previous supporters of the Botha regime, 
even from within the inner circle. This was evident in the varying political fortunes of 
Magnus Malan and F. W. De Klerk.  In this context, the contestation for state power 
became sharp. Botha’s splitting of the State and NP presidencies could not contain these 
contradictions, but merely allowed them to break into the open. On 2 February 1989, due 
to a stroke he suffered the month before (on 8 January) Botha resigned as president of 
the NP, while retaining the State Presidency. Botha expected his Finance Minister, 
Barend Du Plessis to succeed him as NP President.  However, the party chose De Klerk. 
This rebuff of Botha reflected the shift of influence and control of the NP from Botha to 
De Klerk. For example, Chris Heunis, the leader of the NP in the Cape, and Stoffel 
Botha, the Natal leader, publicly endorsed De Klerk.1230  
 The contest for the State Presidency most clearly demonstrated this shift.  A vote 
of the NP MPs would determine Botha’s successor.  Malan was seen as the main 
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contender and, therefore, to be De Klerk’s most serious rival for the post.1231 As Botha’s 
choice, Malan appeared to be his logical successor. Unlike Malan, De Klerk was 
considered a marginal figure in the regime, an outsider in the circles of the SSC. Botha 
distrusted De Klerk, suspecting he was not sufficiently committed to the policies that had 
been pursued over the past decade or to the preservation of apartheid. Botha’s suspicions 
(fears) were confirmed by a speech De Klerk gave in February 1989 speech, declaring 
“white domination, in so far as it still exists must go,” adding the caveat that white 
interests would be protected.1232  In his autobiography, De Klerk stated that he was often 
excluded from the most important discussions.1233 Whether these were self-serving 
statements, designed to distance him from the crimes of the regime, what is clear is that 
he was not part of Botha’s inner circle.  However, in March 1989, De Klerk once again 
emerged victorious over Botha’s chosen candidate.   
 De Klerk’s victory represented more than the definitive defeat of Malan (and by 
extension Botha); it also represented a categorical defeat for the SADF.  Botha (a former 
defense minister) and Malan (then current Defense Minister, a SADF General and former 
SADF Chief of Staff) were seen as firmly ensconced in the military. As General Georg 
Meiring, Chief of Staff of the South African Army, noted Malan’s “powerbase was the 
military.”1234 Botha’s protégé, Malan, was seen as the SADF candidate. This was to 
prove to be his undoing. The SADF’s defeat had precipitated a leadership contest whose 
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result Botha could not predetermine or control. Having invested so much time and 
resources in the drive to dominate the region and hold on to Namibia, the conclusive 
defeat of this military doctrine could not but be the political ruin of those who been its 
chief proponents and architects.  
 Several contemporary newspaper accounts attributed Malan’s eclipse by De 
Klerk to the SADF’s military setbacks. The Economist argued that Angolan military 
events had profound repercussions in Pretoria, particularly on Magnus Malan. According 
to The Economist, Malan appeared to be in control of Pretoria’s external affairs, “running 
his own foreign policy – until his Angolan offensive ran out of puff.”1235 With the failure 
of the military, Malan was “poisoned by diplomacy,” finding himself increasingly 
marginalized from decision-making.1236 The Weekly Mail’s Shaun Johnson asserted that 
Malan’s position was an immediate ‘casualty’ of the SADF’s defeat, with his presidential 
ambitions dealt a mortal blow.1237  O’Meara directly attributed Malan’s political decline 
to the military setbacks in Angola.1238  
 ANC analysts argued that the regime’s leadership crisis represented a significant 
qualitative change. They viewed the divisions within the South African elite as 
propitious and favourable to the liberation movement, directly linking them to the SADF 
military setbacks in Angola.  Neil Zumana argued that Cuito Cuanavale had created a 
favourable terrain for the liberation movement: “The demoralising defeat of the SADF at 
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Cuito Cuanavale, the implementation of Resolution 435 in Namibia, have great 
significance for our struggle.”1239 An April 1989 Sechaba editorial observed, “not Botha, 
not De Klerk, not Heunis, dare address the real problems looming behind their 
‘leadership crisis’ and their confusion. They don’t talk about their defeat at Cuito 
Cuanavale.”1240  The apartheid government was “in disarray, and pulling in different 
directions.”1241  
 The stage for Botha’s eclipse and the rise of F.W. De Klerk - the “reluctant 
reformer,” who as government minister “was notoriously right wing”1242 - was now set. 
The marginalization of Botha’s inner circle and those who remained loyal to him was 
completed when, in short order, many of them retired from active politics. Chief among 
these was Finance Minister Barend Du Plessis, heralding Botha’s own marginalization. 
For his part, Botha refused to vacate the State Presidency. The expectation was that when 
the new State President was chosen, Botha, instead of serving out his full-term, would 
resign, stepping aside for the new office holder. Nonetheless, Botha opted to serve out 
his constitutional term, which expired in September 1989. However, the marginalization 
and defection of his most trusted confidants rendered his position untenable. Botha’s 
decision to stay in office merely highlighted that the levers of power within the South 
African state had passed into new hands. Even though he still formally held onto the 
State presidency, it was De Klerk who was increasingly in control of the South African 
government: a reality that De Klerk readily demonstrated. On 26 May 1989, De Klerk 
declared that serious reforms were necessary and unavoidable.  He then undertook a visit 
                                                
1239 N. Zumana, Discussion Article: Revolution or Negotiations, Sechaba, (1989), 20  
 
1240 Editorial: The Racists Have Problems, Sechaba, (1989), 1 
 
1241 Ibid. 
 
1242 A. Harber, “PW Stuns the Nats”, The Weekly Mail, 3-9 February 1989 
  
 334 
of western Europe, emphasizing that Pretoria was adopting a new approach.   
 Clear evidence of the power shift was the conflict that emerged in the cabinet and 
the NP over foreign policy.  De Klerk and ‘Pik’ Botha began to conduct foreign policy 
independently of P.W. Botha.  This was dramatically demonstrated when public 
disagreement broke out between Botha and De Klerk over De Klerk’s proposed 28 
August 1989 visit to Lusaka to talk with President Kaunda.  Botha’s criticism of and 
opposition to the trip was to no avail.  In a 2 June 1989 letter, Botha described his 
marginalization from the decision-making process: “I am informed of policy statements 
that completely ignore the State President. I am also informed of proposed foreign visits 
by you [De Klerk] without complying with the prescribed rules.”1243 In a 14 August 1989 
television broadcast, Botha denounced the planned visit as playing into the hands of 
South Africa’s enemies: “The ANC is enjoying the protection of President Kaunda and is 
planning insurgency activities against South Africa from Lusaka.”1244   
 Under these conditions, Botha said he could not continue as State President, 
announcing his resignation because: “It is evident to me that after all these years of my 
best efforts for the National Party and for the government of this country, as well as the 
security of our country, I am being ignored by ministers serving in my cabinet.”1245 
While, both De Klerk and ‘Pik’ Botha disputed the claim that they had failed to inform 
the State President, it was clear that P.W. Botha was increasingly politically irrelevant.  
From being able to brag that he could dictate to the editor of Beeld (the largest Afrikaans 
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language newspaper), what to write, Botha was now a figure on the sidelines of South 
African power.1246 On the very next day, 15 August 1989, De Klerk officially assumed 
the State Presidency. Botha’s resignation allowed de Klerk to assume the full formal 
reins of power, which marked the definitive ascendancy of the ‘reformers’ and the 
permanent eclipse of the militarists.   While, Botha’s stroke had greatly diminished his 
political influence, preventing him from playing a significant role in choosing his 
replacement, the decline of his political power had begun well before the dramtic decline 
in his health. It seems unlikely that had his health not deteriorated he would have 
retained the necessary political influence to orchestrate the election of his chosen 
successor, Malan.  
 The regime’s interaction with the ANC (particularly, Mandela) also seem to have 
been given by the military events in Angola impetus, resulting in the initiation of serious 
discussions by Pretoria with Mandela. A source (who held a relatively high position in 
South Africa but wished to maintain anonymity in both name and organizational 
affiliation) said that he witnessed the first and only meeting between Botha (while he 
held the presidency) and Mandela that was held on 5 July 1989. Notwithstanding, 
Botha’s increasing political irrelevance, Mandela allegedly told Botha something to the 
effect: “You are only meeting with me because of what happened in Angola at Cuito 
Cuanavale.”1247 While the person’s status would not preclude him from having been part 
of that important meeting, there is no direct confirmation from other sources that this 
person was present or that Mandela made this particular declaration. However, Mandela 
made several subsequent statements that unequivocally express the conviction that the 
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SADF military setbacks had forced Pretoria to hold serious negotiations with him. For 
example, in 1991, Mandela said that Cuito Cuanavale “was crucial in bringing Pretoria to 
realise it would have to talk.”1248  Other leading ANC members also concur with that 
statement.1249  Ronnie Kasrils, who was part of the ANC negotiating team, stated “Cuito 
Cuanavale changed the chemistry of the contacts between Pretoria and the ANC. They 
became serious and substantive for the first time.”1250 
 Whatever, the reasons behind Botha’s 5 July meeting with Mandela, on August 
21, 1989, the ANC issued the Harare Declaration, laying out the following preconditions 
for negotiations: 1. Unconditional release of political prisoners; 2. Unbanning the ANC 
and other anti-apartheid organizations; 3. Removal of the troops from the townships; 4. 
An end of the state of emergency; 5. Repeal of repressive legislation; and 6. Cessation of 
political trials and executions.  The Declaration was released at that time because the 
ANC leadership had analyzed that there was now a favourable “conjuncture of 
circumstances.”1251 A discussion paper in the August 1989 Sechaba issue elaborated on 
this analysis, noting “the ascendancy of the civilian politicians at the expense of the 
military men following the defeat of the racist army at Cuito Cuanavale.”1252  The 
conclusion drawn was that Pretoria now faced no alternative but to engage in meaningful 
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negotiations: “Only when its forces are put into crisis, does the Pretoria regime reach the 
conclusion that it may have to talk. That is how it was obliged to accept that the 
Namibian question must be resolved on the basis of UN Resolution 435.”1253 
 The first official government contact with the ANC regarding the discussion of 
the commencement of meaningful negotiations (talks about talks) was made by the NIS 
on September 6, 1989.1254 On 9 October, it was announced that eight ANC prisoners 
would be released.  In November 1989, De Klerk took the step that clearly delineated his 
government from Botha: disbanding the National Security Management System. He 
downgraded the SSC, relegating it to a committee directly under and subordinate to the 
cabinet. The political arrangements and the militarized apartheid state that Botha had 
presided over since 1977 had come to an end. While Malan continued to serve as defense 
minister until 1991, he no longer played a significant role in charting foreign or domestic 
policy.  In July 1991, De Klerk removed him from his post, giving him the much less 
influential post of Minister for Water Affairs and Forestry. Ostensibly his removal from 
the defense portfolio was due to his involvement in a scandal of providing covert funds 
to the Inkatha Freedom Party, as part of a plan of undermining the ANC. 
 De Klerk’s new approach signaled the emergence of a new political discourse 
and praxis that necessarily entailed the subordination of the SSC and the SSC to civilian 
authority. Chester Crocker, who had worked very closely with the Botha government, 
underscored the significance of this change. He contrasted the de Klerk’s government 
with Botha’s, noting that “the cabinet had been restored to its proper position as the top 
policy council and the military-led administrative organs were being abolished…The era 
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when South Africa’s white politicians expect their soldiers and policemen to “solve” 
their problems was coming to an end.”1255 The November 1989 Phambili agreed, 
contending that Namibia’s independence had opened the way to the final dissolution of 
apartheid.1256 After Luanda’s request for Cuban reinforcements “the nose of the SADF 
was bloodied.”1257  As a result of the defeat and Namibian independence, the apartheid 
regime faced the worst crisis “of its kind in South Africa’s history.”1258  This crisis could 
only be resolved by “talking to the ANC.”1259 In December 1989 it became very clear to 
Mandela that “some change was imminent.”1260 He was moved to a cottage and allowed 
to have contact with the ANC in Lusaka. This was the prelude to his 11 February 1990 
unconditional release from prison, leading to full-fledged negotiations, which with all its 
twists and turns, including efforts to undermine and weaken the ANC through covert 
state sponsored violence, eventually resulted in the dismantling of apartheid and the 
emergence of black majority rule.  
 The analysis by anti-apartheid organizations that the military situation in Angola 
had proven decisive in forcing South African ruling circles to the negotiating table was 
also reflected by several articles in the western media, which also argued for a 
substantive connection, attributing to Cuito Cuanavale and its consequences a direct 
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causal role in the demise of the apartheid system.  For example, Rich Dowden, in an 
article titled “Who gets the credit for Mandela’s release” published in The Independent, 
singled out Cuito Cuanavale as a critical juncture that demonstrated the non-viability of 
the apartheid regime:  
Those who thought South Africa could hold out in its 
laager by military might were proved wrong at the battle of 
Cuito Cuanavale, in Angola in 1988, when the South 
African Defence Force found itself trapped and outgunned 
by Cubans and Angolans armed with superior Soviet 
weaponry.1261  
 
The failure of the SADF was seen as finally exhausting Pretoria’s capacity to defend the 
status quo.  Richard Martin, in The Globe and Mail (considered Canada’s national and 
most influential newspaper) observed, “by pulling out of Namibia, by releasing Mr. 
Mandela the de Klerk government is admitting that it no longer possesses the will or the 
ability to preserve apartheid.”1262 Within this context, Martin argued, the “major defeat at 
Cuito Cuanavale...was a historical turning point,” as it led South Africa to withdraw from 
Angola and to agree to independence to Namibia.”1263  Linda Freeman, a Carleton 
University political science professor, presented one of the clearest expositions on the 
significance of Cuito Cuanavale.  Among the five factors that Freeman listed as leading 
to the eventual release of Mandela and the beginning of formal negotiations to end 
apartheid, she gave primacy to Cuito Cuanavale.1264 Vital developments were the 
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“dismantling of the National Security Management System” that operated “as a shadow 
government dominated by senior military officials,” the reduction in both military 
spending and compulsory military service and an end to the regional destablization 
war.1265  She asserted: 
South Africa’s defeat at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola in 
1988 was a key event in the displacement of the military 
from the centre of power and the decision to grant 
independence to Namibia. Too many young white 
soldiers had died. Sanctions had crippled South Africa’s 
ability to finance the war and to possess the latest 
military technology.1266 
 
The loss of power had a significant psychological impact on the SADF and the rest of the 
security apparatus. De Klerk’s release of Mandela and unbanning of the ANC and the 
SACP generated disorientation among the ranks of those who had committed themselves 
to the use of force to preserve the system of white supremacy. De Kock noted: “There 
was confusion, especially in the security establishment, and a sense of total sell-out by 
then government…We had just to look at what had happened in SWA/Namibia to see a 
mirror of what was about to happen to us.”1267 As would be expected, many SADF 
generals opposed the loss of state control.  Rumours spread that several members of the 
high command had considered organizing a coup.  However, the seriousness, depth, 
breadth and extent of these plans remain unclear and in dispute.1268 
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CUBA 
From 1975 to 1991, more than 330,000 Cubans severed in the Angolan military mission. 
Havana has acknowledged 2016 deaths.1269 This figure is disputed, with some positing 
death figures as high 10,000.1270 Interviews with Cuban veterans, however, supported the 
lower Cuban figures. They emphasized Havana’s policy of minimizing casualties when 
possible.1271 Nevertheless, the contention over the number of deaths aside, it is quite 
evident that the Angolan experience has marked Cuba in a profound manner. It is 
continually evoked as the central exemplification of revolutionary values. As noted in the 
introductory chapter, Cuito Cuanavale and the Cuba’s role in Angola have become 
integral to the Cuban national narrative. In a sense, perhaps, not intended, George is 
correct in stating that Cuba has mytholigized and contructed “the myth of Cuito 
Cuanvale.”1272  
However, far and above the inflation of its “importance”1273 in service of the 
Castro government’s political purposes, the Cuban role in Angola has assumed a 
meaning beyond politics.  Contrary to George’s assertion that Havana “has erased 
Angola from public memory,”1274 Cuban society is suffused with the recollections of the 
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internacionalistas. The Cuban government has not, as George asserted,  “chosen to 
forget its internationalists operations in Angola,” nor have its Cuban participants “been 
swept under the carpet.”1275 Indeed, while its motives may be debated and challenged, it 
is indisputable that the revolutionary government continues to expend significant time 
and resources in the valorization of the Cuban role in Angola, firmly embedding the 
Angolan mission within popular consciousness.  
The purchase of the war in Angola on Cuban popular consciousness is indicated 
by the popularity of books published about the subject. Most have been personal 
memoirs. These publications tend to sell out very quickly, leading to some being very 
difficult to find once they are released. For example, the author has had to ask friends in 
Cuba to search for certain titles.  There has been a considerable output as indicated by 
this far from complete sample: Secretos de Generales, Al Ecuentro de Los Desconocido, 
Angola: Relatos Desde Las Alturas, La Guerra de Angola, La Paz de Cuito Cuanavale: 
documetos de un processo, Angola: Un Abril Como Giron, Angola: Fin del Mito de Los 
Mercenarios, Angola: Saeta del Norte, Operacion Carlota: Pasajes de una epopeya, 
Cangamba, Victoria Al Sur De Angola. There are a number of other memoirs and 
accounts that are awaiting publication. For example, Eduardo Sarria Gonzalez, author of 
Angola: Relatos Desde Las Alturas, has penned a second volume.  
Several documentaries have been produced. The 1989 La Repuesta a la Escalada 
de Sud-Africa (Response to the South African Escalation),1276 which dealt with the final 
battles in Angola in 1988, was re-broadcast several times due to popular demand. In 
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2007, a twenty-two episode series on the internationalist mission in Angola was 
produced, La Epopeya de Angola (The Epic of Angola).1277 It gripped the attention of 
Cubans. In addition to the books and documentaries, there have been numerous 
commemorations. The main organizer of many of these events is the Asociacion de 
Combatientes de la Revolucion (Association of the Combatants of the Cuban 
Revolution). It was founded in 1993 and is comprised of those who fought in the Cuban 
1956-59 revolutionary war, against the Escambray insurgency in the 1960s and in 
foreign campaigns. One of its primary objectives is to preserve the integrity of the 
historical memory of Cuba’s various internationalist military missions.  
In November 2005, Fidel Castro addressed a major event marking the 30th 
anniversary of Cuba’s military intervention in Angola.1278   On March 24th, 2008, Raul 
Castro presided over a major ceremony that re-iterated the internationalist mission in 
Angola (as embodied in the victory at Cuito Cuanavale) as a defining period in the 
trajectory of the Cuban Revolution.1279  Every year in Havana on May 4th, the 
Organización de Solidaridad de los Pueblos de África, Asia y América (Organization of 
Solidarity With the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America) organizes an event 
commemorating the May 4th, 1978 massacre at the Angolan town of Kassinga of 
hundreds of Namibian refugees by South African troops. This event is attended by 
official representatives from Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Cuba and receives wide 
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coverage in the Cuban media. A central theme of this annual event is the Cuban 
contribution to the defeat of the apartheid regime.  
Perhaps, it was during the crisis of the 1990s that internationalism was to have its 
most decisive impact inside Cuba. As the Cuban Revolution was caught in the maelstrom 
that ensued from the collapse of the Soviet Union and East Bloc, its very legitimacy and 
relevancy was called into question.  The ideological pressures on the island were intense. 
Internationalism was one of the factors that contributed to the resilience of the 
Revolution, especially its perceived role in the defeat of the apartheid regime. Cubans 
took considerable pride in what their country had done in Angola.  This pride was not 
just expressed by soldiers, who often spoke about "returning to Cuba with victory in our 
hands."1280  Samuel Fure Davis, who did not serve in the military, stated: "There was lots 
of excitement about the battle. Word of victory was received with elation. I remember 
vividly the celebrations of the victory.”1281    Cubans not only took pride in their victory 
but in the altruism that characterized the Angolan mission. Nacyra Gomez stated: "Some 
do not understand our presence in a country out of solidarity...We are not there to kill but 
to defend another people, To fight for others and to die for others.”1282   
Nelson Mandela’s July 25th –27th 1991 visit was also a great source of pride. 
Mandela’s choice of Cuba as one of the first countries outside of Africa to visit after his 
release from prison was seen as further validation and affirmation of the Cuban 
Revolution. The resolution of the Cuban Council of State conferring the José Martí 
Medal, Cuba highest honour on Mandela noted that he was visiting at a “decisive hour 
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when the Cuba people have resolved to defend at all costs the revolution, socialism and 
the homeland…”1283 In his July 26th, 1991 speech at Matanzas, Mandela unequivocally 
acknowledged Cuba’s vital role in southern African liberation struggles, declaring: “The 
Cuban people hold a special place in the hearts of the people of Africa. The Cuban 
internationalists have made a contribution to African independence, freedom and justice 
unparalleled for its principled and selfless character.”1284 He also expressed his support 
and admiration for the Cuban Revolution, stating: “We admire the sacrifices of the 
Cuban people in maintaining their independence and sovereignty in the face of a vicious 
imperialist-orchestrated campaign to destroy the impressive gains made in the Cuban 
Revolution.”1285  
The significance of Cuito Cuanavale can, also, be appreciated by contemplating 
what the impact inside Cuba would have been if the result had been reversed.  Fidel 
Castro characterized the commitment to the battles of 1987-88 as a decisive period for 
the Cuban Revolution because "the Revolution was also at stake and a different outcome 
would have meant a major defeat for the Revolution."1286  During Mandela's visit to 
Cuba, Castro again accentuated the dangers that Cuba faced, declaring that "the 
revolution put everything at stake, it put its own existence at stake; it risked a huge battle 
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against one of the strongest powers."1287 An official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
concurred: "A defeat at Cuito Cuanavale would have had a devastating psychological 
and moral impact on the Cuban people.”1288   Consonant with this assessment is that the 
decisive military engagements in Angola occurred before the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. If the war had not been decided at that time and had continued, the Cuban armed 
forces, which were dependent on the Soviet Union for material and diplomatic support, 
would have been left in an isolated and precarious situation. They would have been 
stranded in Angola: 
“What is often not mentioned is that if the U.S. had only know that the 
Soviet Union and the socialist bloc would collapse in just two years, then 
the Washington would not have pressured South Africa to negotiate. It 
would have left the Cuban troops in Angola to fight on alone without any 
support. What I mean it is quite an important factor that things were 
settled then and there at that time. Could you imagine Cuban troops in 
1990 and 1991 fighting in Angola with no support from the Soviet 
Union? Could you imagine Cuba entering the Special Period with over 
fifty thousand troops fighting in Angola? It would have been 
catastrophic for the Revolution!” (emphasis added).1289 
 
But the Cuban armed forces returned victorious. The status of the Cuba armed forces in 
popular consciousness, which was already high, was enhanced. The high standing of 
FAR among the people was important during the Special period as the military assumed 
an expanded role throughout the economy and society. It was one of the principal 
organizations mobilized to preserve ideological and political unity. The values of self-
sacrifice and social solidarity that were the leadership’s watchwords of the early 1990s, 
                                                
1287 Fidel Castro, We will never return to the slave barracks, 31-68 in Nelson Mandela & 
Fidel Castro, How Far We Slaves Have Come! New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991), 34-
35 
 
1288 Interview with Cuban Official, 3 May 2007. Anonymity retained.  
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were the values that FAR embodied: values crystallized in the internacionalistas. The 
internacionalistas, particularly those who were returning, had perforce operationalized 
those values in Angola and now reinforced those principles in Cuba. 
No political or ideological crisis developed.1290 The contribution of the island's 
internationalist record (especially in Angola) to avoiding just such a crisis should not be 
underestimated.  As the Revolution was portrayed as a relic with no meaningful role in 
the world, Cuba's crucial contribution to South Africa’s transformation was a potent 
counter. It fortified belief in the Revolution's relevance and legitimacy in a world that 
was radically different from the one into which it was born and had lived in.  Perhaps, 
the most poignant deployment of internationalism in defence of the Cuban Revolution 
was Fidel Castro's 2003 May Day speech.  The context for the speech was the intense 
criticism of Cuba for the arrest of seventy-five government opponents and the execution 
of three armed hijackers in March and April 2003. Several prominent intellectuals and 
world personalities publicly broke with and condemned the Revolution, questioning its 
very legitimacy.  In response, Castro delivered a speech that covered the island's 
extensive internationalist missions in detail, particularly, its assistance to national 
liberation movements.1291 The war in Angola was given special attention. The speech 
amounted to a comprehensive presentation of the Revolution's curriculum vitae; it was a 
riposte to those who damned and dismissed it.  Thus, what the Cuba Revolution had done 
                                                
1290 For a detailed discussion of the crisis of the 1990s in Cuba see Louis Perez, Jr., 
Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
291-336 and Isaac Saney, Cuba: A Revolution In Motion (London: Zed, 2004), 21-40 & 
58-68 
 
1291 See Fidel Castro  “Speech given by Commander In Chief, Fidel Castro Ruz, 
President of the Republic of Cuba, at the May Day Rally, Revolution Square, Havana, 
may 1, 2003,” 39-53 in Ideas Are Worth More Than Weapons (La Habana: Editora 
Politica, 2003) 
 
  
 348 
- and does - on a world scale was presented as contributions that unequivocally establish 
its legitimacy and validity.  This perspective was reflected in numerous articles published 
in Granma in the lead-up to and during the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary 
of the battles around Cuito Cuanavale. 
GENERAL SUMMATION 
The Botha regime in the form of the SSC had an overweening confidence that it could 
impose its will on the region and act with impunity; in short, it believed in its military 
invincibility. Not only could it not envisage a military defeat, it could not understand that 
a significant military setback would and could redound inside South Africa to the 
detriment of the regime. The defeat of the SADF destroyed the myth of South African 
invincibility, which was integral to Pretoria’s capacity to justify its military actions and 
policies domestically. In many ways, the Botha regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of 
apartheid’s partisans (both within ruling circles and the general white population) was 
based on its alleged invincibility. SADF Major General Chris Thirion, perhaps, 
intuitively appreciated the dangers of losing the invincibility cloak, when he stated that 
he always had misgiving about the escalating level of SADF commitment to the Cuito 
Cuanavale theatre of action: “I thought we should not have become involved to the 
extent we became involved.”1292 Once the regime’s vincibility was demonstrated, doubt 
about its ability to run South African affairs diminished its power.  
 The retreats and concession in the military sphere led to retreats and concessions 
in the political sphere. Central to this process was the military’s removal from the centre 
of power. The failure of the war in Angola meant the discrediting of the policy behind it, 
weakening the power of the SADF within the state and government. The authority of the 
                                                
1292 Interview with Major General Chris Thirion 
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Botha regime (crystallized in the SSC) clashed with the objective conditions: the SSC’s 
authority rested on the SADF and the efficacy of pursuing a military solution, but the 
reality of the defeat in Angola destroyed the basis upon which the legitimacy of this 
authority rested.  A South African victory would have validated the militarist strategy 
and consolidated the military’s hold on the reins of state power. The defeat had the 
obverse effect: it significantly weakened the military’s ability to dominate the 
government. 
As the Botha regime, had invested so much time (more than a decade) and 
resources in the military strategy, the defeat of Pretoria’s campaign to subjugate the 
region’s independent states had profound repercussions inside the country, both on the 
internal resistance and South African ruling circles. An immediate ‘casualty’ of this state 
of affairs was Defence Minister Magnus Malan’s presidential ambitions. As apartheid’s 
existence rested on violence - domestically and regionally - Cuito Cuanavale represented 
not only a military defeat, but a crucial geo-strategic blow that signalled to South African 
ruling circles that that the costs (financial, political and human) of maintaining the 
apartheid regime were too high to sustain. The reality that De Klerk planned to (or 
thought he could) outmanoeuvre the ANC in the negotiation process and fundamentally 
weaken and undermine is clear. But the arena of negotiations was not the favoured 
terrain of the Afrikaner ruling circles: they had perforce to accept it. 
 The placing of Cuito Cuanavale at the centre of the political process that led to 
the demise of the Botha/SADF regime is not a monocausal argument. The point is not to 
ignore or minimize the structural context. Cuito Cuanavale occurred within a 
constellation of factors: Black resistance, economic stagnation, international sanctions, 
overall economic and diplomatic isolation. As argued in Chapter Five, the military 
events in Angola interacted with the economy and South Africa’s internal situation. 
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Given the confluence of so many factors and the multi-faceted crisis that confronted the 
apartheid system, it seems almost illogical to point to one single factor or cause for the 
dissolution of the apartheid regime.  
At the time of the 1987-88 military engagements in Angola, Botha and his clique 
seemed committed to maintaining their grip on state power. Despite, opposition from the 
majority of the capitalist class and increasing dissent from within the ranks of his own 
party and ministers, the SSC was still the locus of power and it was in the hands of Botha 
and his military allies. The regime was firmly entrenched in state power and determined 
and convinced that it could preserve apartheid by achieving regional hegemony, and was 
only committed to making cosmetic changes. The program to crush the anti-apartheid 
movement within and without South Africa remained in full force and effect. 
The mounting pressures (internal and external) and structural contradictions 
rendered apartheid unsustainable in the long-term. As the economy deteriorated and 
South Africa’s international isolation increased, Botha could not prevent fissures within 
apartheid’s South Africa’s dominant class widening into significant fault-lines.  South 
Africa faced profound and irresolvable economic problems and demographic challenges 
generated by the apartheid system.1293 Where and how do the military events in Angola 
fit within the constellation and concatenation of these structural contradictions? 
 Thus, the question remains: Why at a particular time (1988-1989) Botha and the 
military became marginalized and displaced from state power?  The evidence seems to 
suggest that a plausible answer to this question is: The defeat of the SADF in Angola 
was the catalyst precipitating the end of the Botha regime, leading to F.W. de Klerk’s 
                                                
1293 For example, Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa, 224-251, Fieldhouse, 
Anti-Apartheid, 486-487; Iliffe, Africans, 284-285 
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rise to power. Structural pressures opened rifts in the South African ruling bloc but the 
military setbacks proved decisive in shifting the balance of power between the contesting 
factions in favour of the reformers.   
 It is in the context of the drive for regional hegemony (of which the war in 
Angola was central) and the particular mode of governance that had emerged in South 
Africa under Botha that the impact battle of Cuito Cuanavale must be understood. The 
specific nature of the apartheid state (its militarization) under Botha rendered it 
particularly vulnerable to developments in the military sphere. By wedding itself to the 
total strategy program and fashioning the state instrument to wield that program, Pretoria 
not only hinged the preservation of white rule on achieving regional hegemony, but also 
ensured that the definitive failure of this program would have decisive, if not fatal, 
consequences, for regime.  
CONCLUSION 
The contribution of this dissertation is to present the war in Angola waged by the SADF 
between 1975 and 1988 (especially, the battle of Cuito Cuanavale) in a different light. 
By adducing new evidence, while at the same time reconsidering and recasting evidence 
that has long been available, it places the military events of 1987-88 in a new analytical 
context. If Angolan voices are largely absent from the preceding narrative, it is because 
the Cubans and South Africans were the principal protagonists, producing the major 
accounts of the war. As the 1987-88 conflict developed it became a trial of strength and 
strategy between Havana and Pretoria. Nevertheless, the lack of Angolan voices 
represents a lacuna that needs to be addressed in subsequent research.  
The struggle for and against apartheid took place as much outside as inside South 
Africa, with the war in Angola the most important external arena. The defeat of the 
SADF at Cuito Cuanavale also occurred as the apartheid system faced continuing 
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economic decline, growing white popular disenchantment and increasing international 
pressure.   This context transformed the battle from a merely military event to one of 
regional-geopolitical dimensions that enabled it to become the accelerant for the demise 
of apartheid. Cuito Cuanavale was not only decisive for the independence of Namibia, 
but also a direct contributor to apartheid’s dissolution. The military setbacks in Angola 
could not but have had a significant impact on the apartheid state. Pretoria had invested 
so much institutionally, temporally and economically in the military strategy that any 
defeat of the campaign to subjugate the region’s independent states would have had to 
have profound repercussions inside the country: both on South African ruling circles and 
the internal resistance. This was the vulnerability of the regime. Serious military defeat 
or setback threatened the integrity and legitimacy of the entire structure that had been 
developed and elaborated under Botha and the SADF. 
 Throughout its history new stresses and strains emerged and old ones were 
exacerbated within the apartheid system.  However, the Cuban intervention to defend 
Angolan independence and to challenge South African regional dominance was 
unanticipated. It introduced a new dynamic, over and above the South African internal 
contradictions: a new dynamic that the Botha regime was unable to plan for and to 
successfully counteract. Cuba's role in the 1987-88 conflict in Angola extended beyond 
the shear numerical dimensions of the island's troop and materiel commitment. Cuba 
brought to bear a strategic vision, which had an indelible and decisive impact on the 
course of events. Havana’s assumption of leadership of all the armed forces in southern 
Angola arrayed against the SADF changed the overall strategic approach.  Havana 
combined the tactics necessary for the joint Cuban-Angolan effort to successfully repel 
the SADF with a strategy designed to bring an end to Pretoria’s military adventures 
beyond South Africa’s borders. This resulted in stripping the apartheid military system of 
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its impunity, which, in turn, unleashed what proved to be unstoppable pressures that 
would eventually sideline the State Security Council in spearheading unceasing 
repression of domestic anti-apartheid social and political forces. 
 There are all sorts or types of events that transpire outside a country that may 
have an impact inside that country, but not all events are an existential threat. Cuito 
Cuanavale and its aftermath (the outflanking Cuban/Angolan drive to and military build-
up on the Angolan/Namibian border) posed just such an existential threat. Cuito 
Cuanavale was much more consequential for the end of apartheid than generally 
acknowledged; it was an integral part of apartheid’s death throes.  Together with the 
Sharpeville Massacre, the Rivonia Trial and the Soweto Uprising, Cuito Cuanavale is 
one of the most important chronological markers in the struggle against apartheid.  
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The following is a partial listing of primary source documents concerning Operations 
Hooper, Modular and Packer (1987-1988), DECLASSIFIED and provided by the South 
African National Defence Forces (SANDF), then translated from Afrikaans originals by 
the author and consulted extensively for this study.  
MINISTER OF DEFENCE (GROUP 6) Manuscript Groups 
No. Box No. SANDF File ref. Vol. Subject  Period (mm/dd/yy) 
1. 8 SVR 1/87 1 Security State Council 02/02/87 
2. 8 SVR 2/87 1  State Security Council 16/02/87 
No. Box No. SADF File ref Vol. Subject Period (mm/dd/yy) 
3. 8 SVR 3/87 1  State Security Council 02/03/87 
4. 8 SVR 4/87 1 Security State Council 16/03/87 
5. 8 SVR 5/87 1  State Security Council 30/03/87 
6. 8 SVR 6/87 1  State Security Council 13/04/87 
7. 8 SVR 7/87 1 Security State Council 27/04/87 
8. 8 SVR /8/87 1  State Security Council 13/05/87 
9. 8 SVR 9/87 1  State Security Council 25/05/87 
10. 8 SVR 10/87 1 Security State Council 08/06/87 
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11. 8 SVR 11/87 1  State Security Council 22/06/87 
12. 8 SVR 12/87 1  State Security Council 27/07/87 
13. 8 SVR 13/87 1  Security State Council 10/08/87 
14. 8 SVR 14/87 1 State Security Council 24/08/87 
15. 8 SVR 15/87 1 State Security Council 07/09/87 
16. 8 SVR 16/87 1 Security State Council 21/09/87 
17. 8 SVR 17/87 1 State Security  Council 05/10/87 
18. 8 SVR 18/87 1  State Security Council 19/10/87 
19. 8 SVR 19/87 1 State Security Council 02/11/87 
20. 8 SVR 20/87 1  State Security Council 16/11/87 
21. 8 SVR 21/87 1  State Security Council 30/11/87 
22. 8 SVR 21/87 1  State Security Council  20/12/87 
23. 8 SVR 1/88 1  State Security Council 18/01/88 
24. 8 SVR 2/88 1  State Security Council 01/02/88 
25. 8 SVR 3/88 1 Security State Council 15/02/88 
26. 8 SVR 4/88 1 State Security Council 29/02/88 
 
No. 
Box No. SADF File ref Vol. Subject Period (mm/dd/yy) 
27. 8 SVR 5/88 1 State Security Council 14/04/88 
28. 8 SVR 6/88 1 Security State Council 28/03/88 
29. 8 SVR 7/88 1 State Security Council 11/04/88 
30. 8 SVR 8/88 1 State Security Council 25/04/88 
31. 8 SVR 9/88 1 State Security Council 10/05/88 
32. 9 SVR 10/88 1 State Security Council 23/05/88 
33. 9 SVR 11/88 1 Security State Council 06/06/88 
34. 9 SVR 12/88 1 State Security Council 20/06/88 
35. 9 SVR 13/88 1 State Security Council 25/07/88 
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36. 9 SVR 14/88 1 State Security Council 08/08/88 
37. 9 SVR 15/88 1 State Security Council 22/08/88 
38. 9 SVR 16/88 1 Security State Council 19/09/88 
39. 9 SVR 17/88 1 State Security Council 17/10/88 
40. 9 SVR 18/88 1 State Security Council 31/10/88 
41. 9 SVR 19/88 1 State Security Council 14/11/88 
42. 9 SVR 20/88 1 State Security Council 28/11/88 
 
Newspaper sources & periodical literature (non-scholarly)  
° Newspapers and periodicals consulted (sources for lesser-known publications in this 
list are identified in the main text). 
African Affairs 
African Communist, The 
Africa Report 
All-Africa GlobalMedia 
Asahi Evening News [Japan] 
Associated Press, The 
Burger, Die 
Cosatu News 
Daily Telegraph [London UK], The 
Democracy in Action 
Economist, The 
Foreign Policy 
Globe and Mail, The 
Granma Diario 
Granma International 
Independent, The [London, UK] 
Kerkbode, Die 
Latin American Herald Tribune 
Mail & Guardian, The [Johannesburg] 
Mayibuye 
Morning Star 
New York Post 
New York Times, The 
NUM News 
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Observer, The [today the Sunday edition of The Guardian, but formerly separate London 
Sunday broadsheet]  
Phambili 
Rand Daily Mail [Johannesburg] 
Resister (“Journal of the Committee for South Africa War Resistance”) 
Reuters News Agency 
Sechaba 
Soldier of Fortune 
Sowetan, The 
Star, The [Johannesburg] 
Sydney Morning Post [Australia] 
United Nations Monthly Chronicle 
Washington Post, The 
Washington Times, The 
Weekly Mail, The [Johannesburg] 
World, The [Soweto] 
 
• Articles (chronologically ordered) 
1974 
“Big apartheid change on way,” The Star [Johannesburg], 22 January 1974. 
“Builders Warn on African Unions,” The Star, 22 January 1974. 
“SA to block recruiting of mercenaries,” Rand Daily Mail, 11 September 1974. 
“Give Vorster his six months, says Schwarz,” Rand Daily Mail, 7 November 1974. 
1975 
“Foreigners leave Angola to its fate,” The Times, 4 November 1975.  
“Leftist lose two big towns in Angola,” The Times, 5 November 1975. 
Ashford, Nicholas. “Can the West afford to lose out in the power struggle for Angola?”, 
The Times, 11 November 1975. 
Niddie, David. “Now the nine SASO accused await judgment,” Rand Daily Mail, 11 
November 1975. 
Bridgland, Fred. “Mystery of South African accent in armoured units,” The Times, 15 
November 1975. 
“Dear John…it’s all your fault,” Rand Daily Mail, 13 December 1975. 
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“SA four held by MPLA,” Rand Daily Mail, 18 December 1975. 
“Massive armoured column thrusts deep into Angola,” Rand Daily Mail, 22 December 
1975. 
“The laager danger,” Rand Daily Mail, 22 December 1975. 
Richard Walker, “Vorster warns on Angola,” Rand Daily Mail, 25 December 1975. 
1976 - 1986 
“Mr. Vorster urges West to prevent Angola being ‘hounded into communist fold at 
bayonet point,’” The Times, 2 January 1976. 
“How a ‘war by proxy’ developed,” The Times, 6 January 1976. 
Ellsworth Jones, Will. “Captured South African Soldier tells journalists of his unit’s role 
in Angola civil war,” The Times [London], 9 January 1976. 
“Russia’s African Empire,” The Times, 14 January 1976. 
Nicholas Ashford, “S Africans on retreat in Angola,” The Times, 23 January 1976. 
David Bender, “Kissinger Believes Cuba ‘Exports’ Revolution Again,” New York Times, 
5 February 1976. 
Nicholas Ashford, “South African Cabinet discusses danger of confrontation as MPLA 
races onward in Angola,” The Times, 12 February 1976. 
“Decisive battle of Angola Shaping Up,” The World, 19 January 1976. 
“MPLA forces sweep though Angola,” The World, 19 January 1976. 
“Unita Beats Back Cuban,” The World, 20 January 1976. 
“Featured fighter is the people’s idol,” The World, 22 January 1976. 
Ray Kennedy, “S Africans to stay in Angola ‘until stalemate is achieved,’” The Times 22 
January 1976. 
“Big Row Brews Over Angola: SA Parliament meets on crucial issue,” The World, 26 
January 1976. 
“Angola – What is going on?” The World, 28 January 1976. 
 “Cuban offensive repulsed,” The World, 30 January 1976. 
“MPLA Continue to Rout FNLA,” The World, 9 February 1976. 
“White’s will eventually give in SASO,” The World, 6 February 1976. 
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“SASO faces action by government,” The World, 10 February 1976. 
“Black Soldiers train to defeat Ovambo,” The World, 10 February 1976. 
“SASO ‘Inciting Armed Revolt,’ “The World, 10 February1976. 
“SASO’s fate hangs in the balance,” The World, 11 February 1976.  
“SASO Leader Hits back at Govt Report,” The World, 11 February 1976. 
“OAU Support For MPLA,” The World, 12 February 1976. 
Nicholas Ashford, “South African Cabinet discusses danger of confrontation as MPLA 
races onward in Angola,” The Times, 12 February 1976. 
“SASO Accused of stirring race hatred,” The World, 13 February 1976. 
“Cubans nearing SWA border,” The World, 13 February 1976. 
Nicholas Ashford, “Will South Africa go to War?” The Times, 13 February 1976. 
Roger Sargent, “The mercenary legend slips away in Angola,” Rand Daily Mail, 13 
February 1976. 
“Moment of truth for Angola,” The World, 16 February 1976. 
Untitled article, Rand Daily Mail, 17 February 1976. 
“Bloodbath Fears Grow,” The World, 17 February 1976. 
“MPLA Warned To Keep Out,” The World, 18 February 1976. 
“South Africa must stand firm,” The World, 18 February 1976. 
“South Africa peace contact by MPLA,” The World, 18 February 1976. 
“SA must recognize the MPLA,” The World, 18 February 1976. 
“Asking a pertinent question,” The World, 19 February 1976. 
“Warning from Vorster,” New York Times, 19 February 1976. 
“SA soldiers on standby in border operational zone,” The World, 20 February 1976. 
Michael T. Kaufman, “White Officials of South Africa Debate Black Loyalty in a War,” 
New York Times, 21 February 1976. 
Nicholas Ashford, “Black S Africa newspaper asks its readers if they would fight,” The 
Times,  23 February 1976. 
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“I’ll ignore the war and perhaps it will vanish,” The World, 24 February 1976. 
Sulzberger, C.L. “U.S. Indecision in the World,” New York Times, 21 February 1976. 
 “Kaunda’s hardening line on Rhodesia issue,” The World, 24 February 1976. 
“Turfloop to decide on SASO,” The World, 25 February 1976. 
“Cuba will support Namibians,” The World, 25 February 1976. 
“Cuba in Africa to stay,” The World, 26 February 1976.  
“Cunene ‘scheme’ the SADF’s,” The World, 2 March 1976. 
“Congress defuses Cuba warning,” Rand Daily Mail, 29 March 1976. 
“Breakfast Quip,” Rand Daily Mail, 29 March 1976. 
Nicholas Ashford, “S Africa takes a political gamble in withdrawing from Angola,” The 
Times 29 March 1976. 
“100 Wounded in Angola – SAAF Chief,” Rand Daily Mail, 2 April 1976. 
“MPLA tells UN of SA’s ‘total defeat’ in Angola,” Rand Daily Mail 2 April 1976. 
“South Africa Condemned for Aggression against Angola; Full Compensation 
Demanded,” UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XIII, No. 4, April 1976. 
“From Sharpeville to Soweto,” The Times, 17 June 1976. 
Untitled article, Observer [London {Sunday broadsheet}], 20 June 1976. 
“Killing fields: the superpowers in Africa” The Economist, 3-9 August 1976. 
“The laager danger,” Rand Daily Mail, 22 December 1976. 
“We stand alone against the Reds, says PM,” Rand Daily Mail, 1 January 1977. 
Bob Conolly, “Hands Off,” Rand Daily Mail, 31 May 1978. 
Helen Zille, “West has woken to Red Peril – PM,” Rand Daily Mail, 1 June 1978. 
Emiela Jaroschek, “SA terror task force,” Rand Daily Mail, 2 June 1978. 
Rebusoajoang, “Education and Social Control in South Africa,” pp 228-239 in African 
Affairs, Vol. 78 No. 311, April 1979. 
Jo-Ann Bekker, “Detention figure keeps rising,” The Weekly Mail, 11-17 July 1986. 
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Patrick Laurence, “What PW told Geoffrey Howe: Hands off SA!” The Weekly Mail, 25-
31 July 1986. 
1987 
Roy Kennedy, “Tit for tat threats precede London meeting on Angola,” The Times, 2 
May1987 
Patrick Lawrence, “Year of the Big Stick,” The Weekly Mail, 12-18 June 1987 
Thami Mkhwanazi, “A Namibian vision of the strife this side of the border,” The Weekly 
Mail, 10-16 July 1987 
Mono Badela, “Activists hide as UDF men held: Bags packed as unionists head back 
underground,” The Weekly Mail, 24-30 July 1987 
“Pliant, eh?  Namibia,” The Economist, 22 August 1987 
“Text calling for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa vetoed after 
discussion in eight meetings,” UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XXIV No. 3, August 1987 
“Untitled,”The Weekly Mail, 3 – 9 September 1987 
Mark Verbaan, “Battle which could change the course of Angola’s war,” The Weekly 
Mail, 2 - 9 October 1987 
Patrick Laurence, “Angola: Has Fapla lost the war? Or just a battle?” The Weekly Mail 6 
– 12 November 1987 
Richard Dowden, “SA military admits fighting alongside Unita in Angola,” The 
Independent, 12 November 1987 
“4 South African soldiers said to die in Angola,” New York Times, 13 November 1987 
William Claibourne, “S. African military says intervention in Angola staved off rebel 
defeat,” Washington Post, 13 November 1987 
David Crary, “Win over Marxist forces leaves Savimbi ecstatic,” Washington Times, 13 
November 1987 
Michael Hornsby, “Pretoria and Unita dispute battle credit,” New York Times, 13 
November 1987 
“SA confirms Angolan casualties,” The Independent, 13 November 1987 
“S. Africans die as Unita claims big victory in Angola,” The Daily Telegraph, 13 
November 1987 
“In Angola up to its neck,” The Guardian, 13 November 1987 
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“Four SADF Soldiers Dead,” The Sowetan, 13 November 1987 
“Pretoria reports 5 died in Angola,” New York Times, 14 November 1987  
“S. African toll swells in Angola,” New York Post, 14 November 1987 
Tony Allen-Mills, “South Africa’s whites question Angolan forays,” The Independent, 
14 November 1987 
Peter Godwin, “Botha in war zone,” The Sunday Times, 15 November 1987 
Aggrey Klaaste, “War - the first casualty is truth,” The Sowetan, 16 November 1987 
Patrick Laurence, “Now its head-on conflict as SA tackles Soviet forces,” The Weekly 
Mail, 13-19 November 1987 
“SADF invasion slammed.” The Sowetan, 20 November 1987 
“SADF Bungles Attempts to Stifle News,” The Sowetan, 20 November 1987 
Bernard E. Trainor, “Angola Drive on the Rebels is said to fail,” New York Times, 22 
November 1987 
“Angola: 7 points for peace,” The Sowetan, 23 November 1987 
Quentin Peel, “EC hints at SA action in Angola,” Financial Times, 24 November 1987 
“Angola: The Way to Peace,” The Sowetan, 24 November 1987 
Philip Van Niekerk, “Strangely, this battle may lay a path to peace,” The Weekly Mail, 
20 – 26 November 1987 
Gavin Evans, “All along the Magnus line, 50 km deep into Angola,” The Weekly Mail, 
20 - 26 November 1987 
Mark Verbaan, “Mutiny as troops say no to Angola,” The Weekly Mail, 20 - 26 
November 1987 
 “SADF ‘pullout,’” The Sowetan, 7 December 1987 
James Brooke, “Cubans on patrol in South Angola,” New York Times, 16 December 
1987 
“No link says Malan,” The Weekly Mail, 11-17 December 1987 
“Namibian People Fight Under The Banner Of SWAPO,” Sechaba, December 1987 
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1988 
“S. African troops drive in Angola: AP,” The Montgomery County Intelligence Record, 7 
January 1988. 
“Cuban warplanes in Angola attack South African forces: Associated Press,” Syracuse 
Herald Journal, 21 January 1988. 
Ray Kennedy, “Angolans besieged,” The Times 21 January 1988. 
Pascal Fletcher, “Angola Determined To Stop South Africans From Taking Key Town,” 
Reuters, 23 January 1988. 
“Kaunda praises Cuban air raids on South Africans in Angola,” BBC Monitoring 
Service: Africa, 25 January 1988. 
David Rogers, “Rebel Capture of Besieged Town Would Be Serious Blow To Angola,” 
Reuters, 26 January 1988. 
“Bloody Battle Rages in Angola,” The Sowetan, 28 January 1988. 
Michael Hornsby, “Key battle rages as Crocker talks to Angolans,” The Times, 28 
January 1988. 
“Besieged Angolan Town Rescued: Reuters,” Chicago Tribune, 28 January 1988. 
“Editorial,” Resister: Journal of the Committee for South Africa War Resistance, No.54, 
Feb/Mar 1988. 
John F. Burns, “Hints That Repression May Lead to Reform,” New York Times, 7 
February 1988. 
“Beyond The Turning Point: SA and its neighbours,” The Weekly Mail, 10-16 February 
1988. 
“Angola’s deadly stalemate,”  The Economist, 27 February 1988. 
John D. Battersby, “Pretoria Aircraft In Angola,” New York Times, 23 February 1988. 
John Battersby and Arik Bachah, “South African Losses Mount In Angola’s Secrecy-
Shrouded War,” Reuters, 23 February 1988. 
“Angola’s deadly stalemate”, The Economist, 27 February 1988. 
“Angolan death toll mounts amid Cuban pullout rumors,” Reuters, 29 February 1988. 
“Pretoria’s War In Angola,” Sechaba, February 1988. 
  
 384 
Jan Raath, “The War in Angola: Luanda forces braced for South African onslaught,” The 
Times, 1 March 1988. 
Pascal Fletcher, “Buoyant Young Cuban Troops Hold Lines Of Defence In Angola,” 
Reuters, 3 March 1988. 
Phillip Van Nieverk, “January’s Cuito victory turns into February’s stalemate,” The 
Weekly Mail, 26 February - 3 March 1988. 
Moira Levy, “Objector Toms gets 630 days,” The Weekly Mail, 4-10 March 1988. 
Peter Godwin, “Secret talks on Angolan war: Military impasse leads to unlikely thaw 
between South Africa and the Soviet Union,” The Times, 13 March 1988. 
Margaret Knox, “Angola arranges a rare tour of the battlefields,” The Weekly Mail, 11 - 
17 March 1988. 
Phillip Van Niekerk, “What Malan really meant: We’ll put a pro-SA regime in Luanda,” 
The Weekly Mail, 11-17 March 1988. 
Peter Godwin, “Secret talks on Angolan war: Military impasse leads to unlikely thaw 
between South Africa and the Soviet Union,” The Times, 13 March 1988. 
“Aliquid novi: Angola,” The Economist, 19 March 1988. 
Neil A. Lewis, “Southern Africa Diplomacy Seen at Impasse,” New York Times, 23 
March 1988. 
Ronnie Kasrils, “Turning point at Cuito Cuanavale,” The Sunday Independent, 23 March 
2008. 
Phillip Van Niekerk, “Pik puts a big damper on Angolan settlement hopes,” The Weekly 
Mail, 18 - 24 March 1988. 
“South Africans reported out to seize Angolan base,” The Christian Science Monitor, 24 
March 1988. 
Tony Allen-Mills, “South Africans relax in Ovambo,” The Independent, 24 March 1988. 
“Angola says troops quell S. African attack in south,” The Christian Science Monitor, 28 
March 1988. 
John Battersby, “More Whites in South Africa Resisting the Draft,” New York Times, 28 
March 1988. 
Shaun Johnson, “All’s quiet at the New Nation. Only the clatter of another telex from the 
SADF,” The Weekly Mail, 31 March – 7 April 1988. 
“Pretoria admits tanks in Angola,” The Times, 5 April 1988. 
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David Crary, “General describes SA role in Angola,” The Independent, 9 April 1988. 
C. A. Basson, “S. Africa Welcomes Aid,” Asahi Evening News (Japan), 11 April 1988. 
John D. Battersby, “South Africa Gives Details of Angola Military Role,” New York 
Times, 20 April 1988. 
Colin Nickerson,”Turning Point In A Civil War? Angolans, Rebels Fight What May Be 
Pivotal Battle,” Boston Globe, 26 April 1988. 
Peter Vale, “The lesson of Cuito: SADF can’t just shoot their way to Luanda,” The 
Weekly Mail, 22 - 28 April 1988. 
Robert Pear, “Four nations to Discuss Withdrawal of Outside Forces from Angola,” New 
York Times, 30 April 1988. 
“Cuito Cuanavale: Turning Point In Southern Africa,” Umsebenzi, Vol. 4 No. 4, 1988. 
“The Agony of Angola,” The Sowetan, 2 May 1988. 
“Cuban forces more near Namibian border as talks start,” Washington Times, 3 May 
1988. 
“4 Powers Meet to Explore ways to End Angola war,” New York Times, 4 May 1988. 
“Talks on Angola,” The Sowetan, 4 May 1988. 
David Braun, “Malan threatens as Cubans advance.” The Star, 16 May 1988. 
“No talks if troops advance,” The Star, 16 May 1988. 
“More SA, Angola talks scheduled,” The Star, 16 May 1988. 
James Brooke, “Angolan Affirms Wider Cuban Role,” New York Times, 17 May 1988. 
“Some more rivers to cross,” The Star, 17 May 1988. 
“Losses inflicted by MPLA ‘much higher’,” The Star, 18 May 1988. 
“Malan: Cuban troops cowards,” The Star, 18 May 1988. 
James Brooke, “Angolans besting South Africa in a remote battle,” New York Times, 18 
May 1988. 
“The Battle For Key Town Turns in Favour Of Angola: Reuters,” Sydney Morning 
Herald, 19 May 1988. 
“31 SADF killed in Angola - Malan,” The Star, 19 May 1988. 
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Jackson Phillips, “The view from Angola,” The Weekly Mail, 20 – 26 May 1988. 
(untitled), The Namibian, 27 May 1988. 
(untitled), The Star, 27 May 1988.  
Al J. Venter. “Siege at Cuito Cuanavale,” Soldier of Fortune, May 1988. 
Karl Maier, “The Military Stalemate,” Africa Report, May-June 1988. 
“Editorial,” Die Kerkbode, 8 June 1988. 
(untitled), Die Burger (Cape Town), 9 June 1988. 
“Blackout: New Emergency laws hit hard,” The Sowetan, 13 June 1988. 
“No quick fix in Cairo,” The Sowetan, 23 June 1988. 
“War ruins rich Angola,” The Sowetan, 23 June 1988. 
“From Cairo With Hope,” The Sowetan, 27 June 1988. 
 “Peace In Balance: Cuba forces launch attack,” The Sowetan, 30 June 1988. 
“Angola: War Drums,” The Sowetan, 30 June1988. 
“Under new management: Angola,” The Economist, 2 July 1988. 
Anton Harber and Shaun Johnson, “Angolan Dam Attack: Has SA lost air superiority?” 
The Weekly Mail, 1-7 July 1988. 
Peter Vale, “The 13 unlucky years between the two battles of Calueque,” The Weekly 
Mail, 1-7 July 1988. 
Peter Brimelow, “A blind eye to Castro; Cuban involvement in Angola; Commentary,” 
The Times, 9 July 1988. 
“Editorial,” The Star, 8 July 1988. 
“Camel-jockeys: Angola,” The Economist, 11 July 1988. 
“Editorial,” Business Daily (Johannesburg), 12 July 1988. 
E. A. Wayne, “Talks on southern Africa resume despite military clash,” Christian 
Science Monitor, 11 July 1988. 
Bernard E. Trainor, “South Africa’s Strategy in Angola Falls Short, Enhancing Cubans’ 
Role,” New York Times, 12 July 1988. 
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Fox Butterfield, “Talks to End the war in Angola Are Resumed on Governors Island,” 
New York Times, 12 July 1988. 
Peter Wellman, “A front-line season of disasters for SA,” The Weekly Mail, 8-14 July 
1988. 
E. A. Wayne, “US Officials hail new give and take in talks on southern Africa,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, 15 July 1988. 
“Botha plays waiting game on accord,” The Times, 15 July 1988. 
Roger Thurow, “Accord on Angola-Namibia Still Faces Tough Test of South African 
Approval,” Wall Street Journal, 18 July 1988. 
Phillip Van Niekerk and Mark Verbaan, “This Road to Peace,” The Weekly Mail, 15 - 21 
July1988. 
Phillip Van Niekerk, “Angola: Tough problem of selling peace to the bosses,” The 
Weekly Mail, 15 - 21 July 1988. 
“Cuba will hit back,” The Sowetan, 22 July 1988. 
Joseph Treaster, “Castro faults Soviet tactics in war in Angola” New York Times 28 July 
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Shaun Johnson and Mark Verbaan, “And now SA...President Nujoma?” The Weekly 
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9 August 1988. 
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August 1988. 
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“3 Nations Achieve Accord On Namibia,” New York Times, 16 November 1988. 
“The peace habit reaches Africa,” The Economist, 19 November 1988. 
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“Derek Bauer’s World,” The Weekly Mail, 15-22 December 1988. 
Ben Magubane, “US Policy In Southern Africa: The Reagan Era,” Sechaba, December 
1988. 
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“Moms speak out against call-up,” Cape Times, 8 February 1989. 
“SWA: Who won the War, “ Cape Times, 8 February 1989. 
“There must be a suitable alternative to conscription,” Cape Times, 10 February 1989. 
“Beyond The Turning Point: SA and its neighbours,” The Weekly Mail, 10 - 16 February 
1989. 
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